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This research is a socio-political discourse analysis of Philippine presidential 
rhetoric after the country’s re-democratization in 1987.  The period under 
investigation—1987 to 2009—is significant in that it departs from 14 years of 
authoritarianism under Ferdinand Marcos.  It is a period characterized by democratic 
restoration as well as the challenge to sustain basic freedoms, civil liberties, and 
democratic institutions amid the changing socio-political and economic landscape 
both in the national and global fronts.  Covering the four post-dictatorship 
presidencies of Corazon Aquino, Fidel Ramos, Joseph Estrada, and Gloria Macapagal 
Arroyo, this thesis examines how specific conceptualizations of key themes and their 
configurations in presidential speeches constitute the schema of each of the four 
presidencies.  The thesis also accounts for the similarities and differences of the 
presidential schemas.  The State of the Nation Addresses (SONAs) delivered annually 
by these presidents are used as primary data. 
Theoretically, the thesis assumes that mediating mental structures such as 
schema account for the relationship between text and context.  In my analytical 
framework, a schema, which is a collection of experiences that mediate our sense-
making processes, is constituted by frames that at the same time organize these 
experiences.  These frames may be represented through conceptual statements—
macro-level conceptualizations—that are likewise constituted by a cluster of 
conceptual metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 2004, 2006, 2008; Charteris-
Black 2004, 2005, 2007) that underlie metaphorical and lexico-grammatical 
expressions found in political texts and talk.  Through repeated use and deployment, 
these metaphors that function as and work in conjunction with rhetorical strategies 
viii 
 
such as logical, emotional, and ethical proofs, strategies of self-representation and 
othering (Van Dijk 1998; Riggins 1997), and political myths (Charteris-Black 2005) 
can set off, prompt, trigger or disrupt (shared) schemas responsible for our sense 
making processes.   
I suggest that the schemas that emerge from the analysis of the national 
addresses may be used to compare similarities and differences among the four post-
dictatorship presidencies and to account for continuities and discontinuities in 
Philippine presidential leadership within the last two decades. 
From the analyses of the post-Marcos SONAs, I deduce a couple of insights.  
First, the themes are metaphorized and framed (Lakoff 2006, 2008) in relation to the 
key themes emphasized by a president and this is accounted for by the evolving socio-
political contexts and the agency of the president.  Second, metaphorizations and 
frames serve to justify and work towards hastening the public acceptance of 
government policies.  Third, schemas of state of the nation and the presidential 
leadership in the post-Marcos SONAs take on a path structure—a movement from one 
point to a desired destination.  What distinguishes a presidential schema from the rest 
is the way specific elements (or themes) in the path structure are conceptualized.   
Finally, certain conceptualizations of the focal themes in the post-Marcos presidencies 
reinforce or adhere to social discourses that tend to perpetuate or reproduce relations 
of dominance and control.  The final point provides impetus for multiple audiences of 
presidential speeches to engage in the critical examination of how themes commonly 
invoked in these addresses are metaphorized and strategically expressed before they 










To read the word, says educator Paulo Freire, is to read the previous reading of 
the world (Freire 1997).   What Freire means is that words that make up our texts and 
talk reflect and recreate human reality.  It is through the reading of texts or by 
understanding the language used to describe human experience that we are able to 
make sense or even ‘uncover’ other people’s understanding of their own experience 
and their conceptions of the world at large.  Freire’s thesis on reading the world/word 
can serve as a guiding principle for discourse analysts who are engaged in the study of 
language used in various domains of human endeavor.  Understanding the use of 
language enables humans to understand perspectives or world views that motivate 
people into action.  In the domain of politics, where language plays a significant role 
in influencing people’s beliefs about the past and present state of affairs and their 
opinions about public policies, the study of political discourse becomes compelling.  
The need for the study of political discourse is affirmed by Gronbeck (1996) when he 
said: 
 
Politics understood as a symbolic action demands that we analyze 
systematically the discourses of political ideology and valuation, of political 
visions and places citizens occupy in such visions; of the means by which self-
interests are converted into public interests—into public policies’ (47-48). 
 
What this implies is that whatever the politician communicates warrants careful 
analysis and reflection.  What the politician expresses as significant, what she1 sets as 
                                                 
1 For the generic pronoun, I use the terms ‘he’ and ‘she’, ‘her’ and ‘him’ interchangeably in this thesis. 
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the national or public agenda, how she casts her constituents’ role in making such 
agenda happen, and the strategies she uses to ensure that what she deems important 
becomes publicly acceptable—all these require systematic study that will help us 
understand the complex domain of politics. 
A number of scholars in the field of language studies have addressed such 
demand by demonstrating that a systematic study of language and other semiotic 
resources not only leads to a productive reading of political texts and talk, but can also 
illuminate our understanding of how politics work.  For instance, Sauer (1997) has 
shown that an analysis of political speeches can contribute to ‘a clearer interpretation 
and explanation of complications regarding the orator’s contraints, functions, and 
dilemmas.’  He says that discourse and discourse elements which include text 
structures, text passages, and form-and-meaning units are manifestations of actions to 
perform specific functions such as persuasion and the accomplishment of political 
success (54).  Moreover, the politicians’ use of these discourse elements reflects what 
choices are open to them and what constraints they face in the public communication 
setting. Wodak’s (2009), in her study of political talk and texts in the European 
parliament, argues that doing politics is very much dependent on context that is 
influenced by a host of factors including but not limited to national traditions and 
political systems as well as subjectivities of political actors.2  Discourse analysts like 
Fairclough (1989, 2001, 2003), van Dijk (1998, 2006), Wodak et al (1999), Chilton 
(2004), and Charteris-Black (2004, 2005, 2007), among others, have offered 
frameworks in the analysis of political discourse.   Their significant contributions to 
                                                                                                                                            
 
2 In her study, Wodak points out that personal histories, national identities, and political loyalties can 
actually serve as resources of the Members of the European Parliament (MEP) in their discourses 
especially in building their arguments, whether these are communicated in the public arena or behind 
closed doors (57-112). 
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the study of political discourse have generated a tradition of scholarship that both 
deepens and explores ways of understanding how language is used in the domain of 
institutional politics and its implications in society at large. 
The present study builds on this scholarship of political discourse, and like 
these studies, it aims to undertake a systematic analysis of the language used in the 
domain of politics.  It focuses on a set of speeches of the same genre delivered by 
various political actors within a country-specific context and who had served as 
democratically elected national leaders after a period of dictatorship.  The country-
specific context under study is the Philippines where political texts and talk prove to 
be a rich source of data for discourse analysts interested in studying democracies in 
the Southeast Asian region.  The various political actors in question refer to the four 
Philippine presidents who had served as the country’s head of state following fourteen 
years of authoritarian rule of Ferdinand Marcos.  The speeches under examination are 
the State of the Nation Addresses (or the SONAs as they will be referred to in this 
thesis).  A SONA is a constitutionally mandated report to the nation delivered by the 
Philippine president annually before members of the Congress during its opening 
session.  Covering the period from 1987 to 2009, this study undertakes a socio-
political discourse analysis of twenty-three SONAs delivered by four post-Marcos 
presidents: Corazon C. Aquino, Fidel V. Ramos, Joseph E. Estrada, and Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo. 
Informed by studies in cognitive linguistics, critical discourse analysis, and 
rhetorical theory and criticism, the thesis develops an analytical framework that 
recognizes the layers of mental structure that mediate between text and context.  In 
this framework, the schema, which is a collection of experiences that mediate our 
sense-making processes (Strauss and Quinn 1997; Quinn 2005), is constituted by 
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frames that at the same time organize these experiences.  These frames are 
represented through conceptual statements—macro-level conceptualizations—that are 
likewise constituted by a cluster of conceptual metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; 
Lakoff 2004, 2006, 2008; Charteris-Black 2004, 2005, 2007) that underlie 
metaphorical and lexico-grammatical expressions found in political talk and texts.  
Through repeated deployment, these metaphors that function as or work in 
conjunction with logical, emotional, and ethical proofs, rhetorical strategies of self-
representation and othering (Van Dijk 1998; Riggins 1997), and political myths 
(Charteris-Black 2005) can set induce or disrupt (shared) schemas responsible for our 
sense-making processes.   
In analyzing the SONAs, I examine how specific conceptualizations of key 
themes and their configurations in presidential speeches constitute the schema of each 
of the four presidencies.  I also account for the similarities and differences of the 
presidential schemas.  I argue that these similarities and differences reflect the 
continuities and discontinuities in presidential leadership and reveal what discourses 
are emphasized or deemphasized over a period of time.  It must be noted that a critical 
position is taken in the study and this is vital in showing that the key themes that are 
most common, and more often than not reified in Philippine political discourse, prove 
to be problematic especially when their conceptualizations by political actors are 
closely examined.  For instance, the theme of democracy, which is almost always 
taken for granted in Philippine political discourse, proves to be a malleable concept 
that has been defined or redefined in ways that favor certain political, and sometimes 
personal, interests.  The study then encourages the readers and listeners of political 
messages not to take these political themes for granted and to constantly engage them 
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in critical analysis before they get transformed into ‘non-negotiable materialities’ or 
‘more authoritative contexts’ (Blackledge 2005). 
In the succeeding sections, I provide a brief background of the Philippine 
political system and the presidency, an explanation on the nature of the SONA and the 
rationale for its selection as an object of inquiry, the aims and objectives of the study, 
and its significance to scholarship in the fields of political discourse in general and of 
Philippine political rhetoric, in particular.  An overview of the thesis chapters is 
provided in the final section. 
1.2 The Philippine political system and the presidency 
The Philippines, as inscribed in its 1987 Constitution, is ‘a democratic and 
republican State’ where the power of the national government is exercised by three 
co-equal branches—the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary.  The president, 
who is elected every six years under the current Philippine constitution, heads the 
executive branch; the legislative is headed by Congress which is constituted by the 
Senate and the House of Representatives, while the judiciary is led by the Supreme 
Court. 
The current Philippine presidential system of government can be traced back 
to the 1935 Constitution which set in place a commonwealth government during the 
period of American colonization.  The constitution, which was patterned after the US 
Constitution, defined the duties and powers of the Philippine president.  In the current 
Philippine charter, the president acts as chief executive, serves as the commander-in-
chief of the armed forces, and has the power to appoint, with consent from the 
Commission of Appointments, members of the Constitutional Commission, 
ambassadors, officers of the armed forces, and members of the Supreme Court, 
among others.  The practice of delivering the annual report to the nation, commonly 
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referred to as the SONA, by the Philippine President is inscribed in the 1935 
Constitution as well as in succeeding national charters that replaced it.   
The 1935 Constitution was replaced by the 1973 Constitution when then 
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos placed the country under martial law.  The 
1973 charter consolidated the powers of the president thereby legitimizing Marcos’ 
authoritarian rule.  In 1986, when Marcos was ousted from power, the 1973 
Constitution was replaced by the Freedom Constitution that gave the revolutionary 
government of Corazon C. Aquino vast powers.  Aquino used her vast powers to 
create a constitutional commission that drafted a new constitution that was eventually 
ratified in 1987.  Those who drafted of the 1987 Constitution drew inspiration from 
the earlier national charters, but had done away with some of the presidential powers 
inscribed in the 1973 Constitution (see Chapter 4 for details).   The 1987 Constitution 
particularly mandates the president to deliver a report to the nation during the opening 
of the congressional session for the year which falls on the third Monday of the month 
of July.  
1.3 The State of the Nation Address 
The SONA is a constitutionally mandated speech that contains the president’s 
assessment of the national situation, the government’s performance during the 
previous year, and her recommendations for the succeeding year.  The SONA is one 
of the many ways the executive department exercises accountability to the nation.   
The practice of delivering a SONA is inscribed in section 20 of Article 7 of 
the 1987 Constitution, which states, ‘The President shall address the Congress at the 
opening of the regular session.  He may also appear before it at any other time.’  This 
provision is quite similar to that of the US Constitution, which states that the president 
‘shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, 
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and recommend to their consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and 
expedient.’ The main difference is the explicitness of the Philippine provision on how 
the President should give his report on the state of the nation to Congress.  That 
method is public address.  America’s first president, George Washington, initiated the 
practice of presenting the constitutionally mandated report on the state of the union in 
person.3  Apparently, the Washington tradition was the inspiration of the writers of 
the Philippine Constitution. 
Rigoberto Tiglao, former presidential management chief of staff, asserts that 
the ‘SONA is the podium for the Chief Executive—as the leader of the nation—to 
explain where she wants to bring the country towards, and to provide Filipinos her 
analysis of the basic strengths and weaknesses of the nation. It is the leader’s role to 
point to the nation’s strengths and gains so as to inspire them to unite and move 
forward’ (cited in Navera 2006, 30-31).  A SONA has the following features: an 
articulation of accomplishments during the term, an analysis of the national situation 
including problems and challenges faced during the previous year, agenda or direction 
setting, and appeals for support and unity, and recommendations to Congress and to 
the Filipino people at large (31).  It serves as an avenue to reaffirm national values.4  
Moreover, the SONA provides accounting for presidential actions and decisions done 
during the term and which may be met with disapproval from some sectors of society.  
                                                 
3 Thomas Jefferson, the third US president broke this Washington tradition by sending his report in 
written form.  The Jeffersonian act would continue until Woodrow Wilson assumed the presidency in 
1913 (Metcalf 2004, 8). 
   
4 The SONA was patterned after the United States’ State of the Union Address (SOUA). Campbell and 
Jamieson (2008) have noted that the SOUA is generically characterized by three processes: (1) public 
meditation on values, (2) assessments of information and issues, and (3) policy recommendations. 




This accounting is realized by the president in her presentation of her leadership’s 
accomplishments and her assessment of the national situation. 
Until recently when the incumbent president chose to deliver his SONA 2010 
largely in Filipino,5 Philippine presidents delivered their SONAs largely in English.  It 
was not, however, unusual to hear them intersperse their speeches with Filipino 
passages.  While this aspect of the SONAs is not fully accounted for in this study, I 
wish to point out that such rhetorical choice appears to have been pursued by the 
national leaders for at least two reasons:  one, to translate a point delivered in English 
earlier in the speech (a strategy of repetition or restatement) and two, to highlight that 
which the president considered important for the knowledge of the Filipino audience 
at large.   For instance, Aquino used Filipino in communicating the nature and 
relevance of people-initated and people-driven ‘Kabisig’ movement (see extract 27 of 
5.3.4) while Estrada underscored the significance of his ‘war on poverty’ agenda by 
communicating his statements on the topic first in English then in Filipino (see extract 
12 of 7.4.4).   
My choice in using the SONA as a focal text for analysis is due to several 
reasons.  First, the nature of the SONA warrants the study of the discursive 
construction of presidential leadership.  Apart from its usual features, the SONA also 
articulates the vision of the president and how this vision is made operational in the 
execution of his duties and responsibilities as a national leader.6  Second, it is a well-
                                                 
5 President-elect Benigno Simeon Aquino departed from the earlier tradition by delivering his first 
SONA largely in Filipino. Notably, the only time he spoke English was when he mentioned ideas 
having to do with his foreign policy. 
 
6 The significance of the speech may be gleaned from the fact that speech becomes part of the public 
record as it is published in the Congressional Journal and more recently, the presidential website 




publicized speech. It is perhaps the only type of presidential speech, apart from the 
inaugural address, that has the most publicity in a president’s term of office. It is the 
public address most identified with the president and most talked about before, 
during, and after the event.  It is broadcast via television, radio, and more recently, the 
Internet (through the government channel and the government website).  Its full text is 
also made available in the national dailies and the government websites as reference 
for researchers and the public at large. Third, the SONA is a site of contestation.  As 
in any form of political discourse, the SONA is embedded with assumptions and 
presuppositions that are dialogic in character as they reaffirm certain interested 
perspectives or respond to competing or opposing ones. 
1.4      Aims and objectives 
How have the post-Marcos presidencies conceptualized the state of the nation 
and the national leadership after the restoration of Philippine democracy?  How have 
these presidencies through their conceptualizations of the national situation and 
national leadership departed from and/or sustained the rhetoric of Marcos’ 
authoritarian rule?   As a corollary to this, how have the post-Marcos presidential 
presidencies fared since the ‘restoration of democracy’ in 1986?  These are the major 
questions that this study seeks to address. 
To address these questions, the study examines the schemas of Philippine 
presidential leadership in the SONAs delivered during the post-Marcos period (from 
1987 to 2009) and accounts for similarities and differences of the presidential 
schemas of the four presidencies covered in the study.  It also examines how these 
schemas reaffirm or subvert, reflect or appropriate social discourses that dominate 
both the national and global spheres.  An example of a social discourse that has 
dominated the national and global spheres, for instance, is the discourse of 
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neoliberalism (discussed in Lakoff 2008, 51-60) or the ‘globalist discourse’ 
(discussed in Fairclough 2006).  I see this discourse coming into fruition in the 
Philippines when the government ratified the General Agreements on Tariffs and 
Trades (GATT) in the 1990s and adhered to the International Monetary Fund and 
World Bank’s (IMF-WB) prescription to follow structural adjustment plans which 
include policies on trade liberalization, deregulation, and privatization.  It should be 
noted, however, that the structural adjustments had been adopted even during the time 
of Marcos’ authoritarian regime when he set to open up the Philippine economy by 
doing away with what were deemed as protectionist or nationalist policies (This will 
be discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis).  How the discourse of neoliberalism has been 
sustained and reaffirmed despite the change of leadership, and more importantly, the 
shift from dictatorship to democracy, is a point that stirs curiousity and therefore, 
warrants critical examination. 
In examining the schemas of presidential leadership, I focus on four key 
themes that run across the SONAs of the four presidencies covered in this study:   
democracy, national economy, peace and security, and the presidency.  The 
identification of these four themes will be discussed in Chapter 3 (Theoretical and 
Analytical Frameworks). 
The following then are the specific objectives of the study: 
1. spell out the metaphorizations and rhetorical strategies used to express the 
four themes in the SONAs of each president; 
2. examine how the conceptualizations of the key themes and their 
configurations in presidential speeches constitute the schema of each of the 
four presidencies; 
3. discuss the similarities and differences of the presidential schemas; and 
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4. examine how these similarities and differences in schemas relate to 
dominant social discourses that pervade both the national and global 
contexts. 
 
1.5 Rationale for the Study 
The study enriches the scholarship on political discourse by examining 
Philippine presidential speeches using an analytical framework that is informed by 
concepts from cognitive linguistics, critical discourse analysis, and rhetorical theory 
and criticism studies.  By focusing on political texts in the Philippines, the study 
increases awareness of and interest in non-Western and ‘Third World’ discourses, 
which can later lead to comparative studies of political talk and texts in various socio-
political contexts.  In employing the said analytical framework in the study of 
Philippine speeches, it offers a way of reading political discourse productively by 
demonstrating how conceptual metaphors function as and work in conjunction with 
rhetorical strategies such as the pisteis, positive self-representation and othering, and 
political myths—all of which will be discussed substantively in Chapter 3. 
This study complements existing studies on the intersections of language and 
the (institutional) political sphere in the Philippine context (e.g., Sugbo 1987; Pelagio 
1990; Fernandez 1990; Pinzon 1997; Navera 2003; Cuba 2005; Pelagio 2005; Gonong 
2007).  But unlike earlier studies which focus on specific political-historical 
personalities (e.g., Pinzon 1997; Cuba 2005; and Pelagio 2005) and specific cases in 
Philippine political history (e.g., Pelagio 1990; Fernandez 1990; Navera 2003) using 
approaches from rhetorical theory and criticism—which focus on the persuasive 
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aspects of discourse, this study covers a longer period of Philippine history,7  is not 
focused solely on a political-historical figure, and more importantly employs a 
framework for analysis that is informed by concepts from both language studies as 
well as rhetorical theory and criticism studies.  For instance, the present framework 
proposes to show how conceptual metaphors, a cognitive linguistic concept, can 
function as logical, motivational, and ethical proofs that not only establish the 
credibility of the political leader but can also be used to advance political beliefs and 
policies.  This study therefore hopes to demonstrate the possibility of integrating two 
distinct but not necessarily disparate traditions of language-based scholarship by 
constituting a viable framework for a productive reading of political discourse in the 
Philippines. 
This study is also important in that it problematizes the themes commonly 
talked about and invoked in Philippine presidential rhetoric after the authoritarian 
regime of Marcos.  Themes like democracy, national economy, peace and order, and 
the presidency are staple themes in Philippine presidential rhetoric because they 
represent issues that almost always confront the nation (Malaya and Malaya 2004; 
Cortes 1999); these themes are often reified and taken for granted.  This study shows 
that by examining their conceptualizations (framing and metaphorizations) working in 
combination with other rhetorical strategies in the speeches, structural relationships 
that privilege one sector of society at the expense of another, which are often 
                                                 
7 I believe that the study’s focus on a period of Philippine history is an important development from 
earlier studies in that it provides a more diachronic account of how linguistic resources have been 
deployed in Philippine political discourse. Earlier studies have also taken into account the historical 
milieu to show how discourse is implicated in its historical context; however, there is the tendency to 
regard the milieu as a mere background to the rhetorical analysis, which somehow defeats the purpose 
of demonstrating the impact of political discourse in history. The potential contribution of the critical 




obfuscated in presidential discourse, can be made apparent.   For instance, in 
examining the conceptualizations of democracy, one might ask:  How has democracy 
been framed in the post-Marcos presidencies?  Why has it been framed as such?  
What do such frames highlight? What do they hide?  How do they configure with the 
framing of other themes in order to constitute a schema of presidential leadership?  
What does this configuration of frames or schema privilege?  What does it 
marginalize?   These are specific questions that the analysis of the SONAs attempts to 
address.  A study of the discourse of post-Marcos presidential leadership can therefore 
serve as a critical assessment of how the four presidencies have fared since the 
‘restoration of democracy’ in 1986. 
That the study engages in a critical assessment of how post-Marcos 
presidencies have fared since the fall of the dictatorship also implies that the study 
partakes in the assessment of recent Philippine political or presidential history.  This 
thesis is written at a time when more than a quarter of a century since the toppling of 
the Marcos regime through ‘people power’ and since ‘the restoration of democracy in 
the Philippines’8 has passed.  More than two decades after the famed uprising that 
sent the dictator into exile, the Philippines is still faced with issues of corruption,9 
communist insurgency (and secessionism in Southern Philippines), and recurring 
crises in leadership.  These long standing challenges are complicated by the fact that 
                                                 
8 The terms ‘people power’ and ‘the restoration of democracy’ became resonant in the Philippine 
political discourse after the fall of Ferdinand Marcos in February 1986.  Corazon Aquino, the first post-
Marcos president and who was the symbolic leader of the anti-Marcos struggle, would constantly 
invoke such terms in her presidential speeches. 
 
9 The Philippines has recently received a very low score compared to its most ASEAN neighbors in the 
2008 corruption perception index (CPI) in a study conducted by Transparency International. The CPI 
measures degree of corruption as seen by business people and analysts. A grade of 10 means a country 
is very clean while 0 means it is very corrupt. Philippines got a score of 2.3 and ranked 141 among 180 





the Philippines has gradually embraced neo-liberal policies by following the structural 
adjustment plans (SAP’s) recommended by the International Monetary Fund and 
World Bank (IMF-WB).10  Scholars from various fields of the social sciences—
political science, history, sociology, and Philippine studies—have made attempts to 
account for the current state of Philippine politics and society.  This research 
participates in the assessment of what has gone on in the past two decades that has 
made the Philippines what it is now (and will probably be in the future) from the 
perspectives of discourse and rhetorical studies.  The thesis works to show how post-
Marcos presidential discourses have contributed to the complex past and present 
political environment of the Philippines. 
1.6       Overview of the chapters 
This thesis consists of ten chapters.  In Chapter 1, I spelt out the aims and 
objectives of the research and established why the study is worth pursuing.  
Chapter 2 reviews literature in the areas of rhetoric, discourse, and Philippine 
presidential leadership upon which this study builds.  In this chapter, I show how the 
studies in these areas are relevant to the present study by identifying what concepts 
and ideas are adopted in the current project.  I also discuss how the present study 
partakes in the ongoing conversations in these different areas by articulating how it 
addresses area-specific concerns and theoretical issues.   
Chapter 3 outlines the theoretical concepts that constitute my conceptual guide 
for the study and explains the analytical framework I shall use to examine the data.  
                                                 
10 The Philippine government under the Ramos presidency signed the General Agreements on Tariffs 
and Trades-World Trade Organization (GATT-WTO) that espouses trade liberalization, deregulation 




Specifically, I offer the possibility of a schema-theoretic framework11 in the analysis 
of presidential speeches.  The framework, as mentioned earlier, recognizes that texts 
and contexts are mediated by layers of mental structures.  Expressions in the texts are 
motivated by conceptual metaphors that function as and work in tandem with other 
rhetorical strategies.  Clusters of related conceptual metaphors make up a conceptual 
frame. A constitution of frames leads up to the schema which reflects and influences 
any particular president’s discourse.  By studying schemas sustained or reproduced by 
political orators or rhetors over time, the analyst can identify continuities and 
discontinuities in terms of political views and policies across administrations.  It can 
also reveal what social discourses (e.g., neoliberalism or globalism) are sustained and 
privileged by the rhetors. 
Chapter 4 provides a historical context to the analytical chapters on the post-
Marcos presidential rhetoric.  It puts together secondary literature on the presidency 
of Ferdinand Marcos from 1972, during which time he imposed martial law in the 
Philippines, to his ouster from public office through a popular mass demonstration in 
1986.  It also provides a metaphorical analysis of Marcos’ rhetoric during his 
authoritarian rule, with the intention of articulating the salient conceptualizations that 
the post-Marcos presidencies address in various ways. 
Chapters 5 to 9 are the five analytical chapters that address the first two 
specific objectives of this research.  Each of the five analytical chapters is divided into 
seven sections which comprise an introduction (i); a recounting of the historical 
milieu of the presidential period under study (ii); separate analytical sections on the 
                                                 
11 The term ‘schema-theoretic’ is used to label the framework that establishes the relationship of 
schemas or schemata to conceptual frames and conceptual metaphors and these terms are explained in 
Chapter 3 of this study. It is to be distinguished from the way the term is used in a strictly formal sense 
in mathematical and computational studies. 
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themes of democracy, national economy, peace and security, and the presidency (iii-
vi); and a chapter summary (vii). 
Chapter 5 covers the SONAs of Corazon C. Aquino from 1987 to 1991, a 
period of transition from the authoritarian rule of Ferdinand Marcos to re-
democratization.  I argue that throughout Aquino’s SONAs, the schema of the state of 
the nation was constructed via a multi-layered configuration of frames, conceptual 
metaphors and their entailments that tend to revolve around the theme of democracy 
and/or the process of democratization.  Aquino, through her speeches, cast herself as a 
primary agent of democracy and a complete anti-thesis of the Marcos dictatorship. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the six SONAs of Aquino’s successor, Fidel V. Ramos, 
while Chapter 7 covers the three SONAs delivered during the unexpired term of 
Joseph Ejercito Estrada who was unseated from the Philippine presidency in 2001.  In 
Chapter 6, I argue that the frame of competition took a privileged position in the 
Ramos presidential rhetoric in that the four themes of democracy, national economy, 
peace and security, and the presidency were framed and metaphorized based on the 
notion of global competitiveness.  Ramos also cast his presidency as an exercise in 
effective management—a conceptualization consistent with his neoliberal orientation 
and his vision of the Philippines as a newly industrialized country.  In Chapter 7, I 
argue that in Estrada’s SONAs delivered during his unexpired term as president, he 
emphasized his movie personality-oriented political brand (Fairclough 2006), that is, 
his tough persona or his macho image which was consistent with his cinematic 
characters that had made him a popular moviestar in earlier years.  This tough image 
of Estrada was reinforced by the way he conceptualized the four focal themes.  I note, 
however, that in spite of the tough and aggressive rhetoric of Estrada, he merely 
sustained the neoliberal policies started by his predecessor. 
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Two chapters—Chapters 8 and 9—are devoted on the presidency of Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo, the longest standing Philippine president since Ferdinand Marcos. 
Chapter 8 covers Arroyo’s three speeches delivered during her successor term and her 
inaugural SONA after she was elected for a full term in 2004.  The chapter centers on 
Arroyo’s recontextualization of the US government-led ‘global war on terror.’  In this 
chapter, I argue that through the SONAs, the Arroyo administration was able to work 
towards sustaining its hold of power on the one hand, and showing its commitment to 
the Bush administration-led global war on terror, on the other.   
Chapter 9 covers five SONAs delivered after what may be regarded as the 
most damaging political crisis faced by the Arroyo presidency in 2005.  The chapter 
focuses on Arroyo’s assertion of presidential legitimacy.  I argue that Arroyo asserts 
her presidential legitimacy through conceptualizations that substantiate the following 
propositions:  (1) The national economy is a strong player in the global arena under 
the Arroyo administration; (2) The existing political system is a roadblock to the 
country’s full development; and (3) The Arroyo presidency is a working presidency 
and has succeeded. 
Chapter 10 synthesizes insights from the five analytical chapters.  It compares 
and contrasts schemas of the four post-Marcos presidencies by examining continuities 
and discontinuities in the conceptualizations of the four themes of democracy, 
national economy, peace and security, and the presidency.  It consists of two 
discussion sections: the first focuses on the key emphases in the four post-Marcos 
presidencies while the second offers a theme-based analysis of the conceptual frames 
and metaphors across the four presidencies.   
Chapter 11 is the conclusion which recaps the aims and objectives of the 
study, provides a summary of insights from the preceding chapters, and offers 
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possibilities for future study.  It also provides the researcher’s reflections on the 
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The study builds on and extends scholarship in areas such as rhetorical theory 
and criticism of public address, critical discourse studies, metaphor studies within 
cognitive linguistics, political linguistics or political discourse analysis, and 
Philippine presidential history. Below, I review some of these works that inform my 
research.  
2.1 Rhetorical theory and criticism of public address  
 In his landmark essay Public Address: A Study in Social and Intellectual 
History (1947), Wrage argued that the study of speeches or public address is also the 
study of ideas in transmission within a historical context.  Wrage substantiated this 
when he said,  
 
A speech is an agency of its time, one whose surviving record provides a 
repository of themes and their elaborations from which we may gain insight 
into the life of an era as well as into the mind of a man [sic]. From the study of 
speeches given by men [sic], then it is possible to observe the reflections of 
prevailing social ideas and attitudes. (Wrage 1947, 33; emphasis mine) 
 
 
While recognizing the idea that speeches reflect social ideas and attidudes 
within a period of time, Parrish (1954, 36) offered to enlarge the scope of public 
address scholarship by also acknowledging the instrumentality of speeches ‘in 
shaping the course of history, in defining and strengthening a people’s ideals, and in 
determining its culture.’  In theorizing about the rhetoric of public address, he 
suggested that critics should consider the following when evaluating a speech: 
impressions made by the speaker’s character or personality, content of the speech 
including the order of his thoughts, and appeals for motivation.  These correspond to 
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Aristotle’s concept of the means of persuasion—the pisteis or artistic proofs, namely, 
ethos or authoritative appeals, the logos or logical appeals, and pathos or motivational 
appeals.  In my study, I regard the pisteis as rhetorical strategies which are useful to 
the analysis of political discourse (see Chapter 3.5.1). 
Black (1965/1978, 50-51) extended the scope of rhetoric by suggesting that 
discourse makes rhetorical and ideological commitments for the speaker and 
constrains the audience ‘to expect certain ways of arguing and certain kinds of 
justifications in later discourses that they encounter, even on different subjects.’  His 
point that a speech shapes our perceptions and brings to light aspects of national 
experience with which people are most concerned is useful in establishing the 
potential impact of rhetoric in society.   
Black’s intimation on the relationship of rhetoric and society is characteristic 
of rhetorical studies in the latter half of the twentieth century.  At this time, scholars 
like Black had begun to rethink or re-conceptualize the idea of rhetoric.  The 
intellectual ferment in the latter half of the twentieth century had redefined and 
expanded what it means to be rhetorical: ‘Rhetoric [is] not merely the art of teaching 
public speaking but rather to be rhetorical [is] a central and substantial dimension of 
many facets of the human social experience’ (Lucaites, Condit, & Caudill 1999, 11).  
A dominant concern in contemporary rhetorical theory is rhetoric’s role in social 
change processes (Lucaites et al 1999).  Contemporary rhetorical theorists like Del 
Gando (2008, 14), who defines rhetoric as ‘the creation of reality,’ presuppose that 
reality is a product of intersubjective articulation and is therefore subject to 
sustenance, alteration, dissolution, recreation, and transformation.  In other words, 
reality is rhetorically constructed and shifts in our rhetorical contructions—say, 
through neologisms, redefinition or reclamation (Allen and Faigley, 1995)—may then 
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potentially bring about changes in ‘power arrangements to benefit those previously 
lacking in either formal or informal prerogatives or influence’ (143).  Rhetoric’s role 
in bringing about change runs parallel to the major concerns of critical discourse 
analysis in the broad field of language studies. 
2.2 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
 Interest in the social role of public address in society is also shared by linguists 
who have done considerable theorizing on the relationship of texts—used in a much 
broader sense to include language and other forms of semiosis—and their social, 
political, and cultural contexts.  Scholars using the critical discourse analytical 
perspective are in the forefront of this research undertaking. 
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is ‘a theoretical perspective on language and 
more generally semiosis as an element or ‘moment’ of material social process, which 
gives rise to ways of analyzing language or semiosis within broader analyses of social 
processes’ (Fairclough 2001, 121; also in Fairclough 2003, 2006).12  It investigates 
the dialectical relationship between discourse and the social contexts, particularly how 
the use of language reflects, manifests, constitutes, reproduces, and circulates 
conditions of inequality, dominance or control and how dominant social processes and 
structures in turn shape and influence the use of language (Fairclough 2006; Martin 
and Wodak 2003; Weiss and Wodak 2003).  Adopting critical reflexivity in research, 
critical discourse analysts view their academic work as dialectically related to social 
conditions of domination (Billig 2003).  This study adopts this critical stance in that it 
                                                 
 
12 Fairclough (in Schaffner 1997, 86) points that in the analysis of discourse, there needs to be a double 
orientation: ‘to (a) the specificity of the particular discursive event, to what is particularly being done 





problematizes the commonly talked about themes in Philippine presidential rhetoric 
such as democracy, national economy, peace and security, and the presidency.  It 
examines how the conceptualizations of these themes make up schemas that sustain or 
reproduce asymmetrical power relations in the Philippine socio-political reality.  It 
aims to show how presidential schemas encourage the use of state power even if it 
means sacrificing basic freedoms and civil liberties, undermine nationalist interests in 
favor of globalist ones, vilify the insurgency without addressing its root causes, and 
lionize the national leadership at the expense of public accountability. 
 An important contribution of the CDA perspective to the study of discourse in 
the humanities and social sciences is its emphasis on textual analysis.  Fairclough 
(2003, 3) argues that ‘[t]extual analysis is not only linguistic analysis; it includes 
‘interdiscursive analysis,’ that is, seeing texts in terms of different discourses, genres, 
styles they draw upon and articulate together. Text-oriented discourse analysis 
(TODA) (Fairclough 1992, 2003) views texts as elements of social events that have 
causal effects in that they bring about changes in their immediate and remote contexts. 
Changes brought about by texts are not mechanical; their effects are mediated by 
meaning-making (2003, 8).  These theoretical assumptions are important for critical 
discourse analysts.  That texts, Fairclough points out, have social, political, cognitive, 
moral and material consequences and effects necessitates an understanding of these 
consequences and effects especially if critical discourse analysts are to raise moral 
and political questions about contemporary societies (14). 
 Common analytical frameworks that have been used in CDA studies have 
included, among others, socio-semiotic, discourse-historical, and socio-cognitive 
approaches. These three are the common approaches referred to by some discourse 
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analysts as constituting the ‘mainstream CDA’ (Billig 2003; Blommaert 2005; Chilton 
2005). 
Fairclough’s socio-semiotic framework offers an analytic framework that is 
problem-centered and ‘combines relational and dialectical elements—negative 
critique in the sense of diagnosis of the problem, positive critique in the sense of 
identification of hitherto unrealized possibilities in the way things are for tackling the 
problem’ (2001, 125). More specifically, Fairclough offers the following stages in his 
framework for analysis: identification of the lexico-grammatical choices in language 
use, description of the production and possible interpretation of these choices, and 
explanation where the analyst relates the text features with the socio-cultural context 
using among other things, the notion of discourse formation.13  His framework also 
includes a critical reflection on the analysis (2001, 125).14   
The discourse-historical approach examines different discourse strategies 
realized through various linguistic forms and relates them with contents of discourse 
which include thematic concerns of the texts for analysis, the historical and political 
contexts of the production of the texts, as well as social and cultural settings which 
may be of relevance to the analysis (Wodak, De Cillia, Reisigl, & Liebhart 1999; 
Blackledge 2005).   
Employing the discourse-historical framework in their studies, Martin and 
Wodak (2003, 9) argue that ‘CDA approaches the issues of ‘history’ and ‘narratives 
on the past’ from an inter/transdisciplinary perspective. The ‘context’ has to be 
                                                 
13 Discourse formation pertains to the rules that govern sets of statements that circulate and are 
perpetuated in certain institutional and social contexts (Foucault, 1972). 
 
14 A specific example of the application of this framework is the study of the mediatization of politics 
associated with a ‘professionalization of communications within government and political parties and 
the management of the mediation of political messages, and the emergence of spin doctoring, seeking 
to put a positive spin on political messages’ (Fairclough 2006, 01). 
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investigated; the dialectics between ‘text and context,’ between certain historical 
events, certain historical images and narratives as well as certain institutional 
conditions—all are involved in forming certain histories.’  The relationship of CDA 
and history has also been noted by Flowerdew (2008, 197) who stated that CDA ‘can 
be historiographic, that is to say, it can play a part in the writing of history.’  
Van Dijk’s (1998) socio-cognitive approach, a framework for ideological 
discourse analysis, examines ideologies associated with social positions of language 
users in communities, groups, organizations or the society at large.  Ideologies, notes 
van Dijk, are ‘systems that are the basis of socio-political cognition of groups… 
[They] organize social group attitudes consisting of schematically organized general 
opinions about relevant social issues.’ They also ‘feature relevant, self-serving 
selection of fundamental socio-cultural values. Since group relations and interests are 
involved, we may assume that ideologies show a polarizing structure of US and 
THEM’ (1998, 139). 
In van Dijk’s approach to ideological discourse analysis, socio-cognitive 
interface is made possible through context models.  In his essay on political cognition 
(2002), he reiterated this by explaining how our personal beliefs, actions and 
utterances on the one hand, and shared social representations—knowledge and 
attitudes organized and underlain by a set of statements or ideology—on the other 
hand, are mediated by these context models (mental models).  These models, he 
explained, are influenced by both our episodic memory (short-term memory) that 
contains our quotidian experiences, and long-term memory that contains values, 




More recently, van Dijk (2006) offered a systematic theory of the structures 
and processes in manipulative communication within a triangulation framework that 
involves the following approaches: discourse analytical, cognitive, and social 
approaches.  In my analysis of Philippine presidential discourse, I consider all three 
orientations (linguistic, pragmatic, and cognitive) as equally important. However, for 
the benefit of clarity, I suggest the following interrelationship of the three 
orientations: As far as presidential discourse is concerned – which is a discourse from 
an interested perspective – the metaphors are strategically used to influence 
(pragmatic) how people make sense of abstract domains of experience (cognitive) and 
they are manifested in varying degrees through text and talk (linguistic). 
I broadly adopt aspects of the said frameworks in developing my analytical 
framework for the present study.  Like Fairclough and Wodak, I recognize the 
dialectical relationship of text and context by relating textual features of the SONAs 
with broad themes that tend to dominate the Philippine socio-political context and 
with the historical milieu where the speeches are situated.  Like van Dijk, I recognize 
the role of cognition in mediating between texts and contexts by showing that a 
multilayered mental structure enables readers and consumers to make sense of 
political texts and talk in relation to the socio-political and historical contexts.  My 
notion of a multi-layered mental structure is further informed by perspectives from 
cultural anthropology (Strauss and Quinn 1997, Quinn 2005) and cognitive linguistics 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 2004, 2006, 2008; Charteris-Black 2004, 2005, 
2007).  Moreover, I adopt van Dijk’s notion of the polarizing structure of positive 
self-representation and negative other representation (or othering) and regard them as 
rhetorical strategies consciously used by politicians in their discourses to boost their 
credibility or advance their respective political agendas (see Chapter 3.5.2). 
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It should be noted that while the critical perspective to discourse analysis has 
generated much scholarship, it has also been subject to criticism from within and 
outside the area. I mention here a couple of some criticisms that the present study 
attempts to address. 
Billig (2003, 44) wrote that ‘mainstream CDA’ has the tendency to move 
towards ‘academic marketization’ and the ‘danger of critical orthodoxy.’ He 
suggested that critical analysts should then engage in a ‘continual intellectual 
revolution’ by being ‘open to new forms of writing and [aware] of its linguistic 
orthodoxies’ (44).  The point of Billig is not to discredit the CDA project, but to 
encourage analysts to be reflexively self-critical and to be receptive to modalities of 
analyzing discourse other than those well defined and established practices.  In this 
way, certain practices of critical analysis are not privileged at the expense of others 
that may offer alternative ways of reading or examining texts and talk.  The thesis 
addresses this concern by offering an alternative way of reading political speeches—
one that adopts aspects of well-established frameworks but is also informed by 
scholarship from other areas like rhetorical studies.   Since both fields—discourse 
studies and rhetoric studies—mirror similar concerns like the role of language in 
social change processes,15 it would be useful to draw upon each other’s insights and 
expand, as it were, the repertoire of critical analysis of political discourse.16 
                                                 
15 McGee (in Lucaites et al 1999, 383) argues that ‘public discourse is not simply a conveyer belt that 
brings ‘ideas’ to the public; rather it is a material entity in its own right. To characterize rhetoric or 
discourse as material is to recognize the substantive effect that it has on an audience at a moment of its 
impact. That impact is a direct result of the unique and complex configurations of language—not 
merely the ideas supposedly ‘carried’ out by such language—employed by rhetors at a particular 
moment in time.’ 
 
16 This also responds to van Dijk’s statement that there is the need for a ‘much more explicit integration 
of rhetoric into the study of discourse, instead of the separate, more traditional formulation of ‘figures 
of speech’’ (2007, xxxv). 
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Other perceived weaknesses of CDA identified by Blommaert (2005, 34-37) 
are (1) the restricted analysis of historical developments where discourse is implicated 
or the lack of diachronic analysis, a history of becoming; (2) the geographic 
restriction to First World, late modern, post-industrial societies; and (3) the tendency 
of CDA to be text- and linguistic-based as well as to focus on available/manifest 
discourses with little or no consideration of ‘absent’ discourses. 
The study addresses the first point by situating the SONAs not only in their 
immediate socio-political and historical context of production, but showing them to be 
implicated in a broader historical and socio-political context and by demonstrating 
that they are interrelated and intertextually coherent (Fairclough 2006), that is, a 
speech draws upon elements from previous speeches and becomes the basis for the 
formulation of succeeding ones.  The study establishes that the discourses of the 
presidents during their respective terms of office are rooted in the discourses of the 
past and may be seen as a form of continuity or reaction to previous discourses.  It 
specifically establishes that the discourses of the period under study (from 1987 to 
2009) had been significantly influenced and shaped by the discourses of the preceding 
authoritarian regime.  This is the rationale for Chapter 4 which provides an account of 
the Marcos authoritarian presidency and its discourses that the four presidencies were 
posed to address.  Moreover, the study also establishes the connection between the 
local and the global by relating the conceptualizations of the key themes of the 
SONAs to some of the broad concerns that circulate in the international or world 
context.  
The second concern is addressed by focusing on presidential speeches in the 
Philippine context.  Such a focus as mentioned in the preceding chapter contributes to 
the increased awareness and interest in non-Western and ‘Third World’ discourses.  
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This present study augments research on the political discourse of the so-called small 
players in global affairs (e.g., Erjavec and Volcic 2007; Tyner 2005) and societies 
within the Asian context. 
 A limitation of the study is that it is, as Blommaert’s criticism of CDA goes, 
text-oriented and that it focuses on manifest or available discourse.  A more extensive 
research would have included the so-called counter-SONAs and undocumented 
stories on the national situations expressed by members of the opposition, militant 
groups, and ordinary folks.  This would have given way to the juxtaposition of the 
official and non-institutional perspectives, government narratives and counter-
narratives, debate and discussion on where the country has been, where it is at 
present, and where it is headed.  The thesis’s limitation notwithstanding, I contend 
that it is still possible to consider ‘absent’ or ‘muted’ discourses even when focusing 
on the manifest ones.  This may be partly achieved by viewing the SONA as a site of 
contestation—as part of a dialogue where the presuppositions and assumptions that it 
holds may be regarded as a response to competing or opposing ones and where its 
expressions become indicative of what it privileges and what it silences.  By deriving 
conceptualizations from the textual and semiotic cues of the SONAs, the critic 
becomes aware of the speaker’s presuppositions and assumptions.  By examining 
accounts of both the immediate and broad historical and socio-political milieus where 
they are situated, the analyst is able to infer which interpretations get reaffirmed and 
which ones get subverted or relegated to the sidelines. 
I wish to emphasize that CDA remains an open-ended research undertaking 
that is subject to debates and rethinking (Wodak and Meyer 2001). By being 
conscious of this, critical analysts constantly explore new ways of making sense of 
texts and talk and therefore veer away from the tendency to move towards ‘the danger 
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of critical orthodoxy.’ An awareness of its limitations enables analysts to engage in 
what Billig terms as ‘continual intellectual revolution’ in the research area. 
2.3 Metaphor studies in cognitive linguistics 
 Like van Dijk, Chilton (2005) argued that CDA cannot neglect the cognitive 
aspect of communication.  Studies on metaphors, especially conceptual metaphors 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1992a, 1992b, 1996, 1999, 2004, 2006, 2008), 
address this concern.  
In a 1975 article published in Educational Theory, Ortony argued that  
 
Metaphors are necessary as a communicative device because they allow the 
transfer of coherent chunks of characteristics—perceptual, cognitive, 
emotional and experiential—from a vehicle which is known to a topic which is 
less so.  In doing so, they circumvent the problem of specifying one by one 
each of the often unnameable and innumerable characteristics; they avoid 
discretizing the perceived continuity of experience and are thus closer to 
experience and consequently more vivid and memorable. (1975, 20) 
 
   
The view by Ortony that metaphors are ‘necessary not just nice,’ communicative 
rather than ornamental is extended and fully developed in the book Metaphors We 
Live By (1980) written by linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson. 
Lakoff and Johnson argue ‘[m]etaphors as linguistic expressions are possible 
precisely because there are metaphors in a person’s conceptual system.’ This is an 
important shift in perspective towards metaphor which has been traditionally viewed 
as ‘a matter of mere language’ (1980, 5). 
Lakoff and Johnson noted that the classical and most widely held theory of 
metaphor is the comparison theory which regards metaphor as a matter of language 
and not as a matter of thought or action. In this theory, ‘a metaphor can only describe 
preexisting similarities and not create similarities.’ This means that the role of a 
metaphor is to merely establish similar attributes between the topic or tenor and the 
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vehicle—a point from which Lakoff and Johnson differed.   In presenting their 
alternative theory, they assert that ‘metaphor is primarily a matter of thought and 
action and only derivatively a matter of language’ and that ‘the primary function of 
metaphor is to provide partial understanding of one kind of experience in terms of 
another kind of experience’ that may involve preexisting isolated similarities, the 
creation of new similarities, and more (1980, 154).  Metaphor then can serve as a 
mode of reasoning and functions to introduce alternative ways of viewing the world. 
Allbitron (1995, 33) extends the conceptual theory of metaphor by suggesting 
that ‘an important function of metaphor is the creation of schemas for understanding 
abstract domains of experience.’ He argues that conceptual metaphors ‘are 
responsible for the existence of schematic knowledge structures that can influence the 
way information about a metaphor’s topic domain is processed and represented in 
memory’ (38).17 The author suggests that by providing a means for tying together 
ideas in the text, metaphors ‘may play an important role in the comprehension not 
only of figurative language, but of discourse in general’ (41, 43). 
Later works of Lakoff (1999, 2004, 2006, 2008) demonstrate the application 
of the contemporary metaphor theory (CTM)—or what would later be known as 
‘neural-based theory of metaphor’ (due to its links with the developments in 
neuroscience)–to American politics.  To Lakoff, American political life is underlain 
by the Nation-as-Family metaphor.  In accounting for American politics, Lakoff 
identified two competing dominant models that induce the use of metaphors for 
morality. These are ‘the strict father’ model—whose basic conservative morality 
                                                 
17 Allbitron expounds that the schemas formed by the entailments of conceptual metaphors functions to 
filter information that is consistent with it, ordering information in a systematic way based on the 




prioritizes the complex of strength metaphors over that of the nurturance metaphors—
and ‘the nurturing parent’ model—whose basic liberal morality prioritizes the 
opposite.  
Another important contribution of Lakoff and Johnson’s thesis is the notion 
that metaphors construct social realities.  The authors proposed that, ‘[m]uch of 
cultural change arises from the introduction of new metaphorical concepts and the 
loss of old ones’ (1980, 45).  This constructivist notion is in fact due to the shift in 
perspective mentioned earlier. As Lakoff and Johnson noted:  
 
The idea that metaphors can create realities goes against most traditional 
views of metaphor.  The reason is that metaphor has traditionally been viewed 
as a matter of mere language rather than primarily as a means of structuring 
our conceptual system and the kinds of everyday activities we perform.  It is 
reasonable enough to assume that words alone don’t change reality. But 
changes in our conceptual system do change what is real for us and affect how 
we perceive the world and act upon those perceptions (1980, 146). 
 
 
It is no wonder then that political leaders’ choice of metaphors can reproduce, 
reaffirm or challenge the way we conceive our socio-political reality.  Lakoff and 
Johnson further cautioned:  
 
Political and economic ideologies are framed in metaphorical terms.  Like all 
other metaphors, political and economic metaphors can hide aspects of reality.  
But in the area of politics and economics, metaphors matter more, because 
they constrain our lives.  A metaphor in political or economic system, by 
virtue of what it hides, can lead to human degradation. (1980, 236) 
 
 
Beer and de Landtsheer (2004) have also noted the constructedness of socio-
political realities and the vital role played by metaphors in the process of social 
construction. They point out that ‘[the] power of metaphor is to understand and 




 Meanwhile, the integration of contemporary metaphor theory in CDA has 
been demonstrated in studies of cognitive linguistics. In his Corpus Approaches to 
Critical Metaphor Analysis (2004), Charteris-Black proposed to integrate Lakoff and 
Johnson’s contemporary theory of metaphor with critical discourse analysis.  He thus 
came up with a framework of critical metaphor analysis which involves the 
identification of metaphors, description, and evaluation, which follow Fairclough’s 
stages of CDA.  
Charteris-Black’s framework of critical metaphor analysis identifies a 
metaphorical expression from words or phrases that cause semantic tension through 
personification, depersonification, and reification (2004, 20).  Charteris-Black 
suggested the use of corpus linguistics for a more ‘accurate’ identification of 
metaphors and goes on to argue that by doing so, the analyst would find it easy to 
establish the context within which metaphors are used.18   
According to Charteris-Black, the description stage makes it possible for the 
analyst to derive from metaphorical expressions the underlying conceptual metaphors 
or conceptual keys which are useful for the explanation stage.  In the explanation 
stage, the analyst is able to relate the use of conceptual metaphors to the socio-cultural 
situation, especially how these metaphors appeal to the prevailing socio-cultural 
beliefs and attitudes or how they can potentially create or privilege certain 
understandings of reality that maintain or challenge the status quo. 
                                                 
18 This, however, poses a problem to analysts of texts where there is inter-sentential and/or intra-
sentential use of English and another language. This is the case with regard to the texts under 
investigation in this study.  In the SONAs, statements spoken in Filipino languages (e.g., Tagalog, 
Ilocano, Bisaya) are interspersed with the statements communicated in the English language. 
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2.4 Political discourse analysis 
The concepts from rhetorical theory, the contemporary (neural-based) theory 
of metaphor, and CDA are useful and relevant to political discourse analysis.  
Sauer (1997) argued that rhetorical analysis can play a role in the description 
stage of the critical discourse analysis of political speeches.  He explained:  
 
The basis of both rhetoric and discourse analysis is functional pragmatic. 
Discourse and discursive elements, such as text passages, text structures, 
form-and-meaning units, and the like are regarded as manifestations of actions 
to perform specific functions… Incorporating rhetoric within the 
methodological set of tools of discourse analysis will thus contribute to a 
clearer interpretation and explanation of complications regarding the orator’s 
constraints, functions and dilemmas (Sauer 1997, 54). 
 
   
Incorporating (classical) rhetorical analysis to critical discourse analysis would 
also mean taking into consideration the nature of public speeches in terms of the 
dimensions of time, context, orator, addressee, medium, type of speech, and aim or 
purpose.  This becomes the basis for describing the nature of public speeches in 
contemporary society (in Sauer’s case, the modern Dutch society).  
That analytical categories of classical rhetoric have remained useful to the 
study of public discourse is underscored in Remer (2008).  Remer points out that 
some of the principles of oratory or classical rhetoric are still relevant in that they 
address important issues like the complexity of human nature (an understanding of 
which would require the rhetor to employ passion or appeal to emotion in order to 
make people act on political decisions or proposed courses of action), the 
(non)existence of equality of opportunity and of fact in participation, and the 
recognition of other forms of participation that do not necessarily conform to the 
notion of ‘rational-critical’ discourse (2008, 191-94).   
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Wodak (2009, 23-24) reaffirms Sauer and Remer’s points by arguing ‘that 
‘doing politics’ is highly context-dependent, influenced by national traditions and 
political systems, by the habitus of politicians, the modes of performance, the many 
embodied personality features, organizational structures, and antagonistic political 
interests.’   Wodak based her central claim on various findings from her ethnographic 
studies of the European parliament.  Sauer, Remer, and Wodak reaffirm the need for 
political discourse analysts to provide an adequate description of the specific as well 
as broad historical, social, political, and cultural contexts of the speeches under 
examination in order to have a context-sensitive analysis—something that the present 
study attempts to achieve. 
In theorizing about political discourse, Chilton (2004) and Charteris-Black 
(2005, 2007) both extend Lakoff and Johnson’s notion of metaphor as a mode of 
reasoning.  Chilton (2004, 203) explains that ‘[c]ross-domain metaphorical mappings 
make it possible to draw inferences that could not be drawn on the basis of direct 
evidence or the basis of direct experience.  In political discourse, metaphors are often 
not just embellishments of literal propositions, but modes of reasoning about, for 
example, the future and about policies.’    
Charteris-Black (2005) applied the critical metaphor analytical framework in 
examining the rhetoric of politicians. In explaining this framework, he demonstrated 
how concepts from classical rhetorical theory can be merged into the contemporary 
theory of metaphor. He specifically showed how conceptual metaphors mediate 
between ideology (associated with the logos or logical proofs) and myth (associated 
with pathos and cultural values) to legitimize policies advanced by politicians and 
delegitimize policies of their opponents.  This study adopts Charteris-Black’s 
theorization on the function of metaphor in mediating between myth and ideology and 
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demonstrates other potential ways on how rhetorical theory can inform the use of 
conceptual metaphors in political discourse analysis. 
In a more recent work, Charteris-Black (2007) extended the critical metaphor 
analytical framework further by considering other semiotic resources apart from 
verbal or linguistic communication. He suggested that ‘leaders – like actors – use 
metaphors and symbols to satisfy followers’ psychological and symbolic needs and 
that leadership is communicated through impression management, metaphor and 
media choices.’   
Charteris-Black (2007, 215) explained that physical appearance, dress and 
body language, use of artefacts and symbols and symbolic action comprise the non-
verbal modes while use of metaphor, use of stylistic features (myths, slogans, 
epigrams, humor), communication of vision and values, and communication of 
legitimacy comprise the verbal strategies.  These verbal and nonverbal modes of 
communication are then integrated in the choice of media that constitutes the 
performance of leadership (216).  It should be noted, however, that the two studies 
conducted by Charteris-Black on political rhetoric (2005 and 2007) are limited to 
‘charismatic’ and ‘highly successful’ leaders.  By focusing on these cases, Charteris-
Black’s work on political rhetoric tends to create idealized models of political 
leadership that can potentially serve as good models of leadership for societies dealt 
with in his study, but not for those others with different historical and cultural 
contexts. 
2.5 Philippine presidential leadership 
Cortes (1999), Martinez (1999), Malaya and Malaya (2004), and Abinales and 
Amoroso (2005) have produced works on Philippine presidential leadership that are 
particularly relevant to the present study. 
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Cortes (1999) provides an account of one hundred years of Philippine 
presidential history.  Written by members of the Philippine Historical Association 
(PHA), the book is at best a useful resource for researchers whose goal is to get a 
picture of the circumstances, highlights, accomplishments, and challenges faced in 
each of the presidential terms from Emilio Aguinaldo’s revolutionary government to 
the early years of the Estrada presidency. 
Martinez (1999) focuses on Philippine political history in the presidencies of 
Aquino, Ramos, and Estrada by examining their SONAs. The author expresses his 
raison d’être for using the SONAs to study presidential leadership early on in the 
book:  
 
The President’s policy is communicated in words and statements before the 
national constituency and official gatherings in speeches or in written 
declarations, orders and messages… [I]n a presidency, the expression of a 
policy is a matter of skilled rhetorical elaboration and not just of substantive 
decision or rumination. (Martinez 1999, viii)   
 
 
Martinez’s book highlights the ‘expressive function’ of the President, one of those he 
claims as unwritten in the Constitution.  It is a function ‘by which he expresses the 
sentiments and aspirations of his people, an unwritten but recognized responsibility 
that also obtains in the orthodox case of those representative legislators, Senate or 
House, when they debate in the halls of Congress, and justices when they pen 
decisions’ (11).  Farther on, the author explains that his main task in the book is ‘to 
show what [the presidents] said, or how they viewed their challenges and dangers, 
how they assessed themselves and their administrations in their own light, not actually 
how they performed…[T]he lessons, the ideas, the policy frameworks, the claims, 
values and ideals contained in the SONAs which addressed particular times and 
circumstances, are always interesting’ (127). The book may be considered one of the 
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first serious works on the role of SONAs in the post-Marcos era. The author, 
however, appears to repudiate his early pronouncements about the importance of the 
president’s expressive function when he states that ‘our interest in this book is in 
content or substance, not in style’ (163)—a position that represents the contentious 
notion that dichotomizes content and form, substance and style or that ideas can be 
seen as separate from how they are communicated through language.  The book 
therefore falls short in understanding the complexities of the expressive function of 
Philippine presidential leadership by focusing solely on ‘ideas’ disregarding that their 
very nature and character during transmission is ‘dependent upon configurations of 
language’ (Wrage 1947 in Burgchardt 2000, 32). The proposed work amends this 
shortcoming by acknowledging that an analysis of linguistic expression is vital to 
understanding how leadership is viewed or framed in presidential communication 
within its social, political, and historical contexts.  
Malaya and Malaya (2004) provide a useful introduction to the collection of 
inaugural addresses of Philippine Presidents from Emilio Aguinaldo to Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo by discussing the most common themes found in the presidential 
speeches. These themes have been useful for the identification of the analytical 
themes in the present study.  The authors also mention a number of the most enduring 
sound bites heard from the presidential podium, and discuss some issues involved in 
the process of speech writing (e.g. ghostwriting). The brief introductions about the 
presidents before their inaugural addresses are presented to the reader provide 
guideposts on how the presidents fared in realizing visions and goals they had earlier 
enunciated in their inaugural speeches. They also provide the reader a glimpse into the 
major accomplishments and challenges faced by each president. 
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Abinales and Amoroso (2005) provide a nuanced account of the dynamics of 
state and society relations from the early communities in the Philippine archipelago to 
twenty-first century Philippine politics.  Its last three chapters on the Marcos 
presidency, the democratization from 1986 to 1998, and the twenty-first century 
politics under the term of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo are particularly instructive for this 
study.  A significant point that the authors convey on the post-Marcos politics is that 
while pre-martial law traditional politics appeared to be reinstated after democratic 
institutions were restored under the Aquino presidency, a political climate giving civil 
society represented by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and people’s 
organizations (POs) unprecedented influence in Philippine government emerged 
(237).  On the other hand, there also emerged—as a ‘political legacy’ of the Aquino 
presidency—the seemingly enduring challenge of maintaining a ‘delicate balance 
between strengthening state capacities and the need to assure a rightly skeptical public 
of the state’s commitment to democracy’ (242). 
The works of Cortes (1999), Martinez (1999), Malaya and Malaya (2004), and 
Abinales and Amoroso (2005) provide useful guideposts on the significant 
developments of Philippine presidential history.  Assessments and semi-biographical 
accounts of the presidential terms of Aquino, Ramos, Estrada and Arroyo also provide 
relevant information on the socio-political and historical context of the post-Marcos 
presidential leadership.  This include, among others, works and/or edited volumes of 
Rajaretnam (1986); Mamot (1987); Aquino (1990); Caoili (1991); Abueva and 
Roman (1993); Cacho-Olivares (1998); Landicho (1999); Coronel (2000); Doronila 
(2001); Hutchinson and Tordesillas (2001); Lacquian and Lacquian (2001); Abueva, 
Alfiler, Domingo and Nicholas (2006); Thompson and Macaranas (2006); and Rice 
(2010).  On the other hand, accounts of people’s organizations (such as the 
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Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace), independent national think tanks (like 
the IBON Foundation), and independent media organizations (like the Philippine 
Center for Investigative Journalism) provide useful alternative perspectives.  These 
groups have published or released papers or statements that focus on specific issues 
that have confronted presidents and their administrations.  I find them particularly 
helpful as they enable researchers working on Philippine presidential discourse to 
(re)consider the nuances and intricacies of historical contexts that constrain political 
texts and talk which in turn are constitutive of such contexts.  For the present study, 
these perspectives have been useful in providing alternative assessments of the state 
of the nation which serve as counternarratives as it were to the SONAs or official 
rhetoric of the presidents. 
2.6 Presidential rhetoric studies 
Theorization on Philippine presidential rhetoric has not been as vibrant as that 
in the West. In fact, many of the studies pursued in the area have borrowed 
frameworks and conceptual guides from American as well as European scholars.  
Particularly useful in the theorization on presidential rhetoric or political 
communication in the Philippines are presidential studies in Medhurst (1996) which 
focuses on the ‘rhetorical presidency,’ Medhurst and Ritter (2003) who examine the 
relationship of speechwriting and presidential leadership, Hart (1987) and Gronbeck 
(1997) who investigate (American) presidential communication in the ‘modern age’ 
or ‘age of secondary orality.’19   
                                                 
19 The term ‘age of secondary orality,’ which refers to the pervasiveness of the use of electronic media 
and new communications technology beginning in the twentieth century to the present, was introduced 
by Walter J. Ong in his works on orality and literacy (see for example, Orality and Literacy: The 
Technologizing of the Word, [London: Routledge, 1982]). 
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Also relevant are the works of Sauer (1997) on political communication in 
modern Dutch society; Fairclough (2000, 2006) on the mediatization of politics 
through branding; and other fairly recent studies that examine the rhetoric of othering 
in George Bush’s presidential discourse after the 9/11 attacks (e.g., Erjavec and 
Volcic 2007; Lazar and Lazar 2007; Leudar, Marsland, & Nekvapil 2004).  Sauer’s 
(1997) notion of ‘modern political communication’ is useful in that it articulates 
features of contemporary public communication that I find apparent in the conduct of 
the SONAs:  public speeches as justification for public decisions made earlier, the 
simultaneous addressing of multiple audiences (e.g., Congress, the Filipino people at 
large, the international community, so-called enemies of the state), the aim to achieve 
both persuasive and political success (that is, the consolidation as well as assertion of 
power), and the propensity to express sound bites that will be picked up by media, 
among others.   On the other hand, Fairclough’s (2000, 2006) notion of political 
‘branding’ is helpful in explaining the inclination of some political leaders to engage 
in image-building and image-restoring strategies (Benoit 1995) or why they tend to 
highlight certain features of their personalities when communicating their policies. 
Needless to say, most of the studies I mention in this section are based on 
American-European experience and traditions; hence, generalizations, insights, and 
theories derived from them do not fully apply to the complexities of Philippine 
political reality. 
2.7 Summary 
This chapter reviewed some of the relevant literature that informs this 
research.  It highlighted works in the areas of rhetorical theory and criticism of public 
address, critical discourse studies, metaphor studies within cognitive linguistics, 
political linguistics or discourse analysis, Philippine presidential leadership, and 
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presidential rhetoric studies.  In reviewing these works, I showed how they are 
relevant to the present study by identifying what concepts are adopted in the current 
project.  I also discuss how the present study partakes in the ongoing conversations in 
these different areas by articulating how it addresses area-specific concerns and 
theoretical issues.  In the next chapter, I draw on some of the ideas discussed in this 
chapter and present an outline of the theoretical perspectives that constitute the 






















Towards a Schema Theoretic Framework for the Analysis of  




In this chapter, I outline the theoretical perspectives—ideas and principles—
that constitute my conceptual guide for the critical analysis of SONAs. In presenting 
the outline, I also affirm some of the ideas discussed in Chapter 2.  Specifically, I 
establish the inextricable relationship between text and context and use this theoretical 
assumption to argue that the configurations of certain features of the texts 
(metaphorical expressions and other rhetorical features) construct schemas of 
presidential leadership that either reinforce/reaffirm or disrupt/subvert social 
discourses that dominate the national and global spheres.  Towards the end of this 
chapter, I shall explain the analytical framework employed in the five analytical 
chapters of this research. 
3.1 The dialectics of text and context 
Like Fairclough (2001, 2003, 2006), I consider the text as ‘an element or 
‘moment’ of material social process, which gives rise to ways of analyzing language 
or semiosis within broader analyses of social processes’ (2001, 121).  Texts, 
according to Fairclough, are elements of social events and have causal effects in that 
they bring about changes. Changes brought about by texts are not mechanical; their 
effects are mediated by meaning-making (2003, 8).  In other words, it is through 
interpretation or the process of making sense of texts or semiotic resources that people 
are able to sustain, reproduce, alter or modify social processes which in turn influence 





The relationship of text and context is complex.  The features of context are 
sometimes thought of as determining or influencing certain elements in the 
linguistic structure of text. However, the relationship is circular, or, rather, 
reflexive, since texts themselves contribute to the constitution of context. 
(Chilton and Schaffner 2002, 16) 
 
 
The impact or consequences of texts in social processes may be accounted for 
through the concepts of recontextualization and intertextuality. Recontextualization, 
according to Blackledge (2005), involves the transformation of discourse. It entails 
the use of an argument in another context—whether through repetition or a summary 
of it with modifications, additions, and deletions.  
 
The repetition, verbatim, of the same argument in a new context involves a 
transformation as discourse almost always attracts new meaning in new 
settings. But argument is rarely repeated verbatim. Instead it is often 
summarized, with new parts added, and others deleted, so that while it bears 
many features of the original, it is transformed in ways which comment on, 
legitimate or otherwise evaluate it’ (Blackledge 2005, 12). 
 
 
Blackledge cites Fairclough’s observation that ‘in the process of 
recontextualization events may be represented in ways which foreground or 
background particular elements, events may be rearranged, so that new elements 
become salient features, events may be abstracted or generalized, and events may be 
explained, criticized or legitimated’ (12).  Recontextualization is also considered a 
powerful feature of the discourse of politicians as the modifications in an argument 
emphasize which parts of it are favored at the expense of others. The privileging of 
certain parts of an argument is crucial especially when the argument moves into 
‘increasingly powerful contexts,’ ‘new and perhaps more authoritative contexts’ or 
‘non-negotiable materialities’ such as public policies, laws, and statutes (13).  These 
‘non-negotiable materialities,’ because they are often imbued with power, become the 
basis for people’s ways of acting, interacting, and representing themselves, others, 
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and their environment.  Recontextualized arguments in presidential decrees, 
legislation or public policy, for instance, may lead to further marginalization of 
religious and cultural minorities or sanction acts that violate basic human rights (e.g., 
the aggressive militarist counter-insurgency strategies of the post-Marcos 
presidencies—see for instance, sections 5.5.3, 7.5, and 8.5) and repression of civil 
liberties deemed vital to a society’s democratic way of life (e.g., Arroyo’s calibrated 
preemptive response which requires protesters to have permits when mounting rallies 
or demonstrations—see Chapter 9.3.2). 
Recontextualization may be seen as a form of intertextuality.  Blackledge 
(2005, 17) notes that the term intertextuality, in its broadest sense, pertains to the 
‘relationships between texts. This may mean, as it often does, the relationship 
between text and an embedded quotation, or explicitly reference to another text, or an 
allusion to a specific text.’20  
Intertextuality is a major research issue for those involved in ‘social discourse 
analysis,’ another term used to refer to social theory-informed discourse analysis such 
as that of Fairclough.  Citing Julia Kristeva’s argument about the intertextual nature of 
social discourse analysis, Strauss (2005) explains: 
 
Social discourse analysis is by necessity intertextual (Kristeva 1986), that is, it 
is concerned with the way other texts are incorporated into the text under 
analysis. This requires familiarity with prior verbal and written expressions of 
the ideologies in question, so you can recognize when a given text 
incorporates established ways of expressing certain sets of ideas. This may 
sound hard, but if the topic is one that you have been studying, this will not be 
difficult. (Strauss 2005, 222) 
 
 
                                                 
 
20 Recontextualization (or importation, to use Sauer’s term) is often used to refer to the process by 




Another way to understand the concept of recontextualization is through Mikhail 
Bakhtin’s concept of ‘voice.’  Blackledge (2005, 14) notes that ‘[i]n Bakhtin’s theory 
of language as responsive to the social world, discourse is dialogic, shaped and 
influenced by the discourse of others. An utterance is a link in a complex chain of 
other utterances, and is informed and shaped by other utterances in the chain.’  
Recontextualization provides what Bakhtin (1984) calls a ‘dialogising 
background’ to another person’s speech or utterance.  He says, ‘The speech of 
another, once enclosed in a context, is – no matter how accurately transmitted – 
always subject to certain semantic changes. The context embracing another’s word is 
responsible for its dialogising background, whose influence can be very great. Given 
the appropriate methods for framing, one may bring about fundamental changes even 
in another’s utterance accurately quoted’ (in Blackledge 2005, 14).  
In political discourse, it is the authoritative voice that usually provides a 
dialogising background to the voices of others.  The contact between the authoritative 
voice and other voices is pivotal to the movement or transformation of discourses into 
more powerful contexts or into non-negotiable materialities.21   
3.2 Schemas as mediating mental structures 
The impact of texts in society may be gleaned from evidence of 
recontextualization, intertextuality, and the concept of voice, but the dynamics of the 
relationship between text and context, language and society, may be further explained 
through the concept of mediating mental structures, which are referred to as mental 
models (van Dijk 1998, 2002, 2006) or schema (Strauss and Quinn 1997; Quinn 
2005). 
                                                 
21 In the words of Blackledge, it is ‘the authoritative voice [that] senses and responds to voices of 




Schemas, according to cognitive cultural anthropologists Strauss and Quinn 
(1997), are mediating mental structures that enable people to make sense of objects 
and situations. They are a collection of experiences that mediate our sense-making 
processes.22 Quinn (2005) provides the following explanation on the nature of 
schema: 
 
A schema is a generic version of (some part of) the world built up from 
experience and stored in memory. The schema is generic…because it is the 
cumulative outcome of just those features of successive experiences that are 
alike. Although schemas can change, those built on repeated experiences of a 
similar sort become relatively stable, influencing our interpretations of 
subsequent experiences more than they are altered by them. To the degree that 
people share experiences, they will end up sharing the same schemas – having, 
we would say, the same culture (subculture). The social world is constructed 
in just such a way that many of our experiences – the language we speak, for 
example, or the way we are brought up as children, or the built environment 
we inhabit – are indeed shared. Hence, many, many of our schemas are 
cultural ones. (Quinn 2005, 38) 
 
 
I would like to elaborate some of the points raised by Quinn with regard to the 
concept of schema, relate them to the subject of my study, and think of possible ways 
of extending them for a productive reading of political discourse, particularly of 
Philippine presidential rhetoric.  The first point that I wish to elaborate is that schema 
is ‘built up from experience.’  Quinn explains that schemas include experience of all 
kinds— 
 
                                                 
22 The stability of schemas is relative to how deeply they have been internalized by individuals and the 
public in general.  Strauss and Quinn discuss both centripetal and centrifugal tendencies that work 
toward or against certain properties of culture.   
 It would seem that the schema theory advanced by cognitive cultural anthropologists like 
Quinn and Strauss complements the textual oriented critical discourse analysis that acknowledges the 
power of texts in the (re)production of social processes (see Fairclough 1992, 2003, 2006 for text-
oriented discourse analysis or TODA).  While the first tends to emphasize the ‘centripetal’ tendencies 
that sustain social realities, the latter tends to highlight ‘centrifugal’ tendencies that tend to disrupt the 





…unlabeled as well as labeled, inarticulate as well as theorized, felt as well as 
cognized. Schemas, in short, can be as various and complex as the experience 
from which they are derived. The same is true, of course, for cultural schemas, 
which do not differ from other schemas except that they are built up from 
experience that has been shared. (Quinn 2005, 38)   
 
 
This is an important point to consider also when dealing with political 
discourse. Political actors and the intended audience of their political acts bring with 
them their backgrounds and experiences when producing and consuming political 
texts and talk; it is then necessary for critical analysts to take into account these 
backgrounds and experiences (i.e., history, social attitudes, social beliefs, ideologies, 
and so forth) in order to show what potentially accounts for the stability or the 
changes especially in shared schemas.   
The second point has to do with the existence of long standing schemas.  
Quinn says that schemas built on ‘repeated experiences of a similar sort become 
relatively stable.’  This is significant especially when examining any of the following 
research scenarios: different political texts communicated by the same political actor 
throughout a period of time; different political texts but categorized under the same 
speech genre; or different political texts of the same genre communicated by different 
actors in different temporal and historical contexts but tackling the same national 
issues or areas of concern.  It is important to ask how these similarities and 
differences figure in the persistence of the schemas over time. 
Relevant to such a concern is the idea that schemas can, or in fact, do change. 
Quinn and Strauss point to centrifugal forces as reasons for changes. It would be 
interesting to find out what it takes for these forces to subvert existing shared mental 
models and create new ones.  Using Quinn’s argument, I suggest that texts and 
performances that are enacted with relative regularity—such as ritualized instances of 
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political speaking (e.g., inaugural addresses, annual ceremonial speeches, State of 
Nation Addresses)—contribute to the (re)affirmation and (re)production of schemas, 
which according to Quinn ‘influence our interpretations of subsequent experiences 
more than they are altered by them.’ Yet, it may also be possible to think that texts 
and performances enacted with relative regularity are potentially open to disruptions 
that can lead to changes in the way political actors and their intended audience view 
social reality.  I suggest that the occurrence of these disruptions may be due to several 
reasons which include, among others, shifts in socio-political and historical contexts, 
changes in leadership (that is, who lead and how they lead), and variations in ways of 
representing, acting, and interacting. This study hopes to account for both re-
affirmative and disruptive elements or factors and how they have contributed to the 
shaping of the social and political realities particularly in the Philippine context. 
Certain features of the text—those that are salient and recurring in discourse—
can prompt or possibly, disrupt cultural schemas, which are responsible for our sense-
making process. This study focuses on metaphorical expressions in political text and 
talk, but it also takes into account how metaphors configure with other rhetorical 
strategies employed in the political speeches under investigation to reinforce or 
reconstitute shared schemas.  These other rhetorical strategies include, among others, 
the pisteis or artistic proofs, strategies of self-representation and othering, and 
political myths—all of which will be discussed in section 3.5 in relation to metaphor.   
3.3 Metaphors and the construction of political reality 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argue that metaphors play ‘a central role in the 
construction of social and political reality’ as they are capable of creating new 
meanings, creating similarities, and thereby defining a new reality.  Having 
established that metaphors are ‘primarily a means of structuring our conceptual 
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system and the kinds of everyday activities we perform,’ Lakoff and Johnson suggest 
that metaphors can actually ‘change what is real for us and affect how we perceive the 
world and act upon those perceptions’ (1980, 146).  Also, Allbitron (1995) has 
suggested that metaphors create schematic knowledge structures that can influence the 
way we make sense of abstract domains of experience.  It is then possible to think that 
political leaders’ choice of metaphors can reproduce, reaffirm or challenge the way 
we conceive our socio-political reality.  This has tremendous implications on the ways 
our public policies are crafted.  It is interesting to consider what metaphors political 
actors use to persuade the public into accepting ideas that it would otherwise give a 
second thought or dismiss outright.  As Lakoff and Johnson have cautioned us: 
 
Political and economic ideologies are framed in metaphorical terms.  Like all 
other metaphors, political and economic metaphors can hide aspects of reality.  
But in the area of politics and economics, metaphors matter more, because 
they constrain our lives.  A metaphor in political or economic system, by 




Charteris-Black (2004, 2005, 2007) builds on Lakoff and Johnson’s theory and 
argues that metaphor in persuasive discourse should be seen from cognitive-linguistic 
and pragmatic perspectives.  He also brings to the fore the notion that metaphor is ‘a 
relative rather than an absolute concept’ (2004, 20).  He states: 
 
Given that there is unlikely to be full consensus either on what is, or is not, a 
metaphor, or on how much the use of a particular word or phrase is 
metaphoric, it may be that definitions of metaphor need to incorporate a 
linguistic, a pragmatic and a cognitive orientation.  The term ‘metaphor’ may 
refer to a bundle of linguistic, cognitive and pragmatic characteristics all or 
any of which are present in varying degrees. Metaphor is not, then, an 
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exclusively linguistic, pragmatic or cognitive phenomenon. (Charteris-Black 
2005, 20) 23 
 
Linguistically, a metaphor is a word or a phrase that causes semantic tension by 
reification, personification or depersonification; pragmatically, it is an ‘incongruous 
linguistic representation that has the purpose of influencing opinions and judgments 
through persuasion’; and cognitively, it is ‘caused by (and may cause) a shift in the 
conceptual system’ (20).  
By integrating the pragmatic view in the cognitive linguistic perspective 
advanced by the Lakoff and Johnson, Charteris-Black recuperates the contribution of 
classical rhetoric to metaphor theory.  The pragmatic view recognizes the role of 
metaphor in persuasion.  From this perspective, ‘metaphor is effective in realizing the 
speaker’s underlying goal of persuading the hearer because of its potential of moving 
us’ (11).  This, Charteris-Black suggests, highlights the emotional impact of 
metaphors because its use ‘taps into an accepted communal system of values’ (12). 
Chilton (1996) acknowledges the work of 18th century philosopher and 
rhetorician Giambattista Vico as the most significant early contribution to the study of 
language and politics, especially the place of metaphor in this imbrication.  Vico 
views metaphor not just as a strategy for persuasion but as ‘an important ingredient in 
the historical evolution of societies and political cultures’ (Chilton 1996, 39). 
 
For Vico, metaphor is both a process of understanding and a process whereby 
individuals and groups interact with one another in civil society and in the 
production of that society. Metaphor is thus not a rhetorical ornament, but a 
constitutive part of thought and society (Chilton 1996, 39). 
 
 
                                                 
23 I see this as somewhat parallel to van Dijk’s (2006) triangulation framework which he uses to come 
up with a systematic theory of the structures and processes in manipulative communication. Van Dijk’s 
framework uses the following approaches: discourse analytical, cognitive, and social approaches.  
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Vico’s perspective resonates in Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1992, 1996, 
2008) and Chilton (1996) who share the theoretical assumption that metaphor is ‘one 
important mode of concept formation and argument construction.’   
 
Metaphor is a conceptual process, and is reflected in the evolution and 
structure of languages and discourses.  Its presence in text and in talk is not 
confined to the ornamental or the persuasive; indeed, these are rather minor 
aspects of metaphor.  Rather, metaphor can be seen to play a major role in 
argumentation (Chilton 1996, 43). 
 
 
The constitutive role of metaphors helps explain the relationship between metaphors 
and policy making.  As Chilton (1996, 68) suggests, ‘I assume policies result from 
perceived interests, are expressed in verbal formulations and declarations, and result 
in actions corresponding to a greater or lesser degree with those formulations and 
declarations.’  He says that at the state of articulation, metaphor plays cognitive and 
interactive roles. 
 
In its cognitive role, metaphor acts as a conceptual instrument that enables 
people to think about situations that are new, complex, or remote.  In its 
interactive role, metaphor acts as a means of, for instance, avoiding direct 
reference, of creating common ground, or of maintaining contextual continuity 
and cohesion. (Chilton 1996, 68) 
 
 
Chilton notes that in discourses elaborated by powerful and influential groups, the 
conceptual and metaphorical resources are constantly exploited and reorganized to 
achieve the purposes of persuasion, legitimation, group solidarity as well as the 
production of new conceptualizations for problematic situations.  He, however, points 
out that metaphors can be contested and reformulated, but also stresses that ‘their 
linguistic embedding in discourse can contribute to a situation where they privilege 
one understanding of reality over others. They will be a contributing factor, though 
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not the sole factor, in the production, reproduction and contestation of political 
realities’ (Chilton 1996, 74). 
 Given the significant role of metaphors in political discourse, it would then be 
crucial to understand its relationship with other ‘contributing factors’ in the 
construction of political realities.  But before I discuss the relationship of metaphors 
with the other contributing factors—which I take here to mean the other rhetorical 
strategies employed in political texts and talk, I would like to introduce the notions of 
conceptual frames and conceptual metaphors (Lakoff 2004, 2008). I believe an 
understanding of these concepts helps establish how metaphorical realizations or 
expressions in political texts and talk relate to the concept of schema.  
3.4 Conceptual frames and conceptual metaphors 
I argue that the notions of frame and conceptual metaphor are useful in 
understanding how metaphorical expressions and realizations in the political texts can 
sustain or potentially subvert existing schemas shared by politicians and their publics.  
They help articulate the relationship between metaphors as realized in texts and talk 
and the broad mental structure we call schemas. 
3.4.1 Conceptual metaphors 
Conceptual metaphors are statements that underlie a number of metaphorical 
expressions (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Charteris-Black 2004).  This understanding of 
conceptual metaphors is based on the cognitive semantic approach towards metaphor 
that originated from the work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and which Charteris-
Black (2004, 2005) and other cognitive linguists (e.g., Semino 2008; Koller 2004) 
broadly adopted in their works on metaphors in discourse.  The approach claims that 
‘metaphorical expressions are systematically motivated by underlying (or conceptual) 
metaphors’ and that motivation implies that there is a single idea that explains those 
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expressions (Charteris-Black 2004, 9).  A conceptual metaphor, which takes the form 
of A is B (e.g., DEMOCRACY IS A WEAPON; LIFE IS A JOURNEY), ‘represents the 
conceptual basis, idea or image that underlies a set of metaphors’ (ibid.).  Identifying 
the conceptual metaphors is particularly useful in finding commonalities and 
variations in the way an issue of national concern is represented across political 
speeches delivered by a single rhetor or across speeches of the same genre delivered 
by different rhetors. 
Conceptual metaphors may also be seen as the major premises or warrants on 
which political arguments are built.  They serve are justifications for policy decisions 
and actions and their identification becomes necessary in reconstructing the 
arguments of a political speech. 
3.4.2 Conceptual frames  
In his best-selling book Don’t Think of An Elephant (2004), Lakoff explains 
that ‘[f]rames are mental structures that shape the way we see the world.  As a result, 
they shape the goals we seek, the plans we make, the way we act, and what counts as 
a good or bad outcome of our actions.  In politics, our frames shape our social policies 
and the institutions we form to carry out policies.  To change our frames is to change 
all of this. Reframing is social change’ (2004, xv).  Lakoff cites as an example the 
framing of the war on Iraq in 2003.  He explains that the George W. Bush 
administration justified the war using the nation as a person metaphor, more 
specifically ‘the rational actor model’ used by the international relations community 
(70, 73).  The metaphor conceptualizes nations as naturally seeking self-interest, and 
when necessary they use military force in order to serve their self-interests (ibid.).   
Lakoff suggests that progressives must make use of alternative articulations based on 
the values of empathy and responsibility in order reframe the American foreign 
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policy. He argues for a conceptualization of the nation as one driven by nurturant 
morality which makes possible actions based on ‘fairness, an ethic of care, protection 
of those needing it, a recognition of interdependence, cooperation for the common 
good, the building of community, mutual respect, and so on’ (Lakoff 2004, 64). 
Frames are part of the ‘cognitive unconscious’; they are ‘structures in our 
brains that we cannot consciously access, but know by their consequences: the way 
we reason and what counts as common sense’ (Lakoff 2004, xv).  Lakoff argues that 
frames are known through language in that ‘[a]ll words are defined relative to their 
conceptual frames.  When you hear a word, its frame (or collection of frames) is 
activated in your brain’ (2004, xv).24   
In my study, I view conceptual frame as a collection or cluster of conceptual 
metaphors that relate or substantiate a particular theme or issue of national concern 
(e.g., democracy).   I argue that the frame mediates between the schema which is a 
broad conceptual category and metaphors that find expression through texts and talk.  
It is through the frame that the relationship between metaphors and a schema is 
established.  On the one hand, frames are macro-conceptualizations that underlie 
clusters of related conceptual metaphors. On the other, frames make up the schema in 
that they give shape or organize what is otherwise an inchoate collection of 
experiences.  As will be shown in the analytical chapters, the conceptual frames of the 
four focal themes in a set of presidential speeches delivered over a period of time 
constitute a president’s schema of the state of the nation and consequently, of 
presidential leadership. 
                                                 




3.5 Metaphors and political speeches 
 Political speeches, especially those given by presidents and national leaders, 
are replete with metaphors and other rhetorical strategies (to be spelled out and 
described in 3.5.1 to 3.5.4)—resources that help circulate and perpetuate the beliefs 
and values needed to rally public support for newly crafted policies or courses of 
action.  Moreover, these resources help sustain political capital (i.e., credibility and 
public support) vital during times of crises. 
Political speeches arguably contribute significantly to presidential image 
making.  They ‘sell’ the president to various interest groups, to powerbrokers who are 
crucial to her success or political survival.  It is through speeches that political leaders 
like the president wield power in that they usually are privileged to have information 
first and to say it in the best way they can (Hart 1987).  In the ‘age of secondary 
orality’ where spontaneity of public utterances made by political leaders especially 
the president is programmed to project favorable public images, political speeches 
have become media spectacles.’25 Pronouncements made by the president on 
television are carefully planned.26   
                                                 
25 ‘Media spectacle,’ on the other hand, is an analytical framework developed by Douglas Kellner. 
Kellner (2003, 2) explains that ‘media spectacles are those phenomena of media culture that embody 
contemporary society’s basic values, serve to initiate individuals into its way of life, and dramatize its 
controversies and struggles, as well as its modes of conflict resolution.  They include media 
extravaganzas, sporting events, political happenings, and those attention-grabbing occurrences that we 
call news – a phenomenon that itself has been subjected to the logic of spectacle and tabloidization in 
the era of media sensationalism, political scandal and contestations, seemingly unending cultural war, 
and the new phenomenon of Terror War.’ 
 
26 Hart (1987, 117) suggests that the mediation of speeches through television, radio and print (and, 
now, the ‘new media’) has actually been concerned with ‘melodramatic imperative needed to make the 
news interesting, the various strategies used to render news anchorpersons credible and the tonal 
features required to make televised news suitably memorable.’  He views this exercise from a rhetorical 
perspective that ‘regards the president as a muse, (her) speeches as a plot to be exploited, and the 




Gronbeck (1996, 41-45) identifies the following characteristics to describe the 
presidency in the ‘age of secondary orality’:27 the employment of multi-mediated 
rhetoric (i.e., verbal, visual and acoustic) and the ‘continuous, complicated and 
compelling process of building and maintaining a political ethos’ central to 
presidential success.  To account for the ‘refashioning of presidential rhetoric’ and 
‘the refabrication of the presidency itself’ in the electronic age, he makes the 
following recommendation:  
 
Politics understood as a symbolic action demands that we analyze 
systematically the discourses of political ideology and valuation, of political 
visions and the places citizens occupy in such visions; of the means by which 
self-interests are converted into communal interests – into public policies 
(Gronbeck 1996, 47-48). 
 
 
This thesis is an attempt to respond to this challenge by focusing on how metaphors 
configure in political discourse to sustain or challenge existing schemas that influence 
the way political actors deal with issues of national or global significance. While 
metaphors serve as the central focus of this work, it is important to recognize that 
such expressions work in tandem with other rhetorical resources that political actors 
like the president (and his communications advisers) draw upon in speech-making. As 
Charteris-Black (2005, 7) argues, ‘What is important, though, about discursive modes 
and figures of speech is that they act in combination with one another rather than in 
isolation; indeed we often isolate them solely for the purpose of analyzing effective 
communication strategies.’   
                                                 
27 Although Gronbeck talks of the American presidency in his essay, his descriptions can be made 
applicable to the Philippine presidency. Considering that the American presidential system has been the 
model of the Philippine government for over seven decades, the Philippine presidency can be seen as 




 There is a range of linguistic and rhetorical resources from which the speakers 
or rhetors draw upon in order to craft their messages. Condit and Lucaites (1993, xii) 
talk of a ‘rhetorical culture’ in order ‘to draw attention to the range of linguistic 
usages available to those who would address a historically particular audience as 
public, that is, a group of potentially disparate individuals and subgroups who share a 
common interest in their collective life.’   They further explain: 
 
In this rhetorical culture, we find the full complement of commonly used 
allusions, aphorisms, characterizations, ideographs, images, metaphors, myths, 
narratives and topoi for common argumentative forms that demarcate the 
symbolic boundaries within which public advocates find themselves 
constrained to operate (Condit and Lucaites 1993, xii). 
 
 
How metaphors in combination with other available rhetorical resources are 
used by the rhetors (i.e, Philippine presidents) in their public addresses is dealt with in 
the analytical chapters of this work.  Below, I discuss how metaphors interact with 
such rhetorical resources as the pisteis also called in classical rhetorical tradition as 
proofs (logos, pathos, ethos), strategies of self-representation and othering, political 
myths, and ideographs.   
3.5.1 Metaphors and the pisteis—logos, pathos, and ethos 
 The study of political speeches necessarily involves the study of ‘means of 
persuasion.’  How do metaphors figure in this system rooted in classical rhetoric is an 
analytical point that scholars have attempted to address.  The means of persuasion 
include the logos, pathos, and ethos—also known as pisteis or the ‘artistic proofs’ in 
classical rhetorical theory. 
Logos pertain to the reasoned arguments or logical proofs that rhetors employ 
to advance a claim.  Pathos, on the other hand, refers to the motivational appeals or 
proofs that the rhetor employs in order to capture the interest of the audience and 
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make them embrace his point. Ethos pertains to the speaker’s authoritative appeal or 
credibility.28  
In this study of Philippine political speeches, I adopt some of the suggestions 
posed by Charteris-Black (2005, 202-209) on how metaphors interact with the three 
artistic proofs—logos, pathos, and ethos.  Charteris-Black suggests that metaphors 
help communicate political arguments (logos), heighten emotional impact (pathos) of 
political messages, and establish the ethical integrity (ethos) of political 
communicators. 
Metaphors provide proofs to support an argument by ‘drawing on ways of 
thinking by analogy’ (Charteris-Black 2005, 204).  By explaining a political policy 
using certain source domains or vehicles that are cognitively accessible to the 
audience, speakers are able to offer their audience reasons to accept the policy.  For 
instance, by conceptualizing the democracy as the country’s comparative advantage in 
the global economic order, Fidel Ramos, as will be shown in Chapter 6, was able to 
show that democratic system can work towards achieving the ‘tiger status’ in a region 
where it is apparent that authoritarian leaders run successful economies.  Metaphors 
also express or articulate the warrants or basic premises through which political 
arguments are justified.  These warrants or basic premises come in the form of 
conceptual metaphors implied by metaphorical expressions in political texts and talk. 
Metaphors, as suggested by Charteris-Black, increase the emotional impact of 
political messages by sustaining the morale during times of national crisis, 
                                                 
28 Considered the elements that make up a speaker’s credibility are phronesis (good sense), eunoia 
(good will), and arête (good moral character). It should be interesting to note that the speaker’s 
effective use of logical and emotional proofs may contribute to his competence (good sense) and 
trustworthiness (good will); thus, enhancing or boosting the speaker’s credibility. This demonstrates 




communicating the emotional investment that politicians have in their ideas, and 
communicating politicians’ empathy with groups who are regarded as weak and 
needing support (203).  Metaphors enable politicians to create heroes, villains, and 
victims, all of which arouse emotions.  This arousal of emotion is particularly evident 
when nations, political parties, particular systems of political beliefs or particular 
abstract nouns are personified because they are thought of as bad or good persons 
(204).  This is, for instance, shown in the Aquino speeches (in Chapter 5), where 
democracy was rendered as a living entity that sustained the national life while 
dictatorship—particularly the Marcos dictatorship—was a national destroyer and an 
aggravator of the already miserable state of the national economy. 
As metaphors fortify arguments and heighten emotional impacts of messages, 
they also work towards establishing the ethical integrity or the credibility of the 
politicians.  Metaphors establish the ethos of politicians through representations of 
them or their leadership roles as moral agents (cf. Charteris-Black 2005, 203).  This is 
evident in the analytical chapters where it is shown that post-Marcos presidents 
regarded themselves in a position of expertise or as standing on a high moral ground 
when articulating highly contested government policies.  Heightening the ethos of 
political leaders is also made possible when the metaphors used to express or 
articulate political claims or policies imply certain ethical qualities that are especially 
highly regarded by their target audience.  Charteris-Black notes that ‘metaphors 
integrate an evaluation of policies with an evaluation of the politician and it is this 
mirror-like quality that makes them persuasive—the ethical ideals of the audience are 
reflected in the image of the politicians’ (202).   
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3.5.2 Metaphors and rhetorical strategies of self-representation and othering 
As shown earlier, metaphors have a central role in enabling rhetors or political 
communicators to make effective use of logical, emotional and ethical proofs.  Other 
rhetorical strategies that may interact or work in conjunction with metaphors in 
political text and talk are the strategies of positive self-representation and othering.  
Strategies of positive self-representation include self-identity descriptions, activity 
descriptions, norm and value descriptions, position and goal descriptions while 
othering may be in a form of negative lexicalization, negative comparison, norm and 
value violation (van Dijk 1998; Riggins 1997).  These two strategies are parallel to 
Chilton’s notions of legitimization and delegitimization (2004, 47).  The first, as 
noted by Charteris-Black (2005, 17) aims to imbue utterances with evidence, 
authority, and truth, while the latter employs such specific strategies as acts of 
negative other representation, acts of blaming, scapegoating, marginalizing, 
excluding, attacking the moral character of some individual or group, attacking the 
communicative cooperation of the other, attacking the rationality or sanity of the 
other, and in extreme cases, deny the humanness of the other.  Metaphors, being 
linguistic representations of reality, assist in the acts of legitimization and 
delegitimization. 
3.5.3 Metaphors and political myths 
 An important contribution of Charteris-Black’s work on metaphor analysis of 
political discourse is how an analysis of metaphors occurring in political speeches 
reveals the myths on which ideology is based.  In other words, Charteris-Black 
established the interrelationship of the three concepts important to the study of 
political discourse—metaphors, ideology, and myth. 
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 Charteris-Black (2005, 21) argues that metaphors mediate between myth and 
ideology. Ideology, he describes, is ‘a consciously formulated set of ideas that 
comprise an organized and systematic representation of the world and therefore forms 
the basis for acting in the world.’  In this study, ideology is defined as a representation 
of the state of affairs of a nation or society from an interested perspective.  Myth, on 
the other hand, ‘is a common way of communicating ideology’ (21).  Charteris-Black 
explains that a myth   
 
… is a story that provides an explanation of all the things for which 
explanations are felt to be necessary.  Myth engages the hearer by providing a 
narrative that embodies a set of beliefs expressing aspects of the unconscious. 
It provides a narrative-based representation of intangible experiences that are 
evocative because they are unconsciously linked to emotions such as sadness, 
happiness or fear.  Its function in discourse is to explain with a view either to 
entertain or gain power. Myth is therefore a two-sided weapon that can be 
used for evaluation with a positive or a negative purpose’ (22-23).   
 
 
Metaphors are used to legitimize an ideology through the creation of myths.  In using 
the expression ‘tough love’, for instance, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo conjured a story 
where in her government acted with parental care.  Such role justified Arroyo’s rather 
unpopular economic policies like the expanded value added tax.  Another example 
would be her use of the expression ‘working president’ to represent her role as 
national leader.  The expression suggests a story of a hardworking female president 
that is the opposite of her predecessor (Estrada).  The expression, of course, boosted 
her waning popularity and lent legitimacy to her perennially challenged presidency 
(see Chapters 8 and 9).  Metaphors, in other words, trigger or activate myths or 
narrative representations that enable the audience to attach positive (or negative) 
evaluations to a politician’s beliefs and policies which, needless to say, are 
ideologically rooted.  As Charteris-Black articulates clearly, ‘metaphor provides the 
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crucial link between semi-conscious cultural knowledge of myths and conscious 
political ideologies.  By drawing on deeply rooted cultural schemata politicians are 
able to represent their beliefs and their policies as heroic tasks and themselves as epic 
heroes’ (208). 
3.5.4 Metaphors and ideographs 
Another rhetorical resource that works in combination with metaphors is the 
ideograph (an analytical concept particularly used in Chapter 8).  Ideographs are 
slogan-like terms (e.g., ‘freedom of speech,’ ‘rule of law,’ ‘clash of civilizations’) that 
functions as guides, warrants, reasons, or excuses for behavior and belief’ (McGee 
1980/2000, 459).29  I suggest that there are at least two ways by which we can think 
about the relationship of metaphors and ideographs in political discourse.  First, 
metaphors may be viewed as a means to recontextualize30 ideographs. Second, 
metaphors may be seen as rhetorical resources working in conjunction with 
ideographs as well as other rhetorical strategies.  
Such recontextualization may be further divided into at least two possible 
strategies: re-semanticization and re-lexicalization.  Metaphors, because they view 
terms conventionally understood in one domain or context through another domain or 
context, may be seen as a means of recontextualization.  Metaphors have the capacity 
then to refashion, redefine or re-semanticize ideographic terms which are pervasive in 
                                                 
29 An explanation of ideograph is offered by McGee (1980/2000, 467):  ‘An ideograph is an ordinary-
language term found in political discourse.  It is a high-order abstraction representing collective 
commitment to particular but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal.  It warrants the use of power, 
excuses behavior and belief which might otherwise be perceived as eccentric or antisocial, and guides 
behavior and belief into channels easily recognized by a community as acceptable and laudable. 
Ideographs are culture-bound, though some terms are used in different signification across cultures.  
Each member of the community is socialized, conditioned, to the vocabulary of ideographs as a 
prerequisite for ‘belonging’ to the society.’  
 





the rhetoric of political speeches. Needless to say, they add new meaning to popular 
slogans. Re-lexicalization is somewhat the reverse of re-semanticization. In this case, 
the value of the ideograph remains, but its linguistic form changes. It is re-worded or 
rephrased. Using the terms of Saussurean linguistics, I view re-lexicalization as a case 
where the signified or usage and meaning persist, but the signifier changes.  Both re-
semanticization and re-lexicalization may be interpreted as attempts to localize or 
make more relevant issues or areas of concern to the existing public ideologies and 
attitudes.  It may also be a means to boost public acceptance or goad disapproval of 
policies and public personalities.  An example of a re-semanticized ideograph would 
be the term ‘war on terror’ which was conceptualized as ‘war on poverty’ and a 
curative in Arroyo’s SONAs to make the term relevant to the national context (see 
Chapter 8).  Relexicalization is apparent in the use of the term ‘people empowered 
economy’ as a rewording of the term liberal economy (see Chapter 5).  The term 
‘people empowered economy’ draws upon the positive valuation associated with the 
‘people power’ phenomenon which ended more than a decade of dictatorial rule. 
I suggest that ideographs working in conjunction with metaphors and other 
rhetorical strategies contribute to the persuasiveness or ‘persuasive power’ of political 
discourse. I cite as an example the interaction of the ideographic expression ‘war on 
terror’ with the term ‘strong republic’ metaphorized as an effective instrument in 
nation-building in Arroyo’s earlier SONAs (see Chapter 8).  Realized in the texts, the 
expressions sent off the message that Arroyo was keen on having a strong and 
effective state under her watch.  As suggested in the example, the combination of 
ideographs and metaphors in political discourse is usually strategic in that it pursues 
certain political agenda.  These agenda include among others the representation of 
leadership from an interested perspective as well as the legitimization of it.  As 
Navera 64 
 
indicated earlier, the interaction between metaphors and ideographs is shown in 
Chapter 8 which focuses on how the ‘war on terror’ discourse was recontextualized 
by Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in her political speeches. 
3.6 Analytical framework and method 
The theoretical perspectives and concepts mentioned above inform what I 
suggest is a schema-theoretic framework for the critical analysis of Philippine 
presidential discourse.  In this section, I explain how this analytical framework is 
employed in the reading of the SONAs.  First, I define the analytical categories that I 
employ in the analysis of the texts.  Along with the definitions, I also provide 
clarification with regard to my use of certain terms like ‘metaphorize’/ 
‘metaphorization’, ‘metaphorical conceptualization’, and ‘conceptualization’.  
Second, I recount how I delimited the scope of the study through the identification of 
the focal themes.  Finally, I explain the method of analysis by illustrating the levels of 
my analysis (Figure 3.1).  A diagram of the schema theoretic framework (Figure 3.2) 
is also provided to illustrate how the analytical categories relate to each other. 
3.6.1 Analytical categories and some terminological clarifications 
 As discussed in the previous sections, I employ the following terms in my 
analysis of the SONAs:  themes, metaphors, conceptual metaphors, conceptual 
frames/ frames, and schemas.  In the course of my analysis, I also employ the 
concepts of self-representation and othering, ideographs, political myths, and the 
rhetorical proofs—all of which I consider as rhetorical strategies and whose 
theoretical underpinnings have been explicated in 3.5.  As I define the terms, I shall 
also clarify my use of such terms as ‘metaphorize’, ‘metaphorical conceptualization’, 
‘conceptualization.’  All these key terms will be presented in bold fonts in this section 
for the benefit of the reader. 
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 By themes, I refer to the major topics or target domains that are dealt with in 
the analysis of the SONAs.  They are abstract domains constantly discussed in the 
SONAs and may therefore be considered staple topics in Philippine presidential 
rhetoric.  The focal themes in the analysis of the presidential speeches are (1) 
democracy, (2) national economy, (3) peace and security, and (4) the presidency. 
In my framework, I adopt Charteris-Black’s (2005) definition of linguistic 
metaphors as lexico-grammatical expressions that suggest personification, 
depersonification or reification of topics/ target domains/ abstract terms.  These 
expressions are underlain by conceptual metaphors, which are statements that 
resolve the semantic tension among a set of related linguistic metaphors (Charteris-
Black 2005; Lakoff and Johnson 1980). 
I regard conceptual metaphors as conceptualizations that suggest a 
perspective or way of looking at a specific target domain or topic or abstract term.  
Conceptualizations necessarily recontextualize the target domain in that they imply a 
certain representation of such domain. However, not all conceptualizations are 
metaphorical. They may be literal statements that also suggest a perspective or 
representation of a domain or topic or abstract term.  What differentiates a 
metaphorical conceptualization from a non-metaphorical conceptualization (literal 
statement) is that the former suggests a semantic tension between the target domain 
(topic) and the source domain (vehicle/ suggested perspective or representation), a 
domain that is usually more concrete or culturally familiar (Kovecses 2005). 
Related to the above-mentioned terms is the notion of metaphorization.  I use 
the term metaphorization to refer to the metaphoric process of conceptualizing a 
domain of experience using another domain.  To metaphorize is therefore to 
personify, depersonify or to render a domain of experience or a topic as an object.   It 
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involves recontextualization, that is, the representation of a topic or domain of 
experience using another context.  It necessitates that a particular domain of 
experience be viewed from another lens. Metaphorizing therefore entails the 
dislocation from one context or position and a relocation to another. 
I use the term frame or conceptual frame to refer to a statement that 
subsumes a set of related conceptualizations including conceptual metaphors.  It is a 
macro-conceptualization that encompasses conceptualizations that underlie lexico-
grammatical expressions in texts and talk.  It is a general statement that subsumes 
other conceptualizations including conceptual metaphors.  The term is particularly 
useful in the analysis in that it deals with multiple themes in the speeches of four 
presidents.  How each of the themes is framed by each of the presidents is therefore a 
point for comparative and contrastive analysis. 
The term schema as used in the analytical framework is a configuration of 
conceptual frames.  A complex of frames, the schema may be represented by a series 
of interrelated frames. In discourse, it may be realized as a story or a set of 
interrelated propositions or premises that establish a claim. Like the conceptual 
frames, the schemas (their verbalizations are shown in Table 11 in Chapter 10.4 of 
this thesis) serve as points for comparative as well as contrastive analysis.  They are 
particularly useful in showing commonalities and variations in the ways the four 
presidencies under study cognitively structured the national situation and national 
leadership. 
By rhetorical strategies, I refer to the rhetorical proofs, self-representation 
and othering, political myths, and ideographs.  Their theoretical underpinnings and 
some relevant examples of how they are used in this work are provided in the earlier 
sections of this chapter (see 3.5.1, 3.5.2, 3.5.3, and 3.5.4).  What I wish to reiterate 
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here is that the metaphors generated from the speeches actually function as and/or 
work in conjunction with these rhetorical strategies. The pertinent sections mentioned 
show some specific instances of how these rhetorical strategies figure in the analysis 
of the SONAs. 
The analytical categories constitute a four-level analytical framework which is 
illustrated in Figure 3.2 under section 3.6.3.  I wish to note here that the seemingly 
complex and multi-layered framework of analysis is motivated by the scope and 
complexity of the data set.  In this study, I am dealing with conceptualizations of 4 
themes across 23 presidential speeches delivered by 4 presidencies.  Each level of 
analysis requires a category that would enable the analyst to make systematic detailed 
explications as well as a comparative and contrastive study.  At the level of text, 
metaphorical expressions (working as or in conjunction with other rhetorical 
strategies) provide evidentiary basis for the conceptual metaphors that underlie 
expositions of a particular theme, say, democracy.   
The category of conceptual frame is especially useful when the multiple 
themes examined in this study are taken into account.  As there are multiple 
conceptual metaphors that underlie expressions having to do with a particular theme, 
the conceptual frame allows the analyst to make a general statement that subsumes 
related conceptual metaphors on the specific theme.  The general statements provided 
by conceptual frames allow for easy references when the configuration of 
conceptualizations of various themes (in the case of this study, there are four themes) 
in the speeches made by a particular president is discussed. For example, in his latter 
SONAs, Ramos’ framed democracy as precursor to economic development as shown 
by two conceptual metaphors that he used: DEMOCRACY IS A COMPARATIVE 
ADVANTAGE and DEMOCRACY IS A COMPETITIVE EDGE. Such conceptual frame ran 
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consistent with how he framed the national economy in most of his presidential 
rhetoric: a competitor in the global economic arena.  This frame is constituted by 
conceptual metaphors that view the global economic order as BASED ON SURVIVAL OF 
THE FITTEST, A SPORTS ARENA and AN ADVENTURE. This goes to show that as far as 
Ramos was concerned, democracy functions as an aid towards economic 
competitiveness; it must be used to survive in the global economic order (For further 
analysis, see Chapter 6 and Chapter 10.2.2.).  Also, the use of the category of 
conceptual frame facilitates the comparative analysis of conceptualizations of the 
same theme across four presidencies.31 
The schema is a category most useful in the comparative analysis of the four 
presidencies.  Each presidency constitute a schema—a ‘super story’ to borrow a 
phrase from Freidman (2002) or an overall framework that contains and establishes 
the relationship of conceptual frames and conceptual metaphors of the themes under 
study.  This analytical category is also useful in comparing and contrasting each of the 
four presidencies against that of Marcos, that is, how they might have sustained 
and/or deviated from the rhetorical choices made by the dictator. 
3.6.2 Identification of themes 
To delimit the scope of the study and facilitate the reading of all 23 speeches 
included in the research, I chose to focus on what I considered as major themes across 
the post-Marcos SONAs.  A survey of the SONAs gathered from the published 
collections of presidential speeches, the Philippine president’s webpage, and the 
                                                 
31 If a work focuses solely on conceptualization of one theme or idea—and this is evident in the works 
of Lakoff  (2006b) which explains how ‘freedom’ is framed by the conservatives and progressives and 
of Condit and Lucaites (1993) which examines the use of the word ‘equality’ in American rhetoric—
then the distinction between frame and conceptual metaphor may not be necessary.  It may then be 
possible to just use the category of conceptual metaphor or the broader term conceptualization in the 
comparative analysis of how different presidencies have conceptualized the theme. 
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archives and library collection of the House of Representatives in Quezon City, 
Philippines was conducted to identify the common themes and issues salient across all 
23 of them.  I also examined published historical accounts and documents on the 
Marcos authoritarian regime (from 1972 to 1986) and the presidencies of Corazon C. 
Aquino, Fidel V. Ramos, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to 
get a good grasp of the socio-political and historical milieu within which the public 
addresses were situated.  The collection and examination of these historical accounts 
and documents was made possible by a three-month library research in a number of 
libraries and research centers in the Philippines:  the library and archival sections of 
the Philippine House of Representatives; the University of the Philippines Main 
Library’s Filipiniana section; the library of the UP National College of Public 
Administration and Governance; the library of the Philippine Center for Investigative 
Journalism (PCIJ); and the library of IBON Foundation, an independent think tank 
that regularly publishes analyses on the socio-economic and political situation in the 
Philippines.  Crucial for my identification of the focal themes was an account of the 
socio-political situation in the Philippines during the final year of the Marcos 
presidency (see Chapter 4) and the Aquino administration’s assessment of its 
presidential term (see Abueva and Roman, 1993).  The former was significant in that 
it highlighted the issues and concerns to which the post-Marcos presidential 
leadership was positioned to respond while the latter showed what the immediate 
post-Marcos presidency (i.e., the presidency of Corazon C. Aquino) considered as 
vital national concerns that succeeding presidencies were posed to address or build 
on.  I had also taken into consideration the common visions and themes identified by 
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Malaya and Malaya (2004) in Philippine presidential inaugural addresses from the 
time of Emilio Aguinaldo in 1899 to that of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in 2004.32  
Given my initial engagement with the primary texts, my knowledge and 
understanding of the socio-political milieu of the period under investigation as well as 
previous accounts of the major issues and concerns that confronted the four post-
Marcos presidencies under question (Malaya and Malaya 2004, Cortes 1999, Martinez 
1999), I had identified the following focal themes: democracy, national economy, 
peace and security, and the presidency.  I found these focal themes useful for the 
analysis in that they were broad enough to subsume the more specific issues and 
concerns common across the post-Marcos SONAs.  For instance, discussions on the 
issue of poverty and economic relations with other countries necessarily fell under the 
theme of national economy.  The more specific concern on insurgency was logically 
subsumed under the theme of peace and security while issues on graft and corruption 
were placed under the theme of the presidency which covered issues on governance 
and public service. 
3.6.3 Method of analysis 
With the focal themes identified, I pursued the analysis of data based on how 
each presidency developed each theme.  In analyzing the SONAs of each president, I 
focused on portions of the speeches that explicate or discuss a focal theme. From 
these extracts, I identified the metaphorical expressions relevant to the focal theme.  
                                                 
32The themes identified by Malaya and Malaya are ‘the call for unity,’ ‘freedom,’ ‘democracy,’ 
‘citizenship,’ ‘economic growth and development,’ ‘poverty,’ ‘peace and order’ (especially during the 
post-war era), ‘Philippine-American relations,’ ‘graft and corruption,’ ‘heroism,’ ‘Divine Providence,’ 
‘the silent majority,’ and ‘the people’ (2004, 1-12).  
It should be noted that inaugural addresses are inextricably linked to the SONAs in that the 
visions and general statements in the former are substantiated and mapped in the latter discourses 
(Campbell and Jamieson 2008). However, since SONAs are situated within the context of the 
presidential term and not on day one of the presidential term, their concerns are more specific than 




Since metaphorical expressions having to do with the focal theme were varied (that is, 
various source domains or vehicles were used to express a focal theme), several 
clusters of related metaphorical expressions were generated.  From these clusters of 
metaphorical expressions, I derived the underlying conceptual metaphors, which are 
represented in the analysis as A is B (e.g., DEMOCRACY IS A CURE TO THE NATIONAL 
ILLS).  To illustrate this point, I present the following extracts from the SONAs of 
Corazon C. Aquino: 
 
1. I believe that nowhere could you find more effective cures for the ills of 
our country—such as the habit of oppression, the inclination to corruption, 
the betrayal of public interest—than in the blessings of democracy: 
freedom; rights; transparent dealings; and a government of the people by 
the people themselves. (1988) 
 
2. The failed adventurism has underscored the fact that our restored 
democracy has gone past its fledgling stage. (1990) 
 
3. Democracy, once a word, is now alive: this is our legacy. (1991) 
 
 
The extracts above, taken from SONAs delivered in 1988, 1990 and 1991, all deal 
with the theme of democracy. Metaphorical expressions are indicated using italics.  
The first extract metaphorizes democracy as a ‘cure for the ills of the country’ 
suggesting the conceptual metaphor DEMOCRACY IS A CURE TO THE NATIONAL ILLS; 
the last two express democracy as a living (‘alive’) and evolving (‘has gone past its 
fledgling state’) organism, thus, the conceptual metaphor DEMOCRACY IS A LIVING 
ENTITY.  Further examination of the Aquino SONAs would show various 
metaphorical expressions that suggest other conceptual metaphors such as 
DEMOCRACY IS A BENEFACTOR OF THE PEOPLE, DEMOCRACY IS RESOURCE FOR 
PEOPLE POWER, and DEMOCRACY IS A FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT TO A PEOPLE-
POWERED ECONOMY/ CAPITALISM CONDUCIVE TO GROWTH (see Chapter 5.3.4). 
These conceptual metaphors relate to the conceptual metaphor DEMOCRACY IS A 
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CURE TO THE NATIONAL ILLS suggested by extract 1.  They are related in that the 
domains suggested by the terms ‘CURE TO THE NATIONAL ILLS’, ‘BENEFACTOR’, 
‘RESOURCE FOR PEOPLE POWER’, ‘FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT TO A PEOPLE-
POWERED ECONOMY/ CAPITALISM CONDUCIVE TO GROWTH’ yield the broader 
conceptual metaphor DEMOCRACY IS A LIFE-SUSTAINING SYSTEM.  In addition to the 
conceptual metaphors DEMOCRACY IS A LIFE-SUSTAINING SYSTEM and DEMOCRACY 
IS A LIVING ENTITY cued by extracts 2 and 3, several other conceptualizations relevant 
to the theme of democracy have been generated in the analysis of the Aquino SONAs 
(see Chapter 5.3).  These conceptual metaphors include DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL 
ACHIEVEMENT and DEMOCRACY IS PEOPLE-EMPOWERMENT. 
Now, the conceptual metaphors generated from the various clusters of related 
metaphorical expressions on democracy are considered in the analysis as constitutive 
of a macro-conceptualization on democracy, which is referred to in the analytical 
chapters as the conceptual frame.  The conceptual frame is an overarching or general 
statement that shows the relationship of these various conceptual metaphors on a focal 
theme and is represented in the analysis in bold caps, that is, A is B.  In the illustration 
I have just demonstrated, the two conceptual metaphors DEMOCRACY IS A LIVING 
ENTITY and DEMOCRACY IS A LIFE-SUSTAINING SYSTEM combined with other 
conceptual metaphors posited from other extracts on democracy (i.e., DEMOCRACY IS 
A NATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT, DEMOCRACY IS PEOPLE-EMPOWERMENT) would yield 
the following frame:  DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING ENTITY THAT SUSTAINS 





Figure 3.1 An illustration of the levels of metaphorical analysis 
 
The above illustration suggests how the conceptual frame on the theme of 
democracy in the Aquino SONAs is generated.  As there are three other themes 
examined in this thesis (i.e, national economy, peace and security, and the 
presidency), at least three other frames are generated in the analysis of the Aquino 
speeches.  The group of conceptual frames of the four focal themes present across a 
set of SONAs is regarded in this study as that which would constitute a schema of the 
‘state of the nation’ and of presidential leadership.  In my analytical framework, I 
view the schema as an overarching analytical category—a broad mental structure that 
is constituted by the conceptual frames.  The schema is multilayered and complex as 
its constituent units are, but its general or overall structure may be based on the 
patterns suggested by the frames that constitute it.  How conceptual frames make up 
or configure the schema would then form the basis for comparing and contrasting one 
presidential schema to another or for checking out commonalities and variations 
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across the post-Marcos presidencies.  Specifically, they show how stable or fluid the 
conceptualizations of democracy, national economy, peace and security, and the 
presidency are over a period of time.  The stability in conceptualization or framing 
would of course show continuities in terms of ideologies or perspectives in leadership; 
while fluidities would reflect changes in the way the four themes are talked about 
across the four presidencies.  Moreover, a comparative analysis of the presidential 
schemas, which is offered in Chapter 10, would show whether the four post-Marcos 
presidencies had moved centripetally towards or centrifugally against how the state of 
the nation and Philippine presidential leadership had been conceptualized in the 
rhetoric of Marcos’ authoritarian rule. 
When using the analytical framework, I suggest two general functions of 
schemas:  schemas either reflect current socio-political realities or they reconstitute 
the way we view or experience these socio-political realities.  The first engages in 
reproduction or reaffirmation of ideologies, taken-for-granted notions or existing 
dominant discourses while the second engages in recontextualizing and recreating 
these ideologies, notions or discourses, making it possible for alteration, subversion or 
change to happen. 
When schemas reproduce the status quo, it means that the frames and 
metaphorizations used in political texts that constitute them sustain existing realities. 
They re-express what is and in the process reinforce, continue or perpetuate what 
dominates or what is taken for granted.  On the other hand, when schemas 
reconstitute, that is, alter the form of existing realities, it implies that their constituent 
frames and their metaphorizations in political texts deviate from, subvert or replace 
the old ones.  They destabilize and discontinue notions that are almost always taken 
for granted and offer new ways of experiencing or dealing with socio-political 
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realities.  This may bring about change in the way a government manages constraints 
of a given situation and may most likely define the kind of policies that it decides to 
pursue. 
In the analysis of the SONAs, I also take note of the intertextualities and 
recontextualizations exploited by the post-Marcos presidencies.  As the SONAs are 
considered intertexts, the analysis of the presidential speeches establishes reference or 
allusions to previous ones delivered by preceding national leaders.  The SONAs are 
also viewed in relation to Marcos’ authoritarian rhetoric; thus, how such rhetoric had 
been sustained or challenged in the post-Marcos SONAs are likewise taken into 
account.  Moreover, the SONAs of each of the four presidents are seen as discourses 
that draw upon personal histories (including personal brands used in political 
campaigns such as the image of Estrada as tough guy with a heart of gold), accounts 
of national history as well as the existing socio-political structure.  In other words, the 
political texts are treated as recontextualizations of the constraints of the past and the 
present state of affairs. 
 Figure 3.2 on the next page shows a diagrammatic representation of the 























































 This chapter provides an historical context to the succeeding analytical 
chapters on the post-Marcos presidential rhetoric. It puts together secondary literature 
on the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos from 1972, during which time he imposed 
martial law in the Philippines, to his ouster from public office through a popular mass 
demonstration in 1986. 
 Specifically, it aims to outline the justifications or lines of reasoning employed 
by President Ferdinand Marcos for the imposition of martial law in September 1972. 
It also aims to account for the social, economic, and political situation from the time 
martial law was imposed to the end of his presidency. As a corollary to this, the 
chapter also recounts the events that led to the peaceful overthrow of the Marcos 
regime. Moreover, the chapter discusses issues and concerns that were considered 
crucial to the administration that would eventually replace that of Marcos.  Finally, it 
provides a metaphorical analysis of Marcos’ rhetoric from the time he imposed 
martial law to his final year in power, with the intention of articulating the salient 
conceptualizations that the presidencies after Marcos were positioned to address. 
 
4.1       The Marcos presidency before martial law 
 Ferdinand Edralin Marcos became the 10th president of the Republic of the 
Philippines in December 1965.  In his first term of office (1965-1969), Marcos set out 
to realize his grand pronouncement during his inaugural that ‘This nation will be great 
again.’  He pursued ‘an unprecedented national development agenda in response to 
the sociopolitical, cultural, and economic problems besetting the young nation’ 
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(Meimban 1999, 215).  His programs included effective tax collection, enactment of 
new tax legislation, and securing foreign loan through the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).  He also launched the ‘green revolution’ aimed at 
increasing rice productivity and ‘an ambitious and visionary infrastructure program 
which covered the construction of networks of roads and bridges throughout the 
length and breadth of the more than 7,100 islands composing the country’ (216). In 
October 1966, he hosted the Manila Summit Conference attended by six heads of 
states including that of the United States. The summit gave birth to the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization (SEATO), which was ‘intended to contain the spread of 
communism in Southeast Asia’ (ibid.).  
 While Marcos, in his first term of office, as described by one historian, ‘made 
strides in the fields of education, agriculture, industry, and technology’ (Meimban, 
216), political scientist Maria Lourdes Rebullida pointed out that such was only one 
side of the picture. ‘The other side of the picture appeared to be the dark, cloak-and-
dagger scenes involving Ferdinand Marcos’s political manipulation, financial 
schemes and sex scandals that eventually leaked out to the media and came to public 
knowledge, to some extent.  (First Lady) Imelda Marcos’s political style and 
predispositions to power also evoked antagonism’ (2006, 157). 
 In fact, from 1966 to 1968, the deteriorating peace and order situation in the 
country became the most pressing problem Marcos faced in his first term of office 
(Meimban, 216). The period witnessed the massacre of seven farmers suspected of 
being Huk33 sympathizers in Central Luzon, the killing of thirty-two bolo-wielding 
                                                 
33 The term ‘Huk’ pertained to any of armed communist rebels who waged war against what it 
perceived as pro-US leaders of the Philippine Republic installed after Independence from the US 
colonial government in 1946. The term was derived from ‘Hukbalahap’ (an acronym for Hukbo ng 
Bayan Laban sa Hapon or People’s Army against the Japanese), a group of Filipino rebels who fought 
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members of ‘Lapiang Malaya’ in Metro Manila, and the Jabidah massacre and cover-
up in Corregidor Island, which involved the killing of para-military troops being 
trained for what was purported to be a planned invasion of Sabah over which the 
Philippines had territorial claims (ibid.). Senator Benigno Aquino Jr., a staunch critic 
of Marcos, exposed before members of the Philippine Senate the Jabidah cover-up in 
a 1968 privileged speech titled ‘A Garrison State in the Make.’ 
 Presidential historian Adriel Obar Meimban noted that the late 1960s, during 
which time the Marcos presidency encountered socio-political disturbances, was a 
period when two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—were 
engaged in a cold war, an ideological conflict that pitted America’s concept of 
democracy against Soviet Union’s brand of communism.   
In the meantime, the People’s Republic of China was experiencing 
‘revolutionary activities’ through the leadership of Mao Tse Tung, whose socialist 
beliefs attracted students and peasant masses in the Philippines.  A divided Vietnam 
was engaged in civil warfare with Southern part aided by the United States (ibid.).  
The Philippines, which had maintained strong ties with the US since its independence 
and which was then considered a model of liberal democracy in Asia, was positioned 
to help contain the spread of the communist ideology in the region.  
In 1969, Ferdinand Marcos ran for reelection and became the first Philippine 
president to win a second term.  His election as second term president was marred by 
accusations of massive cheating34 and the use of what is touted in Philippine politics 
                                                                                                                                            
the Japanese colonial forces during the Second World War. The group eventually became the military 
arm of the Partido ng Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP). 
 
34 Alex Bello Brillantes in his book ‘Dictatorship and Martial Law: Philippine Authoritarianism in 
1972’ (Quezon City: Great Books Publishers, 1987) wrote that ‘[the] Presidential elections on 
November 1969 between incumbent President Ferdinand Marcos and challenger Sergio Osmena 
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as ‘guns, goons, and gold’ (Rebullida, 2006; Meimban, 1999; IBON Foundation, 
1985).  This and the deepening socio-economic and political crisis of the period 
generated ‘general social discontent’ in the country (Rebullida, 157). 
 
4.2       The martial law of 1972: Rhetoric and reason  
The conditions of general social discontent during the second term of Marcos 
were articulated through student demonstrations, radical activism, labor unrest, 
agrarian conflict, and domestic insurgency (Meimban, 217; Rebullida, 157). Noting 
that by the time Marcos assumed his second term, ‘Philippine politics had become 
intense,’ Rebullida writes:  
 
Student activism was on the rise and the demonstrations at the Malacañang35 
on January 30, 1970, and at Congress on February 3, 1970, caused the Senate 
to create an investigating committee. The core issues identified by the Senate 
committee and decried by mobilized groups of peasants, workers, teachers and 
jeepney drivers, among others included the economic crisis, unemployment, 
devaluation, government extravagance, and high prices of commodities. There 
was opposition to Marcos’s government policies, to graft and corruption in 
government. There was ideological ferment evidenced by the rise of left-
leaning groups and communist insurgency that called attention to feudalism, 
imperialism and bureaucrat capitalism. There were reported killings, 
bombings, breakdown of law and order, and warlordism of politicians in 
different parts of the country. The August 21, 1971, bombing at the Liberal 
Party proclamation rally held in Plaza Miranda causing death and injury had 
shaken the nation; the victory of the opposition candidates in the 1971 
(congressional) elections signaled the challenge to Marcos. (ibid.) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
marked one of the most bitter, expensive, and violent elections in Philippine history. It was also one of 
the dirtiest national elections. Newspapers, radio and television broadcasts carried reports of numerous 
elections irregularities, including massive vote-buying, ballot box stuffing, and cheating. Thus were the 
conditions when President Marcos assumed his second and last four-year term of office. His opponent, 
alleging massive fraud and cheating, never conceded’ (128). 
 




In 1972, a year before the end of his second term as president, Marcos 
declared martial law, citing that it was a constitutional means necessary for ‘the 
preservation of the Republic’ and the ‘reconstruction of society.’  
4.2.1    The theory of democratic revolution 
In justifying the imposition of martial law in the Philippines, Marcos invoked 
his theory of ‘democratic revolution,’ which he also referred to as the ‘revolution 
from the center’ or ‘constitutional revolution.’ He would also later justify the 
consolidated powers of his executive leadership seen during the period of martial law 
by stating that it was a form of ‘constitutional authoritarianism.’ 
Presidential Proclamation 1081 (‘Proclaiming the State of Martial Law in the 
Philippines’) was signed on 21 September 1972 with the following aims: to protect 
the Republic from subversive elements purportedly ‘conspiring to seize political and 
state power by means of anarchy, rebellion and secession’ and ‘to remove the causes 
of popular grievance which had accumulated through decades of neglect and 
oppression and given rise to discontent, chaos and violence, and thereby reestablish 
democracy, restore individual rights, and promote the welfare of the Filipino 
people.’36 The presidential proclamation was anchored on the 1935 Philippine 
Constitution, particularly Article 7, Section 10, paragraph 2 which allowed the 
president to declare martial law in case of imminent threat or danger to the Republic.  
PP 1081 was later sustained by another proclamation which declared the continuation 
of martial law and whose validity was affirmed by the Supreme Court.  Rebullida puts 
this Marcosian agenda quite succinctly: ‘In ideological rhetoric, Marcos promised to 
save the republic, restore peace, and order by military means, and establish a New 
                                                 
36 These reasons were reiterated in Presidential Proclamation 2045 signed in 1981 terminating the state 




Society anchored on social transformation, equality, and democratic participation to 
prevent rebellion from the poor’ (159). 
Two publications by Ferdinand Marcos articulate his rationale for 
implementing martial law: Today’s Revolution: Democracy published in 1971 during 
which time Marcos suspended the writ of habeas corpus37 and Notes on the New 
Society of the Philippines (1973) published a year after he declared martial law 
(Rebullida 2006, 158).  In 1974, he published ‘The Democratic Revolution in the 
Philippines’ which put together the two earlier publications. 
In Today’s Revolution: Democracy (1971), Marcos talked of a ‘revolution 
from the center’ which he explained is ‘an act of direct non-violent confrontation 
against the oligarchy of the Philippines.’ It is supposed to mediate ‘between the 
majority of the poor masses and the minority of the landed, industrial, business and 
commercial elites’ (Rebullida 2006, 158).  The ‘revolution from the center’ warns and 
rejects totalitarianism of both rightist and leftist extremists. It is a ‘democratic 
revolution’—a supposed peaceful means of addressing the socio-political problems of 
the Philippines and ‘engaging in deep and far-ranging changes in the country’ (ibid.).  
Marcos reasoned that his call for ‘democratic revolution’ was sanctioned by 
the 1935 Constitution.  Moreover, the ‘democratic revolution’ was intended to bring 
about the ‘New Society’ which was to replace the old one that according to Marcos 
had ‘reached such a condition that a powerful few, the nation’s oligarchy, held in their 
hands the lives and fates of millions of other citizens’ (1974/1977, 320).  This 
condition of extreme inequity purportedly fueled the rising social activism and leftist 
                                                 
37 The writ of habeas corpus was suspended immediately after grenades exploded at a rally in Plaza 
Miranda killing and injuring senatorial candidates of the opposition. The suspension was lifted after six 





rebellion in the late 1960s and early 1970s—during the second presidential term of 
Marcos—that the ‘revolution from the center’ aimed to quell. 
Notes on the New Society of the Philippines (1973) is somewhat a follow up to 
the earlier publication.  It takes account of the rise of communist rebellion against the 
Philippine republic. In this book, Marcos disclosed documents that revealed activities 
of the extremists from the left and right of the political spectrum, ‘plots to assassinate 
him, shipment of firearms and ammunition, infiltration by subversives of government 
programs, and bombings in different areas’ (Rebullida, 158).  
Marcos rationalized martial law by warning the people of the dangers of the 
communism and the rightist conspiracy.  Rebullida notes that, ‘In [Marcos’] rhetoric, 
martial law and the New Society would target the major threats to the republic, 
namely, communist revolutionaries, rightist conspiracy, Muslim secession, private 
armies and political warlords, rampant corruption, criminal elements, oligarchy, social 
injustice, foreign interventions’ (159). These ‘threats’ to the republic, it must be 
noted, both included existing and long standing problems (i.e., private armies and 
political warlords, rampant corruption, criminal elements, oligarchy, social injustice, 
foreign interventions) as well as imminent ones (i.e., communist revolutionaries, 
rightist conspiracy, Muslim secession). 
In his preface to the book The Democratic Revolution of the Philippines 
(1974/1977), which combines his two earlier publications, Marcos expounded what 
the New Society entailed:  
 
The New Society in which Filipinos live today maybe described as their 
emancipation from an old society whose hallmark was injustice, the supreme 
injustice in which equality of opportunity was withheld from them by an 
oligarchy that appropriated for itself all power and bounty. The New Society is 
in fact a revolution of the poor.  By means of it, Filipinos today are attempting, 
through disciplined vision, to make the rewards of their labors and the fruits of 
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their resources available to all.  By means of it, they are walking out of a 
stupor filled with Walter Mitty fantasies, the opium of the oppressed and 
underprivileged.  To share together in real life is the heart of democracy.  
Accordingly, the New Society is democratizing the wealth of the nation, 
striving to move democracy from cloud to hovel. ( 8) 
 
Marcos found an ally in Carlos P. Romulo, diplomat and one-time chairman of 
the United Nations Security Council.  Romulo, who provided the foreword to the third 
edition of The Democratic Revolution, wrote:   
 
For all the radical rhetoric reverberating in the political forums, he (Marcos) 
knew that the noisiest voices were those who were actually against social 
change: radical rhetoric was employed merely to catapult the power-seekers to 
power.  This sort of thing could, perhaps, be tolerated in a stable developed 
society. But in Philippine society this rhetoric could only foster a revolution 
that was bloody and catastrophic—in Marcos’s words, a Jacobin not a liberal 
revolution. (20) 
  
In his book, Marcos asserted that the rightists and leftists were one in targeting 
his central authority as President.  He said: 
 
Both the reactionary Right and the radical Left found a common focal point 
and symbol for their plans: Ferdinand E. Marcos.  By concentrating on the 
singular person of the president, the conspirators on the one hand, and the 
revolutionaries on the other, were able to concretize for their propaganda 
purposes the complexities of social unrest and the justification of their aims.  
This is the standard technique of propaganda warfare; the creation of a 
scapegoat, a sacrificial lamb. (139) 
 
 
Brillantes (1987), however, noted several fundamental inconsistencies between 
Marcos’ official explanation of martial law and PP 1081, a legal document. One 
inconsistency worth mentioning in this chapter is the fact that while Marcos claimed 
that the imposition of martial law was in response to the purported conspiracies of the 
rightists and leftists to overthrow the government, he made no mention of the rightist 
plot to overthrow the government in the legal document.  Brillantes pointed out that 
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‘everything is attributed to the left’ (131).  If one reexamines PP 1081,38 it would be 
quite easy to infer that it is a well documented account of the activities of the radical 
left—the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed group, the New 
People’s Army (NPA)—at the time.  It most certainly takes note of the increase in the 
number of armed rebels as shown, for instance, by one of the following ‘facts’ cited to 
establish the difficulty in containing ‘the present rebellion and lawlessness in the 
country’: 
 
The New People’s Army, the most active and the most violent and ruthless 
military arm of the radical left, has increased its total strength from an 
estimated 6,500 (composed of 560 regulars, 1,500 combat support and 4,400 
service support) as of January 1, 1972 to about 7,900 (composed of 1,028 
regulars, 1,800 combat support and 5,025 service support) as of July 31, 1972, 
showing a marked increase in its regular troops of over 100% in such a short 
period of six months. (Presidential Proclamation 1081, 1972) 
 
 
The same document also asserted that ‘the rebellion and armed action undertaken by 
these lawless elements of the communist and other armed aggrupations organized to 
overthrow the Republic of the Philippines by armed violence and force have assumed 
the magnitude of an actual state of war against our people and the Republic of the 
Philippines’ (ibid.). 
One of the Philippine’s foremost essayists, Conrado de Quiros, observed that 
the practice of ‘bloating the size of communists’ dated back to the first post-World 
War II Philippine presidential administration, the early years of Independence. In his 
book, Dead Aim: How Marcos Ambushed Philippine Democracy (1997), de Quiros 
wrote:  
 
                                                 
38 PP 1081 may be read online at http://www.lawphil.net/executive/proc/proc_1081_1972.html  




Marcos did not start the practice of bloating the size of the communists. The 
practice dated all the way back to (Manuel) Roxas’s time and the early years 
of Independence.  Each time government submitted its budget to Congress, it 
grossly inflated the strength of the communists and imminence of its threat.  
The size of the Huks grew in direct proportion to the size of the budget: The 
bigger the budget, the bigger the Huks. Eventually, the communists being used 
in this way got to be called the ‘Budgetary Huks.’ 
This was so especially from the second half of the 1950s when the 
Huks rapidly disappeared from the scene.  What prevented their complete 
disappearance was less the cunning of their leaders than the shrewdness of 
their enemy.  The trick, as the Free Press wrote in an editorial on September 
18, 1971, was to show not only that the communist remained strong, or even 
menacing, but that the government was also mightily pushing them back. ‘On 
the one hand, the military authorities must exaggerate the Huk threat to the 
government, and on the other, they must claim, to justify the money they have 
been getting, that they are winning, if they have not already won, the war 
against the Huks.’ (281) 
 
 
Indeed, Marcos was merely recontextualizing a practice carried over from his 
predecessors only that when he was the one in power he had a rather elaborate theory 
and the necessary legal weapons, as it were, to warrant his claims. 
4.2.2    Legal imperatives 
The 1973 Constitution and its amendments in 1976 and 1981 fortified Marcos’ 
rationale for martial law and the New Society.  Clearly, the argument for martial law 
and the New Society as shown in the Marcos publications in 1971 and 1973 as well as 
his presidential proclamations was transformed into more ‘authoritative contexts’ or 
‘non-negotiable materialities’ such as the 1973 charter that replaced the 1935 
Constitution and the Marcos decrees and letters of instructions which were sanctioned 
by the new charter and its amendments to ‘form part of the laws of the land.’ These 
authoritative contexts or non-negotiable materialities served to consolidate the 
executive powers of Ferdinand Marcos (see Rebullida, 2006, 161 and 163).  His 
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presidential speeches including his Reports to the Nation or State of the Nation 
Addresses contributed to the circulation of the New Society ideology.39   
The amendments made in 1976 and 1981 sustained the executive powers of 
Marcos (Rebullida, 163-164). These constitutional amendments enabled him to issue 
decrees, orders, and letters of instructions, that ‘shall form part of the laws of the 
land,’ whenever in his judgment as a president, ‘there exists a grave emergency or a 
threat or imminence’ (ibid.). 
4.2.3    Marcos’ agency 
Marcos’ human agency was instrumental in the realization of martial rule in 
the Philippines (Rebullida, 60).  Specifically, others saw martial law as part of 
Marcos’ plan to perpetuate himself in power.  Brillantes (1987) called this ‘ruler’s 
imperative’ and noted that the Marcos government in fact intervened in the arenas of 
the student and labor demonstrations, the constitutional convention formed in 1971 to 
examine the 1935 Constitution, and the Supreme Court. He established that the 
administration of Marcos had exerted undue influence in these arenas to set the 
necessary backdrop for martial law, to ‘constitutionalize’ the extension of his term in 
office, and to legitimize his authoritarian regime (132). 
                                                 
39 In the last section of this chapter, I shall look into the metaphorical constructions in following 
documents deployed during the authoritarian regime of Ferdinand Marcos: (a)‘The Democratic 
Revolution of the Philippines’ (1974/1977) which consolidates the two earlier publications that 
provided the rationale for Marcos’s imposition of martial law and whose ideas about the Philippine 
society were channeled through his presidential addresses during the martial law years (1972-1981), (b) 
his televised address proclaiming martial law in 1972, (c) his SONA in 1975 as representative of a 
national address during the time martial law was imposed, (d) his speech titled ‘Encounter with 
Destiny’ delivered after martial law was lifted in 1981, and (e) his last two national addresses in 1985 
before he was ousted from the presidency via ‘people power.’ I shall also from time to time allude to 
speeches delivered from 1981 to 1985, which Marcos considered a period of ‘normalization’ after the 




De Quiros (1997) noted that to Marcos, the greatest role of his life was saving 
the Republic from the communist threat. He quoted the following entry written on 9 
March 1970 in Marcos’ diary: 
 
‘I feel my greatest contribution to the country will be saving it from 
communism. It would be easy to adopt palliatives and delay the confrontation 
with the deadly peril. But this would be the easy way out. 
‘After my term and within the decade of the next, the nation would 
have to confront it anyway. And I would have been guilty of dereliction of 
duty, if not cowardice, for not facing up to it and rooting it out while I had the 
opportunity and the power. 
‘So I have decided that I must risk even the future of my family so as 
to save our freedoms and individual dignity.  The issue has become this simple 
and brutal.  It is a matter of survival. It is a matter of daring or not – on my 
part. 
‘And I decide to dare.’ (292) 
 
 
On the one hand, the excerpt from Marcos’s diary shows him to be a responsible and 
accountable leader; on the other, it betrays his sense of self-importance.  Critics of the 
Marcos presidency believe that this sense of self-importance coupled with his desire  
‘to cure the ills of society’ reveals Marcos’ ambition to perpetuate himself in power. 
Jovito Salonga, an opposition senator during the Marcos presidency and Senate 
President during the first post-Marcos presidency, commented the following about the 
declaration of martial law in 1972, as quoted by de Quiros:  
 
‘When [Marcos] came out, he began reading a prepared speech.  He was 
declaring martial law all over the country, he said, and gave the secessionist 
movement in the South, there was the assassination and coup plot by 
Opposition figures.  That was nothing new.  He had been saying those things 
for months. 
‘But then he said something that floored me. He said he was declaring 
martial law not just to curb the insurgency and the secessionist movement but 
also to cure the ills of society. Martial law, he said, had given him the historic 
opportunity and mandate to build a New Society. 
‘Normally, you would be happy to hear something like that.  A 
president wants to reform society – that is well and good. But it was not so in 
this context.  I immediately thought: Martial law is an instrument to restore 
peace and order in society. Once peace and order comes back, martial law is 
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lifted.  It is a temporary measure, it is an emergency measure.  It has a definite 
– and short – timetable. 
‘But reforming society, creating a new society, that is another thing.  
That is not temporary, that has no limits.  That could go on and on. You do not 
reform the society or build a new society in a few years.  You do it in one 




4.2.4    The U.S. connection and class conflict 
Also important in understanding Marcos’ decision to pursue an authoritarian 
presidency in 1972 is the idea that constitutional authoritarianism was a means ‘to 
deal with social unrest that had a bearing on the US-Philippines relations’ (Rebullida 
2006, 161).  It is possible to think that the ideology of the ‘democratic revolution’ or 
the ‘revolution from the center’ was necessary to hasten the accommodation and 
spread of a larger ideology—the neoliberal ideology pursued by institutions such as 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund upon which the United States 
exerts great influence.  
Such line of thinking concerning the imposition of martial law is actually well 
discussed in Brillantes’ book on Philippine authoritarianism in 1972 (1987).  
Brillantes presented several explanations for the imposition of martial law and 
categorized them into two: official perspectives and alternative ones.  He argued that 
the martial law imposition in 1972 was ‘a result of the interplay of the following 
major factors or imperatives: (1) President Marcos’ desire to perpetuate himself in 
power; (2) Pressures emanating from both the world state and world capitalist systems 
to preserve (mostly) American security and economic interests in the Philippines; (3) 
Rivalry for political and economic dominance among certain factions of the ruling 
class; and (4) Efforts of the ruling elite to depoliticize certain segments of the 
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population who were threatening their dominant political and economic position in 
society’ (128). 
While Brillantes acknowledged the validity of the ‘ruler’s imperative’ or 
Marcos’ desire to perpetuate himself in power, he emphasized that ‘the explanation of 
martial law must be put in a broader historically specific context, located in the world 
systems, without, however, neglecting analysis of the classes internal to these 
systems’ (139). Explicating further, he said: ‘Indeed focus must be made on the 
impact of pressures from the world systems upon the Philippine political economy.  
After all, the Philippines is highly integrated into the world state system and world 
capitalist system.  Equal emphasis must be given to internal class dynamics operating 
within the social system’ (ibid.). 
The validity of the class conflict explanation may be seen in how Marcos’ 
administration, at the onset of martial law, disenfranchised some members of the 
ruling elite, whom he considered in his ‘democratic revolution’ treatises as the 
‘oligarchy’ only to replace them with cronies of his administration. 
The pressure to conform to the demands of the world capitalist system—
specifically, the opening of the Philippine economy to foreign investments—is 
evident in the following extracts taken from Marcos’ The Democratic Revolution: 
 
Looking back at the record, we may say that September 21, 1972, marked the 
turning point for the Philippine economy. This is not to say that a miracle 
occurred overnight. The record shows that martial law was the catalyst that 
brought into fruition all our efforts at revitalizing the economy.  This began 
earnestly in February 1970 when I approved adoption by the government and 
the Central Bank of a rigid stabilization program that featured the unpopular 
‘floating rate’ system of exchange administration.  Attention was concentrated 
on strengthening the country’s monetary and fiscal structure.  Incentives for 
growth and expansion of exports and promoting foreign investments, both 
loans and equity, were set in motion.  The need for strengthening these areas 
had long been recognized.  Corrective legislation and policy measures, 
however, suffered from constraints inherent in the old order of anarchy, 
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violence, vested interests, and political orientation.  Both foreign and domestic 
investments faltered for want of faith in the capacity of the government to 
assure them of security, stability and freedom from undue restraints in capital 




Brillantes noted that it was after the imposition of martial law that Supreme Court 
decisions that were detrimental to the economic interests of the foreigners, especially 
those from the United States, were reversed by a provision in the Marcos-sponsored 
1973 Constitution (137). This evidence makes valid the assertion that martial law was 
good for the security and economic interests of the United States in the Philippines 
(ibid.). 
 
4.3      The socio-economic and political situation at the time of authoritarianism 
(1972-1985)  
What transpired in the next ten years or so following the imposition of martial 
law in the Philippines is summarized by Rebullida in the following:  
 
Having proclaimed martial law on September 21, 1972, Ferdinand Marcos 
proceeded to issue General Order 1 on September 22, 1972.  In brief, he 
suspended the legislature, banned political parties, stopped elections, seized 
and controlled the media; and caused the arrest of the opposition leaders and 
dissidents, suspected subversives, even criminals (sic); and prohibited 
unlicensed and unauthorized use of guns.  He ruled the country by executive 
decrees, proclamations and general orders; and exercised all the powers and 
prerogatives as commander in chief of the armed forces of the Philippines. 
The 1973 Constitution and amendments in 1976 and 1981 were drafted and 
ratified in unprecedented ways, resulting in the consolidated powers vested on 
the incumbent, Ferdinand Marcos. (165) 
 
Specifically, the 1973 Constitution gave Marcos power to be both president 
and prime minister until such time that the interim assembly meets and the new 
interim president and prime minister had been designated. However, before such 
Navera 92 
 
could happen, amendments made three years after the new constitution had been 
ratified replaced the initial provision on the interim National Assembly and made 
Marcos simultaneously the president and prime minister and member of the new 
Batasang Pambansa (National Parliament) (166). 
In January 1981, Marcos lifted martial law.  Meimban (1999) noted that the 
announced lifting was timed a month before the first visit of Pope John Paul II to the 
Philippines (236).  This, he said, ‘served to neutralize the noisy minority within the 
Catholic hierarchy critical of the Marcos dictatorship’ (ibid.).  Interestingly, it was 
also timed with the swearing in of Ronald Reagan as the fortieth president of the 
United States. This was seen as a ‘political gesture…intended to assure President 
Reagan (a personal friend of the Marcoses) that Marcos would not be an 
embarrassment to the new American President’ (ibid.).   
To legitimize his hold on power even after the lifting of martial law, Marcos 
then called for a presidential election, where he was eventually proclaimed winner 
(Meimban, 238).  The shift from martial rule to a new term of office for Marcos was 
signaled by replacing the ‘New Society’—in place for almost ten years under martial 
law—with the term ‘New Republic.’40  Notwithstanding the lifting of martial law, 
Marcos maintained his power by making further amendments to the 1973 constitution.  
Rebullida (2006) noted that in that year, Marcos finally ‘established and defined the 
supremacy of the president as the real executive over that of the prime minister as the 
administrative executive’ (166). She argued that, ‘From the constitutional and 
institutional perspective, the structure of government and executive powers stipulated 
                                                 




in the 1976 and 1981 amendments to the 1973 Constitution had convoluted the 
parliamentary form of government’ (173). 
The Philippines under martial law and the ensuing authoritarian regime after it 
was lifted experienced what could be regarded as the erosion or ‘perversion’ of 
democratic institutions: interference in constitution making, sham elections, a 
dominated legislature, a politicized judiciary, a politicized military, and what 
Rebullida termed as the ‘contravention of the ethos of public service’ as well as the 
‘cooptation or sublation of the bureaucracy to the executive’ (167-69).  In other 
words, the democratic institutions experienced undue influence from the executive 
leadership of Marcos. 
On 21 August 1983, former Senator Benigno Aquino Jr., staunch anti-Marcos 
opposition leader, was assassinated on the tarmac of the Manila International Airport 
upon his arrival from a three-year exile overseas. His death was pivotal in heightening 
the anti-Marcos struggle that culminated in what is now known as the ‘1986 EDSA 
people power revolution.’41 
The critical issues that fueled discontent towards Marcos’ presidential 
leadership are categorized by Rebullida into three: (1) political issues concerning 
Marcos’s victory in the elections of 1981 and snap elections of 1986, the authoritarian 
regime’s legitimacy or illegitimacy, the dictatorship disguised as democracy, the 
unresolved assassination of Benigno Aquino Jr., and political repression of the media, 
public opinion, and the opposition; (2) development fiasco, cronyism, corruption in 
government, economic crisis, and the country’s foreign debt; and (3) Marcos’s wealth 
                                                 
41 EDSA stands for Epifanio delos Santos Avenue, the strip of highway in the National Capital Region 
where about two million people converged to call for the ouster of Ferdinand Marcos from presidential 




and plunder of the Philippine economy (Ferdinand and Imelda jointly and separately), 
Imelda’s extravagance and power play  (170).  It should be noted that categorizing 
these issues remains difficult as they were all interlocking or interrelated concerns at 
that time of the Marcos presidency. 
In two of his last public addresses before the National Assembly (Batasang 
Pambansa) in 1985, Marcos reenacted his commitment to strengthen the country’s 
‘democratic dialogue’ and institutions. On 14 January 1985, he reminded the 
members of the Assembly that ‘whatever the party may belong to, however we may 
differ in our political beliefs, we have a common ground to uphold and defend 
together…the democratic system that sustains our nation and through which we have 
all been elected into public office’ (16).  Six months later, he underscored the need to 
tap the democratic ideology and tradition in order to ‘struggle’ against communism 
and socialism. This, Marcos argued, could be pursued by ‘insisting that we must 
develop and nurture our own democratic ideology, one rooted in our experience and 
needs’ (22 July 1985, 19).  In spite of these pronouncements on his renewed 
commitment to democracy, Marcos was unsuccessful in countering the mounting 
opposition against his authoritarian rule, which was channeled through various modes 
of protests by various groups including the civil society.  As Rebullida remarked, ‘In 
the context of liberal democracy, the constitutional and political set up of the New 
Republic and the exercise of power, including political repression, human rights 
violation, and corruption were all construed as dictatorship—a conjugal 
dictatorship42—but rationalized as constitutional authoritarianism.  The interlocking 
                                                 
42 The conjugal dictatorship refers to Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos. While Mr. Marcos was in power, 
his wife, Imelda, wielded immense political influence by having been entrusted by her husband vital 
government positions (While she was governor of Metro Manila, she concurrently headed the Ministry 
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issues of cronyism, foreign debt, failure of development programs and worsening 
socio-economic conditions fueled the rejection of Marcos by many sectors, including 
the youth, business, and the church’ (170). 
In April 1985, IBON Foundation through its publication IBON Facts and 
Figures released, in popular form, a comprehensive report on the Marcos presidency 
titled ‘The Republic after 20 Years.’ The report took into consideration eleven points 
‘basic to any assessment of contemporary Philippine society.’ These points include 
quality of life, prices of basic goods, employment, economic realignment, 
industrialization, foreign debt, the agricultural scene, the role of the state in the 
economy, graft and corruption, the human rights violation, and insurgency. 
IBON noted that after twenty years of Marcos presidency, the quality of life 
among Filipinos had not improved: communicable diseases had spread and caused 
death, poverty and degradation had persisted, and Filipinos had been eating food ‘of 
less quantity and inferior quality’ (2). It also made note of the increase in inflation and 
the fact that nominal wage workers could hardly keep up with the inflation as well as 
the rise of unemployment and export of labor. 
A significant feature of the Marcos presidency pointed out by the IBON report 
was the economic realignment that had a bearing on the agriculture and industry 
sectors as well as the country’s accumulation of foreign debt.  This economic 
realignment—which was skewed towards protecting foreign, mostly US, interests—
is, as cited earlier, considered one impetus for Marcos’ pursuit of constitutional 
authoritarianism.  
                                                                                                                                            
of Human Settlements and Ecology.).  The positions enabled Imelda Marcos to exercise functions in 




IBON’s report noted that Marcos’ economic policies when he was reelected 
for a second term in 1969 ‘set the stage for the reversal of previous policies that 
placed restrictions on imports as well as on outward flow of foreign exchange.’ 
Economists observed that Marcos’ policies pushed for ‘opening the economy wider to 
foreign goods and foreign investments—principally those of the US.’ The declaration 
of martial law, in fact, hastened the Philippines’ entry into free trade (4). The report 
proceeded:  
 
Thereafter, ‘export-led industrialization’ became the economic catchword. 
Investment incentives and preferential credit were given exporters. Rules on 
foreign investments were relaxed. Export processing zones were set up. 
Schedules to lower import tariffs were drawn up and wages maintained at low 
levels not only through wage legislation but also through bans on strikes. 
Foreign markets took precedence over the domestic market. Bananas 
and shrimps went to the Japanese. Sugar had to be rationed at times among 
local consumers. Even rice was exported. Zone employees were forced to 
work overtime, turning out Barbie dolls, tennis balls, beaded handbags, Levi’s 
jeans, assembled watches and cars, semiconductors and the like—for foreign 
companies and foreign buyers (5).43 
 
 
The export-led industrialization, however, did not lower the import dependence of the 
country.  In fact, export promotion boosted it (ibid.). Unfortunately for the 
Philippines, the export-led industrialization had not pushed the economy towards 
genuine industrialization as the raw materials for the supposedly flourishing export 
industries such as garments and electronics were almost 100 percent imported, while 
the country’s export industries were confined to ‘processing, assembling, and 
                                                 
43 This account is especially important in demonstrating how Philippine socio-political realities are tied 
to the global/ world realities. On the other hand, the description proves significant to the analysis of the 
presidential discourses after Marcos, especially when we compare and contrast the shifts in economic 
policies in the Marcos and post-Marcos presidencies and how they have been metaphorically expressed 




packaging.’ Moreover, foreign companies had to be relied upon in spearheading the 
export activities (6). 
Meanwhile, emphasis on commercial crop production enabled big foreign and 
local corporate farms to gain control over large tracts of agricultural lands ‘displacing 
small, self-sufficient farmers and transforming them into plantation and contract 
growers’ (7). 
This import-dependent export-orientation of the Philippine economy plus the 
‘unrestricted outflow of profits and capital by foreign investors—and eventually, the 
drain in dollars caused by servicing foreign debts’ triggered a foreign exchange crisis 
in the late 1970s (5). It was further noted in the report that the rapid growth of foreign 
debts in the 70s was ‘the deliberate result of an ambitious investment program based 
on an export-led industrialization strategy.  Moreover, it had the blessings of the IMF 
and the World Bank, and later, that of private international commercial banks. The 
World Bank itself had projected that the country would need US$15 billion from 1976 
to 1985. Thus, [the Philippines’] foreign debt grew, with both the government 
convinced that, or at least hopeful, that these debts would be settled as soon as the 
export program got under way’ (7). 
The highly import-dependent export promotion, however, failed to take off as 
the prices of traditional export commodities suffered downward trend while the 
traditional markets of Philippine exports started to set up protectionist barriers that 
limited the entry of goods (ibid.). 
Perhaps, better known than Marcos’ adoption of free trade policies was the 
way his government exerted undue influence in the country’s economic affairs. The 
Marcos presidency saw the expanding role of the government in the financial market, 
the creation of government monopolies, and the granting of economic privileges to 
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friends.  Instead of eradicating oligarchy, the New Republic paved the way for 
Marcos and his cronies to replace the oligarchs.  The Anti-Marcos forces called this 
‘crony capitalism’ where the decree-making powers of the president were employed 
‘[to facilitate] the transfer of big business from rival clans to favored ones’ (7-8).  
Also cited in the IBON report were the ‘unparalleled rapacity’ of the corrupt 
and the human rights violations incurred during the Marcos regime.   Basic freedoms 
such as freedoms of speech, the press, organization and public assembly were 
curtailed while arrests, disappearance, and extrajudicial killings of those considered 
critically opposed to the Marcos government became widespread (8-9). 
Constitutional authoritarianism proved to be ineffective in quelling the 
insurgency. It should be noted that Marcos used the ‘growing rebellion’ led by the 
communist New People’s Army and the Moro rebels in Southern Philippines to justify 
the declaration of martial law. Accounts having to do with the insurgency in the late 
1960s and early 1970s regarded the military threat of the NPA negligible (10).  
However, the repressive military regime boosted the membership of communist 
rebels.  The same thing happened to the Moro rebels.  As the IBON report noted, 
‘Martial law declaration on 21 September 1972 did not weaken the Muslim resistance 
a bit. Rather it pushed the Moro counter-offensive towards taking on a more serious 
character’ (ibid.). 
 
4.4      The leadership after Marcos: Issues and concerns  
In the book The Philippines After Marcos edited by R. J. May and Francisco 
Nemenzo and published in 1985 when Marcos was still occupying the presidency, 
opposition senator Jose W. Diokno, who was incarcerated during Marcos’ martial 
rule, wrote a chapter on the crisis confronting the Philippines at the time: ‘The post-
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Marcos era has in fact already begun. It began on 21 August 1983 when an assassin’s 
bullet shattered the skull of Senator Benigno Aquino. That bullet, we now know, did 
more than kill the leader of the opposition; it also shattered the regime of Ferdinand E. 
Marcos.  What we witnessed today are its death throes. True, Marcos still occupies 
the presidential palace, but his control over men and events had dwindled’ (Diokno in 
May and Nemenzo, 1985, 1). In that same chapter, he identified issues and concerns 
that would confront the country when Marcos’ rule as the nation’s most powerful man 
ends.  
Diokno articulated in his essay various scenarios that might lead to the end of 
the Marcos regime. He raised the possibility of Marcos’ death due to his failing 
health, in which case potential successors of Marcos from his own party or opposition 
would ‘jostle each other for political advantage or even for survival; they would form 
cliques and alliances and seek the support within the military; some might even seek 
the support of the U.S. government’ (3). The possibilities of military or US 
intervention, to Diokno, did not bode well for the country as it might produce what he 
termed as ‘unstable stability.’  He explained that such intervention ‘would not help 
solve the national problems, but only aggravate them, for it would lead to more 
militarization and less dialogue, greater repression and fewer chances of peacefully 
redressing the just grievances that spawned the Muslim and NPA rebellions, more 
poverty and exploitation of labour and less equality and justice, increased dependence 
on the US government and foreign capital, and diminished Filipino control over our 
economy, our future, even our very survival’ (ibid.). 
In the event of Marcos resignation—caused by pressure from the opposition—
Diokno mentioned a need for transitional government that would essentially ‘de-
Marcosify’ the country and facilitate the restoration of democracy.  Diokno specified 
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the tasks at hand for the transitional leadership: ‘Its first commitment is to call for free 
and honest elections within a period of not more than four months from the date that 
the transitional government takes power.  In addition to calling and supervising those 
elections, the major tasks of the transitional government would be to restore the 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus throughout the country; to grant a general and 
unconditional amnesty to all persons charged, arrested or convicted of political 
offences, wherever they may be (inside or outside of the Philippines); to scrap all 
decrees that grant special privileges to the cronies and relatives of Mr. and Mrs. 
Marcos; to restore full freedom of the press; to restore the independence and integrity 
of the judiciary; to conduct an impartial probe into the assassination of Senator 
Aquino; to redress the more immediate problems of our Muslim and highland 
brothers; and to seek a restructuring of and better terms for existing foreign loans’ (4). 
Diokno also underscored the vital role of the US in the Philippines, stating that 
even before the Second World War, the US policy had always been ‘to see to it that 
the Philippines ”remain in hands we can control or rely on”, ”to permit to the 
Philippine government a continued independence in all internal affairs, but to preserve 
it as a bulwark of US security” (these quotes are from a memorandum of George 
Kennan in 1948); and that it provides a base from which to project US power and gain 
access to the riches of Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the Middle East.’  Diokno 
explained that the policy rests on the premise that ‘so long as American security 
interests in the Philippines do not feel themselves threatened, the US could be 
expected to act with a certain forbearance, with a certain subtlety, a certain amount of 
quiet diplomacy, both with the government and opposition figures, to try and secure 
its ends’ (ibid.).   
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He further argued that however Marcos might leave the political scene, his 
successor—the technocrats’ and the military’s roles in the transition 
notwithstanding—could not ignore the basic problems of the Philippines: ‘the 
inequity of its social system and the maldevelopment of its economy, which together 
have bred poverty, injustice, and the rebellions of the Muslims and the dispossessed’ 
(5).  It should be noted that these ‘basic problems’ Diokno mentioned were not 
necessarily a result of the Marcos administration. In fact, the ‘inequity in [the 
Philippines’] social system and the maldevelopment of its economy’ are considered 
long-standing problems of the country.  It may be assumed that the Marcos 
presidency, in spite of its great pronouncement of transforming the nation (‘This 
nation will be great again’), failed to address these problems because it merely 
disenfranchised a faction of the ruling elite while empowering its cronies and the 
Marcos family (cf. Brilliantes, 1987). 
A freedom fighter and a staunch nationalist, Diokno stressed that neither 
military solution nor following ‘the same prescriptions of the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund that Marcos, [Cesar] Virata and other technocrats have 
been pursuing’ would address the national problems.  Emphasizing the need for the 
transition leadership to find its own way in solving these problems, he wrote: ‘There 
is no pattern it can follow, no model it can copy. If experience has taught Filipinos 
anything, it is that every country is unique and must forge its own future in its own 
way. But the primordial condition for doing this is that we free ourselves of the 
control of the US government.  We could restore freedom to the Philippines. We 
could re-establish democracy.  But unless the successor government can transform our 
society and change the structure of our economy, freedom and democracy would 
count for very little’ (6). 
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Less than a year after the release of The Philippines After Marcos, Ferdinand 
E. Marcos’ theory and practice of ‘democratic revolution’ would end in what is now 
touted as EDSA People Power Revolution of 1986. The exercise of people power in 
February 1986 was considered by many as a culmination of the series of protests 
against Marcos’ political and economic control of the Philippines. Corazon 
Cojuangco Aquino, widow of the slain opposition leader Benigno Aquino and the 
symbol of anti-Marcos protests, would be propelled into presidential power on the 
25th of February that year.  Thus, began the complex transition from dictatorship to 
democracy—that would include efforts at ‘de-Marcosification’ and the still ongoing 
project of transforming the Philippine society as well as attempts at changing the 
problematic national economic structure. 
This thesis as stated in the earlier chapters examines the rhetoric of the 
executive leadership after Ferdinand Marcos.  For a focused study on the post-Marcos 
presidential rhetoric—the evolving conceptualizations and metaphorizations of the 
‘state of the nation,’ I have limited the scope of this research by examining four topics 
of major national concern which may also be considered as significant domains in 
post-Marcos presidential leadership. These are: democracy; the national economy; 
peace and security; and the institution of the presidency or the executive leadership. 
These domains cover, and in fact, interlock with some of the major national concerns 
confronting the Philippines after Ferdinand Marcos’ rule ended via the People Power 
Revolution in February 1986.  Their selection should not, however, be construed as a 
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preclusion of other significant domains or administration-specific concerns that the 
leadership after Marcos needed to address.44 
 
4.5      Metaphors in the Marcos rhetoric (1972-1985) 
At this point, it would be helpful to discuss the metaphorical constructions in 
the official documents deployed by Marcos and his administration in public.  This 
section will specifically discuss the metaphorical conceptualizations found in Marcos’ 
national addresses from the time he imposed martial law in 1972 to his last year in 
public office. These conceptualizations constituted some of the issues and concerns 
that the national leadership after Marcos was positioned to address. 
It is interesting to note that when the official rhetoric on martial law45 is 
analyzed, two seemingly contradictory, but purportedly complementary metaphorical 
constructions of martial law emerge: On the one hand, there is the conceptualization 
MARTIAL LAW IS A DEMOCRATIC INSTRUMENT TO PRESERVE SOCIETY; on the other, 
there is the conceptual metaphor, MARTIAL LAW IS A DEMOCRATIC AGENCY OF 
CHANGE.  Both conceptualizations appear to constitute the frame: MARTIAL LAW IS 
DEMOCRATIC. 
In Marcos’ official rationalization of the martial law declaration, he 
established that ‘[all] indications that the country was fast slipping into irretrievable 
                                                 
44 The Philippines relations with the international community (including regional groups like the 
ASEAN, the United Nations, and the European Union) and with the economic superpower (US) / 
emerging superpowers (like China) are not fully treated and discussed in this work, but are also worthy 
of investigation. Moreover, there are specific issues—like the dispute over Spratlys Islands, the debate 
on the retention of the US military bases, the debate on population control, the Philippine Centennial 
Celebrations in the latter half of the 1990’s during the term of Fidel Ramos, and debates on 
amendments to the 1987 Constitution—that may serve as significant points of departure for the 
analysis of Philippine presidential discourse in the post-Marcos era. 
 
45 I refer to the publication ‘The Democratic Revolution of the Philippines’ (1974/1977) as constituting 




chaos were present, so large and persistent’ (1977, 260) making Presidential 
Proclamation 1081 all the more necessary. He would repeatedly cite the seven sources 
of ‘imminent danger’ to the nation: leftist revolutionaries; rightists; Moro 
secessionists; private armies and political warlords; criminal elements; oligarchs; and 
foreign interventionists (see 156-57, 260).  He referred to them as ‘perils, [which, 
when] allowed to go unchecked, would in time have been sufficient by itself to 
endanger the peace and stability of society’ (260).  The conceptualization that 
MARTIAL LAW IS A DEMOCRATIC INSTRUMENT TO PRESERVE SOCIETY was therefore 
realized by expressing that the nation was in grave danger, that the government was 
constitutionally sanctioned to use martial law to save the nation, and that the 
restoration of civil order through martial law was necessary for the country’s 
constitutional survival.  Martial law was metaphorically expressed as a ‘preservation 
of society’ (189) and as ‘an instrument of defense for democratic government’ (317).  
The following extract from Marcos’ treatise on ‘democratic revolution’ further reveals 
this conceptualization: 
 
1. We had to restore civil order as the bedrock of any constitutional survival. 
Civil order is merely the rationale of all societies: enforcement of and 
obedience to the law. When I placed the entire country under martial law, 
my first concern was to secure the Republic against any uprising, 
politically motivated or otherwise, and to secure the entire citizenry from 
the criminal elements, private armies bred by local politics, and the outlaw 
bands in the countryside, who might either take advantage of the 
temporary panic or undermine our efforts to assert the authority of our 
police forces. It was imperative that we dismantle the apparatus of the 
insurgency movement and the whole system of violence and criminality 
that had virtually imprisoned our society in fear and anarchy (221-22). 
 
In the extract, Marcos begins with a general statement on the necessity to 
restore ‘civil order as a bedrock of any constitutional survival.’  That civil order is 
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metaphorically expressed as a ‘bedrock’ of constitutional survival suggests its primary 
significance to the Philippine polity. This is followed by substantiation of such 
metaphorization, that is, civil order is the rationale of all societies.  These statements 
prefigure the need for martial law, which in the succeeding statements is positioned as 
a preconditioning object of the state (‘When I placed the entire country under martial 
law’)—an instrument as it were—in order for the president to ‘secure the Republic 
against any uprising’ and ‘secure the entire citizenry from the criminal elements.’  
The final statement of the extract is a re-expression of the preceding statements where 
Marcos talks of the urgency to ‘dismantle the apparatus of the insurgency movement 
and the whole system of violence and criminality that had virtually imprisoned our 
society in fear and anarchy.’ That the acts of dismantling an apparatus and a system 
and of securing of the Republic and the citizenry should follow after martial law was 
put in place by Marcos in 1972 renders martial law as an instrument, a counter-
apparatus or a counter-system that is supposed to restore civil order in the embattled 
Philippine society. 
As a DEMOCRATIC AGENCY OF CHANGE, martial law was expressed as 
revolutionizing. Marcos metaphorized it as an instrument of ‘reconstruction’, a 
producer of ‘radical reforms’ and a ‘catalyst,’ suggesting even its transformative 
capacity as shown by the following extracts: 
 
2. In what way can the rebellion of the poor achieve the goal of equality by 
destroying society which perpetuates mass poverty? Governments can 
offer a constitutional and orderly alternative because of their power, which 
they can use oppressively, on the side of the status quo, or redemptively, 
on the side of equality. On the basis of necessary choice I understood the 
declaration of martial law to mean not only the preservation of the 
Republic but also the thorough reconstruction of society. (189) 
 
3. Our martial law is unique in that it is based on the supremacy of the 
civilian authority over the military and on complete submission to the 
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decision of the Supreme Court and, most important of all, the will of the 
people.  It is unique in that it does not seek to maintain the status quo but 
has instead brought about radical reforms. (212-213) 
 
4. The record shows that martial law was the catalyst that brought into 




I shall now show how these conceptualizations were realized and sustained in 
the speeches of Ferdinand Marcos from 1972 to 1985.  For this purpose, I have 
selected the following texts as bases for my analysis: (1) his televised address 
proclaiming martial law in 1972, (2) his SONA in 1975 as representative of a national 
address during the time martial law was imposed, (3) his speech titled ‘Encounter 
with Destiny’ delivered after martial law was lifted in 1981, and (4) his last two 
national addresses in 1985 before he was ousted from the presidency via ‘people 
power.’ I shall also from time to time allude to and use extracts from speeches 
delivered from 1981 to 1985, which Marcos considered a period of ‘normalization’ 
after the lifting of martial law. 
In his first address to the nation under martial law delivered on 23 September 
on radio and television, Marcos emphasized the two conceptualizations: 
 
5. I assure you that I am utilizing this power for the proclamation of martial 
law vested in me by the Constitution for one purpose alone, and that is, to 
save the Republic and reform our society. I wish to emphasize these two 
objectives. We will eliminate the threat of a violent overthrow of our 
Republic, but at the same time, we must now reform the social, economic 
and political institutions in our country. The plans, the order for reforms 
and removal of inequities of our society, the clean-up of government of its 
corrupt and sterile elements, the liquidation of criminal syndicates, the 
systematic development of our economy, the general program for a new 
and better Philippines will be explained to you.  But we must start out with 
the elimination of anarchy and the maintenance of peace and order. 
I have had to use this constitutional power in order that we may not 





In the extract, ‘to save the Republic’ and ‘reform our society’ are both rendered as 
objectives, but they also indicate the two major conceptualizations of martial law. 
That MARTIAL LAW IS A DEMOCRATIC INSTRUMENT TO PRESERVE SOCIETY is 
realized in expressions such as ‘We will eliminate the threat of a violent overthrow of 
our Republic,’ ‘we must start with the elimination of anarchy and maintenance of 
peace and order,’ and ‘I have to use this constitutional power in order that we may not 
completely lose the civil rights and freedom we cherish.’  In these expressions, 
preservation of society is articulated as the elimination of what is considered 
undesirable (‘threat of a violent overthrow of our Republic’ or ‘anarchy’), 
maintenance of what is deemed desirable (‘peace and order’), and ensuring that the 
constitutional rights (‘civil rights and freedom’) are not completely lost.  The last 
expression is especially curious in that it presupposes that constitutional rights such as 
‘civil rights and freedom’ are compromised but ‘not completely’ lost with the 
employment of martial law or ‘use of this constitutional power.’  On the other hand, it 
justifies the use of martial law by implying that it is a guarantee for the continuous 
enjoyment of the constitutional rights and that without it, there is the possibility that 
the people might lose them ‘completely.’  In other words, the expression positions the 
Marcos government’s decision to impose martial law not only as a constitutionally 
sanctioned act, but one that is also pro-democratic, pro-people. 
That MARTIAL LAW IS A DEMOCRATIC AGENCY OF CHANGE is indicated by 
the imperative to ‘reform social, economic, and political institutions of our country.’  
That this imperative for reform is highlighted as an ‘objective’ of the imposition of 
martial law articulates the conceptualization.  Martial law as a democratic agency is 
signaled by expressions that foreground the proclamation of martial law as a power 
that is ‘constitutional’ or ‘vested by the Constitution.’ The conceptualization is also 
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cued by the expression ‘general program for a new and better Philippines’ which 
prefigures the ‘New Society’ that Marcos would later substantiate in his official 
rhetoric including his presidential speeches.  Note that Marcos’s proposition of 
change or ‘reform’ to ‘a new and better Philippines’ also entailed ‘removal of the 
inequities of our society, the clean-up of government of its corrupt and sterile 
elements, the liquidation of criminal syndicates, the systematic development of our 
economy.’  The expressions suggest radical measures of decontaminating society 
(‘removal of the inequities of our society’, ‘the liquidation of criminal syndicates’, 
‘clean-up of government and its corrupt and sterile elements’) and their organization 
in the clause in the above extract (4) indicate that the ‘systematic development’ of the 
national economy logically follows after these radical measures get implemented. 
Success of the constitutional authoritarianism or the imposition of martial law 
was articulated in Marcos’s national addresses in the following years.  In his rhetoric, 
he would show evidence of how his twin objectives of preserving and reforming 
society through the intervention of constitutional authoritarianism had been achieved. 
For instance, the President’s Report to the Nation delivered at the Quirino Grandstand 
on 19 September 1975, three years after Marcos imposed martial law, show 
realizations and expressions of the two central conceptualizations in the Marcos 
presidential rhetoric. 
In sustaining the conceptualizations of martial law, Marcos employed more 
specific metaphorizations.  These metaphorizations provide a multi-level or multi-
layered conceptualization of martial law or constitutional authoritarianism.  To 
maintain the conceptualization MARTIAL LAW IS A DEMOCRATIC INSTRUMENT TO 
PRESERVE SOCIETY, Marcos metaphorized martial law as a CURATIVE and AN 




MARTIAL LAW IS A CURATIVE 
 
6. We are no longer the paralyzed nation, of course, which we were at the 
start of our program in September 1972, but still, if we ask ourselves 
frankly, have we become the nation we wanted to be, after breaking with 
our past? (1975)  
 
 
MARTIAL LAW IS AN AGENCY OF ORDER AND SECURITY 
 
7. There is order where there used to be none; anarchy is only a memory of 
the past; and growth and changes seem to be everywhere around us.  
And when we look at the individual citizen, there is reason to feel 
that his rights and liberties are on the whole much better secured today 




In extract 5, the nation prior to September 1972, during which time martial 
law was imposed, is metaphorized as a body in a state of paralysis (‘the paralyzed 
nation’).  That it was ‘no longer’ the case in 1975 suggests that ‘the program’ or 
martial law served as a curative to the national condition.  In extract 6, the past is set 
in contrast with the present to establish that martial law is an agency of order and 
security (‘There is order where there used to be none; anarchy is only the memory of 
the past’).  Martial law as an agency of order and security is cued by the expression 
‘intervention of constitutional authoritarianism,’ which in the same extract, is 
rendered as instrumental in ensuring better security for individual rights and liberties. 
On the other hand, martial law as a DEMOCRATIC AGENCY OF CHANGE is 
substantiated by metaphorizing martial law as an ECONOMIC BOOSTER, A LIBERATING 







8. The national economy, for many years a deficit spender of resources, 
exhibits both vigor and resiliency in the face of crisis.  Economic activity 
of all kinds is never more pronounced than at any other time in our history.  
International investors, and no less than the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, continue to manifest their faith in the 
economy. (1975) 
 
9. Central to our economic policies is the sharing of increments of growth.  
We cannot speak of growth unless we can distribute such growth to the 
people and we cannot speak of growth unless we first manage an entire 
spectrum of issues and problems that bedevil the economies of the 
industrialized as well as the non-industrialized world. 
The experience of the past three years provides statistical evidence 
that our economy has fared creditably well.  Whoever takes the measure of 
the level of economic effort, whether for, or against, or neutral to the New 
Society or constitutional authoritarianism, cannot fail to admit that 
government intervention is the most significant factor in the acceleration 
of economic activity. (1975) 
 
10. Bur even foreign investments have grown at dramatic rates during the 
three-year period of martial law in the New Society.  From January 1973 
to the end of FY 1975, foreign investments now total P2.25 billion. From 
the total amount of investment applications for the first semester of 1975, 
the Board of Investments has approved foreign investments totaling P50 





11. Today, we find unprecedented prosperity in the rural areas an obvious 
upsurge in the purchasing power of the Filipino farmer, and a general air 
of confidence and optimism in the countryside.  Paradoxically, martial 
law, the instrument of the colonizer to preserve the status quo, has brought 
true freedom to the countryside for the first time in centuries. 
In the first 1,000 days of the New Society, therefore, we have 
succeeded—through deliberate policy and action—in helping the Filipino 




AGENCY OF INTERNAL REVOLUTION 
 
12. Now underneath these surface impressions of vitality and stability, there 
are profound problems that embattle our New Society.  The general signs 
of national strength and progress somehow do not yet completely translate 
into realities sufficiently relevant to the ordinary individual.  We must 
translate into realities sufficiently relevant to the ordinary individual. We 
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must translate our growth into a state of high morale among people.  
Growth is rendered in statistics and changes in the landscape, changes in 
the cities, in the roads, in the infrastructures. But more than this, we need a 
new vigorous climate of confidence and hope, a passionate renewal of 
faith and devotion, which sustains armies and populations even in the 
midst of siege. 
And while our policies decree sweeping changes in our institutions 
and programs, we have lagged behind in the fundamental change on which 
the New Society is truly to be forged.  This is the change within us, in our 
hearts, in our minds, in our souls—the internal revolution, which our 
nation from the time of our forebears has passionately craved for. (1975)  
 
 
As an ECONOMIC BOOSTER, constitutional authoritarianism is rendered as responsible 
for the vigor and resiliency of the economy (7), as ‘the most significant factor in the 
acceleration of the economy’ (8), and for shoring up foreign investments (9).  These 
metaphorizations were significant in establishing that the national economy was 
functioning satisfactorily in the world economic order.  In extract 10, martial law as 
practiced in Marcos’ presidency is differentiated from how it had been employed by 
the colonizers.  No longer meant as an oppressive tool, it is metaphorized as an 
instrument in securing freedom for the farmers—A LIBERATING FORCE.  Extract 11 is 
especially interesting in that in that it articulates martial law as AN AGENCY OF 
INTERNAL REVOLUTION.  Using lofty rhetoric, Marcos suggested that internal 
revolution might be forged through ‘change within us’ or ‘change in our hearts, in our 
minds, and in our souls.’  This may be associated with the goal of changing mindsets 
or inculcating an ideology that would not only embrace the necessity of martial law 
but would render as acceptable the broader context that warrants the imposition of 
such law. 
The twin conceptualizations of martial law as A DEMOCRATIC INSTRUMENT 
TO PRESERVE SOCIETY and as A DEMOCRATIC AGENCY OF CHANGE are also further 
conceptualized in the following formulation: MILITARY ARREST OF SUSPECTED 
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CRIMINALS IS A DE-CONTAMINATION OF THE BODY POLITIC.  On the one hand, 
DECONTAMINATION OF THE BODY POLITIC is seen as way to purge the society of its 
diseases, thus, implying the restoration of the national health or preservation of 
society; on the other, it suggests the necessity for further reform or change in the way 
the body politic works three years after martial law had been implemented.  How this 
formulation is achieved is demonstrated in the following extracts which I shall discuss 
further below: 
 
13. The establishment of constitutional authoritarianism, which enabled this 
government to seize the reins of national directions, has resulted in the 
growth of bureaucracy as a massive machinery that affects every aspect of 
our national life.  But along with this, there have also risen massive 
opportunities for graft, corruption and the misuse of influence, 
opportunities which are now being exploited within the government 
service. (1975/1979) 
 
14. For the last three years I have been watching the conduct of officers and 
employees in the national as well as the local government.  It is my duty as 
President of the Republic of the Philippines to reward what is proper, 
dedicated and devoted service by a public servant, and by the same token, 
to punish for violation of the sacred trust of a public official. (1975/1979)  
 
15. We are not limiting ourselves in this general cleanup to the ranks of the 
government.  There are lawyers, accountants, doctors and other 
professionals who, because of certain claims of blood kinship, affinity, 
personal closeness, friendship to, or business affiliation with, supposedly 
high-ranking officials of the government, arrogantly utilize or wield 
influence not only in corrupting public officials or in coercing them, but 
also in securing for themselves of their associates personal advantages 
denied to others, and in obtaining favors, privileges and preferential 
treatment in derogation of fairness and justice. 
All of them shall be purged from the ranks of those who would 
participate in the fruits of the New Society. 
At the same time, I have ordered the Secretary of National Defense 
to arrest persons in the list of those against whom there is evidence of 
commission of crime. He shall be supported of course by the military 
organization. 
Why have we done this at this time? This is the day of celebration.  
Why this attempt to clean up? Because I have warned, I have scolded, I 
have cajoled, I have reprimanded.  We have given enough time to reform. 
But the contagion continues. 
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Now, it is time to cut off the infected parts of the society from 
active public life before they endanger the entire body politic. (1975/1979) 
 
While Marcos recognized constitutional authoritarianism as an ENHANCER OF THE 
BUREAUCRACY (Extract 12), which provides another layer to the conceptualization of 
martial law as A DEMOCRATIC AGENCY OF CHANGE, he also pointed out the ‘rise’ in 
‘massive opportunities for graft, corruption and the misuse of influence.’  This context 
provided impetus for Marcos to cast himself as a keen observer of the developments 
in the bureaucracy and to conceptualize the president as A JUDGE and 
DISCIPLINARIAN (In extract 13, he said: ‘It is my duty as President of the Republic of 
the Philippines to reward what is proper, dedicated and devoted service by a public 
servant, and by the same token, to punish for violation of the sacred trust of a public 
official’).  Marcos then used the purported rise in massive opportunities for graft, 
corruption and the misuse of influence in order to justify the use of military power in 
‘purging’ the body politic of crime and corruption which he metaphorized in his 
speech as DISEASES as evidenced by the expressions ‘contagion’ and ‘infected parts’ 
(Extract 14).  This decontamination of society expressed in terms such as ‘general 
clean up to the ranks of government,’ ‘purged from the ranks of those who would 
participate in the fruits of the New Society,’ and ‘to cut off the infected parts of 
society from active public life before they endanger the entire body politic’ became a 
legitimating discourse for the arrest of suspected ‘criminals’ which included members 
of the political opposition, critics of the Marcos administration, and activists who 
steadfastly opposed martial law. 
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Even in the speech that declared the lifting of martial law in 1981,46 Marcos 
maintained his justification of constitutional authoritarianism by rendering the eight-
year period under martial law as a crisis government necessary before normalization 
could take place.  Marcos asserted that martial law ‘had succeeded in the attainment 
of its objectives’ and expressed both the restorative/preservationist and transformative 
character of martial law.   
 
16. We can say today with utmost confidence that the nation has surmounted 
the challenges to survival, the paralysis of will, and the decay of 
community that in 1972 had required the declaration of martial law; that 
the lifting of martial law is an accolade not only to the military and defense 
establishment of our country but also to the entire citizenry of the 
Republic. 
After eight years of crisis government, we have lifted ourselves 
from the abyss of crisis onto a high ground of national stability and 
dynamism, such as we have never known in our history as a people. (1981) 
 
In the extract, martial law is metaphorized as a necessary MECHANISM FOR 
SURVIVAL, RESTORATION, and REVITALIZATION (‘the nation has surmounted the 
challenges to survival, the paralysis of will, and the decay of community that in 1972 
had required the declaration of martial law’) which can all be subsumed under the 
broader conceptualization MARTIAL LAW IS A DEMOCRATIC INSTRUMENT TO 
PRESERVE SOCIETY.  This conceptualization was also expressed when Marcos talked 
about national security and peace and order (‘Order has returned to public life’ as in 
extract 17) and the preservation of ‘supreme authority of government’ (extract 16).  In 
                                                 
46Interestingly, Marcos’ explanation for the lifting of martial law in 1981 was due to his belief that the 
beginning of the decade of the 1980s ‘propitious’ time for the country to embark in a new phase of 
governance: 
 
As early as 1976, all the way to early last year, I had decided that the last year for martial law was to be 
1980, and that the beginning of the decade of the 1980s was most propitious for our people and country 




extract 17, the conceptualization MARTIAL LAW IS A DEMOCRATIC AGENCY OF 
CHANGE is also realized and Marcos especially underscored ‘a change in the heart and 
the spirit and the soul of the Filipino people’—a goal he articulated in his speeches 
during the period martial law was in place. 
 
17. Order has returned to public life, and security has been ensured for the 
Republic, not just in one climactic show of the power of government, but 
in sustained, even routinary demonstration of discipline and vigilance.  We 
are now confident that there is no challenge to public order and national 
security today that the national government and our people cannot meet.  
(1981) 
 
18. The supreme authority of government has not only been preserved; it has 
been strengthened and enhanced by pervasive reforms in the process of 
decision-making and program implementation, and in the very soul of the 
bureaucracy.  But in addition to all this there has been a change in the heart 
and the spirit and the soul of the Filipino people.  For to reform a nation, 
one must reform each individual man.  And I can safely say that every 
Filipino has changed for the better. (1981) 
 
Also realized in the 1981 speech of Ferdinand Marcos was the conceptualization 
MARTIAL LAW IS A BOOSTER OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY subsumed under the 
broader conceptualization MARTIAL LAW IS A DEMOCRATIC AGENCY OF CHANGE.  In 
the following extract, Marcos implied that the outcome of the implementation of 
martial law had been favorable to the national economy.  He characterized the 
national economy as ‘sound and full of vigor,’ ‘resilient before crisis,’ and one that 
‘will continue to grow.’  He also implied that martial law had led to the ‘rise in the 
welfare’ of the poor and had ushered ‘a beginning in tapping the social conscience of 
free enterprise’:  
 
19. The national economy is sound and full of vigor.  In eight years we have 
wrought fears of productivity and economic expansion that have brought 
us to the threshold of full economic modernization. The reality and the 
prognosis of continued international economic instabilities do not diminish 
this verdict of economic health.  Therein lies the strength of the Republic 
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of the Philippines and its people.  We have been and we are resilient 
before crisis, and the economy will continue to grow. 
The benefits of economic development and political stability have 
been translated into the rise in the welfare of many sectors especially the 
lower sectors of our society.  With land reform and programs for the 
democratization of wealth and economic development, we have raised the 
very poor among us to a new life, not at the cost of strangling the position 
of the more prosperous members of our society but in regulating wealth. 
Indeed, we have made a beginning in tapping the social conscience of free 
enterprise for the task of promoting the welfare of the many. (1981) 
 
 
Marcos expressed confidence in the new period of normalization and liberalization 
because amendments in the Constitution as well as laws on national security and 
public order were passed. These amendments and laws consolidated the power of the 
President and ensured the legitimacy of his actions against those elements which in 
his judgment ‘imperil’ the life of the nation.  
During the supposed period of normalization (1981-1985), Marcos relied on 
his constitutional powers to issue decrees and letters of instructions to pursue his 
presidential agenda. As he allayed fears of a return to martial law in the face of 
mounting threats from insurgents, he asserted that ‘even if situation should 
deteriorate, we have adequate checks and responses in our system of government to 
cope with this, without having to repair to martial law’ (1984).   
The year 1983, however, proved crucial to this period of normalization.  On 
August 21 of that year, Benigno Aquino Jr., a former Senator and one of Marcos’ 
staunch critics, was assassinated on the tarmac of the Manila International Airport 
upon arrival from a three year exile in the United States.  Aquino’s death galvanized 
protests against Marcos from various groups including members of the militant left. 
Although he no longer had martial law powers at his disposal, Marcos had had 
consolidated powers through the revised constitution and had full control in the use of 
military forces to respond to the activities mounted by protesters and activists. On the 
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other hand, he advocated the process of dialogue within the National Assembly—a 
move that can be seen as a way to delegitimize the critical opposition beyond the 
parliament.  
Even in the absence of martial law, Marcos justified the use of military power 
to address challenges posed by the mounting insurgency in the countryside, disruptive 
dissension in the labor sector, and street protests.  The use of military power was 
justified through the conceptualization PEACE AND SECURITY ARE PRECURSORS TO 
NATIONAL SUCCESS, which took a significant place in Marcos’ rhetoric during the 
post-martial law period.  In the following extracts from Marcos’ 1984 and 1985 
national addresses, peace and security are conceptualized as a necessary and 
‘imperative’ element to ‘spur’ socio-economic growth:  
 
20. As we take purposive action to spur the economy to recovery and growth, 
we need to ensure peace in our society and security of our Republic. 
(1984) 
 
21. In pursuing these initiatives for the economy and society, peace and 
security are imperative to success.  This administration has shown how 
much can be done to strengthen law and order in our social life, and to 
secure the Republic from every threat to overthrow it. (1985) 
 
 
As in his justification of the imposition of martial law in 1972, Marcos 
employed the narrative of imminent threat from the communist insurgents in 
establishing that ‘uncompromising’ utilization of military power was what was 
needed to ensure peace and security.  In the extracts below, the communist insurgents 
are characterized as having taken advantage of the national crisis (‘willfully infiltrated 
and manipulated by subversives and provocateurs’ as in extract 21) and who posed 
‘threats’ to the communities (extract 22). They are described as sources of disruption, 
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‘provocateurs,’ ‘infiltrators,’ and opportunists that had to be met with ‘proper 
response by the government and military forces.’    
 
22. This is a period of uncertainty and stress in national life has also been a 
time of intensive buildup of subversion and insurgency. 
The peaceful pursuit of reforms including demonstrations and 
protests is a necessary part, I presume, of our democratic life.  But it is a 
very grave and disturbing trend when these are willfully infiltrated and 
manipulated by subversives and provocateurs. 
Likewise, the efforts of labor to secure workers’ rights and welfare 
have been marred often by subversive infiltration of their ranks.  And these 
have led sometimes to violence at the picket lines. 
The dangers on this end would not be disturbing but for the 
heightened activities of insurgent terrorists in recent months.  For a 
combination of both—intensified urban activity and countryside 
insurgency—suggests an expansion of aims and buildup of strength. 
The gravity of these threats has therefore been met with proper 
response by our government and military forces.  And you may be sure 
that we shall be vigilant and resolute in our campaign to ensure the peace 
and security of the nation. (1984) 
 
23. As economic difficulties have beset us during the last three years, 
however, those seeking to the overthrow of government by force found the 
time opportune to expand and intensify their activities.  And today the 
peace and security situation is of priority concern.  
Although stability has been attained with respect to the secessionist 
movement in the South, other elements now pose grave threats to our 
communities, the most critical of these being the Communist New 
People’s Army.  
There has been a tendency, particularly on the part of the foreign 
media and foreign observers, to exaggerate the extent of the Communist 
threat, so much so that we are not the subject of all kinds of scenarios on 
when and how the Communists will take over.  This kind of ‘overreacting’ 
on the part of those who do not know the situation first hand merely serves 
to confuse the issues and do not help us any in dealing with the realities of 
the problem. 
While the CPP/NPA has managed, since 1969, to increase its 
strength, improve its firepower, and expand its political influence, it is still 
far from being an immediate threat to government and overall national 
stability.  But it does pose a serious threat to peace and order and in some 
of our communities, and to life and welfare for several thousands of our 
people.  Intelligence estimates today place NPA membership at between 
10,000 to 12,000 men, and this armed force is potent enough to affect 
peace and order conditions in four percent of our 41,615 barangays, where 
it has political and military organizations, and in the additional nine 
percent which it occasionally visits. 
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Likewise, it is significant that 70 percent of violent incidents 
perpetrated in the countryside and in some urban areas in recent years have 
been initiated by the NPA.  Political bias should never cloud our 
perceptions of these acts of violence and terrorism.  From January 1985 to 
June this year, the NPA mounted attacks on 27 municipal buildings and 29 
integrated national INP stations, causing an estimated damage of P92 
million.  In the period from 1981 to 1984, damage caused by the NPA 
attacks amounted to P330 million.  In terms of lives lost, NPA violence 
and terrorism have taken the lives of 600 civilians, including 46 
government officials. 
Our response to the insurgency has been a dual strategy.  In the 
short term, this strategy consists of the uncompromising utilization of 
military power and the application of national security laws against 
insurgents.  For the long term, however, our strategy seeks to achieve 
social, economic and political development as the lasting guarantee for 
social peace. (1985) 
 
It is important to note that the conceptualization that PEACE AND SECURITY 
ARE PRECURSORS TO NATIONAL SUCCESS remained consistent with the twin 
conceptualizations of martial law as A DEMOCRATIC INSTRUMENT TO PRESERVE 
SOCIETY and A DEMOCRATIC AGENCY OF CHANGE.  Peace and security—goals which 
are associated with the preservation of society—were largely pursued by employing 
military power which Marcos continued to harness even after the lifting of martial 
law.  By doing so, Marcos reenacted the formulation that militarist intervention was a 
necessary factor in bringing about social change. 
 During the period of normalization, Marcos also rehearsed the 
conceptualization that DEMOCRACY IS AN ALTERNATIVE IDEOLOGY TO COMMUNISM 
THAT MUST BE NOURISHED AND DEFENDED.  This was of course rooted in his concept 
of ‘democratic revolution’ which in the early 1970s he offered as an alternative to the 
revolution waged by the communist insurgents.  This was also a reaffirmation of the 
Cold War rhetoric where competing ideologies of the world’s superpowers were 
pitted against each other.   
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In the following extract, Marcos cast democracy as an ideology caught in a 
struggle against competing ideologies like communism and socialism.  He suggested 
that victory in the struggle is realized by nurturing democracy (‘renewing ourselves 
many times by an act of faith,’ ‘by tapping anew the great resources of democratic 
ideology and tradition’), defending it against competing ideologies (‘carry the 
struggle to the citadels of the enemy’), and discrediting these competing ideologies 
(‘underscore the sour fruit of communist and socialist experience’).   
 
24. We need have no fear as we engaged in this struggle of ideas, in this test 
between our rival faiths and ideologies.  But it is no longer enough to 
simply trust to the worn saw that our people will never be won over by 
communism or socialism, because of ideals and beliefs they were born to. 
Tradition is indeed on the side of democracy. But it is vain and 
illusory to imagine that this struggle can be won without renewing 
ourselves many times by an act of faith.  It cannot be won without tapping 
anew the great resources of democratic ideology and tradition.  It cannot 
be won if we do not carry the struggle also to the citadels of the enemy, 
and underscore the sour fruit of communist and socialist experience. 
This is the reason why I have not stopped insisting that we must 
develop and nurture our democratic ideology, one rooted in our experience 
and needs. 
This is why I believe it is not enough that we parrot the beliefs of 
others in democratic processes and institutions. We must understand their 
practical import in society, and why they must be defended. (1985) 
 
It is interesting to note that the specific expressions of nurturance and defense are 
themselves realizations of conceptual metaphors that make up the broader 
conceptualization of democracy as an ideology.  These conceptual metaphors are: 
DEMOCRACY IS A RELIGION (‘renewing ourselves many times by an act of faith’), 
DEMOCRATIC IDEOLOGY IS A RESOURCE (‘by tapping anew the great resources of 
democratic ideology and tradition’), and COMMUNISM AND SOCIALISM ARE THE ANTI-
THESIS OF DEMOCRACY (‘carry the struggle to the citadels of the enemy,’ ‘underscore 
the sour fruit of communist and socialist experience’).  These articulations on 
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democracy and other competing ideas like communism and socialism undergird a 
broader conceptualization, that is, IDEOLOGY IS AN EVOLVING ENTITY THAT 
REQUIRES NURTURANCE AND PROTECTION IN ORDER TO SURVIVE AGAINST 
OTHER COMPETING ENTITIES. 
It must be said that Marcos’ insistence on democratic ideology against the 
communist or socialist ideology should be understood within a broader context or 
broader discourse.  During the Cold War era, the Philippines under Marcos was 
regarded as the fortress or ‘citadel’ of democracy in Asia which enabled the United 
States to maintain at that time the second largest military bases outside its shores. This 
meant that the Philippines was strategically positioned to counter the spread of 
communism in Southeast Asia which could very well have been influenced by 
neighboring China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).  It also meant 
that the Philippines served to protect both the military and economic interests of the 
United States (cf. Diokno 1985; Brilliantes 1987).  The democratic ideology that 
Marcos espoused was supposedly favorable to the implementation of liberalization 
policies and structural adjustment plans that Marcos had in his list of economic 
reform measures (IBON 1985). It was therefore imperative to constrain forms of 
dissent that challenge these reform measures and the presence of the US military 
within Philippine territory and to discredit ideologies that repudiate such measures 
and interventionist foreign policies. 
At this point, I wish to summarize the conceptualizations that underlay the 
rhetoric of Marcos’ authoritarian rule. Marcos’ authoritarian presidency may be 
divided into two periods—the period during which martial law was imposed or the 
‘crisis government’ as Marcos would have it and the period of normalization and 
democratization.  It should be noted that the latter part of the second period was, 
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however, characterized by mounting protests against the Marcos regime which 
eventually led to his ouster in February 1986.  Two sets of conceptualizations 
correspond to these periods of Marcos’ authoritarian rule.   
The first set (Table 4.1) is centered on conceptualizations of martial law or 
constitutional authoritarianism.  The following lists down the two frames of martial 




Table 4.1 Frames and Conceptual Metaphors during Martial Rule (1972-1981) 
 
Frames Conceptual Metaphors 
MARTIAL LAW IS A 
DEMOCRATIC MEANS TO 
PRESERVE SOCIETY 
 MARTIAL LAW IS A CURATIVE 
 MARTIAL LAW IS AN AGENCY OF ORDER AND 
SECURITY 
 MILITARY ARREST OF SUSPECTED CRIMINALS 
IS A DECONTAMINATION OF THE BODY POLITIC 
 MARTIAL LAW IS A MECHANISM FOR 
SURVIVAL, RESTORATION, AND 
REVITALIZATION 
MARTIAL LAW IS A 
DEMOCRATIC AGENCY OF 
CHANGE 
 MARTIAL LAW IS AN ECONOMIC BOOSTER 
 MARTIAL LAW IS A LIBERATING FORCE 
 MARTIAL LAW IS AN AGENCY OF INTERNAL 
REVOLUTION 
 MILITARY ARREST OF SUSPECTED CRIMINALS 
IS A DECONTAMINATION OF THE BODY POLITIC 
 CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITARIANISM IS AN 




As explained in the analysis, the conceptual metaphor MILITARY ARREST OF 
SUSPECTED CRIMINALS IS A DECONTAMINATION OF THE BODY POLITIC substantiates 
both of the frames. 
 The second set includes two conceptualizations that remain consistent with the 
twin conceptualizations of martial law.  These conceptualizations have something to 
do with peace and security and the democratic ideology.  Both conceptualizations 
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may be regarded as frames in that they subsume metaphorizations that substantiate the 
proposition that they offer: 
 
Table 4.2 Frames and Conceptual Metaphors after Martial Rule (1981-1985) 
 
Frames Conceptual Metaphors 
PEACE AND SECURITY ARE 
PRECURSORS TO NATIONAL SUCCESS 
 COMMUNIST INSURGENTS ARE 
SOURCES OF NATIONAL DISRUPTION 
AND DISTURBANCE 
 COMMUNIST INSURGENTS ARE 
DANGEROUS ELEMENTS IN THE 
COMMUNITIES 
 UTILIZATION OF MILITARY POWER IS 
PEACEMAKING 
IDEOLOGY IS AN EVOLVING ENTITY 
THAT REQUIRES NURTURANCE AND 
PROTECTION IN ORDER TO SURVIVE 
AGAINST OTHER COMPETING ENTITIES 
 DEMOCRACY IS AN IDEOLOGY THAT 
MUST BE NOURISHED AND DEFENDED 
AGAINST COMMUNISM AND 
SOCIALISM 
  
 DEMOCRACY IS RELIGION 
 DEMOCRATIC IDEOLOGY IS A 
RESOURCE 
 COMMUNISM AND SOCIALISM ARE 
THE ANTI-THESIS OF DEMOCRACY 
 
 
By examining the conceptualizations—frames and conceptual metaphors–of 
martial law, military power, and the democratic ideology as realized and expressed in 
the presidential rhetoric over the period of Marcos’ authoritarian rule (1972-1985), it 
is possible to infer or derive how Marcos throughout his authoritarian presidency 
conceptualized the themes of democracy, the national economy, peace and order, and 
the presidency—the four themes that are closely examined in the succeeding 
analytical chapters on post-Marcos administrations.  Based on the analysis above, the 
following conceptualizations may thus be derived47:  
                                                 
47 This is done to establish points for comparison with the post-Marcos presidential rhetoric; however, 
it should be noted that the treatment in the analytical chapters which focus on the primary data (i.e., 
SONAs from 1987 to 2009) for this study is much more detailed in terms of textual analysis in that 
conceptual metaphors were posited or generated from the lexical and grammatical expressions having 
to do with each of the four themes (i.e., democracy, national economy, peace and security, and the 




Table 4.3 Conceptualizations of Focal Themes as Derived from Marcos’ Rhetoric during the Period of 
His Authoritarian Rule 
 
Themes Conceptualizations (Frames and Conceptual 
Metaphors) 
Democracy  DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF 




POWERS ARE A VIABLE MEANS TO 
DEFEND DEMOCRACY 

National economy  NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A LIVING 
ENTITY WHOSE DEVELOPMENT IS 
DEPENDENT ON NATIONAL STABILITY, 
PEACE AND SECURITY 
 NATIONAL ECONOMY IS AN ENTITY THAT 
IS SUBJECT TO UNFOLDING EVENTS AND 
ARRANGEMENTS IN THE WORLD 
ECONOMIC ORDER 
Peace and security  PEACE AND SECURITY ARE 
PREREQUISITES TO SYSTEMIC NATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
 INSURGENTS ARE SOURCES OF 
DISRUPTION AND DISORDER IN THE 
COUNTRY 
 UTILIZATION OF MILITARY POWER IS A 
VIABLE MEANS TO ENSURE PEACE 
AND SECURITY 
The presidency  THE PRESIDENT IS AN AGENT IN THE 
PRESERVATION OF SOCIETY  
 THE PRESIDENT IS A AN AGENT OF 
SOCIAL REFORM 




The schema that emerges from these conceptualizations is one that acknowledges the 
centrality of constitutional authoritarianism in the national life.  It is regarded as a 
way to protect a democratic society from the threats of communism and socialism. 
When exercised by the president, it becomes a means to protect and reform society. 
Such schema might have served as Marcos’ way of managing the exigencies of the 
                                                                                                                                            
interrelated conceptual metaphors of each theme as expounded by each president in order to show in 
Chapter 10 similarities and variations in the framing of a specific theme across the four post-Marcos 
presidencies covered in this research. 
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times which included among others the Cold War discourse and the external pressure 
to accommodate the neoliberal paradigm. 
As indicated in the historical account of Marcos’s authoritarian rule, the 
official rhetoric on martial law and the use of military power had not gone 
unchallenged during the period of Marcos’ presidency from 1972 until his ouster in 
1986.  As some of the earlier cited publications have demonstrated, Marcos’ 
justification for martial law and the use of military power was countered by evidence 
that his authoritarian regime contravened democratic values and institutions, 
committed human rights violations, and abused presidential power. 
In the next four chapters, I examine not only how the major themes mentioned 
earlier had been conceptualized and metaphorically expressed in the post-Marcos 
presidencies.  I also discuss how the metaphors in the martial law rhetoric have been 
variously recontextualized, that is, subverted, reaffirmed, exploited or redeployed in 





























Corazon C. Aquino – popularly known the world over as Cory Aquino – rose 
to presidential leadership at the crest of a series of non-violent mass demonstrations 
involving approximately two million Filipino civilians along with well-known 
political, military and religious figures.  The demonstrations, which were sparked by 
earlier protests against massive cheating in the Snap Philippine Presidential Election 
in February 1986, unfolded in a highway known as the Epifanio delos Santos Avenue 
(EDSA). It is also considered a culmination of the long-standing protest movement 
that sought to end the more than 13-year old iron-hand rule of Ferdinand Marcos.  The 
movement aimed at restoring a democratic government that was, in the word of 
Filipino essayist Conrado de Quiros, ‘ambushed,’ when martial law was imposed by 
President Marcos in September 1972. 
Understandably, the restoration of democracy through people power and how 
it should translate into something that would transform the nation in general and 
people’s lives in particular became an important point in the presidential discourses of 
Cory Aquino (see Cortes, 1999, 260-261; Malaya and Malaya, 2004, 248-251). 
In this chapter, I argue that throughout Aquino’s State of the Nation Addresses 
from 1987 to 1991,48 the schema of the state of the nation is constructed via a multi-
layered configuration of frames, conceptual metaphors and their entailments that tend 
to revolve/ play around the theme of democracy and/or the process of 
                                                 
48 Included in the texts used for the analysis are the five State of the Nation Addresses of Ms Aquino 
(1987 to 1991) as well as the written document (Report to the Filipino People) that accompanied the 




democratization.  I specifically wish to demonstrate how the concept of democracy is 
conceptualized across her national addresses and how such conceptualization 
configures with the conceptualizations of other themes such as national economy, 
peace and order/ national security, and the presidency.  More specifically, what is 
examined is how the conceptualizations of these themes work in conjunction with, 
complement, support, reinforce or fortify Aquino’s framing of democracy.  
As in the Marcos regime as well as in past Philippine presidencies, the Aquino 
presidency viewed the Filipino nation49 as a living entity or structure – something that 
is capable of expression, is constantly threatened by illnesses brought about by 
internal complications or the environment, is susceptible to further destruction but is 
also capable of restoration and recovery.  Interestingly, Aquino’s five SONAs 
variously suggest this in such expressions as ‘the nation has spoken’ (1987), ‘the 
national will’ (1987), ‘our country is threatened’ (1987), ‘the ills of our country’ 
(1988), ‘the trauma of a wounded nation’ (1988), ‘building a stronger nation’ (1989), 
‘our nation bustled with productive energy’ (1990), ‘our life as a nation’ (1990), and 
‘the country was at a standstill’ (1991).  Moreover, the speeches conceptualize the 
nation as the Filipinos’ collective self.  This is, for instance, demonstrated in the use 
of the  personal pronoun ‘we’ as in the expression ‘we will endure as a free nation’ 
(1991 Written Report) and the possessive personal pronoun ‘our’ as in the line ‘It 
drained the last drop of confidence in our future from all but the hardiest spirits, and 
shattered our image abroad’ (1991). 
While Marcos believed that military rule was crucial to the national survival, 
the Aquino presidency saw its predecessor’s imposition of martial law as destructive 
                                                 




and detrimental to national life. In the rhetoric of Aquino’s SONAs, only in a 
democratic system sustained by what her administration deemed as the ‘ways of 
democracy’ and ‘people empowerment’ can the nation thrive, achieve maturity, and 
develop to its fullest. 
The discussion that follows is organized based on the four themes I have 
chosen to focus on in this study: democracy/ democratization, national economy, 
national security (including peace and order), and the presidency (also referred to as 
the ‘government’ or ‘executive leadership’). Each theme corresponds to one 
discussion section where I present the conceptual frame/s on the theme, spell out the 
conceptual metaphors that constitute the frame/s, and show how these conceptual 
metaphors are realized through metaphorical expressions across the speeches.  In 
Table 5.1, I outline these conceptual frames generated from the conceptual metaphors 
derived from the textual analyses of the Aquino SONAs.  The frames, categorized 
based on the four themes, are explicated in the discussion sections.  The major points 
from each discussion section are then summarized in a concluding section where the 
overarching schema of the state of the nation under the Aquino administration is taken 




Table 5.1 Conceptual Frames in Corazon C. Aquino’s SONAs 
 
Section Theme Conceptual Frames 
5.3 Democracy  DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING 
SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT THAT 
SUSTAINS NATIONAL LIFE  
5.4 National economy  NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A 
MANIFESTATION OF NATIONAL 
LIFE 
5.5 Peace and security  REBELLION AND CRIMINALITY 
ARE THREATS TO DEMOCRACY 
AND THE NATIONAL LIFE 
 THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT 
UNDER THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS 
A DEFENDER OF THE PEOPLE AND 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY 
 THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE 
AGAINST THE REBELS IS 
PEACEMAKING 
5.6 The presidency  THE GOVERNMENT50 IS A MORAL 
COMBATANT, A PROTECTOR OF 
THE PEOPLE AND THE PRIMARY 
AGENT OF DEMOCRACY 
 
Before I present the analytical sections, I shall first provide a historical milieu 
of the Aquino presidency to put into context the conceptual frames and metaphors that 
emerge from the textual analyses. The historical milieu can be found in section 5.2 
which accounts for the significant events that transpired during the presidential term 
of Aquino and the exigencies her administration was positioned to respond.  Sections 
5.3 to 5.6 are the four analytical sections and section 5.7 is the chapter’s summary.  
 
5.2       Historical milieu of the Corazon Aquino presidency (1986-1992) 
 After the assassination of opposition leader and former Senator Benigno 
Aquino Jr. in August 1983, his wife Corazon ‘Cory’ Cojuangco Aquino became the 
                                                 
50 In this study, terms such as ‘government’, ‘executive leadership’, ‘the executive’, and ‘presidential 





symbolic leader of the anti-Marcos struggle. She subsequently rose to power after the 
peaceful overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos through a famed ‘people power’ uprising in 
February 1986.  
Aquino’s presidential term is noted for reestablishing democratic institutions 
and processes undermined during more than thirteen years of Marcos 
authoritarianism. Upon her assumption to presidential power, she restored political 
freedom curtailed under the militaristic rule of Marcos by issuing presidential 
proclamations lifting the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and granting 
amnesty to political prisoners. Among those political prisoners granted amnesty was 
Jose Maria ‘Joma’ Sison, who was the founding chair of the Communist Party of the 
Philippines (CPP) when it was reorganized in 1968. He later went into exile in the 
Netherlands after his release was vehemently protested by those in the military. 
One of the problems Aquino inherited from the Marcos regime was a 
fragmented Philippine society which included the problem of communist insurgency. 
Anti-Marcos activists had noted that the dictator had been the ‘number one recruiter’ 
of communist rebels. Aquino in her well known speech before the US Congress noted 
that communist insurgency that numbered less than 500 before Marcos’s imposition 
of martial law in 1972 swelled to more than 16,000 by the time the dictator fled. 
Aquino pursued peace talks with the CPP but the latter broke off the talks after a 
leftist trade union leader was murdered by a death squad allegedly connected to the 
Philippine Army (Pomeroy 1992, 320). The CPP resumed the armed struggle of its 
New People’s Army (NPA) after the failure of negotiations. In 1988, Aquino declared 
an ‘all-out war’ against the rebels. 
Aside from the challenge of communist insurgency, the Aquino government 
also faced seven military coup attempts, two of which were most devastating—those 
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that transpired in August 1987 and December 1989. Her eventual successor, then 
Defense Secretary and former Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff 
Fidel Ramos, is credited for having stood by President Aquino and for quelling 
military attempts to grab power. There was also restlessness in Southern Philippines 
as Moro rebel forces waged for a Bangsamoro or an independent Muslim Mindanao.  
Also during Aquino’s term, the country experienced some of the worst calamities in 
modern history: the July 1990 earthquake and the Mount Pinatubo eruption in 1991. 
In the same year that Pinatubo erupted, the Philippine Senate voted ‘no’ to the 
proposal that would have extended Philippine-United States Military Bases 
Agreement, ending the decades old presence of US military in the Philippines. 
Noted for her emphasis on ‘people empowerment,’ Aquino used ‘development 
diplomacy’ as a thrust in foreign relations—a policy that focused on the political and 
economic reconstruction of the Philippines through international cooperation. 
Aquino pursued economic reforms including economic liberalization and 
privatization of government-owned and/or government-controlled corporations. The 
perennial problem of graft and corruption in the bureaucracy was addressed through 
the creation of the Office of Ombudsman to investigate complaints of illegal acts by 
government officials.   
Aquino considered as the centerpiece of her administration the Comprehensive 
Agrarian Reform Law which was meant to redistribute land to tenant-farmers. 
However, the non-distribution of the Cojuangco family-owned Hacienda Luisita to its 
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own tenant-farmers became a major source of criticism against the first post-Marcos 
leadership.51 
In 1992, Aquino finished her term successfully with a peaceful transfer of 
power. Throughout her presidency, her leadership style was noted to have been 
operating in a politico-spiritual plane and ‘to have been defined by the virtues of 
sincerity, integrity, religiosity, and humility.’ 
 
5.3       Democracy 
Central to the rhetoric of the Aquino presidency is the following 
conceptualization or framing of Philippine democracy: DEMOCRACY IS AN 
EVOLVING SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT THAT SUSTAINS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL 
LIFE.  This conceptualization is achieved through the following statements that are 
variously expressed across the five SONAs of Ms. Aquino: 
 
(5.3.1) DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING SYSTEM THAT HAD BEEN RENDERED 
WEAK UNDER MARCOS DICTATORSHIP 
(5.3.2) THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT 
(5.3.3) DEMOCRACY IS EMPOWERMENT 
(5.3.4) DEMOCRACY IS LIFE-SUSTAINING SYSTEM 
(a) DEMOCRACY IS A BENEFACTOR OF THE NATION 
(b) DEMOCRACY IS A NURTURER 
(c) DEMOCRACY IS A RESOURCE FOR PEOPLE POWER 
(d) DEMOCRACY IS A CURE TO THE NATIONAL ILLS 
(e) DEMOCRACY IS A KEY TO A PEOPLE-POWERED ECONOMY/ 
CAPITALISM CONDUCIVE TO GROWTH 
 
The conceptual metaphors and their entailments suggest a narrative or story of 
democracy: democracy as a living system had been rendered weak – in other 
accounts, ‘ambushed’ (see De Quiros 1997) – by the Marcos dictatorship.  People 
struggled to fight the dictatorship and their struggle culminated in the people power 
                                                 
51 In November 2011, during the presidential term of Aquino’s son Benigno Aquino III, the Supreme 
Court ruled for the distribution of land of the Hacienda Luisita to the farm workers. 
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revolution that installed Aquino to power. The revolutionary government of Aquino 
worked to restore democracy that remains evolving and can be nurtured by ‘ways of 
democracy.’ This story of democracy when combined with the story of the nation and 
the national economy make up a complex combination of frames that constitute a 
broader frame or the schema of the state of the nation. This would be accounted for at 
the end of the chapter. Meanwhile, I shall explicate how each of the conceptual 
metaphors that lead up to the narrative of democracy is realized in the texts.  
5.3.1 DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT THAT SUSTAINS 
NATIONAL LIFE 
That DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT THAT 
SUSTAINS NATIONAL LIFE is expressed in the SONAs in a variety of ways, a number 
of which generally point to democracy as having been weakened under the Marcos 
regime but restored by the Aquino government that replaced it.  
Two metaphorizations express such conceptual metaphor in the speeches:  
DEMOCRACY IS A BUILDING/ STRUCTURE (as suggested by the phrases ‘democratic 
restoration’ and ‘enlargement of democratic space’) and DEMOCRACY IS A LIVING 
ENTITY (e.g., ‘planted the freest democracy’, ‘our restored democracy has gone past 
its fledgling stage’). Both metaphorizations suggest an evolving or changing system—
a building or structure can be ‘enlarged’ and ‘strengthened’ (in the same way that it 
can be destroyed and weakened) while an organism can develop and ‘mature’ (or 
experience regression). Clearly, what these metaphorizations try to achieve is to 
render democracy as a system that is dynamic or one that is subject to alterations or 





 DEMOCRACY IS A BUILDING/ STRUCTURE 
 
1. Incredibly, despite the significant reduction in the country risk effected 
by the democratic restoration, we were not accorded the terms given 
other countries which got longer periods, better rates and greater 
latitude for growth.  (1987)  
 
2. Despite the great losses sustained, I felt no regret that we had 
completely restored democracy.  (1988) 
 
3. But in one thing we grew from strength to strength – in the 
enlargement of our democratic space and the strengthening of our 
democracy.  (1991) 
 
 
DEMOCRACY IS A LIVING ENTITY 
 
4. Fifteen years ago, in this season of the year, my husband stood in the 
Senate and delivered what turned out to be the valedictory of 
Philippine democracy. He exposed the conspiracy to place the country 
under martial law, dissolve Congress and set the stage for unremitting 
plunder of our patrimony, and the degradation of our great name and 
honor. 
The dictator’s last mockery of democracy was committed in 
this hall, where the loser was proclaimed winner of the snap election.  
Today, I join you in rededicating this hall to true democracy. (1987) 
 
5. Yet nothing generated greater admiration than our political 
achievements. In little over a year, we uprooted a dictatorship and 
planted the freest democracy in the world – with all its good and bad 
features.  (1989) 
 
6. This failed adventurism has underscored the fact that our restored 
democracy has gone past its fledgling stage.  It has proceeded to 
mature and is now ready for a more profound expression in our life as 
a nation  (1990)  
 
7. Every calamity tested the capacity of democracy to absorb distress, 
find relief, and meet the absolute necessities of the people without the 
least curtailment of freedom or compromise of rights.  (1991) 
 




9. The increasing number of registered voters and a national voter turnout 
averaging 80% in all four political exercises demonstrated both the 
vitality and viability of our newly restored democracy.  (1991 WR) 
 
 
The phrases ‘democratic restoration’ and ‘restored democracy’ in extracts 1 and 2 
easily bring to mind the metaphorization that DEMOCRACY IS A BUILDING/ 
STRUCTURE. The phrases presuppose a prior destruction of ‘democracy,’ an indirect 
allusion to the actions of the Marcos regime. They also presuppose that democracy 
can be lost, weakened, enervated, made static so as to render useless, and dissipated.  
The metaphorization of democracy as a structure is also shown in extract 3 with the 
use of the phrase ‘enlargement of democratic space and the strengthening of our 
democracy.’  
Also worth noting is that extracts 1 and 3 suggest that democracy—the 
restored structure—can significantly affect the state of the nation or country. In 
extract 1, it is established as the cause (‘effected by’) of significant reduction in 
country risk while extract 3 suggests a correspondence between national growth (‘we 
grew from strength to strength’) and the ‘enlargement of democratic space.’ 
However, in extracts 6 and 9, the phrase ‘restored democracy’ is given a living 
element.  Descriptions of the ‘restored democracy’ as having ‘gone beyond its 
fledgling stage,’ as having ‘proceeded to mature,’ as being deemed ‘ready for a more 
profound expression in our life as a nation’ (extract 6), and as having ‘vitality and 
viability’ (extract 9) are realizations of the metaphor DEMOCRACY IS A LIVING 
ENTITY.   
The organic metaphorization of democracy is also evident in extracts 5, 7 and 
8.  Extract 5 from Aquino’s third SONA offers a direct expression of democracy as 
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organism by stating that it is ‘planted’ in place of an ‘uprooted’ dictatorship, while 
extract 8 is most explicit about the vitality of democracy through the expression 
‘democracy… is now alive.’  In extract 7, democracy is depicted as having the 
‘capacity to absorb distress,’ ‘find relief’ and ‘meet the absolute necessities of the 
people without the curtailment of freedom or compromise of rights.’ Needless to say, 
the description accords an agentive element to democracy.  
Extract 4 taken from the inaugural State of the Nation Address of Aquino in 
1987 highlights her husband’s, then Senator Benigno Aquino Jr., speech in 1968 
which forewarned of an impending ‘garrison state in the make’ (Aquino 1985). The 
recollection of that incident in the national address implies how ‘democracy’ ended 
with the declaration of martial law, the dissolution of Congress – a democratic 
institution Aquino referred to as ‘the hall of democracy,’ and the rise of Ferdinand 
Marcos’s dictatorial regime.  To Aquino, a direct consequence of the end of 
democracy was the degradation of the nation’s (‘our’) ‘great name and honor’, 
implying that the life of the nation – including its credibility or reputation – is 
anchored on the viability of democracy. The third statement of the same extract 
provides a recounting of a depraved action in the past (‘mockery of democracy was 
committed in this hall, where the loser was proclaimed winner of the snap election’) 
in the Congressional hall – the same place where her speech was delivered.  Notably, 
the expression ‘the dictator’s last mockery of democracy’ in the statement implies 
further the role of Marcos in the national degradation. Such recounting of an 
unfavorable past is followed by a statement on the present (‘Today, I join you…’) 
which highlights how the new government’s role contrasts with that of Marcos: the 
Aquino administration’s participation in ‘rededicating this hall to true democracy’ 
against the ‘dictator’s mockery of democracy.’ 
Navera 137 
 
5.3.2    RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IS AN ACHIEVEMENT 
The restoration of democracy from the destruction caused by the Marcos 
dictatorship is considered a national achievement in the Aquino SONAs.  That such 
restoration is A NATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT underscores the importance of this evolving 
system to the Philippine national life. This can be gleaned from the following extracts:   
 
10. Our extraordinary achievements in fulfilling the first requirement of 
renegotiation [of foreign debt payment], the establishment of free and 
responsible government, gained us applause but no substantial 
accommodation from our foreign creditors.  (1987)  
 
11. This day completes the circle of our democratic achievements. Now 
Philippine democracy rests solidly upon the three pillars of freedom: 
the President, the Supreme Court and Congress.  (1987) 
 
12. Mr. Senate President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Congress, join me 
now in expressing our congratulations and deepest gratitude to those 
who have this day by God’s grace given to the nation the fully ripened 
fruit of freedom – ang ating mga kababayan, ang mamamayang 
Pilipino (our countrymen, the Filipino citizens).  (1987) 
 
13. That pride and that confidence rest, however, on the continuing faith in 
the one solid and undeniable achievement of the great moral exertion 
of our people: the establishment of a democratic government under an 
honest and dedicated leadership.  (1987) 
 
14. This is the real national emergency, for what is involved here is not 
underutilized manufacturing capacity or insufficient incentives for the 
rich, but the very quality of the Filipino who symbolizes the great 
Asian miracle: a revolution without blood, democratic restoration 
without tears.  (1988) 
 
15. We held elections that were the freest and most participative in the 
history of this – perhaps of any – republic in the world.  (1989) 
 
16. I therefore ask you, Honorable Senators and Representatives of this 
[…] our people’s Congress, and the rest of our leaders, to renew with 
me our commitment to the dream that bound us together in 1986: 
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Democracy, freedom, sovereignty, economic growth, social justice. 
(1990) 
 
17. Against our economic gains that are ever hostages to fortune, stands 
one steadfast, unalloyed achievement: our democracy. Destined, I 
believe, to outlive our problems and deck with the graces of liberty the 
material progress of our future. That achievement is better seen from 
the disinterested distance of foreign admirers, than from the myopic 
view of those at home who wish to destroy it.  (1991) 
 
18. The legacy of a restored democracy not only has made Juan de la Cruz 
confident to speak his mind and walk our streets safely.  It has made 
him proud to proclaim anywhere in the world that he is Filipino. (1991 
WR)   
 
As an achievement, the restoration of democracy or the democratization of the 
country after the people power revolution is variously described as ‘extraordinary’ 
(10), ‘complete’ (11), ‘solid and undeniable’ (13), ‘steadfast’ and ‘unalloyed’ (17).   
In 12, the achievement is a harvest – ‘the fully ripened fruit of freedom’ given 
to the nation by the Filipino people (‘ang mamamayang Pilipino’).  It is also 
considered ‘the great Asian miracle’ (14), a phrase which underlies the religious 
dimension of the people power revolution and the democratic restoration that 
followed.  
In extract 15, the use of superlatives ‘freest’ and ‘most participative’ in the 
context of ‘the history of this –perhaps of any – republic in the world’ to refer to the 
congressional, provincial, municipal, and barangay (village) elections – considered 
then and now as the most concrete forms of democratic exercise in the Philippines – 
emphasizes the significance of democratization as a national achievement.  It is a 
dream that has been achieved, one that has bound the national leaders together (16); it 




On the other hand, it is important to note in extract 10 the caveat to celebrating 
the establishment of a democratic government as an achievement seeing that ‘no 
substantial accommodation from foreign creditors’ was achieved in the renegotiation 
for foreign debt.  In other words, the president was quick to remind her audience of 
the reality that the nation would face in spite of the significant accomplishment of 
democratization. 
5.3.3    DEMOCRACY IS EMPOWERMENT 
One of the most important conceptualizations of democracy introduced by the 
Aquino administration is the idea that DEMOCRACY IS EMPOWERMENT.  This may be 
considered an important legacy of the Aquino presidency having been installed 
through a ‘people power’ uprising in 1986.   
To the Aquino presidency, democracy, a system which had been ‘mocked’ 
under martial rule imposed by the Marcos presidency, but ‘restored’ to its ‘true’ form 
and substance when Aquino was put into power, and tested by threats emanating from 
leftist insurgents and military rebels, needs to be nurtured if it has to thrive and sustain 
national life. The following extracts illustrate the said conceptualization: 
 
19. Our swift democratization was done against the advice that I reserve 
emergency powers in the face of rising military adventurism and 
communist terrorism. But I believe then – and time has proved me 
right – that this nation shall find no greater source of strength to defend 
democracy than in the enjoyment of all its rights and liberties.  
Democracy is our faith and the root of our strength to defend it.  
(1989) 
 
20. But there is a way to strengthen democracy that is within the country’s 
reach.  That is through the empowerment of the people.  (1991) 
 
21. But empowering the people means more than just giving them 
elections every three years.  It means enlarging their contact with 
government beyond elections to its daily workings – so that the vast 
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resources of one support the initiatives of the other, and the policies of 
government are refined by the insights of the people.  By this means 
the lives of the people shall be constantly improved and the people 
themselves empowered by the habit of directing their own government.  
People empowerment, through people’s organizations, NGO’s, 
foundations and cooperatives, is the surest means we know to make 
government mirror the aspirations of the people. We want elections to 
be just one of the other more effective means to bring the people into 
government and government to the people, to make it truly a 
participatory democracy.  (1991)  
 
22. The organized participation of the people in daily government may 
provide the stabilizing element that government has always lacked.  
The active participation of the people in government will lend proper 
direction and continuity to policy. (1991) 
 
23. Where once we almost lost our voice as a nation, today we speak with 
many voices, but it is a responsible and committed noise. If we push 
for empowerment, it is because we know it is our guarantee that we 
will endure as a free nation.  (1991 WR) 
 
24. Peaceful, honest and orderly elections through which the will and the 
wisdom of our people would be expressed shall enable us to bequeath 
our legacy of democracy strengthened by our responsible and mature 
citizenry.  (1991 WR)  
 
In the above-mentioned extracts, reinforcement of democracy is expressed through 
defense (19) and strengthening (20, 24) of it; and the means to reinforce (defend or 
strengthen) democracy would be through people empowerment and/or democratic 
practices (e.g., ‘enjoyment of [democratic] rights and liberties’ (19), ‘peaceful, honest 
and orderly elections’ (24)). Democratic practices and people empowerment are 
variously characterized as ‘a way to strengthen democracy’ (20), ‘enlarging people’s 
contact with government’ (21), ‘a stabilizing element’ (22), and ‘our guarantee that 
we will endure as a free nation’ (23).  People empowerment is also made synonymous 
with the terms ‘participatory democracy’ (21) and ‘organized/ active participation of 
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the people’ (22). Moreover, it is conceptualized as crucial to the process of 
policymaking (21 and 22). 
5.3.4    DEMOCRACY IS A LIFE-SUSTAINING SYSTEM 
The relationship between democracy and the national life is substantiated by 
the characterization of democracy as A LIFE-SUSTAINING SYSTEM. As earlier 
mentioned, this conceptualization is accomplished using the following more specific 
conceptual metaphors that underlie the texts:  
 
(a) DEMOCRACY IS A BENEFACTOR OF THE PEOPLE,  
(b) DEMOCRACY IS A NURTURER,  
(c) DEMOCRACY IS A CURE TO THE NATIONAL ILLS,  
(d) DEMOCRACY IS A RESOURCE FOR PEOPLE POWER, and 
(e) DEMOCRACY IS A FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT TO A PEOPLE-POWERED 
ECONOMY/ CAPITALISM CONDUCIVE TO GROWTH. 
 
 
Democracy’s role as a BENEFACTOR OF THE PEOPLE is realized in the 
following extracts: 
 
25. Many have benefited from the example of our previous struggles.  
Many more stand to profit from what we shall make out of our 
democracy and freedom.  (1990) 
 
26. Participatory democracy will end the practice of punishing provinces 
and municipalities for the wrong vote in the last poll. It will separate 
elections, where the people vote for their favorites, from the provision 
of public service which every Filipino has a right to expect from the 
government, regardless how he voted. (1991) 
 
Extract 25 underscores the assurance of benefits (or profits) people will get 
from democracy while extract 26 suggests how a particular form of democracy, that 
is, participatory democracy, can ensure provision of public service to the Filipino 
voters in spite of how they actually voted.  Extract 27, below, is another evidence of 
the said conceptualization (i.e., DEMOCRACY IS A BENEFACTOR), but it uses a 
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concrete example of democracy—what is referred to as mga Kabisig (Partners)52—to 
express such conceptualization. The Kabisig may be considered personifications of 
democracy as conceived by President Aquino.  They are ‘katulong’ (helpers) and 
‘kasama sa pagtulong’ (fellow helpers) in all aspects of national life.  
 
27. Ang mga Kabisig nating ito ang nagbigay buhay sa diwa ng EDSA.  Sa 
lahat ng dako ng ating bansa ay taglay pa rin nila ang diwa ng 
rebolusyon ng 1986. Patuloy silang kumikilos, laban sa kahirapan, 
kaguluhan, sakit at kamangmangan. Katulong natin sila sa 
pagpapabilis at pagpapalaganap ng ating mga programa: sa repormang 
pansakahan; sa kapayapaan at kaayusan: sa pangangalaga ng ating 
kalikasan at likas na yaman; sa pagpapatupad ng desentralisasyon; at sa 
paghango natin sa kapos-palad nating kababayan mula sa kahirapan. 
Kasama natin sila sa pagtulong sa mga biktima ng nagdaan lindol sa 
Cabanatuan, Dagupan, Baguio at iba pang pook. Binigyang buhay ng 
mga Kabisig nating ito ang diwa ng ating Saligang Batas; binigyang 
halimbawa nila ang tunay na kahulugan ng demokrasya.   
 
(Trans. Our Kabisig (Partners) give life to the spirit of EDSA. In all 
parts of the country, they still possess the spirit of the revolution of 
1986.  They continue to act against poverty, disorder, disease, and 
ignorance. They help us in accelerating and disseminating our 
programs: in agrarian reform; in peace and order; in caring for our 
environment and natural resources; in implementing decentralization; 
and in saving our less-fortunate countrymen from poverty.  They are 
with us in helping the victims of the recent earthquake in Cabanatuan, 
Dagupan, Baguio and other places.  Our Kabisig give life to the spirit 
of the Constitution; they exemplify the true meaning of democracy.) 
(1990) 
 
In the same extract, the Kabisig movement is also depicted ‘to give life’ to the 
spirit of EDSA people power revolution (‘diwa ng EDSA’, ‘diwa ng rebolusyon ng 
1986’), which spawned the process of democratization of national life in the first 
place, and to the spirit of the Constitution (‘ang diwa ng Saligang Batas’) which is an 
                                                 




important hallmark of the restoration of Philippine democracy. The extract therefore 
lends itself to the conceptualization that DEMOCRACY IS A NURTURER. This can also 
be inferred from the following extracts where the democratization led by the Aquino 
presidency is credited for the ‘emergence of a healthy multiparty system’ that is 
touted to pave way to ‘the more ideological, cause-oriented and platform-guided 
interests and legitimate concerns of key sectors of our population’ (28) and where the 
initiative in participatory culture of kabisig is regarded to engender productivity (i.e., 
‘yield more fruits in the years ahead’) (29). 
 
28. More than these, we have seen the emergence of a healthy multiparty 
system, spanning the entire range of the political spectrum, with the 
more traditional personality-based political parties being effectively 
challenged by and gradually yielding to the more ideological, cause-
oriented and platform-guided interests and legitimate concerns of key 
sectors of our population.  (1991 WR) 
 
29. Certainly, the initiatives in foreign policy, economic policy and 
participatory culture of kabisig, as a strategy for getting the right 
things done right away, will continue to yield more fruits in the years 
ahead. (1991 WR) 
 
Complementing the conceptualization of democracy as life-giving and life-
sustaining is the statement that DEMOCRACY IS A CURE TO THE NATIONAL ILLS. This 
is made explicit in extract 30 and suggested in 31:    
 
30. I believe that nowhere could you find more effective cures for the ills of 
our country – such as the habit of oppression, the inclination to 
corruption, the betrayal of public interest – than in the blessings of 
democracy: freedom; rights; transparent dealings; and a government of 
the people by the people themselves  (1988) 
 
31. Every calamity tested the capacity of democracy to absorb distress, 
find relief, and meet the absolute necessities of the people without the 




Extract 30 expresses that the ‘nowhere could you find more effective cures for the ills 
of our country...than in the blessings of democracy.’ The expression runs parallel to 
Marcos’ conceptualization of martial law as a curative (see Chapter 4).  Marcos would 
himself insist that the imposition of martial law was within the bounds of democracy 
as he even called it ‘constitutional authoritarianism.’ Aquino would, however, trounce 
that Marcosian assertion in her speech by specifically spelling out what she meant by 
‘blessings of democracy’ as source of national cure. In the extract, she showed that 
the ‘blessings of democracy’ which include ‘freedom; rights; transparent dealings; 
and a government of the people by the people themselves’ can remedy ‘the ills of our 
country’ which include ‘the habit of oppression, the inclination to corruption, betrayal 
of public interest,’ all of which the Marcos administration was accused of 
perpetrating.  In extract 31, the curative dimension of democracy is expressed in these 
terms: ‘the capacity of democracy to absorb distress, find relief, and meet the absolute 
necessities of the people without the least curtailment of freedom or compromise of 
rights.’  That democracy can ‘absorb distress,’ ‘find relief,’ and ‘meet the necessities 
of the people’ in times of calamity underscores that democracy is a resource for 
comfort (‘relief,’ ‘meet the necessities’) and adjustment (‘absorb’).  Again, Aquino 
struck a contrast with Marcos by emphasizing that comfort and adjustment can be 
achieved ‘without the least curtailment of freedom or compromise of rights.’ 
That DEMOCRACY IS A RESOURCE FOR PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT/ PEOPLE 
POWER is realized in extracts 32, 33, and 34. 
 
32. To give the people greater power over their lives is the essence of 




33. Democracy is the only way for us. We must therefore find the ways by 
which the pitfalls that go with its blessings are reduced, while its 
inherent strengths are brought to the fore.  Of those strengths the most 
promising is people power, a reserve for nation building we tapped 
only once in our history with such marvelous result. (1991)  
 
34. The bottom line of the CARP is to empower our people so that they 
could more actively shape their economic destinies.  After barely three 
years of implementation, the lives of thousands of farmer-beneficiaries 
have been transformed. (1991 WR) 
 
In extract 32, democracy ‘[gives] people greater power over their lives’ while in 33, it 
is ‘the only way for us’ and has ‘people power’ as one of its ‘strengths,’ having been 
‘a reserve for nation building’ tapped during the mass demonstrations in 1986.   In 34, 
the CARP or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program – considered by Aquino 
as the ‘centerpiece of democracy’ (1991) – is described as empowering and 
transformative.  It is important to note that in Aquino’s presidential discourse, the 
metaphorization of democracy as A RESOURCE FOR PEOPLE POWER appears to 
complement the earlier conceptualization of people power as a MEANS TO NURTURE 
DEMOCRACY (see 5.3.3). This goes to prove that as far as the Aquino congressional 
speeches are concerned, democracy and people power are mutually sustaining and 
that one is rendered weak without the other. 
Also subsumed under the conceptualization DEMOCRACY IS A LIFE-
SUSTAINING SYSTEM is the metaphorization of democracy as a crucial element in 
bringing about a kind of economic system conducive to growth (DEMOCRACY IS A 
KEY TO A PEOPLE-POWERED ECONOMY/ CAPITALISM CONDUCIVE TO GROWTH).  This 
metaphorization is realized in statements that express an indirect causal relationship 
between democratization and economic security and/or development. In the following 
extracts, economic development, expressed in such terms as ‘recovery,’ ‘growth’ and 
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‘economic security,’ is ‘accounted for,’ ‘powered by,’ ‘engendered,’ and ‘guaranteed’ 
by a ‘people powered capitalism’ and/or ‘market-oriented economy,’ which, the 
Aquino government claimed, have been made possible with the restoration of 
democracy or democratization.  In the next nine extracts, I highlight the expressions 
of development (e.g., economic growth, recovery, etc.) by putting the lexico-
grammatical choices in bold italicized fonts. I also highlight expressions of how such 
development is achieved by italicizing the terms or phrases used.  Linguistic 
expressions of democracy/ democratization or democratic restoration are underlined. 
 
35. We have tracked this growth and found it accounted for mainly by 
small and medium businesses and by Filipino-Chinese entrepreneurs, 
sectors that made few demands on the public sector, other than to be 
left alone to work in the democratic space we created. We are seeing 
people-powered capitalism in action.  (1988)  
 
36. On economic front, we must provide long delayed incentives to the 
sectors that have powered our recovery particularly the small and 
medium term enterprises.  (1988)  
 
37. First, we have to strengthen the foundations of a vigorous market-
oriented economy.  This would involve continued adherence to 
prudent fiscal and monetary policies and reliance on market forces in 
the functioning of the economy.  These policies have engendered 
robust growth of private investment, output, employment and 
consumption. These have also kept inflation at acceptable levels and 
helped protect the real incomes of wage earners. We must steer away 
from the siren songs of quick fixes, easy spending, unwarranted 
subsidies, and irrational price controls, which elsewhere have 
contributed to bloated deficits, tailspin hyperinflation, and social 
instability.  (1989)  
 
38. All these now could help us see how we have contributed to a climate 
of economic security: a market-oriented economy was restored, crony 
capitalism and economic cartels in sugar and coconut industries were 
dismantled.  We are a democracy that protects rather than persecutes, 
sequesters if necessary, rather than confiscates, guarantees rather than 
Navera 147 
 
steals the fair and fitting share of the entrepreneurs’ and workers’ fruits 
of labor.  (1991 WR) 
 
The patterns of causality implied in the above-mentioned extracts can be illustrated 
thus:   
 
Democratic space/ democratization → people-powered capitalism → growth 
(35) 
  
Democracy → people powered economy → economic recovery (36)  
 
Democratization → adherence to prudent and fiscal monetary policies and 
reliance on market forces → vigorous market oriented economy/ robust 
economic growth (37) 
  
Democracy → restoration of market-oriented economy → climate of 
economic security (38). 
 
   
The role of democracy – particularly of the democratic government of Aquino 
– in launching national economic recovery is communicated directly in extracts 35 to 
38. It is expressed quite explicitly in extract 35 which mentions ‘the small and 
medium business/enterprises’ (also cited in extract 36 of the same speech) as 
instrumental to the nation’s economic recovery and growth.  In extract 36, these small 
and medium term enterprises are explicitly described as having actually made 
possible (‘powered’) the country’s economic ‘recovery’ from its supposedly ailing 
condition in the Marcos regime. 
In extract 37, the line ‘continued adherence to prudent fiscal and monetary 
policies and reliance on market forces in the functioning of the economy’ is supposed 
to suggest a contrast to some of the economic policies during the Marcos years53; 
                                                 
53 It is noted for instance that ‘the proliferation of inefficient and unprofitable public sector enterprises 
and bad loans held by the Philippine National Bank, the Development Bank of the Philippines (two 
major financial institutions of the Philippine government), and other government entities, was a heavy 
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hence, it is reasonable to assume that, in this extract, democratization, with the 
Aquino government at its helm, paved way to the purportedly more sound economic 
policies.   These policies are rendered as some sort of a reinforcement (‘strengthen the 
foundation’) and stimulus (‘engendered’) of the economy.  They are also represented 
as vehicles to keep the economy on the right track.  This is especially suggested in the 
expression, ‘We must steer away from the siren songs of quick fixes, easy spending, 
unwarranted subsidies, and irrational price controls, which elsewhere have 
contributed to bloated deficits, tailspin hyperinflation, and social instability,’ where 
the phrase ‘steer away’ implies some sort of a redirection. More specifically for 
Aquino, it should be a redirection from the practices of the past (‘quick fixes, easy 
spending, unwarranted subsidies, irrational price controls’)—the practices supposedly 
prevalent during the Marcos regime.  She cast these practices as easily tempting 
(‘siren songs’), but was quick to add that they had actually put the economy in an 
unfavorable state: they caused excesses (‘bloated deficits’) and put inflation out of 
control (‘tailspin hyperinflation’).  The adoption of more ‘prudent’ policies as well as 
the ‘reliance on market forces’—made possible with the onset of re-
democratization—would then be the best alternative in order to do away with the 
excesses, to stabilize inflation, and to ensure economic growth in general.  
A similar line of reasoning can be found in extract 38 where democracy 
characterized as conducive to a free and fair market economy and a system that 
‘protects,’ ‘sequesters if necessary,’ and ‘guarantees…fair and fitting share of 
entrepreneurs’ and workers’ fruits of labor’ as opposed to the previous system of 
                                                                                                                                            
legacy of the Marcos years’ (‘Economy of the Philippines’, The US Library of Congress, Available at 
http://countrystudies.us/philippines/59.htm). However, it should also be noted that both Marcos and 
Aquino pursued structural adjustments plans—trade liberalization, deregulation, privatization—as 




crony capitalism (a system that ‘persecutes,’ ‘confiscates’ and ‘steals the fair and 
fitting share of the entrepreneurs’ and workers’ fruits of labor’).  
Indirect causality is also evident in the president’s presentation of her 
recommended solution to alleviate poverty in the country. This is evident in extracts 
39 and 40 below. 
 
39. Our principal focus must be on rural development – the liberation of 
the economic, social and political energies of the countryside…We 
need to decentralize political structures to widen the people’s 
participation in national life.   
A people-powered revolution must aim for a people-
empowered democracy and economy.  Rural development will best 
realize this aim. The alleviation of poverty will come with the 
upliftment of the rural poor.   
Unless we draw our rural areas into the dynamics of the 
national economy, turning hinterlands of decay into frontiers of 
progress, our growth and equity goals will not be attained, neither in 
the short nor the long term.  (1989)54  
 
40. A key link in breaking the bondage of poverty and what has been 
called the curse of underdevelopment is a liberal economic 
environment that encourages and supports the pursuit of a prosperous 
life with dignity.  (1991 WR) 
 
In extract 39, rural development is rendered as a booster (‘upliftment’) of the rural 
poor.  The ‘upliftment’ is supposed to bring about the empowerment of the people and 
consequently a ‘people powered economy’ vital to the ‘alleviation of poverty.’ 
Interesting here is how an upward movement (‘upliftment’) for the rural poor is 
established to have direct link to the decrease or downward movement (‘alleviation’) 
                                                 
54 It is important to note that in this extract, the analyst interprets the use of the term ‘(rural) 
development’ as a process (that is, ‘the liberation of the economic, social, political energies of the 
countryside’ and ‘[drawing out] our rural areas into the dynamics of the national economy, turning 
hinterlands of decay into frontiers of progress’). The goal is ‘alleviation of poverty’ which is an 
expression of ‘economic development’ (growth, recovery) which is used earlier to denote an outcome/ 




of poverty.  This suggests that rural development is an agency of change (upward 
movement for the poor on the one hand, and downward movement of poverty on the 
other).  That it is transformative is made explicit in the expression ‘turning hinterlands 
of decay into frontiers of progress’, where hinterlands and frontiers are set in contrast 
by associating them with the terms ‘decay’ and ‘progress’, respectively.  In extract 40, 
poverty is not just something to be made less serious or to be alleviated; it is 
metaphorized as a ‘bondage’ which a ‘liberal economic environment’ is supposedly 
capable of ‘breaking.’  By rendering poverty as bondage and the liberal economic 
environment as a key link in breaking the bondage, Aquino underscored the 
importance of adopting free market economic policies in the post-Marcos leadership.  
An indirect causal pattern similar to the earlier ones can be gleaned from the two 
extracts just mentioned:   
 
Democratization → rural development → people powered economy → 
alleviation of poverty (39) 
 
Democratization → liberal economic environment → breaking of bondage 
from poverty (40) 
 
Such pattern is also manifested in several instances such as the representation 
of the state of labor industrial relations (i.e., Democratization → liberated labor sector 
→ reduction in strikes and full utilization of industrial capacity), which is seen in 
contrast with the conditions ‘under the dictatorship’; 
 
41. Industrial capacity, idle for lack of capital, markets, and confidence 
under the dictatorship, has been fully utilized. 
The economic upturn is reflected in the reduction of industrial 
actions.  The exuberance of a suddenly liberated labor sector has 
made room for a deeper appreciation of the need for all sectors to 
work together – rather than against each other – for the general 
improvement.   
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Let us not, however, use the reduction in strikes by itself as an 
invitation to more investments, but rather as a barometer of the more 
equitable distribution of the progress we are making.  (1989)  
 
the Aquino government’s policy with regard to the private sector (Democratization → 
privatization → strengthening of the private sector); 
 
42. Related to our government efforts for decentralization and devolution 
of functions of our central office to the local units, the surge of NGO-
GO project collaboration, and the support for local autonomy and the 
autonomous regions, we also continue to push for privatization to 
challenge further and strengthen our private sector. (1991 WR) 
 
and the state of the Philippine environmental movement (Democratization → 
participative process and Kabisig spirit/ Spirit of partnership → flowering of the 
environmental movement): 
 
43. Doubtless, the Philippine environmental movement, long muzzled by 
the dictatorial past, is experiencing its flowering in the highly 
participative processes and Kabisig spirit of this administration, with 
peace as its foundation. (1991 WR) 
 
Let me make a more detailed analysis of the last three examples.  Extract 41 expresses 
development in a rather elaborate formulation. In expressing this formulation, Aquino 
first presented a proposition that not only affirms the achievement of her government 
in the labor sector (‘Industrial capacity…has been fully utilized’), but contrasts it with 
the achievement under Marcos (‘Industrial capacity, idle for lack of capital, markets, 
and confidence under the dictatorship’).   Then, Aquino proceeded by equating    
‘economic upturn’ with ‘the reduction of industrial actions.’ This ‘reduction of 
industrial actions’ or ‘reduction in strikes’ was attributed by Aquino to what she terms 
as ‘the exuberance of a suddenly liberated labor  sector’ that ‘made room for a deeper 
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appreciation of the need for all sectors to work together…for the general 
improvement.’ Moreover, Aquino explained that the reduction in strikes was ‘a 
barometer of the more equitable distribution of the progress we are making.’ From 
these assertions, it is implied that the ‘suddenly liberated labor sector’ was made 
possible by the departure from the Marcos’ dictatorship and the country’s efforts at 
re-democratization under the Aquino administration. This then brings us the general 
causal formulation: democratization → liberated labor sector → reduction in strikes 
and full utilization of industrial capacity. 
 Extract 42 expresses that the ‘push for privatization,’ which was part of the 
Aquino government’s economic policies to achieve national development, is ‘related’ 
to other democratization-related efforts such as ‘decentralization and devolution of 
functions of our central office to local units, the surge of NGO-GO project 
collaboration, and the support for local autonomy and the autonomous regions.’  It 
should be noted that these democratization-related efforts were also efforts at de-
Marcosification in that they deviated from the highly centralized and ‘sultanistic’ 
(Thompson 1995) not to mention ‘paternalistic’ (as opposed to collaboration-oriented) 
Marcos regime. That development is expressed in terms of ‘strengthen(ing) our 
private sector’ is, however, indicative of the Aquino administration’s subscription to 
the structural adjustment plans prescribed by world financial institutions to Third 
World societies like the Philippines. 
 Extract 43 deals with the Philippine environmental movement, which may be 
seen as part of a larger umbrella of creative movements including those of non-
governmental organizations and people’s organizations (NGOs-Pos) that fully 
developed under the Aquino watch. In the extract, Aquino expressed that the 
participative processes and collaboration-oriented ethos (‘Kabisig spirit’) encouraged 
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by her administration had led to the ‘flowering’ of the Philippine environmental 
movement. Again she struck a contrast between the ‘flowering’ of the movement 
experienced under her administration with its having been ‘long muzzled by the 
dictatorial past.’  The expression ‘flowering’ metaphorizes the movement as having 
achieved the height of its development while the expression ‘long muzzled’ gives off 
images of restriction and control that make development almost impossible.  The 
contrast suggests that democratization not to mention de-Marcosification was 
conducive to the full development of creative movements such as the Philippine 
environmental movement. 
The following table summarizes the similar patterns of causality evident in the 
last nine extracts cited: 
 
Table 5.2 Patterns of Causality between Democracy and Economic Development 
 
Extract Patterns of causality (the root cause in bold letters) 
35 Democracy → people powered capitalism → growth 
36 Democracy → people powered economy → economic recovery  
37 Democratization → adherence to prudent and fiscal monetary policies 
and reliance on market forces → vigorous market oriented economy/ 
robust economic growth 
38 Democracy → restoration of market-oriented economy → climate of 
economic security  
39 Democratization → rural development → people powered economy → 
alleviation of poverty 
40 Democratization → liberal economic environment → breaking of 
bondage from poverty 
41 Democratization → liberated labor sector → reduction in strikes and full 
utilization of industrial capacity 
42 Democratization → privatization → strengthening of the private sector 
43 Democratization → participative process and Kabisig spirit/ spirit of 




To summarize this discussion on democracy vis-à-vis the national life, I would 
like to point out that the framing of democracy in relation to President Aquino’s 
concept of ‘the nation’ in her State of the Nation Addresses from 1987 to 1991 may 
be described as an elaborate one in that it entails a multi-layered conceptualization.  It 
makes use of conceptual metaphors that build towards broader, more inclusive 
conceptual metaphors subsumed under the frame. But this framing of democracy is 
further complexified when seen in relation to how other themes such as national 
economy, national security/ peace and order, and the presidency are conceptualized in 
the Aquino presidential rhetoric. As will be suggested towards the end of this chapter, 
the confluence of these conceptualizations and the elaborate framing of the 
democracy make up the broader frame or schema of the state of the nation during the 
years of the Aquino presidency. 
 
5.4       National economy 
In Aquino’s SONAs, the constant reference to the national economy as 
something capable of ‘growth’ and ‘recovery’ makes it a synecdoche for national life; 
thus, the conceptualization THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A MANIFESTATION OF 
NATIONAL LIFE. 
There are several ways by which the conceptualization of the national 
economy is achieved in the addresses. The following conceptual metaphors derived 
from the addresses establish the conceptual frame NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A 
MANIFESTATION OF NATIONAL LIFE:   
 
(5.4.1)  THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS AN AILING PERSON 
(5.4.2) POVERTY IS A DESTRUCTIVE FORCE THAT HAS KEPT THE 
NATIONALECONOMY IN A MISERABLE STATE 
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(5.4.3) THE MARCOS DICTATORSHIP WAS AN AGGRAVATOR OF THE ALREADY 
MISERABLE STATE OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY. 
(5.4.4) THE WORLD ECONOMY AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ARE 
LIFE-SOURCES AND BENEFACTORS OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY 
(5.4.5) THE AQUINO GOVERNMENT IS AN INVIGORATOR OF THE (AILING) 
NATIONAL ECONOMY. 
 
The combination of these conceptual metaphors and their entailments already 
constitute a rescue narrative, a story that positions the new government of Aquino as a 
hero/ heroine or protagonist poised to deliver the nation or the national economy from 
a miserable state brought about by the destructive force of poverty, compounded by 
years of struggle under the Marcos dictatorship, and deeply affected by the changing 
conditions of the world economy.  
5.4.1   THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS AN AILING PERSON 
In the national addresses, the national economy is portrayed as fragile, 
‘severely distressed’ and ‘has contracted considerably’—that is, THE NATIONAL 
ECONOMY IS AN AILING PERSON—when the Ms. Aquino first came to power (44, 45). 
 
44. When I took power 17 months ago, I was immediately called upon to 
deal with the dangerous combination of a severely distressed economy 
and a growing insurgency – threats which fed on each other and on the 
hopelessness and confusion which prevailed. (1987) 
 
45. By 1985, the economy has contracted considerably; its rate of growth 
had been negative for two consecutive years.  The country was at a 
standstill, as if waiting only for the last rites to be performed. By 1986, 
we had turned the economy around – in less than a year.  We improved 
on that performance the year after. (1991) 
 
Note the juxtaposition of the economy and the country in extract 45: economic 
conditions stand for country’s conditions; and what happens to the economic situation 




5.4.2   POVERTY IS A DESTRUCTIVE FORCE THAT HAS KEPT THE NATIONAL 
ECONOMY IN A MISERABLE STATE  
A major indicator of the national economy’s fragility is the incidence of 
(massive) poverty conceptualized as A DESTRUCTIVE FORCE THAT HAS KEPT THE 
NATIONAL ECONOMY IN A MISERABLE STATE. This is suggested in the extracts below: 
 
46. Poverty blighted the land.  Five million families (or 59 percent of the 
total) live below the poverty line, as compared to 45 percent in 1971. 
Dictatorship had done nothing but make more of our people poorer.  
It also made us sicker.  The prevalence of malnutrition among 
our young and the incidence of birth fatalities had risen at alarming 
rates. In short, an economy in shambles and a polity with no 
institutions save my presidency to serve as the cornerstone of the new 
democracy that we set out to build. (1987) 
 
47. Memory will bring more vividly to mind than a recitation of statistics 
the devastation of our country then, the deep and sweeping poverty of 
the great mass of the people, the trauma of a wounded nation.  (1988) 
 
48. Yet poverty remains prevalent.  The lowest 30% of our population 
remains mired in unchanging misery.  (1989) 
 
Particularly noticeable in extract 46 is how ‘poverty’ is linked to the state of the 
national economy (‘an economy in shambles’). This link, mentioned in the inaugural 
SONA of Aquino, establishes the already obvious notion that the incidence of poverty 
betrays the national economic conditions. In reading extracts 47 and 48, therefore, it is 
presupposed that ‘the deep and sweeping’ as well as ‘prevalent’ incidence of poverty 
that had ‘mired’ a significant population of people ‘in unchanging misery’ is 
indicative of the state of national economy. 
Navera 157 
 
5.4.3 THE MARCOS DICTATORSHIP WAS AN AGGRAVATOR OF THE ALREADY 
MISERABLE STATE OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY 
The Aquino administration also blamed the massive poverty on the previous 
administration – the Marcos dictatorship – which Aquino claimed to have aggravated 
the already impoverished condition of the country (see example 46, ‘Dictatorship had 
done nothing but make more of our people poorer.’).  
In the Aquino addresses, the Marcos dictatorship is particularly held 
responsible for the impoverished state of the nation. In the following extracts from 
Aquino’s first (1987) and final (1991) State of Nation Addresses, Marcos, referred to 
as ‘the dictator’ (or his regime, ‘the dictatorship’), is exposed as manipulative and 
corrupt, dispositions that, as expressed in the addresses, had further compounded that 
dire national state (THE MARCOS DICTATORSHIP WAS AN AGGRAVATOR OF THE 
ALREADY MISERABLE STATE OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY.) 
 
49. The dictatorship gave special privileges to government corporations 
and select individuals.  In their various forms, these enterprises 
enriched the few at the cost of impoverishing the many.  They distorted 
markets and factors of production.  And they bore the aspect of 
legitimacy that made challenge and change impossible.  (1987) 
 
50. I mention this (re: economic recovery in 1986), not to offset the 
shortcomings of the present with the achievements of the past.  I 
mention it to show what can be done in such a short time, and how 
much improvement was made from conditions far worse than what we 
have today the dictator’s apologists notwithstanding, that the country 
was worse off now than when he and his wife were stealing the country 
blind. (1991) 
 
In extract 49, the dictatorship is established as the sanctioning agent of crony 
capitalism where government corporations and select individuals are given ‘special 
privileges.’ These corporations are consequently blamed for enriching a few at ‘the 
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cost of impoverishing the many’ and for distorting ‘markets and other factors of 
production.’ On the other hand, extract 50 refers to Marcos as a ‘dictator’ whose 
presidency is described in the very telling clause ‘when he (Marcos) and his wife were 
stealing the country blind.’  This can be read as a strategic move to emphasize that the 
conditions during the Aquino administration, in spite of its shortcomings, were better 
compared to the state of the national economy when Marcos was in power.  
5.4.4 LIFE-SOURCES AND BENEFACTORS OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY 
But while the Aquino administration blamed the Marcos dictatorship for the 
sorry state of the national economy, it also recognized how national economic 
conditions were interrelated with constraints imposed by the international economic 
conditions and the global context at large.  Aquino conceptualized this reality in two 
ways THE WORLD ECONOMY AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ARE LIFE-
SOURCES OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE NATION and THE WORLD ECONOMY 
AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ARE BENEFACTORS/ PATRONS OF THE 
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE NATION. 
 
THE WORLD ECONOMY AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ARE LIFE 
SOURCES OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY 
 
51. Recession hit the international economy in the early ‘80’s. Every 
economy suffered, but the heaviest toll was taken on the fragile 
economies of the developing nations.  (1987) 
 
52. We must grow; yet maintain access to the international financial 
system. We must find ways of funding our growth without being held 
hostage to debt. If we are to meet our commitments to our creditors, 
the bankers must first meet our financing needs.  (1987) 
 
53. The world economy is held back by the debt that countries such as ours 
carry.  In 1987 there was a negative outflow of $2.2 billion to our 
foreign creditors. It was blood from the veins of our economy, and took 
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a heavy toll in missed output and lost employment.   We need a 
transfusion to maintain our growth.  
The international initiative for a consortium of donor countries 
to support Philippine development plans could give us that transfusion. 
I welcome the support of world leaders for the economic development 
assistance program for the Philippines. We see innovative and far-
reaching debt reduction as a vital component of this international 
initiative. (1987) 
 
…ARE BENEFACTORS/ PATRONS OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY 
 
54. Our maturity is anchored on our ability to earn and maintain a place of 
honor and respect in the community of nations.  This place of honor 
also rests on our credibility before our international creditors.  Today, 
we still suffer from the burdensome legacy of the past.  Our foreign 
debt continues to stare us in the face; and so does the responsibility of 
servicing all these debts.  (1990)  
 
55. I could have repudiated the foreign debt, won the passing praise of a 
greatly relieved people, and the lasting contempt of a devastated 
country.  I could have opted for outright hostility towards the 
international banking system and invited its retaliation.  But the only 
result would have been to weaken the present democracy against the 
conspiracies of the former government, which contracted the miserable 
debt in the first place.  I would have taken the chance, if I were the 
only one at risk, but I had a country to take care of. (1991) 
 
Clearly in the extracts 51, 52 and 53, the life of the national economy is linked to the 
global context, that is, the status of the world economy (‘recession in the 1980’s’), the 
international financial system, and foreign development assistance. Particularly in 
extract 53, payment of the foreign debt is seen as a threat to the economic life, as the 
negative outflow that resulted in the debt service is likened to loss of blood (‘blood 
flowing from the veins of our economy’). Furthermore, the initiative of foreign 
countries to extend economic assistance to the Philippines is seen as a necessary 
transfusion to propel it to development.  Such economic assistance involved debt 
reduction which is viewed as ‘vital’ or life-saving/ life-sustaining. 
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On the other hand, extracts 54 and 55 present justifications for the Aquino 
government’s policy of servicing foreign debt, a considerable part of which was 
‘contracted’ during the presidency of Marcos. In these extracts from Aquino last two 
SONAs, justifications for debt service include the need to ‘earn and maintain a place 
of honor and respect in the community of nations,’ to maintain ‘credibility before our 
international creditors,’ and to respect the international banking system in order to 
ensure support for the newly restored but fragile democracy that was susceptible to 
threats and attacks. Again, the vital link between the national economy and global 
financial system, between the country or nation-state (also referred to as ‘we’, ‘us’ in 
extract 54) and the community of nations is established in the utterances.  That the 
supposedly re-democratized Philippines was obligated a huge amount of debt incurred 
under the Marcos dictatorship in order to ‘earn and maintain a place of honor and 
respect in the community of nations,’ ‘maintain credibility before international 
creditors’ and to ensure support for democracy, however, underscored the seeming 
over-dependency or over-reliance of the national economy on the world financial 
institutions. Needless to say, it communicated that the country was under the 
patronage system controlled by these financial institutions. 
5.4.5    GOVERNMENT IS AN INVIGORATOR OF THE ECONOMY 
As expected of SONAs, Aquino’s speeches reported on what her government 
had done to address the dire conditions of the economy as well as outlined 
recommendations on how ‘recovery’ and ‘growth’ could be achieved and sustained.  
In this light, the national economy was conceptualized as something that can be 
revived or revitalized.  Aquino underscored that economic recovery and sustained 
growth are only possible in the post-Marcos government founded on democratic 
ideals.   
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Throughout Aquino’s national addresses, the new government had been 
portrayed to offer new hope for the nation in general and the national economy in 
particular to recover and regain its momentum for progress.  The addresses underlay 
the conceptualization that THE AQUINO GOVERNMENT IS AN INVIGORATOR OF THE 
(AILING) NATIONAL ECONOMY.  Extracts 56 to 59 below further illustrate the 
conceptualization of the national economy as a living system – one that can show 
signs of health, can be propelled and sustained to achieve growth, and can be pushed 
upward (upward mobility being a primary conceptual metaphor for growth): 
 
56. I am pleased to report certain healthy signs in the economy.  GNP 
posted a modest growth at 1.5 percent. Exports posted volume growth 
of 21.7 percent, (1987) 
 
57. We have reaffirmed our faith in private initiative to propel and sustain 
our economy (1987) 
 
58. Let me return to the measures taken to spur the growth of the economy. 
(1988) 
 
59. We have pushed the economy upward by creating new jobs and 
sources of livelihood and moving millions of Filipinos out of the 
danger zone of poverty into the safety net of self-sufficiency with 
dignity  (1991 WR) 
 
Also, national economic recovery, revival or revitalization is especially evident in the 
following extracts with the living system conceptualization very much in the fore: 
 
60. [It] is not world market but a reinvigorated domestic economy that is 
paving the way to recovery. (1987) 
 
61. We revived a dead economy and in three years had it well on the road 
to recovery.  The figures are well-known and unimpeachable, yet some 




62. The economic upturn is reflected in the reduction of industrial actions.  
(1989) 
 
63. Last year, our nation bustled with productive energy.  (1990) 
 
64. A total of 17 billion 480 million pesos in foreign investments poured 
into our country, 75 percent more than the previous year, evidence of 
the continuing confidence of the international community in our 
economic recovery. (1990) 
 
65. In all of our efforts to sustain the forces in our economy, we have 
emphasized the use of science and technology. At present we are 
transferring technology from those who generate them to the end-users, 
especially in our rural areas.  (1990) 
 
It is interesting to note that the ‘recovery’ of the national economy is likened to a 
destination (‘way to recovery,’ ‘road to recovery’) and upward trajectory (‘economic 
upturn’), which is consistent with the conceptual metaphors LIFE IS A JOURNEY and 
MORE IS UP, examples well discussed in Lakoff and Johnson (1980). It may be 
inferred that the movement suggested by such expressions was instigated by the 
incumbent presidency which recommended specific measures in order to achieve the 
desired national economic goal or destination.  Extracts 64 and 65 particularly 
demonstrate examples of these specific measures (i.e., encouraging foreign 
investment and the use science and technology) to build confidence as well as sustain 
the forces in the economy.   
 
5.5       Peace and security 
Considered the ‘enemies’ or anti-theses of democracy are ‘dictatorship,’ the 
‘communist insurgency’ or ‘the Left,’ the ‘military adventurists/ rebels’ or ‘the 
Right,’ and criminality.  With Aquino at the helm of the nation, however, 
‘dictatorship’ from the presidential podium was no longer regarded as a major 
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national threat. Allusions to dictatorship in Aquino’s congressional speeches only 
signified what the nation lost and how the nation suffered before the democratic 
restoration. They also served to allay fears of reverting to an authoritarian form of 
government that remained prevalent among a number of the Philippines’ neighbors in 
the Southeast Asian region. This sentiment was validated by Aquino in her 
valedictory SONA when she said:   
 
66. The formula for success is said to be dictatorial government.  But we 
tried that already, with worse results than the most irresponsible 
democracy can produce.  Besides, the spirit of our race will not accept 
a dictatorship; and memories, fresh as the scars it left, will not let us 
consider that option again.  (1991)  
 
In the extract, ‘dictatorship’ is set in stark contrast to ‘democracy’ by conceptualizing 
the former as ‘worse’ than ‘the most irresponsible democracy’ and as a non-option or 
non-choice for a people who have borne scars from the experience of dictatorial rule. 
As if to emphasize that the period of Marcos dictatorship was an unpleasant 
time of the struggle for democracy in the Philippines, Aquino likened it to darkness in 
her accompanying 1991 Report to the Filipino People.  The conceptualization 
DICTATORSHIP IS DARKNESS is rendered in the following extract:   
 
67. The dark night is over. It ended in 1986.  Our long day’s passage to the 
brightest hour of our democracy continues.    (1991 WR) 
 
5.5.1 REBELLION AND CRIMINALITY ARE THREATS TO THE DEMOCRACY AND 
THE NATIONAL LIFE 
The fresh ‘scars’ of Marcos dictatorship notwithstanding, what concerned the 
Aquino administration more was the persistence of the communist armed rebellion 
and the military coup that constantly challenged the leadership of Aquino.  Together 
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with criminality, the communist rebellion and military coup attempts were considered 
as threats to the restored democratic society; thus, the conceptualization REBELLION 
AND CRIMINALITY ARE THREATS TO DEMOCRACY AND THE NATIONAL LIFE. 
In this sub-section, I shall discuss separately how the ‘major national threats’ 
(communist rebels, military adventurists, and criminals) are represented in the 
SONAs. 
As a threat, the communist insurgency is vilified in the speeches (see extracts 
68 to 71 below) as feeding on ‘hopelessness and confusion,’ brutal, self-destructive, 
immoral, cruel, opportunistic, and manipulative of the democratic system the Aquino 
leadership set in place.   
 
68. When I took power 17 months ago, I was immediately called upon to 
deal with the dangerous combination of a severely distressed economy 
and a growing insurgency – threats which fed on each other and on the 
hopelessness and confusion which prevailed.  (1987) 
 
69. There will be no progress in our communities without order, without 
securing the lives and properties of our citizens against criminality and 
insurgency. (1989)  
 
70. A better indicator is the brutality with which the Communist leadership 
has treated the common people and even their own ranks.  This self-
destructive course reveals a movement whose organizational and 
moral center has ceased to hold. This picture of disarray is both good 
and bad.  For we must brace ourselves for greater cruelties from a 
cause that is now indistinguishable from a common crime. (1989)   
 
71. Of course, the push for NGO partnership has not been without 
problems.  In recent years, we have monitored the rise of almost 100 
NGOs that have served as front organizations of major threat groups 
like the CPP/NPA, who systematically channel funding obtained from 
abroad to subversive activities which distort the efforts and priorities of 




In the above mentioned extracts, items 69 and 70 are particularly interesting as the 
communist insurgency is collocated with ‘criminality’ and ‘common crime.’ This 
strategy suggests that the insurgency might no longer be treated as a movement with 
legitimate social and ideological concerns, but as ‘a cause indistinguishable from a 
common crime’ and bereft of a ‘moral center.’ This strategy justifies the use of 
military force in dealing with the insurgents, which will be discussed later in the 
chapter. 
In a subtle way, the communist threat is also depicted as a parasite to the host 
villages or communities—a depiction which underlies the conceptual metaphor 
COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IS A DISEASE. This implies that any measure proposed by 
the government to address the situation, especially measures involving the military, is 
curative:   
 
72. We have reduced the fighting strength of the CPP/NPA by 19 percent 
by the end of 1989.  And we brought down the number of communist-
affected barangays55 by nearly two-thousand, or 25 percent of the total 
number in 1988.  (1990) 
 
73. Our Armed Forces has been working closely with our civilian 
bureaucracy: constructing roads in insurgency-infested areas, actively 
participating in relief and rehabilitation efforts after natural disasters, 
as well as quelling attempts at seizing state power. (1991) 
 
74. Development underscores the role of our civilian agencies in making a 
difference in responding to our people’s needs and expediting the 
delivery of services, especially in isolated and insurgency-vulnerable 
communities.  (1991 WR) 
 
                                                 




The extracts through phrases such as ‘communist-affected barangays’, ‘insurgency-
infested areas’, and ‘insurgency-vulnerable communities’ clearly establish that the 
host communities are held hostage to the insurgency that thrives in these areas and 
takes advantage of their vulnerability.  But the severity of the communist threat is 
underscored by the conceptualization that THE COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IS 
TERRORISM:   
 
75. Every measure must be taken to protect the people’s security against 
communist terrorism while the CVO and CAFGU systems are put in 
place. (1988) 
 
76. For the armed Left, it has been a year of defeats and retreats; a year of 
propaganda by terror rather than the strategic initiative of which I had 
boasted.  The rejection of our peace efforts restored to Government the 
moral basis of war. (1989)  
 
77. Attempts to subvert the government under the deceptive cloak of 
winning the hearts and minds of our people continue.  As the 
CPP/NPA has realized that it has failed to reach its strategic stalemate 
stage this year, there are clearly signs of desperation, indicated by 
attempts to increase terroristic acts like bombings, a possible shift to 
the protracted people’s war, and monitored plans to forge ideological 
leanings.  (1991 WR)  
 
Using the domain of terrorism to conceptualize the communist insurgency is also 
carried out to represent the military rebels or the extreme right as in the 
conceptualization THE MILITARY REBELS ARE TERRORISTS.  This is evident in the 
following extracts: 
 
78. Our country is threatened by totalitarian slavery on the left and 
reversion to fascist terror and corruption on the right.  (1987)  
 
79. For a few days, these misguided elements waged war against our 
people, employing a terrifying fear strategy that unmasked all their 
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pretensions to ideological inclinations.  Before our people, they 
attempted to display brute force, hoping to create an aura of armed 
victory. (1990)  
 
80. Terroristic activities of the ultra-rightist groups, particularly the 
August bombings, like the Welgang Bayan, repelled rather than won 
the sympathies of the people. Already, some 841 ultrarightist elements 
have been neutralized. (1991 WR) 
 
How the acts of terrorism by the military rebels affected democracy and the national 
life is exemplified in the following extracts: 
 
81. One month after I stood here and sounded a call for unity, the Right 
made its boldest and bloodiest move against the new democracy.  With 
characteristic treachery, it lunged in the middle of the night at the 
heart of the Republic.  While the attack was repulsed, the August 28 
coup attempt almost wiped out the hard-won gains of the whole year 
and revived the nagging doubt that this country could have any future 
other than turmoil.  (1988)  
 
82. As we, however, were making real headway in our socio-economic 
thrusts, the enemies of our democracy, who comprised some two 
percent of the military, struck on December 1, 1989 in a futile bid to 
blunt the impact of the gains of our democracy.  (1990)  
 
83. While there are still a few within the AFP who continue to hang the 
sword of Damocles over our people, I am proud to say that, on the 
whole, the Armed Forces of the Philippines continues to be the 
protector of our democratic gains.  (1990) 
 
84. By 1986, we had turned the economy around – in less than a year.  We 
improved on that performance the year after. This progress was cut off 
by the August ’87 coup attempt. (1991) 
 
85. We were on the verge of a second take-off when the December 1989 
coup broke out.  It drained the last drop of confidence in our future 





86. But those natural calamities were preceded by another entirely the 
work of human hands: the massive December 1989 military revolt that 
cut short a second economic recovery, after the dislocation caused by 
the earlier August 1987 coup attempt.  That one strangled the powerful 
rebound of the Philippine economy after the EDSA Revolution.  (1991 
WR)  
 
These extracts recount how the military coup attempts especially in August 1987 and 
December 1989 worked as agents of destruction.  They are rendered as damaging 
(‘wiped out hard won gains’),  destabilizing (‘revived nagging doubt’ of instability), 
anti-democratic (made ‘a futile bid to blunt the impact of the gains of our 
democracy’), economically disruptive (‘cut off’/ ‘cut short’ economic progress/ 
recovery), predatorial (‘drained the last drop of confidence in our future’), a destroyer 
of the country’s international reputation (‘shattered our image abroad’), and an 
economic obstruction (‘strangled the powerful rebound of the Philippine economy’).  
The expressions vilify the military coups attempts and the rebels that waged these 
attempts, but they hardly addressed issues raised by the rebels, some of them 
legitimate ones.  Extract 83 especially uses the expression ‘continue to hang the sword 
of Damocles over our people’ to suggest the persistence of adventurism in the military 
that to the President veered away from the military’s constitutional role as protector of 
the nation’s democratic gains. The expressions, which underlie the conceptual 
metaphor MILITARY REBELS ARE DESTROYERS, characterize the military rebels as 
destructive forces meant to stunt – i.e., cut off, cut short, strangle – (economic) 
growth or progress as well as to diminish – i.e., wipe out, blunt, shatter – the restored 
democratic government.  In extract 81, the image of the military rebels as destroyers 
becomes more vivid with its portrayal as a treacherous, murderous plotter, who 
‘lunged in the middle of the night at the heart of the Republic.’  
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Another way of characterizing the military rebels in the SONA is through the 
demonization, which underlie suggesting the conceptual metaphor THE MILITARY 
COUP PLOTTERS ARE EVIL.  In extract 87, the use of the term ‘evil design’ brings to 
the fore Aquino’s religious inclination. A devout Catholic, she must have conceived 
of her government in ‘a politico-spiritual plane’ where enemies of the state and of the 
democratic institutions which she helped put in place are considered ‘evil’ and bereft 
of moral basis (cf. Mamot, 1987).  This is shown in the following example:   
 
87. Once more, our people, and 98 percent of our armed forces who 
remained loyal to our Constitution, thwarted the evil design of this 
band of military adventurists and their civilian supporters. (1990) 
 
It is important to note the use of the terms ‘misguided elements’ and ‘adventurists’ 
(extracts 79 and 87 above and 88 below). Like the Aquino government’s 
characterization of the communist insurgency, these terms portray the military rebels 
as thoughtless and lacking in morality (‘misguided’).  This may be seen as a strategy 
to undermine whatever legitimate claims or concerns the military rebels had had to 
justify their actions:  
 
88. While we have yet to fully recover from the consequences of the 
imprudence of these misguided elements, our resolve to move forward 
has not been diminished.  This failed adventurism has underscored the 




5.5.2    THE MILITARY IS A DEFENDER OF DEMOCRACY 
Given the threats posed by the communist and the military rebels, it was 
important for Aquino to define the role of the military in the post-Marcos government.  
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In her SONAs, particularly the last two ones, she emphasized the specific role of the 
military in her administration: THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT UNDER THE NEW 
GOVERNMENT IS A DEFENDER OF THE PEOPLE AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY.  An important strategic reformulation of the role of the military, this 
conceptualization is illustrated in the following extracts: 
 
89. Our maturity is anchored, too, on the commitment of our soldiers to 
our Constitutional democracy.  (1990)   
 
90. While there are still a few within the AFP who continue to hang the 
sword of Damocles over our people, I am proud to say that, on the 
whole, the Armed Forces of the Philippines continues to be the 
protector of our democratic gains.  Even as they perform their mandate 
of keeping peace and order in our land, they are also our partners in 
our development goals. (1990) 
 
91. In the previous regime, the military establishment was viewed as part 
of the oppressive state machinery, instead of being the defender of the 
people. Not anymore.  Our Armed Forces has been working closely 
with our civilian bureaucracy: constructing roads in insurgency-
infested areas, actively participating in relief and rehabilitation efforts 
after natural disasters, as well as quelling attempts at seizing state 
power. (1991)   
 
The second and third extracts above also emphasize that THE ARMED FORCES ARE 
DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS and that they are PARTNERS OF THE CIVILIAN 
BUREAUCRACY, respectively.  These conceptualizations complement their role as 
defenders of the people and of constitutional democracy (extract 89 and 90).  That the 
military forces are DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS is explicitly expressed in the line ‘they 
are also partners in our development goals’ (90). On the other hand, their 
conceptualization as PARTNERS OF CIVILIAN BUREAUCRACY is expressed and further 
substantiated in extract 91.  In the extract, Aquino regarded the following as examples 
of the military’s partnership with the civil bureaucracy: ‘constructing roads in 
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insurgency-infested areas, actively participating in relief and rehabilitation efforts 
after natural disasters, as well as quelling attempts at seizing state power.’  These 
expressions render the military as builders, rescuers, and protectors of the state—roles 
that manifest support for the civilian bureaucracy.   
Such civilian-military partnership is also explicated in the following: 
 
92. I am pleased to note that even in our peace and order efforts, the 
partnership is applied.  The civilian sector continues to play a vital 
role in our integrated strategy towards the attainment of these goals.  
This partnership is evident in our various inter-agency councils, such 
as the peace and order, the regional development, and the national 
reconciliation and development councils. (1990)  
 
 
In the extract, what is conveyed is that the partnership generated under the Aquino 
administration involved reciprocity between the two sectors. While, on the one hand, 
the military had been involved in civilian or non-military activities like ‘constructing 
roads’ and ‘participating in relief and rehabilitation efforts’ (91) the civilian sector, on 
the other, had been engaged in ‘peace and order efforts’ as purportedly evidenced by 
‘various inter-agency councils’ created towards this end (92).  The engagement of the 
civilian sector is underscored by pointing out that it ‘continues to play a vital role’ the 
‘integrated strategy.’ The expression plays up the supposed strong partnership 
between the two parties—the military and the civilians.  It however tends to keep 
under wraps the military abuses in the countryside most prevalent after the Aquino 
administration took a more conservative position, one that is veered towards the right, 
as well as the recurring tension between the military and left-leaning members of the 
country’s civil society. 
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5.5.3    MILITARY FORCE IS PEACE-MAKING 
On the other hand, the characterization of the military as a development 
partner bolsters the conceptual frame that THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST 
THE COMMUNIST AND MILITARY REBELS IS PEACE-MAKING.  This is established 
with the following more specific conceptualizations that also serve as reasons or 
supporting statements. 
 
(a) THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IS SECURITY OPERATIONS IN THE 
GOVERNMENT’S COUNTER-INSURGENCY STRATEGY  
(b) THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IS  A DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION TO 
INSURGENCY 
(c) THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE TO DEFEND DEMOCRACY AND THE NATION 
IS MORAL ACT  
 
The following extract expresses statement (a) where the use of military force is 
recontextualized as ‘security operations,’ a lexical choice that lends legitimacy to its 
adoption by a democratic government. It is established as a component of a broader 
counter-insurgency strategy that includes ‘development’ and ‘reconciliation’:   
 
93. The Government strategy to quell the insurgency consists of three 
simultaneous approaches: (1) Development; (2) Reconciliation; and (3) 
Security Operations.  Development underscores the role of our civilian 
agencies in making a difference in responding to our people’s needs 
and expediting the delivery of services, especially in isolated and 
insurgency-vulnerable communities.  Reconciliation provides options 
for rebel returnees to merge quietly back into the mainstream of our 
society. Security operations become necessary only when there are 
monitored hostile activities of armed groups, posing peace and order 
problems and a threat to the lives of our innocent citizens. Successful 
security operations led to the neutralization of at least 50 CPP/NPA 
leaders, eight of whom are Central Committee members and the rest 
being leaders of various functional and territorial commissions.  The 
combined development and reconciliation efforts have also led to a 
reduction of barangays affected by the armed communist insurgency.  
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Today, it is estimated that only 4,841 or 12% of the 40,848 barangays 
nationwide are affected. (1991 WR) 
 
In the extract, the pursuit of ‘security operations’ is conditional: ‘only when there are 
monitored hostile activities of armed groups, posing peace and order problems and a 
threat to the lives of our innocent civilians’ will it become necessary. What the extract 
aims to do is to equate ‘security operations’ with the ‘neutralization’ of the 
communist rebels. Further examples of the act of neutralizing the insurgents are cited 
below.  What is interesting to note in the extracts is how the objects of neutralization 
are expressed.  That ‘sixty three ranking communist leaders,’ twelve of whom were 
‘top ranking national leaders of the CPP/NPA’ were ‘neutralized’ highlights an 
achievement of the Aquino government in the area of national peace and security.  On 
the other hand, that ‘threats posed by extremist elements will continue to be 
neutralized and minimized’ underscore the government’s aversion to extremism.  
Furthermore, in both extracts, neutralization of the communist rebels is expressed in 
passive form (‘were neutralized’; ‘will continue to be neutralized and minimized’); 
however, while extract 94 appears to downplay the role of government in the act of 
neutralization, extract 95 foregrounds the significance of citizens’ participation in the 
act of neutralization (‘Through determined citizen vigilance and active cooperation 
with government’).  
 
94. Sixty three ranking communist leaders were neutralized. Of this, 12 
were top ranking national leaders of the CPP/NPA.  (1990)  
 
95. Through determined citizen vigilance and active cooperation with 
government, we are confident that the threats posed by extremist 




It is interesting to note that the harsh connotation of security operations is 
mitigated by highlighting that counter-insurgency involves development and 
reconciliation as shown in extracts 96, 97, and 98.   
 
96. Development underscores the role of our civilian agencies in making a 
difference in responding to our people’s needs and expediting the 
delivery of services, especially in isolated and insurgency-vulnerable 
communities.  (1991 WR) 
 
97. We won back to the stream of society thousands more of armed 
insurgents.  (1991 WR)  
 
98. Reconciliation provides options for rebel returnees to merge quietly 
back into the mainstream of our society.  (1991 WR)  
 
Extract 96 again highlights the civilian-military partnership by explaining that 
‘development’ in the government’s counter-insurgency program emphasizes the role 
of civilian agencies ‘in responding to people’s needs and expediting the delivery of 
services, especially in isolated and insurgency-vulnerable communities.’  This implies 
that within the counter-insurgency framework, ‘security operations’ waged by the 
military and development work pursued by the civilian agencies are complementary 
tasks in helping alleviate the conditions of the communities affected by insurgency.  
On the other hand, extracts 97 and 98, which express winning back thousands of 
armed insurgents ‘to the stream of society’ or ‘merging quietly back into the 
mainstream society,’ suggest that within the framework of the government’s counter-
insurgency, the rebels are offered the option to be integrated back, as it were, into 
lawful Philippine social system.  In both extracts, the conceptual metaphor SOCIETY IS 
A RIVER is realized by such expressions as ‘the stream of society’ (97) and ‘the 
mainstream society’ (98).  The image of a stream or watercourse is particularly useful 
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in suggesting a desired flow or course towards a specific direction.  To say that rebels 
or dissidents should join or merge back into the ‘(main)stream of society’ most 
certainly privileges the direction or flow as defined or determined by those in power 
or those who assume the dominant position in society.  It denies potential differences 
or counterflows as they are considered inimical to the status quo.   
The belligerent tone is underplayed when the fight against insurgency is seen 
within the framework of democracy. This brings to the fore two related 
conceptualizations: DEMOCRACY IS A WEAPON AGAINST INSURGENCY and THE USE 
OF THE MILITARY FORCE IS  DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION TO INSURGENCY.  The first 
evidently runs across the four extracts below while the second is suggested in extracts 
100 and 101.     
 
99. To all of you in this chamber today who are here because you won at 
the ballot box, democracy is beating back the challenge of the 
totalitarian Left. We are winning because we have given back to the 
people control of their lives and faith in the future.  To that renewed 
hope we add the fresh vigor of a new army of democracy.  Above all, 
we now have a future.  (1988)  
 
100. My assessment of the peace and order situation is mixed.  With regard 
to the insurgency, the tide has turned – I believe permanently.  The 
main weapons were democracy, a greater concern by government for 
rural needs, the economic recovery, a heightened respect for political 
and human rights, and a deeper commitment to their proper mission on 
the part of the Armed Forces. (1989)  
 
101. In summary, we have beaten the insurgents less by fighting than by the 
example of our humanity, our concern, and the impact of our economic 
progress.  (1989)   
 
102. But I believe then – and time has proved me right – that this nation 
shall find no greater source of strength to defend democracy than in the 
enjoyment of all its rights and liberties.  Democracy is our faith and 




Democracy as A WEAPON AGAINST INSURGENCY is realized in such expressions as 
‘democracy is beating back the challenge of the totalitarian left,’ ‘the fresh vigor of a 
new army of democracy’ (99); ‘[t]he main weapons were democracy…’ (100); ‘we 
have beaten the insurgents…by the example of our humanity, our concern, and impact 
of our economic progress’ (101); and ‘[d]emocracy is…the root of our strength to 
defend it’ (102).  While the expression in extract 101 does not directly point to 
democracy as a weapon or an instrument of defense, the values that Aquino 
articulated—‘example of our humanity, our concern, and impact of our economic 
progress’—in her speech communicated the democratic ideals that she advanced (see 
section 5.2), thus, making it possible to suggest that they were Aquino’s democratic 
instruments with which she had ‘beaten the insurgents.’   
Meanwhile, the conceptual metaphor THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IS  A 
DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION TO INSURGENCY is subtly suggested in extracts 100 and 101. 
In both extracts, the application of military force or the pursuit of ‘security operations’ 
(by the Philippine Armed Forces) gets hidden or obscured when articulations of non-
military efforts such as ‘democracy’ (100), ‘a great concern by the government for 
rural needs’ (100), ‘a heightened respect for political and human rights’ (100),  
‘humanity’ (101), and ‘economic recovery/ progress’ (100 and 101) are pointed out as 
‘the main weapon’ against the insurgents.  In 100, the use of the military force is 
implied in the expression ‘a deeper commitment to their proper mission on the part of 
the Armed Forces,’ one that appears to couch the militarist component of the counter-
insurgency framework in soaring rhetoric.  Moreover, the phrase ‘a deeper 
commitment to their proper mission’ suggests that the armed forces’ engagement with 
the communist rebels was sanctioned by Aquino’s democratic government as long as 
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the mission of fighting the communists was clearly and correctly understood 
(‘proper’) by the military men and that commitment to such mission was intensified 
(made ‘deeper’).   In 101, the conceptual metaphor is expressed in the line ‘we have 
beaten the insurgents less by fighting’ which seems to downplay the role of the 
military in the government’s counter-insurgency efforts. Notwithstanding such 
suggestion, the expression still indicates that Aquino’s democratic government 
recognized the armed forces (the ‘fighting’) as having contributed to the purported 
defeat of the insurgents. 
Another way of justifying the use of military force is to establish that it is a 
moral act. This line of reasoning is pursued in the following extracts:   
 
103. The application of force will be as effective as it is judicious. The 
operational thrust of our armed forces is predicated on deterrence, 
preemption and destruction.  (1987)   
 
104. Some will say that force does not address the roots of insurgency. I 
will answer: Indeed, for such roots are addressed by measures of 
economic improvement and equitable distribution.  But such measures 
also need time to bear fruit, time that only feats of arms and 
negotiating from strength can buy us.  (1987)  
 
105. We have chosen to improve our capability to effectively manage force 
not so that we who desire peace could wage war but rather, so that 
those who would war upon us will realize, by the deadlines of our 
riposte, the virtues of peace. (1987)  
 
106. Thus, ‘we shall bear arms for the intent of bearing them is just,’ and, if 
necessary, we shall mourn our dead by celebrating the birth of 
generations whose legacy shall be one nation, free, upright and 
prosperous.  (1990) 
 
‘The application of force’ is seen as a well-thought out decision (‘judicious’), a 
necessity (‘But such measures also need time to bear fruit, time that only feats of arms 
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and negotiating from strength can buy us’), peace-oriented, and ‘just.’  Interestingly, 
in extract 106, Aquino paraphrased lines from Shakespeare’s King Henry IV to 
establish the justness of the government’s intention to apply force or ‘bear arms.’ 
It is important to note that Aquino was emphatic in pursuing and exhausting 
peaceful dialogues and negotiations in spite of the application of military force to 
address the problem of insurgency: 
 
107. … we shall continue to exhaust measures and avenues that will involve 
all our people in the task of moral and material reconstruction and 
national unity.  (1987)  
 
108. Meanwhile, we have kept the door open for peaceful negotiations.  The 
Cabinet Cluster on Security and Political Development continues to 
conduct peace dialogues and negotiations with the Multisectoral Peace 
Advocates. In the simplicity of our lives, we are relearning peaceful 
means of approaching and resolving conflicts and articulating needs 
and fears as a key strategy of democracy. National unity, after all, must 
be forged amidst the diversity of opinions, cultures, and ideologies in 
our pluralistic society.  The power of massive peace, which our people 
had shown at EDSA, serves as a beacon light in our continuing efforts 
to rebuild a just society. (1991 WR)  
 
In all these configurations, it is important to consider that the SONAs are not just a 
mere recounting of and accounting for the plight of the nation but a national 
assessment pursued by the incumbent leadership.  It is then necessarily a means by the 
president to represent her leadership or her government. In the next section, I discuss 
what representations of the Aquino government emerge from and are necessarily 




5.6       The presidency 
Given earlier conceptualizations of the nation as a living entity sustained by an 
evolving democratic system, of communist and military rebellion as threats to the 
democratic way of life, and of the militarist solution as an act sanctioned by the 
government in defending democracy and fighting against communist and ‘ultra-
rightist’ threats, it is not difficult to derive the following conceptualization of the 
Aquino government’s place in the national schema:  THE GOVERNMENT IS A MORAL 
COMBATANT, A PROTECTOR OF THE PEOPLE AND THE PRIMARY AGENT OF 
DEMOCRACY.  
As a sanctioning agent of the use of military force against the communist and 
military rebels, the government under the Aquino watch established itself as A MORAL 
COMBATANT.  In the following extracts, Aquino positioned her administration as 
having the ‘moral basis,’ the ‘moral edge,’ the ‘moral ascendancy’ in the conflict with 
the insurgents:   
 
109. The rejection of our peace efforts restored to Government the moral 
basis of war.  (1988)   
 
110. Yet, they must do this (civilians defending their communities) with the 
same respect for human lives and disciplined restraint we expect of our 
soldiers in dealing with non-combatants.  Let us not lose the moral 
edge to this conflict.  (1988)   
 
111. I have already noted the progress that has been made against the 
insurgency.  The increasing isolation of the rebels has allowed military 
operations to succeed as never before. But such operations must take 
greater care to avoid collateral damage to the civilian population.  For 
our moral ascendancy has accounted for the greater part of our 
superiority in this conflict. The protection of human rights even under 
conditions of conflict must be a key consideration in military 




The government’s ‘moral’ position established by the above-mentioned utterances 
complements the justification that militarist solution, packaged as ‘security 
operations’ in the counter-insurgency strategy, is a democratic solution to communist 
rebellion.  Working in conjunction with such positioning is the government’s 
characterization as an AGENT OF PEACE through ‘respect and protection of human 
rights’ evident in extracts 110 and 111 above and explicated in extract 112 below:  
 
112. One of the underpinnings of our government is peace through respect 
and protection of human rights.  Human rights may well be the heart of 
our democracy. Thus, immediately upon assumption to office, we 
restored the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, repealed the decrees 
on Preventive Detention Action (PD 1877 and 1877-A) and released 
political prisoners. We also created the Presidential Committee on 
Human Rights.  Our 1987 Constitution then provided for an 
independent Commission on Human Rights to investigate all forms of 
human rights violations and to recommend measures that would further 
promote human rights. We have also directed the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines and the police to comply strictly with the required legal 
processes in all cases of arrests and detentions, and approved the 
designation of all city and provincial state prosecutors as human rights 
coordinators. (1991 WR) 
 
But while it espoused ‘peace,’ Aquino’s government saw the inevitability of using 
force in order to be the PROTECTOR OF THE PEOPLE from the armed rebels. Such is 
reflected in the following:  
 
113. I wish we could still pursue the path of peace.  Yet until the NPA and 
their friends come to trust their doctrines to the ballot box rather than 
the armalite, Government has no choice except to defend our people 




Ultimately, the Aquino presidency projected and presented itself publicly as THE 
PRIMARY AGENT OF DEMOCRACY through out its SONAs.  This intimation is evident 
in the following extracts:   
 
114. My mandate was not just to make a country rich, but to make 
democracy work:  To make it work as a system of genuine popular 
participation.  To make it meaningful to the lives of the common 
people by giving them jobs and justice, work with dignity, health and 
education, and reason to hope that the future will be better for 
themselves and their children. (1988)  
 
115. When the two Houses of our Congress, therefore, meet in this Fourth 
Regular Session, there are two things I shall ask of you.  First, I ask 
you to consider and appreciate the significance of this time in our 
history.  I ask you to consider the options for a giant step forward that 
are arrayed before us. And second, I ask you to address a legislative 
agenda that will push our democracy further into that level of maturity 
– a higher level of maturity necessary to the rebuilding of our nation. 
(1990) 
 
116. On June 30, 1992, the traditional ceremony of political succession will 
unfold at the Luneta. The last time it was done that way was in 1965.  I 
shall be there with you to proudly witness the event.  This is the glory 
of democracy, that its most solemn moment should be the peaceful 
transfer of power. (1991) 
 
 
In 114, Aquino categorically asserted that her mandate ‘was not just to make the 
country rich, but to make democracy work.’  The assertion itself articulates the 
conceptualization that THE AQUINO PRESIDENCY IS THE PRIMARY AGENT OF 
DEMOCRACY.  That Aquino openly expressed in her national address her mandate—to 
make democracy work as ‘a system of popular genuine participation’ and to make it 
‘meaningful to the lives of the common people’—communicates that she 
acknowledged her responsibility in the democratization process and that she had a 
stake in the direction the process had taken.   
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The sense of responsibility and ownership in the democratization process 
expressed in 114 is further realized in extract 115, where Aquino, whose 
constitutional mandate was to annually report on the state of the nation before 
members of the Philippine Congress, asked congressional representatives and senators 
‘to address a legislative agenda that will push our democracy further into that level of 
maturity – a higher level of maturity necessary to the rebuilding of our nation.’  What 
is important to note here is how the evolution of democracy into ‘a higher level of 
maturity necessary to the rebuilding of the nation’ is going to be instigated or induced, 
as it were, by a legislative agenda that Aquino recommended to Congress.  The 
extract makes a case for the configuration of two conceptualizations or frames 
mentioned in this chapter: DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING SYSTEM OF 
GOVERNMENT THAT SUSTAINS NATIONAL LIFE and THE AQUINO PRESIDENCY IS 
THE PRIMARY AGENT OF DEMOCRACY.  What may be surmised from this 
configuration is the presupposition that in Aquino’s presidential rhetoric, it was the 
Aquino presidency—who led the transition from the Marcos dictatorship to 
democracy—that sustained Philippine national life during that period. 
The configuration is also evident in 116 where Aquino, during her valedictory 
SONA in 1991, declared that the ‘traditional ceremony of political succession’ would 
take place on the constitutionally authorized date.  This was of course meant to dispel 
rumors that she would run for president in the 1992 elections.56  By declaring so and 
promising that ‘I shall be there with you to proudly witness the event,’ Aquino sealed 
her fate as the primary agent of democracy.  Although she was not constrained by the 
                                                 
56 Aquino, who was brought to power through ‘people power’ uprising or extra-constitutional means, 
was not covered by the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the incumbent president to run for a second 
term. At the time of her presidency, there were talks of making her consider getting a fresh full term as 




1987 Charter to run for six-year presidential term in the 1992 presidential election, 
Aquino thought it best to follow the constitution to the letter.  And by describing ‘the 
peaceful transfer of power’ as ‘the glory of democracy’ and ‘its most solemn 
moment,’ she established a striking difference between her and Marcos.  While 
Marcos sought to perpetuate himself in power, she was willing to relinquish power to 
another leader. Thus, as Aquino proved her presidency to be THE PRIMARY AGENT OF 
DEMOCRACY through her rhetoric, she likewise drew a distinction between her 
presidency and that of Marcos, suggesting that it was the Marcos dictatorship that 
weakened Philippine democracy (q.v. section 5.2.1).   
Before I conclude this chapter, I wish to note the observation that Aquino’s 
presidential discourse is laced with allusions to spiritual activity or guidance, as 
demonstrated in the following: 
 
 
117. Mr. Senate President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Congress, join me 
now in expressing our congratulations and deepest gratitude to those 
who have this day by God’s grace given to the nation the fully ripened 
fruit of freedom – ang ating kababayan, ang mamamayang Pilipino. 
(1987) 
 
118. …the Filipino who symbolizes the great Asian miracle: a revolution 
without blood, a democratic restoration without tears. (1988) 
 
119. Let me make myself especially clear on this point: I shall complete the 
work that God gave us to do – to make a new nation, strong, and free 
and prosperous. (1989) 
 
120. By the grace of God and the unshakeable faith of the Filipino people, I 
am confident we will pull through. (1990) 
 
121. I hope that history will judge me favorably as our people still regard 
me, because, as God is my witness, I honestly did the best I could. No 





Such carefully laced references to spiritual guidance reinforce the point mentioned 
earlier that Aquino’s presidency operated within ‘a politico-spiritual plane.’  
 
5.7       Summary 
The configuration of all the above-mentioned conceptualizations—conceptual  
frames and conceptual metaphors constituted the overall schema of the state of the 
nation during the incumbency of President Corazon Aquino in so far as her annual 
congressional speeches were concerned.  It is a schema that regards democratic 
restoration as vital to national life in that it enables the full development of the 
national economy and ensures the country’s peace and security. 
The analysis and discussion in this chapter show a multi-level 
conceptualization of the life of the nation and the evolving but fragile democratic 
system within which such national life was circumscribed.  They establish that the 
schema of the state of the nation was constructed via a multi-layered configuration of 
frames, conceptual metaphors and their entailments across the five national addresses 
that tended to revolve or play around the key theme of democracy and/or the process 
of democratization.  
Emphasis on democracy and democratization—its emergence as a key 
theme—in the Aquino congressional speeches may be explained by the socio-political 
context of the Aquino presidency, Cory Aquino’s persona as a heroine of democracy 
and the anti-thesis of Marcos, and the conscious effort of the Aquino administration to 
‘de-Marcosify’ the Philippine government and society especially by contrasting 
Marcos’s dictatorial rule with that of the Aquino presidency.  The Aquino presidency 
was a period of transition from dictatorship to democracy and it was through the 
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Aquino leadership that democratic institutions, basic freedoms, and liberties were 
restored.  Aquino was of course the emergent leader who vowed to repudiate the 
dictatorial style of Marcos leadership by being the very anti-thesis of Marcos 
(Thompson 1995) and by enacting in her public addresses a contrast between the 
‘dark’ period of martial rule and the ‘democratized’ state of the nation after 1986.  
These actions were consistent with the persona or the kind of image or 
characterization Aquino had cast for herself throughout her political career. 
In the Aquino SONAs, the framing of democracy as AN EVOLVING SYSTEM 
OF GOVERNMENT THAT CAN SUSTAIN NATIONAL LIFE is multi-faceted and multi-
layered as evidenced by the various conceptual metaphors underlying the 
metaphorical expressions on democracy in the texts.  
Democracy’s evolution is particularly made evident by conceptual metaphors 
that suggest a trajectory from one stage/ level to a higher one: DEMOCRACY IS A 
BUILDING/ STRUCTURE and DEMOCRACY IS A LIVING ENTITY.  The first conceptual 
metaphor is realized through expressions that suggest movement from destruction to 
restoration while the second is realized through metaphorizations suggesting recovery 
from illness, development from a fledgling stage to maturity or revitalization.  It is 
this movement from one less desired state to a desired one that the Aquino 
government considered worth celebrating, thus the conceptualization DEMOCRACY IS 
A NATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT.  
The celebratory take on democracy is further sustained by discourses that talk 
about what kind of achievement democracy is, why it is a cause for celebration, what 
it offers, how it works for or sustains the life of the nation, and how it can be nurtured. 
These discourses underlie two complementary conceptual metaphors that add layers 
to Aquino’s framing of Philippine democracy. On the one hand, there is the 
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conceptualization of democracy as a national possession that needs to be protected 
and defended from threats or as an object of nurture that draws sustenance from 
‘people power.’ On the other hand, democracy is conceptualized as an agent that is 
life-sustaining. This agentive representation of democracy is realized in metaphorical 
expressions that render democracy as a benefactor of the people, a resource for people 
power, cure to national ills, and as the key to a ‘people powered economy’ or ‘people 
powered capitalism’ conducive for growth. 
That democracy and people power are mutually sustaining elements generates 
the notion that DEMOCRACY IS PEOPLE POWER, which is not at all surprising given the 
fact that the 1987 Constitution—one of the products of the revolutionary government 
of Cory Aquino—has institutionalized the concept of people power.57 Curiously, 
however, the conceptualization of democracy as THE KEY TO PEOPLE POWERED 
CAPITALISM appears to be a mere departure from how neoliberal policies were 
communicated to the public during the Marcos presidency. Recall that in the martial 
law rhetoric of President Marcos, ‘constitutional authoritarianism’ was necessary to 
facilitate the ‘export-led industrialization’ and the ‘opening of the economy,’ 
including the pursuit of the structural adjustment plans prescribed by the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank.  Since the martial law rhetoric no longer functioned 
as a convenient justification for the pursuit of neoliberal policies, the use of ‘people 
power’ rhetoric or the rhetoric of democracy was a logical choice. In other words, the 
same adherence to economic liberalization adopted by Marcos was pursued under the 
                                                 
57 Former Supreme Court Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban suggests that ‘People Power’ is embodied 
in the 1987 Constitution. This he asserts in his column at the Philippine Daily Inquirer, ‘With Due 
Respect’( http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/columns/view/20100515-
270223/Thunderous_triumph_of_People_Power  (Available 17 May 2010)). This view is also shared 
by Eugenia Apostol, founding chair of the Foundation for Worldwide People Power (see 
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20100222-254614/How-to-live-the-way-of-
People-Power (Retrieved on 17 May 2010)). 
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Aquino administration, only that in the latter, such policy was veiled under the 
rhetoric of people power. 
The multi-layered framing of democracy was well entrenched in the Aquino 
rhetoric in that it figured quite prominently in the conceptualization of other 
significant themes such as national economy, national security, and the presidency. 
For example, democratization was seen as instrumental to the recovery and growth of 
the national economy conceptualized in the Aquino speeches as a manifestation of 
national life. Democracy was also used to justify policies that have to do with the 
insurgency and peace and order (e.g., THE USE OF FORCE IS A  DEMOCRATIC 
SOLUTION TO INSURGENCY).  Finally, the Aquino government or presidency, which 
was ushered into power through a mass movement to restore democracy and which 
had carried the agenda of democratization, presented and projected itself in the 
speeches as the PRIMARY AGENT OF DEMOCRACY.  That the Aquino government cast 
itself as such is significant in the overall framing of Philippine democracy and in the 
schema of the state of the nation at large. It is significant in that such 
conceptualization/ characterization has become an important measure for evaluating 
the actions and public policies of the Aquino presidency and the presidencies that 
came after.  
The framing of Philippine democracy in the national addresses of Cory 
Aquino most certainly had implications on the public policies pursued under her term 
as president.  It was under this framing that economic liberalization policies, the 
militarist solution to communist insurgency, and government partnership with non-
governmental and people’s organizations were realized. The framing launched the 
creation of realities that were bound to be recontextualized and adopted by the 
succeeding post-Marcos presidencies. The multi-layered framing of democracy and its 
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configuration with the framing of other themes manifest that the national addresses 
were implicated in an evolving contextual matrix, that is, social, political, cultural, 
national, and global. This accounts for a schema of the state of nation that is 






























The presidency of Fidel V. Ramos, former defense chief and successor of 
Corazon Aquino has been associated with the slogan ‘Philippines 2000’—a term 
which encapsulates Ramos’ vision for the Philippines as a newly industrialized 
country (NIC). Considered a challenge for Ramos was how to steer the country 
towards NIC-hood within the context of a democratic system that had just been 
restored by the previous administration after years of authoritarian leadership under 
Marcos (Thompson and Macaranas 2006).  Ramos articulates this vision of NIC-hood 
through his State of the Nation Addresses.  These addresses I argue underlie a schema 
of national development that puts premium on ‘global competitiveness.’  This 
schema, constituted by a complex of conceptual frames and conceptual metaphors 
realized in Ramos’ SONAs, may be expressed, thus:   
 
The new world economic order is a survival of the fittest socio-economic 
order. It is an inevitable state of affairs where economies compete with one 
another.  The Philippines, in order to survive in the new order, needs to 
transform itself into a newly industrialized country and be globally 
competitive. To be a competitive player in the global socio-economic order, 
the Philippines has to pole vault towards its development goals. Pole vaulting 
towards development can be done by using democracy as a comparative 
advantage and a competitive edge, by ensuring political stability through 
peace and order and the defense of national security, and by pursuing 




In this chapter, I discuss how such schema is realized or expressed 
metaphorically in the SONAs of Ramos throughout his six-year term. As in the 
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previous chapter on Aquino’s SONAs, the discussion below looks into four themes or 
concerns that are likewise examined in the rest of the analytical chapters. These four 
themes are democracy, national economy, national security/ peace and order, and the 
presidency.  The following table shows the theme/ topic-specific conceptual 
metaphors derived from the SONAs of Ramos. 
 
Table 6.1 Conceptual Frames in Fidel V. Ramos’ SONAs 
 
Section Theme Conceptual Frames 
6.3 Democracy  DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING 
SYSTEM  OF GOVERNMENT THAT 
SUSTAINS NATIONAL LIFE 
 DEMOCRACY IS A PRECURSOR FOR 
COMPETITIVENESS  
6.4 National economy  THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A 
COMPETITOR IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMIC ARENA 
 ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION IS AN 
ACCELERATOR OF ECONOMIC 
GROWTH AND IS AN INCENTIVE 
FOR COMPETITIVENESS 
 POVERTY ALLEVIATION IS WAR 
6.5 Peace and security  NATIONAL STABILITY IS A 
PRECONDITION FOR ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBAL 
COMPETITIVENESS 
 PEACE TALKS AND AMNESTY ARE 
STEPS TOWARDS LASTING PEACE 
 GOVERNMENT POLICY AGAINST 
CRIMINALS IS A MORAL AND 
CIVILIZED WAR 
6.6 The presidency  THE GOVERNMENT IS AN ENABLER 
OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND 
DEVELOPMENT 




A historical milieu of the Ramos administration (1992-1998) is provided in section 
6.2 of this chapter to help contextualize the conceptual frames and metaphors that are 
discussed in the analytical sections that follow. 
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6.2       Historical milieu of the Ramos presidency (1992-1998) 
 Fidel V. Ramos, note Malaya and Malaya (2004), came to power with three 
handicaps.  First, he was elected as a minority president, having won the elections 
among seven candidates with less than a quarter of popular votes. Second, he was a 
Protestant in a predominantly Catholic nation. And third, his background as former 
Chief of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) under Marcos and Armed Forces Chief 
under Aquino ‘evoked fears of militarization’ (260). 
Having graduated from the United States West Point, Ramos had a sterling 
military career in the Philippines. When he was appointed Chief of Staff of the 
constabulary by Marcos, he was considered ‘a moderating influence in the Marcos-
controlled military’ (ibid.). 
Ramos is considered an EDSA people power hero for breaking with the 
Marcos regime on 22 February 1986. He was joined by then Defense Minister Juan 
Ponce Enrile. Their defection was backed by the influential Catholic archbishop, 
Jaime Cardinal Sin, who called on Filipinos to assemble at the Epifanio delos Santos 
Avenue (EDSA) to protect Ramos and his fellow defectors. Hundreds of thousands of 
people responded to the Cardinal’s call leading to what is now touted as the EDSA 
people power revolt that sent the Marcoses into exile. 
Ramos’ rallying principles in his 6-year term were ‘people empowerment’ and 
‘global competitiveness.’  His vision for the Philippines as a newly industrialized 
country was encapsulated in the slogan ‘Philippines 2000.’  His presidency has been 
noted to have sustained the economic liberalization pursued by Aquino and her team 
particularly in telecommunications, insurance, transportation, and energy sectors 
(261). He took the ‘unpopular, yet necessary, move of deregulating the oil industry, 
ending decades of subsidized oil prices’ (ibid.). 
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Economic growth and a relatively significant decline in poverty during the 
Ramos administration earned for the Philippines the label ‘emerging tiger’ economy. 
Worth noting during his administration is the signing of peace agreements 
with the rightist Rebolusyong Alyansang Makabayan (RAM) and the separatist Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF).  The Southern Philippines Council for Peace and 
Development (SPCPD), which was created to materialize his accord with the MNLF, 
won for him the 1997 UNESCO Peace Prize. 
Despite the modest economic gains and the historic peace accord with military 
rebels and Moro separatists, the Ramos presidency was marred by a number of 
challenges and controversies. These include: the Delia Maga-Flor Contemplacion case 
in Singapore ‘which exposed the vulnerability of millions of Filipino overseas 
workers,’ allegations of corruption in a land deal with a private company, the 
inconclusive peace talks with the communist movement, the proposed Charter change 
initiative that was purportedly meant to prolong Ramos’ stay in power, the El Nino 
drought, and the 1997 Asian financial crisis (262). 
 
6.3       Democracy 
 Ramos employed two conceptual frames when he dealt with the theme of 
democracy in his SONAs. The first, expressed through his earlier speeches, 
reaffirmed the frame set off by his predecessor while the second was more attuned to 
the idea of global competitiveness which undergirded his presidential schema. 
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6.3.1 DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING SYSTEM THAT SUSTAINS NATIONAL LIFE 
Having participated in the people power revolution that toppled the Marcos 
dictatorship and having been at the helm of defending the newly restored democratic 
government against challenges from the military and the Philippine Left, Ramos was 
inevitably disposed to invoke democracy—the much valued term in the immediate 
post-Marcos presidency—in his major presidential speeches. In fact his first three 
congressional speeches delivered from 1992 to 1994 talked of democracy as a 
SOURCE OF NATIONAL STRENGTH (1992), A RESOURCE FOR DEVELOPMENT (1993), A 
FOUNDATION FOR A GOOD SOCIETY, and FUNCTIONAL SYSTEM THAT IS CAPABLE OF 
INITIATING CHANGE (1994). In other words, Ramos reaffirmed, at least rhetorically, 
the democratic values carried over from the previous administration. The extracts 
below demonstrate what I mean: 
 
1. Certainly, we are today a nation confirmed in our constitutional 
democracy: strengthened by the trials we have weathered. (1992) 
 
2. Development is impossible if it is not people-powered and people-
centered.  Whenever foreign observers look at our country, their 
principal wonder is how we have managed to languish in 
underdevelopment in spite of our tremendous human resources – 
specially our labor force – their literacy, their competence, their 
resourcefulness, their high sense of moral values. (1993) 
 
3. Perhaps, it is because the kind of democracy we have known – for the 
better part of the century – has emphasized the individual over the 
community; private gain over the public good; civic rights over civic 
duties.  But, in truth, the concept of civic duty is the core of the historic 
tradition of democracy everywhere. (1994) 
 
4. We Filipinos have already won our democratic revolution. History has 
made our culture of freedom proof against tyranny. Of course, freedom 
by itself does not bring about progress.  But it provides the most 
enduring foundation stone for the good society we are trying to build – 




5. Our democracy is far from perfect – but it works well enough for us to 
be able to move it away from the politics of patronage, guns, goons, 
and gold. (1994) 
 
Extract 1 underlies the conceptual metaphor DEMOCRACY IS A SOURCE OF THE 
NATIONAL STRENGTH (‘a nation is confirmed in our constitutional democracy’).  The 
term ‘confirmed’ specifically brings to the fore the notion that the nation is well 
entrenched—therefore, strengthened—in the ‘constitutional democracy’ restored by 
the Aquino government. A restatement of Aquino’s conceptualization of democracy 
as instrumental to economic growth is evident in extract 2 which establishes that 
‘people power’ is imperative to development (i.e., DEMOCRACY IS A RESOURCE FOR 
DEVELOPMENT). Both extracts 3 and 4 point to the conceptualization of democracy as 
A STRUCTURE, one that has a ‘core’ and that serves as ‘foundation stone’ while extract 
5 suggests that democracy can effect change—A FUNCTIONAL SYSTEM CAPABLE OF 
INITIATING CHANGE—in a political culture mired in patronage and the tradition of 
‘guns, goons, and gold.’ These conceptualizations derived from the extracts run 
consistent with Aquino’s framing of democracy as AN EVOLVING SYSTEM OF 
GOVERNMENT THAT CAN SUSTAIN NATIONAL LIFE. 
6.3.2 DEMOCRACY IS A PRECURSOR FOR COMPETITIVENESS 
Interestingly, it was in his latter speeches, particularly in his 1995 and 1997 
addresses, that Ramos articulated a significant shift in the way democracy should be 
viewed in the post-Marcos Philippine society. While he admitted that ‘once upon a 
time, democracy was a millstone around our neck’—an apparent concession to 
Singapore’s former Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew’s cutting remark on democracy in 
the Philippines during the latter’s state visit, Ramos emphasized that the ‘Philippine-
style democracy’ (see extract 6 to 9 below) can be seen as the country’s ‘competitive 
Navera 195 
 
edge’ (1995) or ‘unique comparative advantage’ (1997) in the new global economic 
order.  These conceptualizations, it should be noted,  appear to relate to the conceptual 
metaphor DEMOCRACY IS A RESOURCE FOR DEVELOPMENT (as shown in extract 2 
above) which is similar to Aquino’s conceptualization of democracy as A KEY TO A 
PEOPLE POWERED ECONOMY CONDUCIVE TO GROWTH (see Section 5.3.4 of Chapter 
5). However, the metaphorizations of democracy as a ‘competitive edge’ and ‘unique 
comparative advantage’ suggest that the national goal is not just development or 
economic growth, but global competitiveness, which is necessary for national 
survival. Democracy is conceptualized in these metaphoric expressions as that which 
would distinguish the Philippines from its economic competitors. Needless to say, 
these metaphorizations are consistent with the Ramos schema of national 
development mentioned earlier. 
Specifically, Ramos’ conceptualization of Philippine style democracy as ‘our 
competitive edge’ afforded him the opportunity to discuss its potential—what it does 
best in consonance with the demands of the times (re: new economic order) (6), what 
it demands from the Filipinos (7), and what needs to be done with it in order to adapt 
to the demands of the future (8). 
 
6. Philippine-style democracy is our competitive edge—because 
democracy—by awakening and mobilizing ordinary people to the 
possibilities of their lives—enlarges tremendously our talent pool of 
enterprise, knowledge and productivity. (1995) 
 
7. But let us not forget that the democratic way – by enlarging the latitude for 
debate and dissension – also demands harder work, greater cohesiveness – 
and social responsibility – from every one of us. (1995) 
 
8. If our democracy is to adapt to the dynamism – of society, culture and 
politics – which is the wave of the future, then it must become more 




Note that in extract 6, it is conceptualized as a kind of booster that ‘awakens’ and 
‘mobilizes’ ordinary people to the possibilities of their lives and that ‘enlarges’ the 
‘talent pool of enterprise, knowledge and productivity.’ The word group ‘talent pool 
of enterprise, knowledge and productivity’ is particularly in consonance with the 
globalist discourse (Fairclough 2006) and neoliberalism (Bourdieu 1998).  
 While building on the agentive quality accorded to democracy in extract 6, 
extracts 7 and 8 present certain conditions that Ramos deemed necessary to maintain 
democracy’s role as a competitive edge in the global economic order.  These 
conditions ‘demanded’ by the ‘democratic way’ and impelled by the need to ‘adapt to 
the dynamism’ are couched in terms that tend to communicate the values of free 
competition: ‘harder work’, ‘greater cohesiveness’, ‘social responsibility’, ‘pervasive’ 
and ‘participatory.’ ‘Harder work’ connotes discipline which is highly valued in the 
frame of competition (Lakoff 2008, 79-80).  ‘Greater cohesiveness’ and ‘social 
responsibility’ are terms that easily counteract ideas of individual freedom and 
dissent. ‘Pervasive’ and ‘participatory,’ while very much suggestive of freedom and 
democracy, may also mean lack of regulation or de-control, which are consistent with 
the free market ideology or ‘conservative worldview’ (62-63).  Interestingly, these 
terms are emphasized as they are situated in independent clauses that convey 
imperativeness (‘demands’ and ‘must’). 
Ramos’ final SONA (1997) reinforced this notion of democracy as a 
PRECURSOR/ PRECONDITION FOR GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS. In his remark, he 
emphasized the inevitability of democracy in a market-oriented global economic 
landscape. 
 
9. And we cannot allow our democracy to wither – because Philippine 
democracy is our unique comparative advantage in the new global order. 
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(Applause) Only democracy can release the spirit of enterprise and 




In extract 9, democracy is again conceptualized as an organic entity (‘wither’), but it 
is cast more directly as a significant factor that is supposed to put the Philippines on 
the lead (‘our unique comparative advantage’) in the context of ‘the new global 
order.’ The vitality of democracy, which can be inferred from the metaphorization of 
it as an organic entity (another realization of the conceptual metaphor DEMOCRACY IS 
A LIVING ENTITY), is then seen as instrumental in the Philippines’ survival and 
fortitude in the competitive world context. The extract also appears to reverberate 
Aquino’s conceptualization of democracy as KEY TO PEOPLE POWERED ECONOMY 
CONDUCIVE TO GROWTH (‘Our democracy can release the spirit of enterprise and 
creativity among our people’).  Seen within the frame of global competition, however, 
such conceptualization in Aquino’s rhetoric appears limited in scope.  In Aquino’s 
terms, economic growth and development are the end goals of re-democratization 
while in Ramos’, the economic growth and development propelled by the restored 
democracy are just means to an end.  
In summary, while he echoed some of the democratic values affirmed Aquino 
during her term, Ramos was obviously inclined to make use of ‘democracy’ along the 
lines of the ‘free market’ or ‘market-driven economy’ which was essentially the thrust 
of new global economic order. 
 
6.4      The national economy 
‘Global competitiveness’ may be regarded as the key term in Ramos’ 
congressional speeches. Such emphasis on ‘global competitiveness’ may be seen as a 
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response to the shift in the global economic order and the challenge to show that 
democracy and development are reconcilable (Thompson and Macaranas, 2006). 
By ‘global competitiveness,’ Ramos was of course referring to the ideal, the 
characteristic trait or the quality that the national economy in particular and the nation 
in general should aspire for in the changing world context. 
In his 1997 SONA, for instance, he talked of the need to ‘find our competitive 
niche’ in a ‘survival-of-the-fittest economic order’ where ‘great opportunities await 
the intelligent, the self-disciplined, the innovative, the daring, the young bulls, and the 
tiger cubs’ and which ‘imposes several penalties on the inefficient, the unskilled, the 
non-productive, the timid, the disunited, and the lame ducks.’ The image triggered by 
the phrase ‘survival-of-the-fittest economic order’ as well as the deeply polarized 
representations (e.g., ‘the self-disciplined’ as opposed to ‘the unskilled’, ‘the daring’ 
as opposed to ‘the timid’, ‘the young bulls’ as opposed to ‘the lame ducks’) in Ramos’ 
utterances showed a kind of social Darwinism present in his interpretation of the 
globalist discourse.  
Ramos’ emphasis on ‘global competitiveness’ was clearly linked to the 
discourse of the ‘new world order,’ sanctioned by such international agreement as the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades (GATT) and the formation of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). It should be noted that it was during Ramos’ presidency 
that the Philippines ratified the GATT-WTO. It was also during his time that the 
adoption of structural adjustments which involved economic liberalization, 
privatization, and deregulation came into full swing. 
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6.4.1    THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A COMPETITOR IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
ARENA 
Ramos’ conceptualization of the Philippine economy vis-à-vis the global 
economic order may be subsumed under the conceptual frame of competition where 
the Philippine economy is conceptualized as the competitor while the global 
economic order the competitive arena. This conceptual frame is constituted by a 
number of conceptual metaphors that underlie the metaphorical expressions found in 
the Ramos SONAs.  
With regard to the national economy, metaphorical expressions having to do 
with overcoming global challenges, meeting international benchmarks, fighting for 
survival, and engaging in competitive sports are evident in the Ramos presidential 
speeches. The following table outlines Ramos’ conceptualization of the Philippine 
economy in the context of the global economic order, which Ramos also described as 
‘a brutally competitive economic order’: 
 
 Table 6.2 Ramos’ Framing of the National Economy in the Global Economic Order 
 
TARGET DOMAIN SOURCE DOMAINS 
THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
ORDER/  “NEW WORLD ORDER” 
 SURVIVAL-OF-THE-FITTEST 
SITUATION 
 SPORTS ARENA 
 ADVENTURE 
THE PHILIPPINES  FIGHTER FOR SURVIVAL 
 PLAYER 




The following extracts from the Ramos’ speeches show how the various 
conceptualizations of the global economic order (as shown in Table 6.2) are realized 




THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER IS BASED ON THE SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST: 
 
10. We must prepare our economy for the new trading order ordained by the 
Uruguay round of the general agreement on tariffs and trade.  Our survival 
in the evolving world trade organization will depend on how competitive 
our export industries can become. (1994)  
 
11. Let us not delude ourselves: It is a brutally competitive economic order 
emerging out there. (1995)  
 
12. This ‘survival-of-the-fittest’ socio-economic order and political order 
imposes several penalties on the inefficient, the unskilled, the non-
productive, the timid, the disunited, and the lame ducks.  But great 
opportunities await the intelligent, the self-disciplined, the innovative, the 
daring, the young bulls, and the tiger cubs. (1997)  
 
 
…IS A SPORTS ARENA: 
 
13. The power crisis is on its way to resolution because of the United Actions 
of Congress and the Executive Branch.  This is where our strength lies, in 
unity of purpose and harmony of actions.  But these alone will not be 
sufficient for the economy to be strong and resilient for global 
competition.  We therefore have also introduced reforms to restructure the 
system in favor of inefficiency away from protecting the inefficient. 
(1993)  
 
14. If we fail to adapt to new economic realities, we will lag even farther 
behind. Worse, we may fritter away the gains we have already won. How 
then do we face this challenge? How do we stay on track and accelerate 
our advance?  (1995)  
 
15. We must now move aggressively to bring our people up to speed with the 
global economy.  To create high-wage jobs in the future, human-capital 
investments are the key. (1997)  
 
 
…IS AN ADVENTURE: 
 
16. Thus, both self-interest and International commitments compel us to turn 
our economy outward – toward participation in humankind’s shared 
adventure of development. We signed the Uruguay round of agreements to 
improve our market access to the rich countries and to qualify for special 





It is clear from the above extracts that competition is deeply entrenched in 
Ramos’ representations of the world economy. It then becomes an important backdrop 
and a rationale for national economies to be viewed as COMPETING PARTICIPANTS in 
dynamics of the global economy.  It is no wonder then that in Ramos’ SONAs, the 
Philippines had been conceptualized either as a PLAYER or GLOBAL/REGIONAL 
COMPETITOR.  These conceptualizations may be seen in the following extracts: 
 
THE PHILIPPINES IS A PLAYER: 
 
17. But surely, my beloved countrymen, our greatest achievement has been to 
restore our faith in ourselves, and in what we can do together as a national 
team.  (1994) 
 
18. If we fail to adapt to new economic realities, we will lag even farther 
behind. Worse, we may fritter away the gains we have already won. How 
then do we face this challenge? How do we stay on track and accelerate 
our advance? (1995) 
 
19. If our country is to become a significant player in the Asia Pacific, then 
we must now prepare the place we want to have in this future world. We 
must find our competitive niche – and nurture it. (1997) 
 
20. We must work hard to win our place in the world – because the world will 
not stop for those who stand idly by on the roadside of development. 
(1997) 
 
21. The plain truth is that we can no longer make do with economic 
leapfrogging – because other countries are leapfrogging, too.  Our aim 
should rather be to pole-vault into the twenty-first century. (1997) 
 
22. And under our pole-vaulting strategy, we aim to turn the Philippines into 
an Asian hub for software development and training. (1997) 
 
 
… A GLOBAL/ REGIONAL COMPETITOR:  
 
23. We now have a real opportunity to secure a fair share of the investments 
flowing into the ASEAN Region. What is important is that we continue to 
improve our country’s attractiveness for investments—by emphasizing our 




24. With this further economic liberalization, Metro Manila can now compete 
to become a financial and trading center in Southeast Asia and our 
archipelago can aspire to become a landmark in the borderless world of 
the future. (1995) 
 
25. Resolution of our home-grown conflicts will free us to focus on 
sharpening our competitiveness in the Asia Pacific and world markets as 
well as deliver social services more effectively to our people. (1996) 
 
26. We must make not just our business enterprises – but the whole of national 
society – competitive in the world by expanding research and development 
(R&D) in the emerging technologies and in education, especially in 
science and technology at all levels. (1996) 
 
27. And how do we assure for ourselves the place we want to have in the 
future world? How can we find our competitive niche – and defend it? 
(1997) 
 
It is interesting to note that Ramos’ use of sports metaphors help heighten or intensify 
his rhetoric’s emphasis on competitiveness.  This is especially evident in his final 
address (1997) where he proposed a shift in economic strategy, that is, from 
‘economic leapfrogging’ to one that is highly elaborate, not to mention competitive 
strategy: ‘the pole-vaulting strategy’ (see extracts 21 and 22).  The term 
‘leapfrogging’ suggests a movement, a trajectory from one place to another.  In the 
context of development theory, it happens when a developing country skips the 
supposedly harmful phases or stages gone through by industrialized countries. These 
harmful stages of development include the polluting development trajectory that is 
deemed inimical to the environment (Goldemberg 1998).  That the term 
‘leapfrogging’ is replaced by a highly competitive and elaborate sport, ‘pole-
vaulting,’ shows a more competitive drive towards achieving national development 
goals. 
Ramos described ‘the pole-vaulting strategy’ as ‘[his] administration’s legacy 
to future administrations.’ It is a strategy which would supposedly ‘complete the 
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transformation of [the Philippine] economy from an inward to an outward orientation’ 
and would enable the government ‘to move aggressively to bring our people up to 
speed with the global economy.’58  
The impetus for global competitiveness and competition as manifested in the 
above extracts is further realized in expressions that render them imperative for the 
country. The following extracts demonstrate this: 
 
28. Global competitiveness must begin at home. (1993) 
 
29. The first modernization is that of the economy – to make it more 
productive; to make it competitive in the world; and to make room for the 
small and middle-sized industries which are the building blocks of 
economic democracy. (1993) 
 
30. We also need to recast our laws on trusts, monopolies, oligopolies, cartels 
and combinations injurious to public welfare – to restore competition 
where it has disappeared, and to preserve it where it still exists.  In a word, 
we need to perpetuate competition as a system to regulate the economy 
and achieve global product quality. (1993) 
 
31. We now have a real opportunity to secure a fair share of the investments 
flowing into the ASEAN Region.  What is important is that we continue to 
improve our country’s attractiveness for investments – by emphasizing our 
competitive advantage. (1993) 
 
32. Competition is particularly fierce for trade and investments. And the 
countries most likely to capture these investments are those that set out the 
appropriate policies. (1995)  
 
 
In these extracts, competitiveness and competition are seen as a reality that economies 
like that of the Philippines cannot do without (as in extracts 28 and 32) on the one 
                                                 
 
58 The use of such sporting events to describe the government strategy lends itself to the journey 
metaphor invoked in explaining the national development aspirations (e.g., ‘roadside of development’ 
in extract 20). On the other hand, it might not have been as effective or as memorable as the use of 





hand, and as the sure and only means to adapt to that reality (as in extracts 29, 30, and 
31), on the other.  
6.4.2 ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION IS AN ACCELERATOR OF ECONOMIC 
GROWTH AND AN INCENTIVE FOR COMPETITIVENESS 
Along with advocating global competitiveness in the new world economic 
order, Ramos saw the need to advance the idea of economic liberalization both as a 
national and global imperative. On the national scale, economic liberalization is that 
which would propel the country towards global competitiveness. It is set in contrast 
with protectionist policies which are viewed as barriers to economic growth.  On the 
global scale, it is the principle that undergirds the new world economic order. 
 Specifically, Ramos’ speeches conceptualized economic liberalization (and its 
more specific renderings like tariff reduction, privatization, deregulation, export-
orientedness and outward orientation) using the following metaphorizations—A 
BOOSTER OF ECONOMIC GROWTH and AN INCENTIVE FOR COMPETITIVENESS: 
 
LIBERALIZATION IS A BOOSTER/ACCELERATOR OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
33. We must press on with deregulation and liberalization and bring down the 
last of our self-imposed barriers to economic growth left over from the age 
of protectionism. (1994) 
 
34. The other day, I issued Executive Order No. 264 promulgating a tariff 
reduction program that accelerates our economy’s outward-orientation. 
(1995) 
 
35. First, growth today is being boosted by exports and investments and not by 
consumer spending or government pump priming. (1996) 
 
36. Second, growth is being accompanied by some increase in private savings 
and not necessarily by increasing external debt or foreign loans. (1996) 
 
37. Deregulation and privatization have worked particularly well in 
transportation and communications, and energy. These policies have 
encouraged a rapid growth in demand enabling the private sector to offer 
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more and varied transport services like the Supercat Ferries in the Visayas, 
the new airlines and even big-ticket items like Edsa’s MRT 3, the Metro 
Manila Skyway, the expressways extending to Clark, Subic and Batangas 
Port, Terminals II and III at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport or 
NAIA. (1997) 
 
38. We are also working on the privatization of the National Power 
Corporation and the Philippine Postal Corporation as key elements in our 
effort to pole-vault into the information age. (1997) 
 
 
…IS AN INCENTIVE FOR COMPETITIVENESS 
 
39. With this further economic liberalization, Metro Manila can now compete 
to become a financial and trading center in Southeast Asia and our 
archipelago can aspire to become a landmark in the borderless world of the 
future. (1995) 
 
40. Competitiveness goes beyond GDP and other macro-economic measures. 
It encompasses the entire spectrum of the political, social, cultural, 
scientific and value systems of a country. And the lesson from East Asia is 
clear. Competitiveness comes from an open economy – from a stable 
political system and from a united, hard-working people. Competitiveness 
comes from modern infrastructure, and from work-people trained in 
cutting-edge technology. (1996) 
 
41. Privatization will allow an enlarged provident fund system to widen its 
coverage; increase management flexibility in investing its portfolio; 
increase statutory minimum contributions; and decentralize its operations. 
(1996) 
 
42. …we must complete the reforms – like the liberalization of retail trade 
and the Anti-trust/Anti-monopoly Act – because this will make the market 
system work more effectively. (1997) 
 
43. We must also nurture a stable capital market – one that will encourage 
long-term investor confidence; mobilize efficiently domestic savings and 
foreign investments for our social and physical infrastructure; work in 
conformity with international standards. (1997) 
 
 
In extracts 33 to 38, deregulation, liberalization, privatization, and export-
orientedness or tariff reduction—all of which are part of structural adjustment plans 
(SAPs) prescribed by global financial institutions like the IMF-WB—are 
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conceptualized as pivotal elements—boosters or accelerators—in achieving national 
economic growth.  As boosters or accelerators, these SAPs are expressed in such a 
way that their implementation necessitates urgency (‘press on’) and brings about a 
positive spin for the economy (‘accelerates our economy’s outward orientation,’ 
‘growth is being boosted by exports and investment,’ ‘growth is being accompanied 
by some increase in private savings,’ ‘deregulation and privatization…have 
encouraged a rapid growth,’ ‘privatization…as key [element] in our effort to pole-
vault in the information age’). 
 A similar conceptualization is evident in extracts 39 to 43, although in these 
extracts, liberalization is specifically conceptualized as an incentive for 
competitiveness.  This conceptualization is evident in expressions that suggest that 
economic liberalization or an open economy translates to becoming a regional 
economic hub (39), competitiveness in the various systems of the country (40), better 
management of government owned and controlled corporations (41), effectiveness of 
the market system (42), and conformity with the demands of the global economic 
order (43). 
Viewed as antithetical to economic liberalization are protectionist policies 
which are conceptualized as impediments or barriers towards economic growth and 
therefore inimical to the country’s realization of its competitive potential.  The 
conceptual metaphor PROTECTIONIST POLICIES ARE AN OBSTRUCTION TOWARDS 
ACHIEVING GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS is realized in the following extracts: 
 
44. To improve government’s capability to provide adequate services and 
infrastructure for the economy, we seek an amendment to the public 
transport service law – last revised in 1952 – to rid it of its restrictive 
regulatory framework and to foster a new competitiveness in our land, 
water, and air transport industries. Efficient transport must complement 
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our breakthroughs in the telecom industry which has served to link our 
archipelago more closely by high-tech means. (1994) 
 
45. Five other laws that should have been repealed or amended long ago 
include the Investment Company Act of 1960, which contains a provision 
requiring all directors of investment companies to be citizens (although, 
strangely enough, the same law does not restrict foreign equity in these 
companies).  With the lifting of foreign exchange controls, the Uniform 
Currency Act of 1950 should now be repealed to allow a free market in 
international financial and trading transactions. (1995) 
 
46. I also ask Congress to repeal the minimum capital requirements for foreign 
investors in wholesale and export enterprises under negative list ‘B’, and 
to delete entirely negative list ‘C’ of the Foreign Investments Act of 1991.  
I further ask the Congress to amend the Financing Company Act of 1969 
and the Investment Houses Act of 1973 to allow unrestricted foreign 
investment in finance companies and investment houses. Moreover, we 
must take the necessary steps now to ensure the rapid development and 
expansion of our domestic capital market. (1995) 
 
47. To complete our liberalization of the economy, let us repeal the remaining 
laws – some enacted over 40 years ago that still limit economic growth 
and deny consumer access, the Filipino consumer to quality goods at 
lower prices. (1996) 
 
48. Let us be clear about what we should not do.  We must reject all calls for a 
return to the closed, stagnant and inward-looking economics of the last 
40-45 years. (1997) 
 
49. We cannot remake this country without tearing open the old blinders and 
throwing away the old formulas. (1997) 
 
The protectionist policies are variously referred to in the above extracts as ‘restrictive 
regulatory framework’ (44), ‘foreign exchange controls’ (45), specific laws like the 
Financing Company Act of 1969 and the Investment Houses Act of 1973 (46), ‘the 
closed, stagnant and inward-looking economics of the last 40-45 years’ (48), and ‘the 
old blinders…and old formulas’ (49).  They are ‘laws—some enacted over 40 years 
ago that still limit economic growth and deny consumer access…to quality goods at 
lower prices’—that,  to Ramos, needed to be repealed in order for his administration 
to pursue its economic agenda (47).   
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The proposed policy change, that is, the repeal, amendment and replacement 
of existing ‘restrictive’ laws, is seen as that which would propel the economy towards 
competitiveness as well as its national development goals. This is particularly evident 
in extracts 46 and 47 where the explicit recommendation to repeal and amend the 
existing laws is conceptualized as significant steps towards ‘rapid development,’ 
‘expansion of our domestic capital market,’ and ‘liberalization of the economy’—
considered prescriptions for competitiveness.  The proposed economic policy is also 
metaphorized as an act of removal realized in such terms as ‘to rid of,’ ‘lifting of,’ 
‘tearing open’ and ‘throwing away’ (as shown in extracts 44, 45, and 49) and as an act 
of repudiating the existing policy which Ramos strongly described as ‘closed, 
stagnant, inward looking economics of the last 40-45 years.’ This obvious othering of 
the existing policy can be read as a repudiation of the protectionist, in fact, nationalist 
economic policy, that for decades had denied the foreign, especially American, 
capitalists to fully exploit and take advantage of the natural resources of the country.  
6.4.3    POVERTY ALLEVIATION IS WAR  
Precisely because the Philippines in the post-Marcos era remained as a Third 
World or developing country with a significant number of the population living below 
the poverty line, poverty alleviation became a major concern. At this juncture, I shall 
focus on the conceptualizations of poverty, the poor, and the poverty alleviation 
program of the Ramos administration and examine them vis-à-vis the executive 
leadership’s conceptualization of the Philippine economy as a global player in the 
new world economic order. 
 Ramos framed poverty alleviation using war metaphors. This is somewhat 
similar to conceptualizations in the Anglo-American political discourse (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980; Semino 2008).  Semino notes that ‘WAR metaphors are often used in 
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relation to particularly serious and intractable problems, and to the initiatives and 
strategies that are developed in order to solve them. This leads to expressions such as 
‘war against crime,’ ‘war against inflation,’ ‘war against drugs,’ ‘combating 
unemployment,’ ‘combating the drug trade’ and so on.  Metaphors such as these 
emphasize the gravity and urgency of the problem in question, and the seriousness of 
the effort that is being made to solve it’ (100). 
 By using the expression ‘the war on poverty’ to indicate his plans for poverty 
alleviation in his 1992 speech, Ramos had made clear his conceptualizations of 
poverty and the government initiatives and strategies that would be employed to 
address it. The following extracts are reflective of the war frame in that poverty is 
seen as an ‘enemy’ and government initiatives are conceptualized as ‘interventions’ 
against poverty or as war strategy:  
  
 GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES ARE INTERVENTIONS/ WAR STRATEGY 
  
50. THE WAR ON POVERTY. These measures will in time move the economy 
back to growth.  But let us not imagine growth by itself will suffice to 
bring the poor majority of our countrymen and communities into the 
mainstream of development. (1992) 
 
51. We shall undertake three main types of intervention against poverty: 
The first is to ensure the delivery of basic social services to the poorest 
communities and to make sure that every poor family has a decent 
minimum of health, nutrition, housing and education. 
The second is to see to it that the poor gain access to agrarian reform, 
skills training and extension services that will open up livelihood 
opportunities and jobs to them. 
And the third is to help poor communities organize cooperatively – to 
empower them to play a greater role in their own development, (Applause) 
and to make their voices heard in the making of public policy. (1992) 
 
52. The central thrust of all our programs is Poverty Alleviation.  We must 





53. But because the poor cannot wait – because, in Gabriela Mistral’s phrase, 
the child’s name is today – we have intervened to put poverty alleviation at 
the center of government’s concerns. (1995) 
 
54. Our war against poverty must be fought by a strong army of citizens.  We 
must mobilize not only government but the entire citizenry on the rallying 
cry of self-help and self-reliance. All hands – not just government’s – are 
needed to win this war. (1995)  
 
55. The impetus for any winning strategy should come from below – by 
harnessing the energies of the poor themselves. (1995)  
 
 
POVERTY IS A SELF-PERPETUATING, OPPRESSIVE ENEMY 
 
56. Right now, our more realistic goal is to prevent poverty from perpetuating 
itself. (1995) 
 
57. Yes, there is still great poverty among us, but every time we touch one 
family with our livelihood and social service programs; every time a 
quality job gives one worker a higher sense of dignity; every time we 
transform a Smokey Mountain into a decent place for human beings, then 
we loosen the grip, the iron grip of poverty on our people. (1996) 
 
 
The government’s interventionist role in poverty alleviation generates a significant 
insight on how Ramos viewed the poor during his presidency.  Interestingly, the 
Ramos speeches conceptualized the poor in two ways: one, as victims who need to be 
rescued not to mention benefit from government interventions (as in extract 51) and 
two, as an active agent in the ‘war against poverty’ (as exemplified in extracts 54 and 
55). These conceptualizations can also be surmised in the following: 
 
THE POOR ARE VICTIMS AND BENEFICIARIES OF THE GOVERNMENT 
 
58. We must, in sum, depart from the ‘trickle down’ policies of the past, which 
had only left our poor farmer and other poor communities behind – and 
move into the policy of ‘positive discrimination’ to lift them up and equip 
them with the humanities of life. (1992) 
 
59. Fourth, Social Reform.  In Poverty Alleviation, we have moved away from 
the old ‘trickle down’ policies to ‘positive bias’ for our poorest provinces 
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and the numerous pockets of poverty that are to be found even in our 
richest cities. (1994)  
 
60. One – we need to build up the absorptive capacity of the poor by 
enhancing the capability of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
people’s organizations (POs) – such as cooperatives, livelihood 
associations and self-help groupings – that are dedicated to them… 
Two – we need to improve our mobilization of financial resources – 
raised both here at home and from official development assistance – that 
are meant for the exclusive use of the poorest sectors. 
Three – we need to synergize, consolidate and streamline all of 
government’s strategies, programs and agencies that address poverty 
alleviation into a more focused and better coordinated collective effort that 
reaches down to the barangay level. (1995) 
 
61. We do, however, realize that the ultimate solution to poverty is providing 




THE POOR ARE AGENTS OF DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNMENT BENEFICIARIES 
 
62. After consultations with all these sectors, we have determined the need for 
three basic types of interventions. 
The first is to give the poor access to quality basic services – the very 
imperatives of survival for people living on the margin.  The ‘flagship’ 
programs under this agenda include socialized housing for the urban poor. 
The second is to give the poor better means to earn their own living. 
Priority programs under this agenda include intensified implementation of 
agrarian reform and a sustained ‘credit for the poor’ effort. 
The third major item on our Social Reform Agenda is a package of 
programs that will enable ordinary Filipinos to take part effectively in 
decision making processes that directly affect their interests and welfare. 
(1994) 
 
63. And we have gone some way in placing the common tao at the center of 




Curiously, while Ramos recognized the capacity of the poor to help themselves and to 
become agents of development, he nevertheless emphasized in his speeches that the 
empowerment of the poor and their communities comes from the government. This 
complexifies the concept of ‘people power’ that emerged when Aquino rose to power. 
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Not only is the government an enabler of the people’s capacity for self-help and self-
reliance. More importantly, it is a government that can distribute resources to groups 
(nongovernmental organizations, people’s organizations, etc.) that it deems qualified 
‘to build the absorptive capacity of the poor’ (60), that crafts ‘a package of programs 
that will enable ordinary Filipinos to take part in decision making processes (62), and 
that has ‘gone some way in placing the common tao59 at the center of development’ 
(63).  It is the government as an institution which, through its policy initiatives and 
strategies for poverty alleviation, decides ultimately which is enabling and which is 
disabling, which is empowering and which is not empowering—a tendency that 
relegates the poor to the role of mere beneficiary and not really an active agent of 
change. 
 
6.5       Peace and security 
 In the area of peace and order and national security, the following interrelated 
conceptual frames emerge from the Ramos SONAs: (1) NATIONAL STABILITY IS A 
PRECONDITION FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; (2) PEACE TALKS AND AMNESTY 
ARE STEPS TOWARDS LASTING PEACE; and (3) GOVERNMENT POLICY AGAINST 
CRIMINALS IS A MORAL AND CIVILIZED WAR. The first articulates the imperative 
for national stability in achieving national development goals.  The last two enunciate 
what the Ramos administration considered as necessary measures to achieve national 
stability.  Specifically, the second conceptual frame explains measures pursued by the 
Ramos administration in order to resolve conflict with the rebels—communist, Moro, 
                                                 
59 The term ‘common tao’ is used in Philippines—whether in the spheres of political discourse or 
otherwise—to refer to the people, the masses or ordinary folks. 
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and military.  The last one provides justification for the government’s policy to 
address the problem of criminality.   
6.5.1 NATIONAL STABILITY IS A PRECONDITION FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
In Ramos’ congressional speeches, national stability is a prerequisite or a 
precondition to economic development.  This, for instance, is evident in his assertions 
that conceptualize stability as a ‘platform’ for economic takeoff, one that is built on 
the ‘foundation’ or ‘rock’ of ‘peace, civil order and social harmony’ (67).  It is that 
which would ‘release the full energies of the nation’ (65).  These and other related 
conceptualizations of national stability are shown in the following:    
 
64. Examples from East Asia teach us that the first – and foremost – 
requirement of economic development is stability, which is the long-term 
predictability of the political system. (1993) 
 
65. If we are to release the full energies of the nation, people who live, work 
and produce must be secure in their persons, in their property and in their 
homes. (1993) 
 
66. Political stability underpins our turnaround.  We held two successful 
elections these past three years – proving Philippine democracy is no 
longer fragile as it once was. (1995) 
 
67. Ultimately, the pace of growth will depend on how solidly we build our 
platform for takeoff. 
That platform will be stable only if it is built on the rock of peace, civil 
order and social harmony. (1995) 
 
68. Within two years, I am confident we shall leave our country and people a 
legacy of social cohesion and political unity – on which future 
governments can build greater national capacity, stability and prosperity 
for all Filipinos. (1996) 
 
Extracts 64, 65, and 66 suggest that stability and security are imperatives to national 
(economic) development, also expressed as the ‘release’ of ‘the full energies of the 
nation’ or ‘turnaround.’ This is evident in the expressions ‘first and foremost 
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requirement’ (64), ‘must be secure’ (65), and ‘underpins’ (66).  Extract 67 shows a 
more elaborate expression of the conceptual metaphor by conceptualizing ‘stability’ 
as a platform ‘built on the rock of peace, civil order and social harmony.’  In extract 
68, ‘stability’ is positioned alongside expressions such as ‘greater national capacity’ 
and ‘prosperity,’ both suggesting development goals. Moreover, the terms ‘social 
cohesion’ and ‘political unity’—terms which characterize national stability—are 
expressed as the basis for the development goals. 
6.5.2 REBELS ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO NATIONAL PROGRESS 
It is important to note that when Ramos was elected president, he inherited a   
country encumbered by rebellion from forces on both ends of the Philippine political 
spectrum. On the one hand, there were the military rebels who attempted several coup 
d’etats against the Aquino government under which Ramos served as defense chief. 
On the other, there was the long standing armed struggle by the Communist Party of 
the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA). In Mindanao, there was the Muslim 
secessionist movement by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).  These forces 
were a major concern for Ramos who wanted to make sure the country was conducive 
for the free market enterprise.  It is interesting then how his political rhetoric, 
particularly the rhetoric of his SONAs, (re)constructed the reality of these forces vis-
à-vis his vision of a newly industrialized Philippines. 
 So how were these forces constructed in the SONAs? As far as Ramos’s 
SONAs were concerned, the communist, Muslim, and military rebels were viewed as 
obstacles or impediments to national progress.  In his inaugural SONA (1992), Ramos 
established that the instability and uncertainty posed by the conflict with the rebel 




69. Peace and security are the first urgent problem.  For as long as instability 
and uncertainty characterize our common life, we shall not make any 
headway. (1992) 
 
70. Peace is a process. And we must all join hands to bind and heal the 
conflicts that have so long divided and held us back. (1992) 
 
 
Variously, the (military, Muslim and communist) rebels had been metaphorized as 
misfits or wayward members of society, as a dangerous conflagration, as diseases—
generally, as threats—that need to be dealt with if stability is to be achieved: 
 
THE REBELS ARE MISFITS/ WAYWARD MEMBERS OF SOCIETY 
 
71. This is why in my inaugural address, I immediately raised the issue of 
amnesty to enable all rebels to re-enter civil society as law-abiding 
citizens. (1992) 
 
72. Erstwhile military rebels have been reintegrated into civil society – even 
as the process of dealing with their grievances continues, many of the 
reforms they suggest – in our electoral practices, for example – have been 
incorporated into our proposals to Congress. (1996) 
 
 
…ARE A CONFLAGRATION 
 
73. Radical Insurgency should never flare up all over again: These last 18 





74. Again and again, this spirit of rebellion has broken out – in leftist 
insurgencies, military mutinies, and separatist movements. (1993) 
 
75. We cannot keep using force and violence to suppress these outbreaks. We 




It is important to note that Ramos identified poverty as the root cause of rebellion and 
this is then tied to his discourse on poverty alleviation (see discussion in 6.3.3). 
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6.5.3 PEACE TALKS AND AMNESTY ARE STEPS TOWARDS LASTING PEACE 
 Dealing with the rebels is another important aspect of the Ramos 
administration and the rhetoric that accompanied it.  On the one hand, Ramos pursued 
peace talks with the rebels and offered ‘the olive branch of peace’ through an amnesty 
program. Both the peace talks and the amnesty were viewed as steps towards ‘lasting 
peace’ that would consequently ensure political stability in the country.  This is 
evident in the following extracts:  
 
76. This grant of amnesty is the initial step in a comprehensive peace and 
unification process that shall address the problem of bringing back all 
other rebels to the fold of the law, I, therefore, invite both chambers of 
Congress to join the Executive in constituting a National Unification 
Commission, that will include representatives of the private sector. This 
commission will undertake extensive consultations with concerned sectors 
of society including rebel groups, in order to formulate a viable amnesty 
program and the process that will lead to a just, comprehensive and lasting 
peace. (1992) 
 
77. Finally, I ask Congress to repeal Republic Act No. 1700, as amended, so 
that the Communist Party of the Philippines and similar organizations will 
no longer be outlawed but allowed to compete freely, openly and 
peacefully in the political, economic and social arena instead of their 
following the path of the armed struggle. (1992) 
 
78. With the dissident National Democratic Front (NDF), our peace talks have 
finally moved on to substantive issues, but we are no more than cautiously 
optimistic – because of the ideological issues involved and the hard-liner 
positions the NDF has taken. (1996) 
 
79. Fortunately, that 60-year old conflict has substantially declined in its 
intensity – partly because our amnesty program has enabled individual 
rebels to return to the ways of peace. (1996) 
 
80. The Davao City consensus of last month with the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF) which envisioned our 14 Southern Provinces 
and the cities therein being brought into a special zone of peace and 
development (ZOPAD), with the Southern Philippines Council for Peace 
and Development (SPCPD) to promote it, moves us closer towards the 
resolution of the conflict that has cost more than 120,000 lives, with so 





It was during Ramos’ term that the repeal of the Anti-Subversion Law had been 
passed. The statement allowing the Communist Party and similar organizations to 
‘compete freely, openly, and peacefully in the political, economic and social arena 
instead of their following the path of the armed struggle’ (see extract 77) suggests that 
the government offers an alternative, a more viable route so to speak, to the one 
pursued by the communist rebels in the country. It goes without saying that this route 
where Communist Party and similar organizations ‘compete freely, openly, and 
peacefully’ is in line with the discourse of competitiveness, where supposedly 
superior ideas out-credit the weak ones. 
The instrumentality of peace in bringing about national goals can be seen from 
the following utterances in Ramos’s 1996 congressional speech:  
 
81. Ladies and gentlemen of Congress, peace as we well know is a process 
and it must be carefully nurtured and so is development. Peace and 
development always go together.  Together, both are best weapons to 
alleviate the poverty in Mindanao and everywhere else, because the lack of 
either one breeds deprivation and foments tension and armed conflict. 
Mindanao – as well as the rest of the Philippines, needs peace if it is to 
achieve the sustained broad-based development its people deserve. (1996) 
 
 
In the extract, peace is conceptualized as something interconnected with development, 
indicating that one is without the other. It is also rendered as a ‘weapon’ to alleviate 
poverty, one whose absence ‘breeds deprivation and foments tension and armed 
conflict.’ In other words, it is a necessary factor in achieving ‘sustained broad-based 
development.’ Such representations of peace (first, as ‘weapon’—an instrument in the 
‘war on poverty’—and second, as a significant variable in the resolution of armed 
conflict and ‘sustained broad-based development’) remain consistent with the notion 
of global competitiveness that undergirds the rhetoric of Ramos during his presidency. 
Navera 218 
 
6.5.4 GOVERNMENT POLICY AGAINST CRIMINALS IS A MORAL AND CIVILIZED 
WAR 
On the other hand, Ramos, being the former chief of the country’s armed 
forces, pushed for the modernization of the both the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
and the Philippine National Police. His administration also adopted a tough stance 
against criminality by sponsoring the re-imposition of death penalty and by regarding 
the government policy against criminals as a display of strength and a ‘moral,’ not to 
mention ‘civilized,’ war (1997).  In the following extracts, the death penalty is 
metaphorized as an effective deterrent to criminality (82) and the proposal to restore 
death penalty a civilizing instrument (83), while the overall government effort to curb 
criminality is seen as WAR, where the government role is intensified by rendering it as 
a tough crime buster (84), an ‘unrelenting’ combatant (85), a self-correcting fighter 
(86), a crusader (87), law enforcer and moral warrior (88). 
 
 DEATH PENALTY IS AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT TO CRIME 
 
82. First, I ask the Congress to restore the death penalty to cover heinous 
crimes, (Applause) which of late have enjoyed resurgence – encouraged no 
doubt, by the weakness of our deterrents. (1992) 
 
 
PROPOSAL TO RESTORE DEATH PENALTY IS A CIVILIZING INSTRUMENT 
 
83. Last year, I proposed that we restore the death penalty.  We must show 
determination to prevent any reversions to barbarism. (1993) 
 
 
ANTI-CRIME EFFORT IS WAR; GOVERNMENT IS A COMBATANT/ WARRIOR 
 
84. All-out war we reserve for criminals, terrorists and plunderers. We have 
broken the back of the biggest crime syndicates, dismantled the most 
notorious armed groups, and effected changes in the leadership and chain 





85. On still another front – in our war on criminality – we will be just as 
unrelenting (1995) 
 
86. We will pursue our fight against heinous crimes with greater vigor – even 
as we continue to cleanse our government of the scalawags and grafters 
within its ranks – whether in the executive, the legislative or judicial 
branch (1997) 
 
87. And I ask all of you to join me in a crusade against dangerous drugs 
(Applause) – which threaten particularly our young people. And for this 
crusade we need to amend the Dangerous Drugs Law and the passage of 
the Anti-Racketeering Bill (1997) 
 
88. And we will employ the full force of government against criminals, the 
outlaws, especially their masterminds, the drug lords and the financiers 
who persist (Applause) in challenging the rule of law and undermining the 
moral fabric of our society.  We will hit them hard again and again. (1997) 
 
 
Ramos’ adoption of various measures against rebellion and criminality 
manifested a presidency that made sure no stone was left unturned when it came to 
ensuring peace and order in particular, and national stability at large. What was 
important to him was that the preconditions for the country’s ‘economic take off’ 
were met.  
 What clearly emerges from Ramos’ discourse on national stability is a 
government that is a steadfast peace maker—one that embodies patience, forbearance, 
courage, and steadfastness: qualities that are also associated with participants in a 
competitive sports or undertaking. This is clearly articulated in the following extract 
from his national address in 1995: 
 
89. If the peace process is to be the test of government’s patience and 
forbearance – then I assure you we have patience and forbearance enough 
– and above all, the will to forge a just settlement that will endure. 
And if it is to be a test of our courage and steadfastness, why then, 




This conceptualization of government or executive or presidential leadership as a 
person—specifically as an agent of competitiveness—will be discussed in the next 
section. 
 
6.6       The presidency 
In discussing Ramos’ conceptualizations of the presidency, I take into account 
how he viewed his role in government in his congressional speeches.  I argue that this 
significantly renders how the presidency as a form of institutional leadership had been 
represented during his administration.  
6.5.1 GOVERNMENT IS AN ENABLER OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
It may be argued that the conceptualization of the government as an ENABLER 
OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT provides a clear proof of the Ramos 
presidency’s proclivity towards the discourse of global competitiveness.  Ramos 
offered in his SONAs several measures paving the way to such a conceptualization.  
To Ramos, the government as an enabler of economic growth is realized in 
two ways: one, by ‘putting the house in order’ and two, by ‘liberalizing the economy’ 
(1994).  These measures are supposed to create ‘conditions for self-sustaining 
growth.’    
The expression ‘putting the house into order’ implies a parental aspect in 
governance and management of governmental affairs.  It suggests disciplining (often 
associated with a strict father) and imposing cleanliness and orderliness in the house 
space (associated with the role of the homemaker, usually the mother, in the 
traditional concept of the family).  ‘Putting the house into order’ uses a domestic 
metaphor that puts the Philippine government particularly the Philippine president in 
the role of the parent, that is, THE GOVERNMENT IS A PARENT. Thus, as a parent that 
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puts the house in order, the government guarantees an environment characterized by 
political stability (discipline) and social cohesion (harmony). Such conceptualization 
of the government is realized in the following extracts: 
 
90. Because of this experience, we now know development cannot take place 
in our country unless we put our house in order. 
And this – to me – means accomplishing three things: 
One, restoring political and civic stability.  
Two, opening the economy: dismantling monopolies and cartels 
injurious to the public interest, and leveling the playing field. 
Three, addressing the problem of corruption and criminality. 
These three tasks – once completed – shall secure the environment for 
self-sustaining growth – and enable the government to act positively and 
consistently in the national interest. 
Our strategic framework to establish effective government – of putting 
our house in order – so that our drive for development can begin – we call 
Philippines 2000. (1993) 
 
91. The first year we devoted to putting our house in order – to restoring 
political stability, enhancing national unity, and strengthening social 
cohesion – as requisites for economic recovery. (1994) 
 
As one that is responsible for liberalizing the economy, the government 
promotes opening the economy and ensuring a level playing field of enterprise. The 
conceptualization THE GOVERNMENT IS AN AGENT OF ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION is 
realized in the following passages: 
 
92. We shall also tap private resources under the Build-Operate-and-Transfer 
and similar schemes.  To liberalize the private sector’s entry into the 
transport industry, it will be necessary to amend the 50-year old Public 
Service law. (1992) 
 
93. We should then be able to mobilize development financing for both 
agriculture and industry – not just through Government financial 
institutions but primarily through the private banking system, whose 




94. In trade, we expect a rise in export demand as our major markets return 
to growth.  You can count on the Executive to do all we can to make our 
industries worldwide competitive. (1992) 
 
95. This means gradually abolishing all remaining quantitative restrictions 
on trade, liberalizing the foreign exchange market and adopting a more 
realistic foreign exchange rate. (1992) 
 
96. The second (year) we devoted to liberalizing the economy – opening it to 
competition, and leveling the playing field of enterprise. (1994) 
 
97. We have taken the following initial steps to improve our export 
competitiveness… (1994) 
 
98. To improve government’s capability to provide adequate services and 
infrastructure for the economy, we seek an amendment to the public 
transport service law – last revised in 1952 – to rid it of its restrictive 
regulatory framework and to foster a new competitiveness in our land, 
water, and air transport industries. Efficient transport must complement 
our breakthroughs in the telecom industry which has served to link our 
archipelago more closely by high-tech means. (1994) 
 
In extracts 92 to 98, the Ramos government is positioned as a primary agent of 
economic liberalization. The pronoun ‘we’ consistently appears in these extracts to 
refer to the executive and is then followed by expressions that suggest any of the 
following actions: legislate or formulate policies that liberalize the economy (92, 95, 
96, 98), tap private resources to fund social infrastructure (92, 93), and initiate steps to 
improve export competitiveness (94, 97).  
The conceptualization of the government as a GROWTH ENABLER evident in 
the above-mentioned extracts from Ramos’s 1992 to 1994 SONAs is consistent with 
the notion of global competitiveness.  Notably, this indicates intertextual coherence in 
Ramos congressional speeches. 
6.5.2 THE PRESIDENT IS AN EFFECTIVE MANAGER 
When Ramos talked about effective government as a way of restating the 
imperative of ‘putting the house into order’ (extract 90), he was also suggesting that 
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presidential leadership is all about effective management, or that THE PRESIDENT IS 
AN EFFECTIVE MANAGER. This other conceptualization of the executive leadership is 
again in consonance with the schema of competitiveness prevalent in his presidential 
discourse. Take for instance the following extracts from Ramos’s 1994, 1995, and 
1997 SONAs: 
 
99. How did we accomplish all these things? 
We were able to do what we did – not by emphasizing ideology, 
but by seeking consensus and taking actions.  
Not by setting people apart – but by bringing them together. 
Not by charisma – but by quiet competence and patience, patience 
and patience. 
The lesson is clear: without hard work, there are no miracles.  We 
must perform as we pray, and pray as we perform (1994)  
 
100. I cannot overemphasize the need to improve government’s capacity and 
effectiveness.  Our ultimate objective is to assert the rule of law – to 
replace privilege with effectiveness, and establish the social cohesion and 
legal equality that characterize a working democracy. 
Management teachers remind us that there is a difference between 
efficiency and effectiveness. 
The public agency and public servant can be efficient for as long as 
they fulfill their mandate within the law – even if that law is already 
outdated. 
Effectiveness, on the other hand, has to do with meeting objectives 
at the appointed hour.  Effectiveness is doing the right thing at the right 
time. 
In the present condition, our bureaucracy is saddled with structures 
and systems fit only for a bygone age. 
An old bureaucratic joke asks the simple question: ‘If it takes two 
ditch-diggers two days to dig a ditch, how long would it take four-ditch 
diggers.’ 
The logical answer should be one day. But – real, bureaucratic life 
– the correct answer is probably ‘four days’ – or perhaps forever. 
Indeed, we have made government the employer of the last resort. 
(1995) 
 
101. For my part (applause), let me assure you the work of government will 
never slacken during this final year of my watch (applause). I will not be 
a lame-duck President for two reasons: First, because that is not my 
nature and you know that very well (applause). And second, the times call 
for vigorous tigers and not enfeebled fowls (applause). I will be working 
and governing. You will all feel and hear and see me working and 
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governing as your President until I turn over the presidency to the 13th 
President of the Republic at high noon on 30 June 1998. (1997)  
 
Extract 99 from the 1994 SONA establishes the difference between leadership rooted 
in ideology and charisma and one that is action-oriented, unifying and performance-
oriented. To Ramos, the latter option was what ascertained his administration’s 
accomplishments in the past year.  It was his version of an effective management or 
administration; it defined his leadership style.  The version of leadership and 
management distinguished him from his predecessors and even from those sectors 
that challenged or were highly critical of Ramos presidency. It may be surmised that 
the expression ‘perform as we pray, pray as we perform’ is both an allusion and a 
critical commentary on the previous administration of Corazon Aquino, who made no 
secret about her reliance on prayer in her exercise of presidential leadership. The 
expression can be seen as intertextually coherent with the rhetoric of Aquino that 
laced the domain of politics and governance with references to religion and 
spirituality.  
On the other hand, the use of a triad and antithesis found in the following 
lines—‘not by emphasizing ideology, but by seeking consensus and taking actions. 
Not by setting people apart – but by bringing them together.  Not by charisma – but by 
quiet competence and patience, patience and patience’—may be interpreted as a jab 
against Ramos’ critics from the mainstream opposition and the Philippine Left.  It 
must be noted that some of his chief political rivals including his Vice President 
Joseph Ejercito Estrada and fellow 1992 presidential aspirant Miriam Defensor 
Santiago had been publicly acknowledged as charismatic leaders. Also other 
organized opposition groups like the Communist Party and other left-leaning 
organizations had been normally portrayed in the mainstream Philippine politics as 
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highly steeped in ideological debates.  In fact, these debates had caused deep divisions 
and splintered groups in the Philippine Left (see for instance, Garcia 2001).  To 
Ramos, a presidential leadership that therefore de-emphasizes ideology and is not 
dependent on charisma, one that is instead action–oriented and has the competitive 
qualities of ‘quiet competence’ and ‘patience’ is the way to go. 
 Extract 100 from the 1995 SONA perhaps best captures what Ramos meant by 
effective management. In this speech, he made reference to management theory and 
how bureaucratic process in the Philippines had failed in achieving optimum results.  
He first established ‘the need to improve the government’s capacity and 
effectiveness.’ Effectiveness was then associated with the terms ‘rule of law’ and 
‘legal equality’ suggesting that the former can only be achieved when the law is made 
applicable to all and does not exempt the privileged few. Ramos then proceeded to 
talk about the difference between efficiency and effectiveness as taught in 
management classes, but related this to the Philippine case, which because of 
‘structures and systems fit only for the bygone age’ could not manage to achieve 
optimum results in the bureaucracy. This commentary on the limitations and 
constraints confronting the ‘bureaucratic life’ was a move to re-emphasize the need to 
establish changes in the system of governance, which Ramos earlier in his speech 
acknowledged as ‘the foundation of sustained development.’  Embedded in this entire 
discourse on the necessity to pursue efficacy in the bureaucracy is the metaphorization 
of the government as an employer. By describing the bureaucracy as ‘saddled with 
structures and systems fit only for the bygone era,’ Ramos was implying that the 
government would remain ineffective and inefficient (‘the employer of the last 
resort’) until the constraining ‘structures and systems’ are replaced with ones that are 
appropriate for the current or contemporary conditions.  
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 In extract 101 from his valedictory SONA in 1997, Ramos sealed his 
representation of the president as AN EFFECTIVE MANAGER by assuring his audience 
that ‘the work of the government will never slacken during the final year of my 
watch.’ He indirectly likened himself to a ‘vigorous tiger’ which was mentioned in the 
speech to counter accusations that presidents in the tail end of their term of office end 
up as ‘lame duck’ also referred to in the address as ‘enfeebled fowls.’  This was 
underscored by the repetition of the phrase ‘working and governing’ to signal that the 
Ramos brand of leadership would continue until his last day in office. The choice of 
the image of a vigorous tiger in rendering Ramos’ presidency or presidential 
leadership was most likely deliberate as the image appeared logically consistent with 
his vision of the Philippines as a newly industrialized economy, also metaphorized as 
a ‘tiger’ status or economy among trading partners in the ASEAN and East Asian 
regions (see for instance Thompson and Macaranas 2006, 92).  
Emphasis on such terms as ‘quiet competence and patience,’ ‘effectiveness,’ 
‘performance,’ ‘vigorous tigers’ in the above-mentioned extracts demonstrates 
various realizations of the value of competitiveness in the exercise of Ramos’ 
presidential leadership. Ultimately, to Ramos, an effective manager aims for 
competitiveness. Such virtues as patience and hard work as well as the characteristics 
of quiet competence and vigor contribute to that end. 
 The conceptualization of a president as AN EFFECTIVE MANAGER may be 
further seen from the extracts that run below: 
 
102. One of my first moves was to issue Memorandum Order No. 27, ordering 
all departments and agencies to eliminate duplication of functions, 
achieve greater cost-effectiveness, and rechannel resources to priority 
projects.  It is time we addressed this issue together. Give me the 
authority to reorganize the bureaucracy – and I assure you that we shall 
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achieve the kind of organization required for efficient, effective and 
quality administration (1993) 
 
103. And – six – we must raise the quality and integrity of our governance – 
because only the competent and responsible exercise of authority can 
bring about our country’s modernization (1995) 
 
104. To accelerate such reforms, we need above all to improve dramatically 
the effectiveness of public institutions.  We must simplify the systems of 
regulations, licenses and permits accumulated over generations of big 
government that have often become opportunities for corruption (1995) 
 
105. The entire public sector we must transform from a regulatory into a 
promotional and developmental paradigm serving and urging the private 
sector to become globally competitive similar to those that led to East 
Asia’s amazing transformation these past 30 years (1995) 
 
106. And as practiced during the past five SONAs, I shall today – 30 days 
ahead of schedule – also submit the President’s budget for 1998 – all in 
the interest of sound financial management and the cost-effective 
utilization of public funds (1997) 
 
 
Like those earlier cited before them, these extracts express the necessity for effective 
management, which is realized in such expressions as ‘efficient, effective and quality 
administration,’ ‘competent and responsible exercise of authority,’ ‘[simplifying] 
systems of regulations,’ ‘[transforming] the public sector into a promotional and 
developmental paradigm,’ ‘sound financial management [and] cost-effective 
utilization.’ Interestingly, the extracts especially those delivered in 1995 (i.e., extracts 
103 to 105) express that such management measures are critical to modernization, the 
acceleration of reforms or global competitiveness. These expressions work in 






In this chapter, I have established that the notion of ‘global competitiveness’ is 
key in understanding the schema of Fidel V. Ramos, the second Philippine president 
in the post-Marcos era.  I argued that the frame of competition took a privileged 
position in the Ramos presidential rhetoric in that the four themes of democracy, 
national economy, peace and security, and the presidency were framed and 
metaphorized based on the notion of global competitiveness.   
The pervasiveness of the idea of competition is evidenced by a shift in the way 
democracy was conceptualized in the Ramos presidential speeches. His earlier 
SONAs reaffirmed the conceptual frame employed by his predecessor but his latter 
congressional speeches viewed democracy as a comparative advantage.  In Ramos’ 
SONAs from 1995 to 1997, democracy had been regarded as a necessity for the 
nation to survive in the global economic order.  
The global economic order being a highly competitive arena where the race 
for survival is given premium, Ramos conceptualized the Philippine national 
economy as a competitive participant who needs to develop his/her full potentials and 
competitive advantage to ensure his/her survival.  This conceptualization was realized 
in the speeches through the metaphorization of the national economy as a player or 
global/ regional competitor.  
In making the national economy competitive, Ramos underscored the need to 
adopt measures on economic liberalization.  The analysis of the speeches reveals that 
economic liberalization had been considered a vital step towards national growth and 
development, and consequently global competitiveness.  Metaphors that suggest 
movement and trajectory, especially competitive sports, had been deployed to ensure 
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that the presidential discussions on the Philippine economy remain anchored on the 
frame of global competitiveness.  
In the area of poverty alleviation which the researcher subsumed under the 
topic of national economy, war metaphors had been employed. This use of the war 
frame ran consistent with the frame of competition in that the kinds of ‘intervention’ 
presented by Ramos to alleviate poverty were aligned with measures deemed 
necessary to achieve competitiveness in the economic front. 
National stability was viewed by Ramos as the foundation or platform towards 
economic take off.  Ensuring peace and order which included resolving conflicts with 
communist, military and Muslims rebels was deemed vital in ‘releasing the full 
energies of the nation.’ The elimination of rebellion and criminality was therefore 
linked to the competitiveness aspired for by the Ramos presidency. 
The Ramos presidency regarded itself as an important agent in achieving the 
country’s global competitiveness. In doing so, Ramos rendered presidential leadership 
as an exercise in effective management, thus the conceptual metaphor THE PRESIDENT 
IS AN EFFECTIVE MANAGER. It goes without saying that this conceptualization put 
emphasis on certain managerial characteristics and values that reinforce the notion of 
global competitiveness that undergirded Ramos’s presidential schema. 
While the Ramos SONAs underlie a rather distinct schema based on the 
president’s agenda to transform the Philippines into a globally competitive and newly 
industrialized country, they still somehow channeled conceptualizations that 
constituted the schema of Ramos’ immediate predecessor, Aquino, and even that of 
Marcos.  Such conceptualizations include the rendering of economic liberalization or 
‘opening of the economy’ as well as of peace and security as precursors to national 
development.  Also Ramos, like his predecessors, engaged in positive self-
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representation by rendering the executive or the presidency as the powerful agent that 
could make national development happen.  This channeling of previous 
conceptualizations provides evidence of the continuities of political beliefs and 

















































Joseph ‘Erap’ Ejercito Estrada60 won with a wide margin of votes when he ran 
for the presidency in 1998.  His presidential campaign was based on a pro-poor 
agenda with ‘Erap para sa Mahirap’ (Erap for the Poor) as slogan. It is widely 
acknowledged that his populist campaign rhetoric coupled with his image as a tough 
guy with a heart of gold for the poor—an image carved from his archetypal movie 
characters—was instrumental in making him the third post-Marcos President. 
Estrada’s SONAs during his unexpired term from 1998 to 2000 were woven 
around his persona or character as a tough leader armed to fight poverty. This 
character—which was a confluence of his archetypal role in Philippine cinema as a 
tough guy with a heart of gold, his success story as a town mayor, his nationalist 
stance while in Senate, his tough image as a crime buster which he carved out while 
serving as vice president to Fidel Ramos, and his general appeal to the masses—was 
an important focal point in his speeches in that it was supposed to propel the kind of 
development he had envisioned for the Philippines. 
Considering the evolving Philippine socio-political and cultural context, it is 
to be expected that each of the four themes considered as foci of this research had 
been dealt with differently in the Estrada national addresses.  
Democracy did not figure prominently in his speeches except in 1999 when 
Estrada had to address ‘fears’ that the democracy regained in 1986 was being 
‘threatened.’ National economy, being an important topic of concern in Estrada’s 
                                                 
60 Estrada’s nickname ‘Erap’ is the reverse of the Filipino word ‘pare’ which means ‘buddy.’ It is a 




populist campaign rhetoric, took an important place in Estrada’s presidential 
speeches. Noticeable is how poverty alleviation, a ‘centerpiece’ of the Estrada 
administration, was conceptualized by employing the militarist metaphoric expression 
‘war on poverty.’ Though not necessarily original as it had been deployed in the 
speeches of Marcos and Ramos, this militarist expression tied in well with the tough 
character that Estrada projected. 
National security and peace and order remained a major concern in Estrada’s 
short-lived presidency. Special attention was given to the secessionist movement in 
Mindanao especially in his 1999 and 2000 speeches. He variously conceptualized the 
armed rebellion including the secessionist movement as obstacles to progress, a threat 
to constitutional democracy, and as a disease that needs to be crushed. His 
presidential rhetoric conflated armed rebellion with criminality, where crime was 
dealt with using justice of the punitive instead of the restorative kind.  Estrada also 
conceptualized war as a necessary instrument to ensure peace, thereby warranting the 
determined use of military action when dealing with the problem of insurgency in the 
countryside and Moro secessionism in Southern Philippines.  Of course, the topic of 
presidential leadership had lent itself to interesting metaphorizations especially 
because of Estrada’s rather colorful image as a national leader. 
In this chapter, I discuss how each of these themes—democracy, national 
economy, peace and security, and the presidency or presidential leadership—had been 
variously conceptualized in the Estrada SONAs and how such conceptualizations 
channeled Estrada’s largely macho rhetoric. Also, I shall show how such 
conceptualizations differ or remain in consonance with their conceptualizations in 
earlier post-Marcos presidential rhetoric. The following table shows the conceptual 





  Table 7.1 Conceptual Frames in Joseph Estrada’s SONAs 
 
Section Theme Conceptual Frames 
7.3 Democracy   DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF 
DEFENSE AND PROTECTION 
 DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING 
ENTITY  
7.4 National economy  THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A 
PATIENT IN NEED OF MEDICAL 
PRESCRIPTION 
 THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A 
POTENTIAL DISASTER VICTIM 
 RADICAL RESTRUCTURING IS A 
MEANS TOWARDS 
COMPETITIVENESS 
 WAR ON POVERTY IS A 
PRESCRIPTION/ FORMULA FOR 
RECOVERY AND GLOBAL 
COMPETITIVENESS 
7.5 Peace and security  ARMED REBELLION AND 
CRIMINALITY ARE OBSTACLES TO 
SOCIAL PROGRESS, THREATS TO 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, 
AND DISEASES/PESTS THAT NEED 
TO BE CRUSHED 
 ARMED REBELLION IS A CRIME 
 WAR IS PEACE 
7.6 The presidency  THE PRESIDENT IS A TOUGH 




A historical milieu of the Estrada presidency is provided in section 7.2 to 
contextualize the conceptual frames and metaphors discussed in the analytical 
sections. 
 
7.2 Historical milieu of the Joseph Estrada presidency (1998-2001) 
Known as a top-rated and highly acclaimed popular actor in Philippine 
cinema, Joseph Estrada had a vast experience in Philippine politics and governance 
before he won a landslide presidential victory in 1998.  He was a long time mayor of 
the city of San Juan in Manila during the time of Ferdinand Marcos; he was elected 
senator during the Aquino presidency; and he was vice president to Fidel Ramos from 
Navera 234 
 
1992 to 1998.  His electoral campaign slogan ‘Erap para sa Mahirap’ (Erap for the 
Poor) proved to be effective when he earned 39 percent of the total number of votes—
the highest number of votes in Philippine electoral history at that time.  Interestingly, 
while his program of government declared a pro-poor theme that emphasized food 
security, mass housing, and public health as top prioties, tough stance and rhetoric 
seemed to be what characterized the short-lived Estrada presidency. 
Estrada’s tough stance was particularly evident when he dealt with the 
problem of insurgency.  In 1999, he endorsed the Philippine-US Visiting Forces 
Agreement (VFA) which the Philippine Senate eventually ratified. Although the 
accord only allowed joint military exercises between the Philippine and US troops, it 
is seen to have reestablished American military presence in the Philippines 
particularly in the South which faced rebellion and secessionism from Moro groups.   
In 2000, Estrada declared an all-out war with Moro rebels. This provided a go-
signal for the armed forces to overrun and reclaim ‘base sanctuaries’ in Mindanao that 
were occupied by the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a breakaway 
group of the Nur Misuari-led Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) which had 
made a peace accord with the Philippine government under the Ramos administration 
in 1996.  Estrada’s counter-insurgency programs included Oplan Makabayan in 1998 
and Oplan Balangai in 2000, which employed ‘the strategy of concentrating heavy 
troop deployments and conducting intensive and relentless military operations in 
priority areas the AFP considered as strongholds of the NPA, MILF, and the Abu 
Sayyaf Group (ASG)’ (Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace 2006, 6). 
Criticized by the mainstream Philippine media for his laidback management 
style, Estrada faced a debilitating political crisis due to allegations of corruption. In 
October 2000, his erstwhile friend Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson made an exposé on 
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Estrada’s involvement in an illegal numbers game that led to his impeachment trial 
before the Philippine Senate. 
In January 2001, barely two and a half years after his ascent to presidential 
power through a huge popular vote, Estrada was ousted through what is touted as 
EDSA Dos or People Power 2. 
 
7.3       Democracy 
 As mentioned earlier, the theme of democracy did not figure prominently in 
Estrada’s SONAs except in 1999 when he had to allay ‘fears’ that the democracy was 
under threat.  In his 1999 State of the Nation Address, Estrada had to reaffirm his 
‘unwavering commitment to democracy’ to dispel the growing perception that the 
president had resorted to authoritarian rule and tyranny when dealing with his critics.  
This was the time when Estrada was highly criticized for his ‘high handed efforts in 
crushing and attacking opposition such as the pressure and closure of critical media 
outlets and the red baiting of militant oppositionists’ (Tujan 2000, 25). 
 Specifically, Estrada addressed two issues before he started with his 
assessment of the national situation. The first was on the state of democracy during 
his presidential term, and the second was on the issue of cronyism. The following 
extract focuses on the state of democracy: 
 
1. (a) I, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, President of the Republic of the Philippines, 
with the nation, the world, and God as my witness, do hereby reaffirm my 
unwavering commitment to democracy.    
(b) I stand by my solemn oath to defend the Constitution as president. I 
will always uphold freedom in all its various forms; including the freedom 
of speech, of the press, of worship, of assembly, and of choice. None of 
these freedoms are under threat.   
(c) Those who fear the loss of freedom do not share my faith in the 
strength of our constitution, in the sturdiness of our institutions, in the 
passion of our people to preserve their freedom, and in their determination 
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and power to defend it.  Freedom may have been lost before. It will never 
be lost again. Our people will see to that.  I as president will stake my own 
life on it.   
(d) Yet may I remind our people that liberty without responsibility is 
license, that freedom does not confer the right to violate the law or the 
rights of others, that freedom without responsibility is the formula for 
chaos, anarchy, and lawlessness.    
(e) The paranoid will take that last statement as a hidden threat.  The 
rest will see it as a self-evident principle, accepted throughout the ages, 
and needing neither apology nor defense.  Yet, given a choice between 
freedom and restraint, I will choose to err on the side of freedom.     
(f) To paraphrase Voltaire: I may not agree with what you say, but I 
will defend to the death your right to say it.  But that does not mean I 
waive the right to argue with you! That is as much my constitutional right 
as it is yours.    
(g) Let all doubts be erased. Democracy, freedom and the constitution 
are alive and well in this country.  (1999) 
 
 
Democracy61 is conceptualized in the extract as AN OBJECT OF DEFENSE AND 
PROTECTION.  This is realized in such expressions that suggest commitment to its 
defense (‘I, Joseph Ejercito Estrada,…do hereby reaffirm my unwavering 
commitment to democracy’; ‘I stand by my solid oath to defend the Constitution as 
president’; ‘I will always uphold freedom in all its various forms’), its protection by 
institutions and established practices (‘Those who fear the loss of freedom do not 
share my faith in the strength of our constitution, in the sturdiness of our institutions, 
in the passion of our people to preserve their freedom, and in their determination and 
power to defend it’), and assurances of vigilance and sacrifice (‘[Freedom] will never 
be lost again. Our people will see to it. I as president will stake my own life on it.’).   
                                                 
61 Notably, the term is associated and made synonymous with such terms as ‘freedom’ and the 
‘constitution.’ As implied in paragraph (b) of the extract, the three terms—democracy, freedom and the 
constitution— are interlinked. It may be surmised based on the earlier rhetoric of the post-Marcos 
presidencies, especially that of Aquino, that the 1987 Constitution is the material expression of the 
abstraction of democracy and that ‘freedom and all its various forms’ are the concrete manifestations of 




That the commitment to its defense was pursued by no less than Estrada, the 
highest leader of the land, suggests that democracy is no ordinary object of defense. It 
is also a PRIZED/ TREASURED IDEAL.  Democracy’s protection from potential loss is 
ensured by political institutions including the charter which are metaphorized as 
stable structures that are strong and sturdy (as shown in the phrases ‘strength of our 
constitution’ and ‘sturdiness of our institutions’) and established practices like ‘people 
power’ as suggested by the phrases ‘the passion of our people to preserve their 
freedom’ and ‘their determination and power to defend it.’  It is interesting to note 
that Estrada’s vow to ‘defend’ and ‘uphold’ A PRIZED IDEAL that is subject to threat 
and potential loss channelled earlier conceptualizations of the Philippine president as 
the primary agent of democracy (see sections 4.5 and 5.6). 
 The expressions ‘strength of our constitution’ and ‘sturdiness of our 
institutions’ may also be read as realizations of the conceptual metaphor DEMOCRACY 
IS A STRUCTURE which was also employed in the speeches of Aquino and Ramos.  
Interestingly, democracy and its manifestations are also conceptualized as LIVING 
ENTITY (as shown in the line ‘Democracy, freedom and the constitution are alive and 
well in this country’).  Recall that both conceptualizations—STRUCTURE and LIVING 
ENTITY—are evident in Aquino’s rhetoric and make up a larger conceptualization: 
DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING ENTITY.  It may be said then that Estrada’s brief 
discussion on democracy is not just a reaffirmation of his constitutional duty as 
president to protect it, but also partly a reaffirmation of Aquino’s framing of 
Philippine democracy.  
In paragraph (d), Estrada assumes a strict father image (Lakoff 1996) where he 
insisted that freedom should be coupled with ‘responsibility’ in order to veer away 
from ‘chaos, anarchy, and lawlessness.’ This formulation can be seen as Estrada’s 
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way to warrant his public stance against the critical media as he had earlier filed a 
libel case against some members of the critical press. Invoking ‘responsibility’ 
seemed to be his way to assert the need for discipline in a democracy, an absence of 
which would bring about disorder and contravention of the rule of law. 
In paragraph (e), he cast those who are critical of the coupling of ‘freedom’ 
and ‘responsibility’ as ‘paranoid’ and justified the coupling as a matter of fact—‘a 
self-evident principle, accepted throughout the ages, and needing neither apology nor 
defense.’ But as if to allay fears that he would opt for a regimented political system, 
he added that ‘freedom’ is an OPTION (‘a choice’) he would prefer to ‘restraint.’ 
In paragraph (f) he paraphrases the French philosopher Voltaire by saying, ‘I 
may not agree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your right o say it.’ 
This statement casts him as the heroic DEFENDER while it casts democracy or 
freedom, especially the freedom of speech, as the DEFENDED.  He then used this as a 
premise for insisting on his ‘right to argue’ and asserted that it is ‘as much 
constitutional right as it is yours.’ These assertions cast him then not only as a 
DEFENDER of the freedom of speech, but also a chief ENFORCER of it. 
 
7.4       National economy 
Though popularly elected in 1998, Estrada’s foray into the Philippine 
presidency faced the challenge of a national economy mired in the Asian financial 
crisis.  His first national address in congress, however, reveals that the situation 
created an opportunity for Estrada to render the national situation in metaphorical 




In conceptualizing the state of the Philippine economy, Estrada employed 
health and disaster metaphors. Two conceptual frames enabled Estrada to articulate 
and explain the state of the Philippine economy vis-à-vis the Asian financial crisis: 
THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A MEDICAL PATIENT and THE NATIONAL ECONOMY 
IS A POTENTIAL DISASTER VICTIM.  Both of these conceptualizations are expressed 
in the following extract from Estrada’s first SONA delivered in 1998: 
 
2. Hindi na ako magpapaligoy-ligoy pa. Nasa harap tayo ngayon ng 
matinding krisis na gumugulo sa buong Asya. (I am not going to beat 
around the bush. We are faced with a severe crisis that has caused disarray 
in the whole of Asia.) 
Ayon sa mga eksperto, wala pa tayo sa pinakamalubhang yugto ng 
krisis. (According to experts, we have not yet reached the worst part of the 
crisis.) 
Kung babalewalain natin ang kinalalagyan nating ngayon, tiyak na 
lulubog ang ating bansa sa bigat ng ganap na recession. (If we are going to 
take our current state for granted, I am sure that our nation will sink 
because of the weight of complete recession.) 
Kaya ba nating iwasan ito? O hihintayin na lang ba nating tamaan tayo 
ng lalong matinding dagok sa ating kabuhayan? (Are we capable of 
preventing this? Or are we just going to wait for the worst hit on our 
livelihood?) 
Malubha ang lagay ng ating ekonomiya, at namimilagro ang kabang-
yaman ng bansa. (The economy is in grave condition, and the national 
treasury is in danger.) 
Hindi kayang punuan ng pamahalaan ang kakulangan ng ekonomiya. 
Sa madaling salita, bangkarote and gobyerno. (Our government is not 
capable of filling up what our economy lacks. In other words, the 
government is bankrupt.) 
Sawa na ang taumbayan sa mga walang-kabuluhang pangako’t 
palabas. Sa harap ng matinding krisis na ating pinagdaanan nitong 
nakaraang taon, ang kailangan nati’y mga mabilis at mabisang lunas.  Ito 
ang matinding hamon na dapat nating tugunan—tayong lahat: ang 
panguluhan, ang kongreso, ang pribadong sektor, ang mamamayan. 
Mabigat na hamon ito—subalit buo ang tiwala kong mas matimbang ang 
pinagsama nating talino, sipag, kakayahan. (The people are fed up with 
senseless promises and show. In the face of the severe crisis that we have 
gone through this past year, what we need is a quick and effective cure. 
This is the challenge that we have to address—all of us: the presidency, 
the congress, the private sector, the people.  The challenge is great—but I 
have full confidence that our combined intelligence, diligence, and 





I shall explain in separate sections (7.4.1 and 7.4.2) how the two conceptualizations 
are realized in the above-mentioned extract and were actually sustained in the Estrada 
SONAs.  In doing so, I argue that both conceptualizations of the national economy as 
A MEDICAL PATIENT and A POTENTIAL DISASTER VICTIM strategically positioned 
Estrada and his administration as THE MEDICAL HERO/ RESCUER of the purportedly 
ailing and fragile economy—a rendering that was in line with Estrada’s tough 
rhetoric. 
7.4.1 THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A MEDICAL PATIENT 
To Estrada, the Philippines, especially its economy, was gravely ill when he 
assumed power and it was his duty as the elected leader to find an effective cure for 
the ailing national economy.  In extract 2, he described the economic condition using 
such expressions as ‘wala pa tayo sa pinakamalubhang yugto ng krisis’ (we have not 
yet reached the worst part of the crisis), ‘malubha ang lagay ng ating ekonomiya’ (the 
economy is in grave condition), ‘matinding krisis’ (serious crisis) that require ‘lunas’ 
(cure) that is both ‘mabilis’ (quick) and ‘mabisa’ (effective). These expressions 
underlie the conceptual metaphors ECONOMIC CONDITION IS HEALTH, THE NATIONAL 
ECONOMY IS A LIVING ENTITY SUBJECT TO ILLNESS, and THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC 
AGENDA IS A MEDICAL PRESCRIPTION.  These conceptualizations are akin to Aquino’s 
framing of the national economy as a MANIFESTATION OF NATIONAL LIFE (the nation 
being a LIVING ENTITY who suffered and died under Marcos dictatorship and was 
restored back to life during the period of re-democratization); however, they point to a 
more specific frame: THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A MEDICAL PATIENT. 
Estrada’s use of health metaphors to explain the national economic state was 
sustained in his 1999 and 2000 SONAs.   
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In 1999, Estrada provided a listing of his administration’s accomplishments, 
capping an account of each accomplishment with the phrase ‘We did it.’  This 
rhetorical device may be seen as a form of diacope—a repetition of a word or phrase 
after an intervening discourse—to add emphasis to the accomplishments of his 
administration.  He repeated the phrase five times until he introduced the policy on 
pump priming in which case he admitted that in reducing the government deficit—
something he promised to do in 1998—‘we did not do it.’ This admission was not an 
admission of failure, but a means to present an alternative course. At this point, it was 
necessary for Estrada to return to the use of health metaphors when describing this 
apparent shift in economic policy. In the following extract, Estrada repudiated the 
policy of the Ramos administration (‘a 25% across-the-board forced savings on the 
expenditures of the government’) by likening it to an inappropriate prescription 
(‘administering the medicine for high blood pressure to a patient with low blood 
pressure’) which he claimed could have worsened the national economic condition: 
  
3. At a time when the economy was threatened by recession, the previous 
administration had decided on a 25% across-the-board forced savings on 
the expenditures of the government. This was like administering the 
medicine for high blood pressure to a patient with low blood pressure. 
Lalong lulubha ang pasyente, at baka mamatay pa ng hindi oras. (Trans. 
The condition of the patient got worse, and he might even die so 
suddenly) (My favorite doctor, The First Lady, always makes sure that my 




The extract underlies the conceptual metaphor THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC 
AGENDA/POLICY IS A MEDICAL PRESCRIPTION, where the Estrada economic 
agenda/policy was supposedly a better prescription than that of Ramos. It props up the 
framing of the national economy as A MEDICAL PATIENT in need of medical 
intervention from the Estrada administration.  Estrada played up this use of health 
Navera 242 
 
metaphors by making a parenthetical statement about his wife-doctor—referred to in 
the extract as ‘The First Lady’—making sure always that his blood pressure is normal 
‘[e]specially when I’m reading the newspapers.’ This statement appears to have been 
made as a verbal jab against the critical press, which purportedly caused abnormal 
health conditions for Estrada himself.  Interestingly, this representation of the critical 
press works parallel to the representation of the recession which had supposedly put 
the national economy in high risk. 
In his 2000 State of the Nation Address, Estrada described that the economy 
was in ‘healthy’ condition in that ‘as a whole [it] has experienced moderate growth, 
low inflation, low interest rates, strong exports, a healthy balance of payments, and 
record-high international reserves.’ He insisted that the weaknesses in the foreign 
exchange of the peso, the national currency, ‘cannot be attributed to the country’s 
macro-economic fundamentals’ but ‘a result largely of a new Asian currency 
contagion: Other currencies in the region have been weakening due to political factors 
and the strength of the US economy and the US dollar.’ He furthered that ‘If the peso 
had not adjusted accordingly, our exports would have become less competitive. 
Obviously, the nervousness about the potential implications of the Mindanao conflict 
on the economy also contributed to the depreciation of the peso.’  
In the preceding presidential pronouncements, health metaphors were 
employed to conceptualize the state of the national currency, that is, its condition was 
a result of the ‘Asian currency contagion.’ This metaphorization made it easy for the 
speaker to suggest that the performance of the Philippine peso was affected by the 
state of other regional currencies as influenced by political factors as well as that of 
the US economy and the US dollar. Also, the performance of the national currency 
was linked to the competitiveness of the Philippines in the world market—a desired 
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state. Moreover, internal conflicts such as the ones waged in Mindanao were seen as 
forces that contributed to the depreciation of the national currency. 
As in 1998, health and weather metaphors were mixed in Estrada’s 2000 
SONA to articulate the conditions besetting the national economy.  The following 
extract shows this: 
 
4. We were thus witness to a paradox: strong exports, large external trade 
and payment surpluses, and record levels of international reserves side by 
side with a depreciating peso. 
That paradox, in fact, might be harbinger of some dark clouds coming 
back. After a brief period of recovery from the financial crisis, the Asian 
region is suffering from a mild relapse. As mentioned, the currency 
exchange rates are depreciating. Oil prices have gone up substantially. 
Unemployment is rising. And investments are nervously staying away 
from the East Asian region as a whole.  (2000) 
 
 
In the extract, what is regarded as the paradox—the co-occurrence of strong 
macroeconomic fundamentals with the peso depreciation—is realized as a possible 
‘harbinger of some dark clouds,’ an expression which underlies the conceptual 
metaphor ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ARE WEATHER CONDITIONS.  On the other hand, it 
is expressed as a condition of ‘suffering from a mild relapse’ which implies a different 
conceptual metaphor, that is, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IS A HEALTH PROBLEM/ ILLNESS. 
In the next section, I focus on the use of weather metaphors. 
7.4.2 THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A POTENTIAL DISASTER VICTIM 
 Extract 2 (see page 228) from Estrada’s 1998 SONA is also interlaced with 
expressions using metaphors that suggest potential disaster and danger. This is evident 
in the following expressions: ‘tiyak na lulubog ang ating bansa sa bigat ng ganap ng 
recession’ (I am sure that our nation will sink because of the weight of complete 
recession) and ‘O hihintayin na lang ba nating tamaan tayo ng lalong matinding dagok 
sa ating kabuhayan?’ (Or are we just going to wait for the worst hit on our 
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livelihood?). These expressions conceptualize the economy as A POTENTIAL 
DISASTER VICTIM in need of a rescue, with the regional economic recession as the 
impending danger or disaster.  
In his 1999 SONA, Estrada conceptualized the Philippines as a survivor of the 
regional economic crisis. Expectedly, he was wont to provide a sterling account of 
what his administration had done in the previous year and how his year-old 
presidency had managed to steer the country away from the crisis. This time, he 
employed weather and journey metaphors to describe the economic recession and the 
recovery of the Philippine economy from that recession, respectively.  In the 
following extract, Estrada conceptualized the Asian crisis as a violent weather, a 
storm that the Philippines, metaphorized as a sea vessel, had survived with the 
President, the captain, at the helm, together with a ‘team’ of experts in various fields 
who, indirectly metaphorized as his crew,  assisted him in steering the vessel in the 
right course: 
 
5. Sa aking inagurasyon sa Luneta noong ika-30 ng Hunyo 1998, mahigpit 
kong iginiit na "Huwag n’yo akong subukan!" Nguni’t ang sumubok sa 
akin ay hindi ang taong-bayan kundi ang matinding bagyo na tumama sa 
ating ekonomiya.   (In my inauguration at Luneta on the 30th of June 1998, 
I firmly asserted “Don’t try me!” But what tried me was not the people but 
the heavy storm that hit our economy.) 
Nang ako’y hinirang na maging kapitan ng barko ng ating 
sambayanan, ito ay kasalukuyang palubog na sa maalong dagat ng 
"Asian crisis". Sabi ko sa aking sarili: ang ganda naman ng "timing" ng 
aking pagsakay. Hinahampas ng hangin at alon ang barko. At lalong 
masama, kakaunti na lang ang gasolina sa kanyang tangke. Paano natin 
ngayon dadalhin ang barkong ito sa ligtas na lugar hanggang makalipas 
ang malupit na panahon?   (When I was elected to be the captain of the 
national ship, the economy was sinking in restless seas of the Asian crisis. 
I said to myself: What a wonderful timing in taking the ride. The air and 
the waves kept on rushing against the vessel. Worse, I have limited 
gasoline in my tank. How are we going to bring this vessel/ ship to a safe 
place until the violent weather is over?) 
Mabuti na lang, ang aming "team" ng mga kilalang dalubhasa sa 
kanya-kanyang linya ay nagkaisa sa pagpapasya kung paano lulutasin ang 
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mga problemang ating hinaharap noon. Sa pamamagitan ng aming 
pagtutulungan, pagsisikap at mga tamang pamamalakad, napaayos namin 
ang paggalaw ng barko. Nang sumikat ang araw, ang karamihan ng mga 
ibang barko ay nakalubog pa rin at nagsisikap pang umahon, nguni’t ang 
barko ng Pilipinas ay nakalutang na sa liwanag ng araw. (Good thing, 
our team of experts in different fields is united in their decision on how to 
solve the problems that we are facing.  Through teamwork, patience and 
good management, we were able to steer the ship in the right course. 
When the sun rose, most of the ships are still submerged in the waters and 




Notably in the following extracts, he further established the extent of the crisis by 
likening it to A NATURAL DISASTER or TURBULENCE and by articulating the kind of 
help the Philippines received from its people, its government and outside forces to 
weather the storm. 
  
6. In 1998, most of our Asian neighbors sank into recession. In contrast, our 
country managed a modest but positive growth of one-tenth of one percent 
(0.1%) in our Gross National Product. However, our Gross Domestic 
Product dipped by one-half of one percent (0.5%) during the year. In the 
first quarter of this year, our GNP abruptly surged upward by 2% and our 
GDP by 1.2%. Last year, we were struggling to keep ourselves from 
sinking. Today, we are sailing towards the high seas again.    
It is time once more to pay tribute to a special class of Filipinos: our 
overseas workers. They as a group kept our GNP growth at positive rates 
even during the worst of times. They continue to be our economic 
saviors.  (1999) 
 
7. So when the global market gobbles up $1.2 billion worth of Republic of 
the Philippines Global Bonds for budget support, from the first country to 
float such an issue after the Asian crisis; and when the market buys up the 
$400 million of Bangko Sentral bonds issued for reserve management 
purposes; and when the Eurobond flotation of the national government 
raises $383 million: -- obviously, the world believes that in the 
Philippines, it has stopped raining. We are getting a shower of umbrellas! 
(1999) 
 
8. Only last Thursday, the IMF Executive Board completed the fourth review 
under our standby arrangement. This will now allow us to draw about 
$214 million, which will further increase our gross international reserves. 
The IMF executive directors also praised the Bangko Sentral, headed by 
Governor Gabriel Singson for the last six years, for the successful 
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In the extracts, ‘sinking’ (6), ‘raining’ (7), and ‘turbulence’ (8) are expressions used to 
suggest the gravity of the Asian crisis.  They are metaphorical expressions that relate 
to the existence of a disconcerting meteorological phenomenon—a storm—which the 
national economy, metaphorized as a ship, had to withstand.  Rendered as saviors of 
the economy are the Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) (6), national government (7), 
and its monetary policy sanctioned by global financial institutions such as the IMF 
(8). 
7.4.3 RADICAL RESTRUCTURING IS A MEANS TOWARDS COMPETITIVENESS 
In the course of articulating his economic agenda, Estrada offered a shift in the 
rhetoric used to articulate desired changes in the Philippine economy: he suggested a 
shift from ‘reform’—a ‘faddish word’ which he regarded as ‘too weak and 
wimpish’—to ‘radical restructuring’ which was in consonance with his tough, not to 
mention macho, image. He said: 
 
9. I must confess, however, that I find the faddish word ‘reform’ as too weak 
and wimpish. What I believe the Philippine economy needs is not just 
reforms but radical restructuring, from the ground up.  
 
 
The extract conjures such conceptual metaphors as REFORM IS WIMPISH while 
RADICAL RESTRUCTURING IS A SHOW OF STRENGTH. Both may be interpreted as 
gendered as being ‘wimpish’ may be regarded as characteristic of emasculation while 
‘radical restructuring’ suggests aggressiveness, courage and physical strength that are  
associated with stereotypical masculinity.  And to Estrada, ‘radical restructuring’ was 
what the country needed for his economic policies to flourish. 
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In the following extracts, Estrada explained that the economic structure of the 
Philippines had been impeded by protectionist policies—a position that echoes one of 
Ramos’ conceptualizations in his SONAs: PROTECTIONIST POLICIES ARE AN 
OBSTRUCTION TOWARDS ACHIEVING GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS (see Chapter 6.3.2).  
He proposed ‘radical restructuring’ as the means ‘to make the economy productive, 
efficient, and globally competitive’: 
 
10. Many are asking why is it that other Asian countries, which went through 
a worse crisis than we did, actually grew faster on the rebound. One 
reason is that we recovered from a higher base, they from a lower one. A 
more fundamental reason is that the very structure of the Philippine 
economy today was inherited from past decades of import-substitution and 
protective policies, aggravated by economic mismanagement and 
corruption. Our industrial base is thin. Due to decades of neglect, our 
agricultural productivity is low. Our population growth rate is high. And 
our technology is on a catch-up mode. Rectifying these decades of 
historical errors and lapses will take much more than two years of any 
presidency. 
Radical restructuring entails the modernization of the economy, both 
physically and electronically, to make it more productive, efficient, and 
globally competitive. And modernization must touch not just agriculture 
and industry but the brains and hands of our people, to put the country 
squarely on the path of the information superhighway, which in turn links 
the world's knowledge-based economies into one vast global network. 
 
 
Curiously though, the ‘radical restructuring’ did not seem to depart from what had 
been implemented and advocated in the past administrations. In fact, it had been used 
to justify free trade agreements and structural adjustments inherited from the previous 
governments of Aquino and Ramos.  
In the following extract, Estrada’s ‘radical restructuring’ appeared to be 
consistent with Ramos’ schema of national development that put premium on the 




11. All these institutional reforms and radical restructurings, plus additional 
measures I will mention later, should restore and increase the country's 
ability to compete for investments in the future.  
As we build our infrastructure, so shall we build our information 
superhighway. In fact, instead of just retracting the history of other faster-
growing countries, we have decided to leapfrog from the so-called old 
economy to the new economy: using information technology, including e-




In the preceding extract, ‘radical restructuring’ together with ‘institutional reforms’ 
are conceptualized as the means to increase ‘the country’s ability to compete for 
investments.’ Estrada also obviously discounted his predecessor’s word choices by re-
employing the concept of economic leapfrogging (‘leapfrog’) instead of Ramos’ ‘pole 
vaulting’ strategy used by the latter in his final SONA.  Though both terms had been 
employed to mean accelerating the country’s level of competitiveness, Estrada’s less 
original choice appeared to be in keeping with the rhetoric of development and at the 
same time a rejection of Ramos’ rhetorical strategy. On the other hand, the use of 
‘leapfrog’ instead of the sophisticated sport ‘pole vaulting’ appears to reduce 
Estrada’s aggressive and macho rhetoric. 
It may be said that the shift in rhetoric, that is from ‘reform’ to ‘radical 
restructuring,’  was a move that was in consonance with the presidential image 
projected by Estrada—the image of toughness and machismo. The use of ‘radical 
restructuring’ was merely a deployment of a relatively novel buzzword to impact the 
message of the president. Substantially, Estrada’s ‘radical restructuring’ did not differ 
from the previous programs of the past administrations. In fact, it merely echoed the 
neoliberal policies adopted by the governments of Aquino and Ramos. 
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7.4.4    WAR ON POVERTY/ POVERTY ALLEVIATION IS WAR 
An outstanding feature of the rhetoric of Estrada’s national addresses with 
regard to the national economy is the ‘war on poverty.’  Clearly, this was borne out of 
the populist (pro-poor) rhetoric that the president used in his political campaign. The 
phrase is of course not unique to Estrada since the same one was employed by Fidel 
Ramos in his presidential speeches. However, the use of this phrase worked 
consistently with Estrada’s tough image and the highly militarist rhetoric which he 
employed to address national security as well as peace and order concerns (see 7.5) 
The extract below illustrates Estrada’s use of the phrase ‘war on poverty’ which he 
described as ‘not just a policy but a passion’: 
 
12. I consider poverty an intolerable social shame. It cries out not for marginal 
attention but for a total approach. For me, the war on poverty is not just a 
policy but a passion. I deplore the fact that the past economic programs of 
this country were mostly upside-down. Baligtad (Reversed). They aimed 
at developing the apex and neglected the base.     
My own belief is the opposite. Uplifting the rich leaves the poor 
behind. But uplifting the poor lifts everyone, including the rich.    
Let me make this clear. My vision is not just the alleviation of poverty 
but its ultimate eradication. Alleviation is temporary. Eradication is 
permanent. Alleviation is limited. Eradication is total. The proper 
response to the problem of poverty is not superficial treatment but total 
structural change. Hindi maaring puksain ang kahirapan sa pamamagitan 
ng patapal-tapal at papahid-pahid lamang. Kailangan ay baguhin ang 
buong sistema. (Poverty cannot be eradicated by merely applying 
something on surface. It requires a change of the entire system.)   
I realize that "eradication" is unattainable in real life. But getting as 
close to it as possible is worth the effort. It is true that Jesus Christ said: 
"the poor you will always have with you," but he did not say they had to 
be the majority. My vision is to drive poverty away from the center and 
into the periphery of our concerns, to make it a marginal rather than a 
mainstream problem.    
Hence, our war on poverty is not just one program of government. It is 
the overriding business of the government itself. It is built into and 
embedded in our total economic and social programs. It defines and 
drives the substance, the content, and the heart and soul of our entire 
strategy of government.    
Ang ating kampanya laban sa kahirapan ay hindi isang programa 
lamang ng pamahalaan. Ito ang sentro ng patakaran at pagkilos ng 
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pamahalaan. Nakatatak ito sa kabuuan ng bawa’t programang 
pangkabuhayan at pang-lipunan. Ito ang magbibigay-buhay at lakas sa 
diwa at puso ng pagkilos at pamamalakad ng pamahalaan.  (NB: A 
restatement in Filipino of the preceding paragraph)  
It is essential for our war on poverty that the economy develops in 
general, but this is not enough. It is also important that development 
efforts be re-directed towards the poor, towards the base of our society. In 
my thirty years of public service, I have always decided for the greater 




In the extract, Estrada conceptualized ‘war on poverty’ as a FORMULA or a 
PRESCRIPTION that is ‘built into and embedded in our total economic and social 
programs.’  It is a life-inducing formula in that it ‘defines and drives the substance, 
the content, heart and soul of our entire strategy of government.’  
Estrada’s ‘war on poverty’ is supposed to be different from the economic 
programs of the past that purportedly ‘uplift the rich’ but leave the poor behind.  It 
conceptualizes poverty as taking up a substantive part of the social structure by 
alluding to poor as the ‘base’ of the social pyramid and by describing poverty as a 
central or ‘mainstream’ problem that need to be driven to the ‘periphery’ or made 
‘marginal.’ Estrada’s assertions that he was for the ‘ultimate eradication’ of poverty 
and not just for its ‘alleviation’, that the ‘proper response to the problem of poverty’ is 
‘total structural change’ and not ‘superficial treatment’ betray his aggressive stance. 
They are consistent with his assertions on ‘radical restructuring’ where he showed his 
characteristic male audacity. 
 Underlying the ‘war on poverty’ concerns articulated in the Estrada 
presidential rhetoric was the continuation of globalist neoliberal policies started out in 
the previous administrations, especially that of Ramos, Estrada’s predecessor. This is 




13. All these shifts will take place in a free market environment. All 
investments in industries, whether large or small, upstream or 
downstream, capital- or labor-intensive, will be welcome. But special 
attention will be placed on "unblocking" investments in small and 
medium-scale industries, especially in the rural areas. There are many 
obstacles in our laws and in our landscape that impede the spontaneous 
flow of investments and technology into these industries. These obstacles 
will be removed by programs that will open up and make markets more 
efficient: whether by legislation, by policy and regulation revamps, by 
focused infrastructure construction, or by other means.    
Investments create jobs. And jobs provide both income and dignity. 
They are the decisive eliminators of poverty.     
Our war on poverty is in our programs to enable our industries to 
achieve global competitiveness. We will transform the power sector to a 
market-based, competitive industry in order to lower the costs of power. 
The Omnibus Power Bill is necessary to achieve this. We will exploit our 
competitive advantage in high-tech industries. Our science and technology 
policies are being re-oriented towards satisfying the needs of the 
underprivileged.  (1999) 
 
 
The extract, which talks about encouraging a ‘free market environment’ to achieve 
global competitiveness, metaphorizes the government-facilitated entry of investments 
in small and medium-scale industries, especially in the rural areas, as a form 
‘unblocking’ the (rural) economy. Such metaphorization presupposes that the status 
quo had not been conducive to investments.  This is explicated in the metaphorization 
of existing laws as ‘obstacles’ that serve to ‘impede the spontaneous flow of 
investments and technologies’—a metaphorization that underlies the conceptual 
metaphor PROTECTIONIST POLICIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS TOWARDS ACHIEVING 
GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS.  The removal of these ‘obstacles’ is supposed to ‘open 
up and make markets more efficient,’ which serves as a metaphorical expression for a 
liberalized economy. Several ways are offered to go about the ‘unblocking’ and 
‘opening up’ of the national economy: ‘by legislation, by policy and regulation 
revamps, by focused infrastructure construction, or by other means.’ They are 
conceptualized as MECHANISMS FOR REMOVAL OF OBSTACLES/IMPEDIMENTS. 
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The extract also shows a justification for the Estrada-sponsored proposal to 
amend the constitution, especially what was purported as ‘protectionist policies’ that 
bar foreigners from owning land. In this regard, the war frame became a significant 
means to cast those who oppose the policies pushed by the Estrada administration as 
‘enemies’ against which the people and recipients of the government economic 
agenda should fight and resist. This will be further explored in the next section on 
national security and peace and order—domains where Estrada appeared to favor ‘the 
military sword to provide swift solution over rising criminality as well as rising 
popular unrest and rebellion’ (Tujan 2000, 23). 
 
7.5       Peace and security 
In Estrada’s 1999 national address, rebellion or insurgency was characterized 
as irrelevant.62 Estrada went on to discredit its founding leaders in exile by referring 
to them as leaders who have abandoned their followers ‘para magpasarap sa ibang 
bansa’ (in order to enjoy themselves abroad) and to pursue an ‘insurgency by remote 
control.’ While he was open to negotiations with the communist rebels in the 
‘community level,’ he made it clear that such was possible only on the 
administration’s terms. In his characteristic street-smart rhetoric, Estrada used the 
vernacular to communicate his message to the rebels: 
 
14. Nguni’t mabuti na ring maliwanag ang usapan. Kuwentas klaras. Kakaunti 
na lang ang panahon at pasiyensiya na nalalabi sa pag-dadada. Isuko na 
ninyo ang inyong armas. Bumalik na kayo sa buklod ng batas at ng ating 
lipunan, At dito tayo mag-usap ng masinsinan, bilang magkakapatid, 
walang sandata sa kamay, walang tutukan ng baril. (But it is good when 
things between us are clear. Cuentas claras. Time and patience left for 
                                                 
62 Interestingly, this line of argument had been repeated by the Arroyo government in dealing with the 




talk is getting shorter. Surrender your arms. Return to the fold of the law 
and our society. And this is where we should talk seriously, as brothers 
and sisters, without arms or weapons, not at gunpoint.) (1999) 
 
 
Estrada employed several metaphorizations in order to negatively represent the 
insurgency in his speech: insurgency as an obstacle to national progress, as a 
manipulated act or operation, as a threat to constitutional democracy, and as a disease 
or pest that needs to be crushed.63   
 
INSURGENCY/REBELLION IS AN OBSTACLE TO SOCIAL PROGRESS 
 
15. Ang isa pang balakid sa digmaan laban sa karalitaan, at sa kaunlaran ng 
buong bayan, ay ang rebelyon ng ilan sa ating mga kababayan. (Another 
obstacle in war against poverty, and to national progress is the rebellion 
waged by several of our compatriots.) 
 
 
LEADERS OF THE INSURGENTS ARE MANIPULATORS 
 
16. Sila’y matagal nang iniwan ng kanilang mga lider upang magpasarap sa 
ibang bansa, at doon nila tinutulak ang ‘insurgency by remote control’. 
(They have long been abandoned by their leaders to spend good time in 
other countries where they pursue insurgency by remote control.)   
 
 
INSURGENCY IS A THREAT TO CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 
 
17. Our people overwhelmingly support our constitutional system and our 
functioning democracy. No insurgency of any color has the legal, 
political, or moral right to seek to bring it down.    
This government was elected by the people. It enjoys their support. 
Your rebellion does not. And this government was not elected to 
compromise the sovereignty of this Republic, not in substance, not in 
symbol, not ever.    
If you wish to run the government, seek the people’s mandate. If you 
have any grievances against the government or against society, seek your 
redress within the law. You have a right to your beliefs, but you cannot 
justify your belligerence.    
 
 
                                                 
63 The last one is an allusion to a popular advertisement where a popular film and television actress 




INSURGENCY IS A DISEASE/PEST THAT NEEDS TO BE CRUSHED 
 
18. Hindi binebeybi ang rebelyon. Pinipisa. Kaya, huwag n’yo kaming 
hamunin!   (Rebellion is not to be treated like a baby. It is squashed. So 
don’t you dare challenge us!) 
 
 
Notably, the final conceptual metaphor was likened to how the government dealt with 
crime, and Estrada was explicit about this in his SONA: 
 
19. Hindi binebeybi ang rebelyon. Pinipisa. Kaya, huwag n’yo kaming 
hamunin!   Gayon din ang masasabi ko tungkol sa krimen at mga salarin. 
Hindi nilalambing ang krimen. Dinudurog. Hindi kinukupkup ang 
kriminal. Pinaparusahan. Lalong-lalo na iyong mga nagtutulak ng bawal 
na gamot sa ating mga kababayan. Setenta por siento ng krimen ay 
nagmumula sa pag-gamit ng droga. (Rebellion is not to be treated like a 
baby. It is squashed. So don’t you dare challenge us! The same applies to 
crime and its perpetrators. A crime is not something to be coddled. It is 
crushed. A criminal is not somebody to be harbored. He is punished. 
Especially those who are pushing/selling drugs to our compatriots. 
Seventy percent of crimes committed are due to drug-use.) 
 
 
The juxtaposition of contrasting images in the statements – a nurturing image 
(‘binebeybi’ (to baby), ‘nilalambing’ (to coddle or pamper)) and a punitive one 
(‘pinipisa’ (to squash), ‘dinudurog’ (to crush), ‘pinaparusahan’ (punish)) – is worth 
noting. They serve as rhetorical strategies of othering as they vividly visualize the 
kind of negative treatment that both the rebels and criminals deserve. That rebellion 
and crime (target domains) are rendered as diseases also suggest that the two may be 
conflated making possible the formulation that ARMED REBELLION IS A CRIME, where 
crime is to be dealt with either punitive measure or retributive justice.64  Such a 
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presupposition was consistent with Estrada’s persona as a crime buster – an image he 
had held long before he assumed presidential power.65  
It is interesting to note, however, that in spite of Estrada’s belligerent rhetoric 
against the rebels, he was rather conciliatory in his 1999 congressional speech by 
referring to them earlier as ‘kababayan’ (compatriots).  This seemingly sympathetic 
stance towards the communists may be due to the fact that several of those who 
supported Estrada’s bid to the presidency were intellectuals, university professors, and 
community organizers associated with factions of the Philippine Left (some of whom 
later became members of his cabinet). 
In 2000, Estrada claimed success in his ‘all out war’ policy against the 
secessionist groups in Mindanao such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). 
He then proposed a four-point strategy in approaching the Mindanao question, which 
included forging peace talks with MILF ‘within the framework of the [1987] 
Constitution.’ In inviting MILF ‘into a brotherly embrace of peace,’ Estrada took the 
opportunity to discuss why the rebel groups should drop their secessionist goals.  
Estrada conceptualized secessionism or the separatist movement as a threat 
that aimed to amputate Mindanao from the organic body that is the Philippines. He 
went on to give ‘some unsolicited advice’ to MILF, stating that secessionism ‘is an 
                                                 
65 This image constitutes part of the ‘Erap myth,’ which in itself is a confluence of various forces. It is a 
product of discourses from Joseph Estrada’s four-decade stint in the Philippine movie industry; from 
authorized and unauthorized biographers’ depiction of his personal life; from the media portrayal of 
him through radio, television, print or the Internet; from his public utterances; and from everyday face-
to-face talks about his many images – as politician, husband, father, grandfather, lover, gambler, 
womanizer, actor, the Filipino Robin Hood, intellectual lightweight, leader, protector of film workers, 
Chinese Filipino businessmen supporter, anti-elite, perennial bida, nationalist, anti-US bases senator, 
the carabao lawmaker, the impulsive speaker, Tagalog-speaking President, Clinton counterpart, 
centennial president, ama ng masa – that have endeared him to most members of the lower classes of 
society and some members of the elite. To put it succinctly, powerful signifiers have contributed to 




impossible dream’ with which the majority in Mindanao and international community 
do not sympathize: 
 
20. May I give the MILF some unsolicited advice. Secession in the 
Philippines is an impossible dream. There simply is no space in our 
geography, in our demographics, and in our national psyche for forcibly 
carving another state out of the present Philippine territory. For that 
reason, the foreign models you invoke, like East Timor, will not work for 
you.  
Please bear in mind that you are neither the sole occupants nor even 
the majority in the lands you wish to carve out to convert into your own 
state. There are whole Filipino populations in Mindanao--Muslims, 
Christians, and Lumad--who do not want their territories and their 
residencies disturbed. Not even the majority of the Muslim population 
share your separatist views nor the violent means you employ to attain 
them. The overriding passion of the people of Mindanao is for peace.  
Our people will simply not stand for the dismemberment of the 
country. All of the Philippines belongs to all Filipinos. No part of it 
belongs to any particular group.  
And the international community as a whole will neither support nor 
sympathize with secession. In fact, we deeply appreciate the statement of 
his excellency, Dr. Azeddine Laraki, secretary general of the Organization 
of Islamic Conference (OIC), encouraging Muslim minorities in non-
member states [and I quote] ''To contribute effectively to the progress of 
the countries they live in and to respect their sovereignty and laws.'' 
[Unquote.]  
Secession as a dream is also out of tune with history. If there is one 
lesson that historical evolution has taught us, it is this: That diversity is a 
cause for celebration, not segregation; that cultural cross-breeding leads to 
strength while in-breeding leads to weakness; and that cultural identities 
are enriched by interaction and impoverished by isolation. Some of the 
most glorious creations and achievements of civilization are the products 
of the historical confluences between Islam and Christianity.  
What we should strive for is not just peaceful coexistence but 
interactive harmony and constructive interdependence. (2000) 
 
 
In the extract, Estrada not only conceptualized secessionism as an act of 
dismembering the country (body), but also as an impossible dream ‘that has no space 
in [the] national psyche,’ and a dream that is ‘out of tune with history’—one that 
deviates from ‘the lesson of historical evolution has taught us.’ These 
conceptualizations portrayed the Moro secessionists as a radical minority offering a 
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proposition that was not only disagreeable to the people of Mindanao and the 
international community, but also dangerous to the national life.  They made it appear 
as if the quest for self-determination by the Moros would make the proposed 
Bangsamoro land inimical to interaction with other cultural communities beyond its 
shores. Also, they portrayed the secessionist movement as irrelevant in the 
contemporary world that is supposed to regard ‘diversity as a cause of celebration.’ 
This portrayal curiously deemphasized the ‘historical and systemic marginalization of 
the Moros’ in Southern Philippines (Santos 2008) and how the previous governments 
including post-Marcos administrations had themselves been complicit in the 
marginalization of the Moros in the countryside through state policies and programs 
that tend to under-privilege Muslim communities in the Philippines.66 In a way, the 
conceptualizations succeed in othering groups like the MILF, making the militarist 
solution pursued by the Estrada administration justifiable.  
Justification for the militarist solution may be seen in the following extract:  
 
21. We cannot negotiate over secession. The sovereignty and the integrity of 
the republic are not available for compromise or trade--not even for the 
sake of peace. Any peace won by bartering any portion of our sovereignty 
is an immoral peace.  
Moreover, the sovereignty and integrity of the republic are 
unconquerable. No guns will ever terrorize the Filipinos to surrender any 
piece of their sovereignty to anybody: not--as our history shows--to any 
colonial power, not to any foreign invader, and certainly not to any 
internal rebel. 
We cannot talk about secession. But we can talk about a new 
beginning for Mindanao.  
In fact, if you are bold enough for it, we can talk about a different war, 
a bigger war that needs to be fought. I do not mean the guerrilla warfare 
that you appear to have shifted to. I hope you stop--for the sake of the 
                                                 
66 In Marites Vitug and Glenda Gloria’s ‘Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao’ (Quezon 
City: Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs and the Institute for Popular Democracy, 
2000), it is noted that ‘what figure as an important reason for joining the Moro rebellion such as the 




people, especially the poor, who will suffer the most from continued 
hostilities. But if you decide to engage us further, we are ready for you. If 
you can shift strategies and tactics, so can we. 
When I talk of another war, I mean the war to correct historical 
wrongs, which left a sad legacy of poverty and social injustice to 
Mindanao. This is the war that all of us, including ex-rebels, should fight 
together.  
Fighting the rebellion is one thing. It takes the military to do it. But 
fighting the root causes of rebellion is another. It will take the whole 
society to do it. (2000) 
 
 
The extract reveals a rhetoric that easily reverts to the ‘war’ frame—that even the 
resolution of the problems in Southern Philippines could be conceptualized as a battle.  
In the extract, Estrada initially lays out the non-negotiables (‘We cannot negotiate 
over secession.  The sovereignty and integrity of the republic are not available for 
compromise or trade…’).  He then repudiates the use of arms to challenge sovereignty 
(‘No guns will ever terrorize the Filipinos to surrender any piece of their sovereignty 
to anybody’).  Moving on, he introduces the possibility of talking ‘about a new 
beginning for Mindanao.’  But just when the recipient of the message is about to think 
that Estrada is taking a conciliatory stance or, at the very least, is calling for a 
dialogue, he suddenly frames his talk in the domain of war (‘we can talk about a 
different war, a bigger war that needs to be fought’) and renders the rebels in ways 
that elicit negative evaluation of their resolve (‘the guerilla warfare that you appear to 
have shifted to’; ‘continued hostilities’).  And then he turns into a combative and 
defensive mode (‘But if you decide to engage us further, we are ready for you.  If you 
can shift strategies and tactics, so can we’), suggesting that the government is not 
about to back out from the fight pursued by the rebels.  In the final paragraph of the 
above extract, war against rebellion per se (‘fighting rebellion’) is distinguished from 
war against ‘the root causes of rebellion’ (‘fighting the root causes of rebellion’).  
While this makes the militarist solution one of several approaches to address the 
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problem of Moro insurgency, the use of the war frame (as evidenced by the use of the 
term ‘fighting’ or the expressions ‘a different war, a bigger war that needs to be 
fought,’ ‘a war to correct the historical wrongs’ in the last three paragraphs of the 
extract) naturalizes the use of military force; the frame renders the use of force 
inevitable. 
In the extract below, the MILF rebels are metaphorically expressed as wielders 
of violence (‘they built up an army and used their firepower to force their separatist 
aims against an unwilling people’), plotters (‘the rebels simply used the peace talks as 
an opportunity for arms buildup, for troop recruitment and training, for deployment, 
for territorial consolidation, and for enlarging their threat to the republic’), destroyers 
of the country’s image (‘they inflicted severe damage on the country’s image 
abroad’), traitors to the country (‘The military camps they maintained…were not 
under the command and control of the government of the Philippines. They owed 
their allegiance elsewhere’). This portrayal of the Moro rebels made it appear that 
pursuing negotiations with them had become impossible and unnecessary. 
 
22. The MILF could not be talked out of their position, whether territorial or 
ideological. They said that their goal of secession was non-negotiable. 
Well, neither is the sovereignty and integrity of the republic. No one can 
challenge that proposition by force of arms and get away with it. 
It would have been quieter if the conflict could be resolved by an 
exchange of words rather than by an exchange of fire. But whenever 
words were tried in the past, in the name of so-called peace but which in 
reality was appeasement, the rebels simply used the peace talks as an 
opportunity for arms buildup, for troop recruitment and training, for 
deployment, for territorial consolidation, and for enlarging their threat to 
the republic. 
There would have been a larger space for tolerance if they had pushed 
their cause in the open marketplace for ideas. But instead, they built up an 
army and used their firepower to force their separatist aims on an 
unwilling people.  
True to form, the MILF took advantage of the 1997 ceasefire to 
commit at least 227 violations. These include the kidnapping of Father 
Luciano Benedetti in September 1998; the occupying and setting on fire of 
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the municipal hall of Talayan, Maguindanao; the takeover of the 
Kauswagan Municipal Hall; the bombing of the Lady of Mediatrix boat at 
Ozamiz City; and the takeover of the Narciso Ramos Highway. By doing 
so, they inflicted severe damage on the country's image abroad, and 
scared much-needed investments away. The numerous camps they 
maintained were not Boy Scout camps. They were staging areas and 
launching pads for expanding the MILF rebellion further. These military 
camps were not under the command and control of the government of the 
Philippines. They owed their allegiance elsewhere. (2000) 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, such conceptualization of the Moro rebel groups served as a 
convenient excuse to pursue the militarist solution towards Moro rebellion in 
Mindanao. And to Estrada, forging war was necessary to achieve peace (WAR IS 
PEACE). This is evident in the following extract where the military option is 
metaphorized as an inevitable response to rebel’s use of force (‘armed rebellion 
demanded an armed response’; ‘In effect, we did not choose the military option. It 
was forced upon us’) and a mechanism to ensure peace (‘In order to ensure permanent 
peace in the future, we had to demolish the rebels’ apparatus for making war’): 
 
23. Given all these, plus the unabated murders, terrorism, ambushes, 
extortion, bombings, illegal control of buildings and public highways, and 
other atrocities committed by the rebels in the pursuit of their secessionist 
aims, the government was faced with two choices. One was to play the 
sucker, keep tailing and let the problems grow until the republic was in 
real mortal danger. The other was to meet force with force. An armed 
rebellion demanded an armed response. The sitting-duck strategy has 
never been known to work well...for the duck.   
In order to ensure permanent peace in the future, we had to demolish 
the rebels' apparatus for making war. Moreover, abstention from military 
action would have been tantamount to political abdication.  
In effect, we did not choose the military option. It was forced upon us. 
But we used it. And we succeeded. (2000) 
 
 
In the extract, Estrada made it appear that the government had no better choice than 
‘to meet force with force’ as the rebels were involved in extremist and anarchic 
activities (‘unabated murders, terrorism, extortion, bombings, illegal control of 
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buildings and public highways and other atrocities’).  The other choice that Estrada 
foisted was actually rendered a non-option.  The abstention from the military action—
the complete opposite of that which he proposed to do—had been labeled the ‘sitting 
duck strategy,’ a supposedly counter-intuitive choice as the government was ‘to play 
the sucker, keep tailing, and let the problems grow until the republic was in real 
mortal danger.’ Estrada also considered it ‘tantamount to political abdication.’ This 
rather simplistic reduction of the alternative solutions to the insurgency in Southern 
Philippines to two options (‘to meet force with force’ versus ‘to play the sucker’; 
‘armed response’ versus ‘the sitting duck strategy’; ‘military option’ versus 
‘abstention from military action’; ‘to demolish the rebels’ apparatus for making war’ 
versus ‘political abdication’) and the obvious mockery of the less favored option was 
a clear case of false dilemma or either-or fallacy that worked as a strategy to diminish 
the value of solutions other than military action. This might have been necessary as 
the endorsement of the military action as well as the indictment of any option that 
refuses or contradicts such action both worked to bolster Estrada’s image as a tough 
leader. 
 
7.6      The presidency 
Estrada conceptualized his role as president in terms of journey metaphors. In 
his inaugural SONA in 1998 (see 24), he regarded himself as a guide (see 25), a 
rescuer of the embattled nation, and a pilot that was tasked to lead the country’s take 
off (see 25). These metaphorizations are evident in the introductory part of his speech 
where he said: 
 
24. Today, I stand before you with an accounting of the present with a road 
map for our future. 
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Paano ba tayo itatawid sa krisis na bumabalot sa ating ekonomiya? 
(How are we to overcome the crisis that envelopes our economy?)  
Nasaan na ba tayo ngayon? (Where are we now?) 
Saan ba tayo nanggaling? (Where have we been?) 
Saan ba tayo patutungo? (Where are we headed?) (1998) 
 
25. To conclude, my aim is to help our country escape the recession. 
My solutions are obvious, my proposals may be common place, but 
they were never adopted before. 
In sum, they are to spend wisely and less. And by austerity and 
hardwork generate the means to cover the shortfalls of the past, so we can 
have a smooth runway for final take off. 
Perhaps by then, six years will have passed, and someone else will take 
over as pilot. (1998) 
 
 
That the president is regarded as guide in the national journey is not distinctive to 
Estrada’s presidency. The same conceptualization was latent in the addresses of the 
previous post-Marcos presidents. What might have distinguished him from his 
predecessors was how he specifically characterized himself as a guide or national 
pilot. And this characterization can be seen in his succeeding addresses. 
 Throughout his short-lived presidency, Estrada was sensitive to the criticisms 
leveled against his office. He characterized his presidency as an object of attack from 
the opposition and the critics ‘who have no insight’ (1999). Estrada had to bolster his 
image in his address by proving that he was an effective leader or guide with a 
respectable position in the international stage. In the following extracts, he attributes 
the ‘improvement in the country’s economic performance’ to ‘effective governance’ 
(see 26)67 and by asserting that ‘the current leadership of the Philippines enjoys a high 
level of respect’ in the regional and international forums (see 27): 
                                                 
67 Though not the focus of the study, the codeswitching in extract 26 is worth examining.  It appears to 
have been strategically employed to establish identification with the audience.  Unlike in other SONAs 
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Filipino, Estrada used the colloquial language as evidenced by common expressions as ‘tsamba’ 




26. I narrate all these "inside stories" to make a point. Those who make a 
career and a business out of hitting me are saying that the improvement in 
the country’s economic performance was due to pure luck, to good 
weather, or to anything but Erap. Tsamba lang daw. Kung gumanda ang 
takbo ng ekonomiya, walang kinalaman si Erap. Nguni’t kung bumagsak 
ang ekonomiya, kasalanan ni Erap. Mali naman iyan. (Trans. It was pure 
luck according to some. If the economy runs well, Erap has nothing to do 
with it. But if the economy falters, it’s the fault of Erap. That’s rather 
wrong.) Our recovery was due to the innovative way we analyzed 
situations and made bold decisions.     
Our success was the result of effective governance. It was a matter of 
having the right policies, being supported by competent and dedicated 
cabinet members, respecting the freedom of the market, managing and 
budgeting our resources right, and acting quickly before the danger grew 
or the opportunity disappeared. (1999) 
 
27. With all these developments, it is no wonder that in the space of only one 
year, the other Asian countries and, indeed, much of the world, have come 
to recognize the presidency of the Philippines as among the leaders of the 
region. This is indeed a long way from the skepticism that greeted this 
presidency when it began. In APEC, in ASEAN, and in other regional and 
international forums, the current leadership of the Philippines enjoys a 
high level of respect. Our international prestige is on the ascendant. The 
dramatic rebound in the stock market is a strong indication of confidence. 
And the people, according to the latest surveys, give the president a 77.6% 
approval rating.    
The heads of the IMF and the World Bank also have had good words 
to say. Mr. James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, said: -- and I 
quote -- "What is clear is the Philippine situation is vastly different from 
Korea, Thailand and Indonesia… I think you all know you are weakened 
far less than anyone else in the region with the exception of Singapore." 
(End of quote.) and Mr. Michel Camdessus, managing director of the 
IMF, said he considered the Philippines as a model for countries in the 
ASEAN region. (1999) 
 
 
 From the way he framed the centerpiece of his presidency, that is, ‘war on 
poverty,’ and the militaristic stance he had towards the problem of insurgency 
especially of the Moro rebels in Southern Philippines, it may be inferred that Estrada 
characterized himself as one tough guide. His tough rhetoric was of course consistent 
                                                                                                                                            
as someone more relatable to his audience.  The expressions make the passage sound conversational 
and highlight the apparent irrationality of his critics. 
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with his tough image carved from his cinematic characters during his active years in 
the movie industry and his years of experience as a politician. Curiously, this same 
rhetoric enabled Estrada to undermine the capability of what he regarded as the 
nation’s as well as his presidency’s adversaries (i.e., rebels and critics of the 
administration) while bolstering or reinforcing his image: 
 
28. There are those, in fact, who say that we have no vision. They claim, for 
example, that we have no programs to fight poverty: the central pledge of 
my campaign. They are wrong. It is not the government that is lacking in 
programs. It is our critics who are lacking in perception. It is not I who 
has no vision. It is they who have no insight. (1999) 
 
29. This government was elected by the people. It enjoys their support. Your 
rebellion does not. And this government was not elected to compromise 
the sovereignty of this Republic, not in substance, not in symbol, not 
ever.    
If you wish to run the government, seek the people’s mandate. If you 
have any grievances against the government or against society, seek your 
redress within the law. You have a right to your beliefs, but you cannot 
justify your belligerence.    
Peace we offer you, but appeasement, never. It is the weak that offers 
appeasement to the strong, not vice versa. Do not doubt our resolve. We 
will welcome you back at any time. But we will give your rebellion no air 
to breathe, no space to move, no time to prosper. If you accept peace, you 
will have it. If you do not, we will enforce it anyway. (1999) 
 
30. Our vision is coherent and clear. I wonder why some observers fail to 
perceive it. Please don’t get shocked if I quote from the scriptures; I 
believe the answer is there – and I quote: "They look but do not see, and 
hear but do not listen." (End of quote.) By the way, that was from 
Matthew.    
The English author, George Moore, was right when he said: -- and I 
quote -- "The lot of critics is to be remembered by what they failed to 
understand." (End of quote) (1999) 
 
31. As to those who continue to distract me from pursuing my vision, I take my 
cue from Abraham Lincoln, who said, -- and I quote -- "If I were to try to 
read, much less answer, all the attacks made on me, this shop might as 
well be closed for any other business. I do the very best I know how, the 
very best I can, and I mean to keep doing so until the end. If the end 
brings me out all right, what’s said against me won’t amount to anything. 
If the end brings me out wrong, ten angels swearing I was right would 
make no difference." (End of quote).    
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According to the surveys, millions of Filipinos are saying I am right. 
Between Lincoln’s ten angels and the millions of my own countrymen, I 
choose to believe my countrymen.  (1999) 
 
 
The four extracts show the polarized relationship between the Estrada government 
and its critics and between his government and the rebels.  In extract 28, the self and 
other representations are apparent in the way Estrada denied the criticism leveled 
against his administration (‘There are those, in fact, who say that we have no vision’) 
while attacking or discrediting his critics by suggesting that they were themselves 
guilty of what they accuse him (‘It is not the government that is lacking in programs.  
It is our critics who are lacking in perception. It is I who has no vision. It is they who 
have no insight’).  The use of the expressions such as ‘perception’, ‘vision’, ‘insight’ 
and the ‘lack’ of them appears to indicate a common frame that undergirds the 
conceptualization of criticism as PERCEPTION and government plans and programs as 
A VISION. That frame could be that SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT (which includes but is not 
limited to government planning or programming and social criticism) IS A 
VISUAL/SENSORY EVENT where actors or participants may envision, perceive, draw 
insights or falter in doing so.  By using the strategy of denial (‘They are wrong’), 
attacking his accuser (‘It is our critics who are lacking in perception’; ‘It is they who 
have no insight’), and strategically positioning that what appears to be opposing sides 
in the same conceptual frame (Estrada government versus critics), Estrada was able to 
portray the differences between the two entities and to spell out what was ‘wrong’ 
with his critics’ claim.68   
                                                 
68 It could have been an option for the speaker (or accused) to just deny any assertion from his accuser 
and attack the accuser by attributing negative descriptions to him in which case the specific frame of 




 The same strategy is apparent in extract 30 where he describes his 
government’s vision to be ‘coherent and clear’ while taunting ‘some observers [who] 
fail to perceive it.’ Even his scriptural allusions from Matthew 13 of the New 
Testament and his quote from English author George Moore are indicative of the 
conceptual frame SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT IS A SENSORY EVENT.  The quotes, in fact, 
extend the polarized representation further by showing that the differences are in 
terms of levels of perception (Matthew: ‘They look but do not see, and hear but do 
not listen’; George Moore: ‘The lot of critics is to be remembered by what they failed 
to understand’). The scriptural and literary allusions portray the critics as inadequate 
in their level of social engagement thereby rendering their criticism of the government 
flimsy or insubstantial. 
 In extract 31, Estrada had reduced his critics to being a mere distraction (‘As 
those who continue to distract me from pursuing my vision, I take my cue from 
Abraham Lincoln…’). While this expression indicated his impatience when dealing 
with the opposition and the critical press (Tujan 2000), his use of an appeal to 
authority (re: Lincoln quote and the ‘surveys’) position him as a leader who would be 
unperturbed by attacks (‘I do the very best I know how, the very best I can, and I 
mean to keep doing so until the end’) and who still enjoyed popular support.  
In extract 29, the Estrada government is pitted against the rebels: ‘The 
government was elected by the people. It enjoys their support. Your rebellion does 
not. And this government was elected not to compromise sovereignty of this 
Republic, not in substance, not in symbol, not ever.’ The uncompromising stance of 
the Estrada government in this particular extract suggests formidability which tied 
well with for the tough rhetoric of Estrada. This is particularly intensified in the third 
paragraph where Estrada distinguished the ‘weak’ from the ‘strong’: ‘Peace we offer 
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you, but appeasement, never. It is the weak that offers appeasement to the strong, not 
vice versa.’ True to his tough persona, he expressed his policy towards rebellion in a 
way that suggests the conceptual metaphor ANTI-REBELLION IS CONTAINMENT (‘But 
we will give your rebellion no air to breathe, no space to move, no time to prosper’).  
Interestingly, Estrada conceptualized ‘peace’ as an object that can be had 
when it is accepted by the rebels and ‘enforced’ on them if they do not do so.  That 
peace can be ‘enforced’ suggests that military action is necessary when dealing with 
armed rebellion or that the government takes the armed response WAR IS PEACE. 
Adopting such conceptualization undoubtedly contributed to the tough rhetoric that 
Estrada was keen on projecting. 
 In his 2000 SONA, he explained that his presidency was a ‘learning 
presidency’—one that ‘struggled through the challenges of coping with the learning 
curve.’  His metaphorization of the president as a learner who had gone through and 
survived the difficulties brought about by situational factors such as the regional 
economic crisis and ‘attacks’ from his critics and detractors worked to reaffirm his 
resolve that his was indeed a tough, that is, enduring, leadership. Notwithstanding the 
attacks on his presidency, which he viewed as inimical to the prospects for the 
national economy, his presidency was ‘poised for new beginnings.’ This is shown in 
the following extract: 
 
32. Admittedly, over the past two years, the presidency itself has struggled 
through the challenges of coping with the learning curve. Made all the 
more difficult by the long-lasting effects on the corporate sector of the 
Asian financial crisis and by the vicious attempts of my detractors to 
discredit me and my family. These attacks started way back during my 
campaign and never let up. Now, it has intensified in a more vicious way 
after the SWS reported a recovery in my approval rating. Unfortunately, 
by discrediting me, the head of state and of government, they also 
undermine the confidence of the international community in the country, 
and thereby damage the prospects for our economy.  
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  Sa halip na tayo ay magsiraan, kailangang magkaisa at magtulungan 
tayo sa darating na apat na taon upang mapabilis ang ating pag-unlad. 
Habang tayo ay nag-aaway-away, nagpapalakpakan naman ang ating 
karatig-bansa dahil sa kanila pumupunta ang mga dayuhang kapital at 
turista.  (Instead of mudslinging, we need to unite and help each other for 
the next four years so that we can hasten our development. While we 
squabble, our neighbors rejoice because foreign capital and tourists go to 
them.) 
Nonetheless, the presidency has learned its lessons well at this point, 
the presidency itself is poised for its own new beginnings. 
 
 
Unfortunately for Estrada, his new beginnings did not experience its full realization. 
Almost three months after he delivered what would be his last SONA, Estrada was 
accused of being involved in an illegal numbers game and of receiving huge sum from 
tobacco excise taxes. The accusations would lead to an aborted 24-day impeachment 
trial which culminated in an extrajudicial exercise of ‘people power.’ On January 20, 
2001, six months before Estrada was to deliver his fourth congressional speech, he 
was ousted from the Philippine presidency and was replaced by his constitutional 
successor, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. 
 
7.7       Summary 
In summary, Joseph Estrada’s State of the Nation Addresses from 1998 to 
2000 manifested and expressed tough rhetoric that reflected and reaffirmed Estrada’s 
image as the quintessential Filipino macho—strong, audacious, uncompromising, and 
a hero ready to rescue persons or institutions in distress.   
Democracy as a topic of major concern figured prominently only in his 1999 
speech where he had to allay fears that his administration had resorted to authoritarian 
rule. In his national address, he reaffirmed his commitment to democracy by 
conceptualizing it as an OBJECT OF PROTECTION AND DEFENSE and implicitly as a 
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TREASURED ENTITY/PRIZED POSSESSION, thereby reverberating earlier 
conceptualizations of democracy by his predecessors. 
Understandably, the topic of national economy figured significantly in 
Estrada’s presidential speeches. The state of the national economy was conceptualized 
using health, weather, and journey metaphors, suggesting that the Philippine economy 
was suffering from the disease that was the Asian financial crisis, which at the same 
time posed as an impediment for its full ‘take off.’  Also, the crisis was seen as a 
meteorological obstacle in the country’s sail towards its desired destination. 
Estrada viewed his presidency as one that was tasked to find cure to the 
NATIONAL ILLNESS. He offered a pro-poor oriented economic agenda which he 
framed using a militarist metaphor: ‘war on poverty.’  By using the militarist 
metaphor, not only was his role as champion of the poor underscored in his 
discussion. He also fortified the tough image that he had assumed long before he was 
elevated to the Philippine presidency. Such fortification was not only evident in the 
use of militarist metaphor but also in the deployment of a more aggressive language in 
place of what Estrada regarded as ‘weak and wimpish.’ 
In spite of the tougher and more aggressive rhetoric of Estrada, his policies 
curiously remained consistent with the global neoliberal policies started out in the 
previous administration. This tends to imply that the shift in rhetoric in the case of 
Estrada’s State of the Nation Addresses were more in consonance with the 
presidential image he wanted to project in public than with the policies he introduced 
during his term. In fact, his tough sounding ‘radical restructuring’ did not differ from 
the supposedly more ‘wimpish’ economic ‘reform’ agenda of his predecessors. In 
other words, Estrada’s administration merely sustained the neoliberal policy agenda 
pursued by the Aquino and Ramos governments. This should not however imply that 
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rhetoric merely conceals what is regarded as desired reality or ‘truth.’ In so far as the 
projection of neoliberal economic policy in the Aquino, Ramos, and Estrada national 
addresses is concerned, rhetoric, in fact, appears to clothe, accentuate, build up what 
is presented as truth (re: the inevitability of adopting neoliberal economic policy/ 
policies) so that what is initially thought of as unfamiliar becomes familiar, what is 
regarded as unpalatable becomes palatable, or what is deemed disagreeable, 
agreeable. 
The tough image of Estrada fortified through militaristic metaphors and tough 
rhetoric proved useful when he dealt with the topic on national security and peace and 
order. It came in handy when discrediting the insurgents, who, like criminals, he 
metaphorized as a disease or a pest that needed to be crushed. The common ‘othering’ 
of these two distinct forces in society may be seen as an attempt at conflating 
rebellion and criminality, thus making possible the conceptual metaphor, ARMED 
REBELLION IS A CRIME. As noted earlier, such conceptualization was consistent with 
Estrada’s crime buster persona. More than that, however, it warranted the privileging 
of the retributive kind of justice over the restorative kind. 
The tough image was also particularly necessary when Estrada declared an ‘all 
out war’ with the Moro rebels in 2000.  Noticeable in Estrada’s final SONA was his 
preference for a militarist solution to the Moro rebellion in Mindanao. While he 
seemed to have had an expanded concept of war when he talked about ‘fighting the 
root cause of rebellion,’ his very use of the frame privileged the use of military force 
and in fact, rendered it inevitable. 
What could have been a colorful Estrada presidency conceptualized as a tough 
guide ready to lead the Philippines to its full take off was cut short when Estrada 
became the first Filipino and Asian president to be impeached. The impeachment trial 
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lasted for 24 days and culminated in what is now touted as People Power 2.  Joseph 
Ejercito Estrada was replaced by his Vice President, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, who 















































Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and the Recontextualization  




Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, being the Vice President of Joseph Ejercito Estrada, 
became the constitutional successor after the latter was ousted from power through a 
second EDSA people power uprising in January 2001. The manner through which she 
was catapulted to power—that is, through extra-constitutional means—had put her 
successor presidency under the cloud of doubt. A decision of the Philippine Supreme 
Court stating that Estrada had voluntarily relinquished his position during the height 
of the mass demonstrations at EDSA sanctioned Arroyo’s assumption into the 
Philippines’ highest office.70 Arroyo would eventually hold the Philippine presidency 
for more than nine years—the longest serving president since Ferdinand Marcos. Her 
presidency spanned more than three years of successor term (January 2001 to June 
2004) and six years of full term (July 2004 to June 2010). 
As explained in the introduction, the discussion on the Arroyo presidency is 
divided into two analytical chapters.  The first Arroyo chapter covers SONAs 
delivered during her successor term and her first SONA less than a month after she 
                                                 
69 This chapter draws from the information and discussion found in two earlier papers written by the 
student researcher. The first one titled ‘The Rhetoric of Accountability in Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s 
State of the Nation Addresses (2001-2005)’ (in Public Policy X, July to December 2006, pp. 27-57) 
and the second ‘’WAR ON TERROR’ IS A CURATIVE: Recontextualization and Political Myth-making in 
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s 2002-2004 State of the Nation Addresses’ (in Critical Inquiry in Language 
Studies, Volume 8, Number 4, pp. 313-343).  Some portions in the text that appear in the second article 
are reprinted by permission of Taylor and Francis, Ltd (http://www.tandfonline.com). 
 
70 This decision is, however, contested by legal scholars in the Philippines. See for instance Querubin, 
S. M., A. R. T. Muhi and C. F. Gonzales-Olalia, ‘Legitimizing the Illegitimate: Disregarding the Rule 
of Law in Estrada v. Desierto and Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo,’ Public Policy VII, No. 1, January to 




was elected for a full six-year term in 2004. The chapter focuses on Arroyo’s 
engagement with the U.S. government-led ‘global war on terror,’ which she actively 
invoked during the period under study.  The second Arroyo chapter, Chapter 9, covers 
the rest of the Arroyo SONAs, that is, from 2005 to 2009, and focuses on Arroyo’s 
assertion of legitimacy after a damaging political crisis hit her presidency in mid-
2005.  
In this chapter, I argue that as Arroyo tried to respond to global concerns such 
as the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, she had worked to 
recontextualize through her presidential addresses the discourse on ‘global war on 
terror’ in order to make it relevant and integral to the national agenda that she had set 
when she assumed power in January 2001.  At the same time, I examine how this 
recontextualization worked to legitimize her hold of power especially during her 
successor term. 
The SONAs especially from 2002 to 2004 were delivered during the time 
when Arroyo invoked the country’s engagement in the U.S. government-led global 
war on terror. The term ‘war on terror’ can be seen as both metaphorical and 
ideographic.71 The idea of waging a battle against something that is abstract (terror or 
terrorism) is metaphorical in that it indicates the conceptual metaphor TERROR IS AN 
                                                 
71 It must be noted that some of the examples of ideographs mentioned by McGee (1980/2000) and 
other scholars who have adopted McGee’s framework (e.g., Cloud 2004, Condit and Lucaites 1993) are 
themselves metaphorical. These include ‘freedom of speech,’ ‘rule of law,’ (McGee 1980; Condit and 
Lucaites 1993) and ‘clash of civilizations’ (Cloud 2004). These examples show that notions such as 
‘speech,’ ‘law,’ and ‘civilization’ go through the process of reification or personification (i.e., SPEECH 
IS AN OBJECT; LAW IS A GOVERNING POWER; CIVILIZATION IS A COMBATANT) which causes semantic 
tension (Charteris-Black 2005, 20).  On the other hand, the constant use or deployment of such terms as 
‘freedom of speech,’ ‘rule of law,’ and ‘clash of civilizations’ in public discourse by those who wield it 
(i.e., politicians, judges, the media, the academia) naturalizes their reproduction, circulation, and 




ENEMY IN COMBAT72 or more broadly TERROR IS A PERSON where the abstract term 
‘terror’ is understood through another domain of experience or through 
personification.  But the recurring use of the term ‘war on terror’ in political rhetoric 
has made it ‘ordinary’ but at the same time significantly associated with a ‘collective 
commitment’ to normative goals such as ‘peace,’ ‘political stability’ or ‘protection 
and defense of freedom’; hence, I consider it ideographic.73  
The ideograph ‘war on terror’ has been recontextualized in so many ways.74 
Metaphors can be a means to recontextualize ideographs like ‘war on terror.’ They 
create, extend or revise meanings that are associated with such terms. For instance, 
when former U.S. President George W. Bush declared ‘war on terror’ after the 
September 11 attacks, he associated the phrase with a ‘crusade.’ Arroyo in one of her 
SONAs regarded the ‘domestic war against terrorism’ as an enhancer of ‘international 
visibility.’ These vehicles or source domains help recontextualize the phrase ‘war on 
                                                 
72 In this paper, I adopt Charteris-Black’s (2004) definition of conceptual metaphor as ‘a statement that 
resolves the tension of a set of metaphors by showing them to be related’ (p. 21). By employing this 
category, the analyst makes explicit the target and source domains (A is B) that underlie a set of 
metaphorical expressions spread within or across texts. 
 The conceptual metaphor TERROR IS AN ENEMY IN COMBAT which I argue underlies the 
metaphorical expression ‘war on terror’ is also realized in expressions as ‘our republic’s efforts to fight 
terror and enforce peace’, ‘by breaking the back of terrorism and criminality’ (Arroyo 2002) and ‘we 
have hit hard on terrorism’ (Arroyo, 2003) 
 
73 The catchphrase ‘war on terror’ which has been widely circulated after the 11 September 2001 
attacks in the United States (mostly through statements by the administration of United States President 
George W. Bush as well as through major global media networks) has undeniably contributed to the 
refashioning of political communication in the new century.  
The ‘war on terror’ discourse asserts the U.S. responsibility in spreading the values of 
freedom, liberty, and democracy, which puts it on a high moral plane capable of imposing itself on 
other sovereign states (see for instance articles of Lazar and Lazar, 2007; Cloud, 2004; Erjavec and 
Volčič, 2007).  
 
74 Erjavec and Volčič (2007) provide an interesting addition to the discourse on ‘war on terror’ when 
they assert that the discourse is actually appropriated and recontextualized in local settings.  
Specifically, they analyze how young Serbian intellectuals ‘employ, borrow and appropriate’ G.W. 
Bush’s ‘war on terrorism’ to understand the impact of G.W. Bush’s ‘war on terrorism’ discourse on the 





terror’ to justify policies like military attacks against Afghanistan and Iraq or the 
Oplan Bantay Laya, the Arroyo government’s counter-terrorism program in the 
Philippines. Needless to say, they are also attempts to influence how their respective 
publics should view their government policies. Political speeches like the SONAs 
then are sites where such recontextualization can take place. 
Recontextualized ideographs, that is, ideographs re-fashioned through 
metaphors, inevitably influence any attempt at legitimizing and de-legitimizing 
political leadership. They contribute to political mythmaking—the creation of a 
narrative unfolded by the rhetor or speaker which may be a continuation and 
reaffirmation of an already existing, powerful myth or a subversion of it.75 In other 
words, the configurations of ideographs and metaphors in political texts and talk work 
toward the creation of myths necessary in asserting, legitimizing or fostering public 
support for political leadership.  In the case of Arroyo, whose rise to the Philippine 
presidency had been hounded by questions of legitimacy, and who succeeded a 
presidency built on populist rhetoric, it had been a struggle to present an alternative 
myth that would legitimize her political leadership.  
As in the previous analytical chapters, Chapter 8 looks at how the four themes 
of democracy, national economy, peace and security, and the presidency/ executive 
leadership are conceptualized across the four Arroyo SONAs and how these 
conceptualizations are realized in metaphorical and/or lexico-grammatical 
                                                 
75 Myth is used here in the sense that Charteris-Black employed it in his book (2004). He adopts 
Cassirer’s (1946) concept of the mythmaking in modern societies. He notes that ‘mythmaking – 
accompanied by the use of incantations, slogans, neologisms and semantic distortions – has become an 
extremely sophisticated, self-conscious activity which makes use of the most advanced techniques 
available to manufacture and circulate the product’ (Charteris-Black, 2004, 209). It may be construed 
then that mythmaking in our times is a form of commodification in the realm of politics, something that 




expressions. These conceptualizations together with other rhetorical strategies in the 
texts are examined based on how they substantiate Arroyo’s recontextualization of the 
‘war on terror’ discourse.  The following table outlines the conceptual frames 
generated from the textual analyses of the Arroyo SONAs from 2001 to 2004: 
 
 
Table 8.1 Conceptual Frames in Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s SONAs (2001-2004) 
 
Section Theme Conceptual Frames 
8.3 Democracy   DEMOCRACY IS A WEAPON  
 DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF 
THREAT 
 DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL 
FAITH THAT THE FILIPINOS HAVE 
FOUGHT FOR 
8.4 National economy  THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A 
MANIFESTATION OF NATIONAL 
LIFE 
8.5 Peace and security  CRIMINALITY AND TERRORISM 
ARE PARASITES/ DISEASES 
 CRIMINALS ARE TERRORISTS 
 REBELS ARE CRIMINALS 
 ‘WAR ON TERROR’ IS A CURATIVE 
TO REBELLION AND CRIMINALITY 
 STATE POLICIES ARE 
INSTRUMENTS OF WAR ON 
TERROR IN THE PHILIPPINES 
8.6 The presidency  A STRONG REPUBLIC IS AN 
EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT IN 
NATION BUILDING 
 THE GOVERNMENT IS THE ARM OF 
A STRONG REPUBLIC 





A historical milieu of the Arroyo presidency from 2001 to 2004 is provided 
below in order to situate the speeches in their historical context and to contextualize 




8.2 Historical milieu of the Gloria Macapagal Arroyo presidency (2001-2004) 
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was catapulted to power after the ouster of President 
Joseph Ejercito Estrada through a peaceful people’s uprising now known as the EDSA 
People Power 2.  She was sworn in to office as the country’s 14th president on January 
20, 2001, the day when the Supreme Court declared the presidency vacant.  Her early 
months as president were hounded by questions on the legitimacy of her assumption 
to power.  On May 1, 2001, several days after Philippine prosecutors arrested former 
President Estrada for charges of plunder, the Arroyo administration faced one of its 
toughest challenges.  As they marched to Malacañang, thousands of supporters of 
ousted President Estrada demanded his release and reinstatement.  What was regarded 
as a violent protest of Estrada supporters was quelled when Arroyo declared a state of 
rebellion that led to the arrest of a number of protesters and leaders of the opposition.  
The state of rebellion was lifted a few days later.  The results of the midterm elections 
conducted in the same month proved favorable to the Arroyo administration.  In her 
first State of the Nation Address, she called for an end to political bickering and 
presented her agenda to win the war against poverty. To win this ‘war,’ Arroyo 
offered the following: ‘economic philosophy of free enterprise appropriate for the 21st 
century,’ ‘a modernized agriculture sector founded on social equity,’ ‘social bias 
towards the disadvantaged,’ and improved ‘moral standards of government and 
society.’ 
Before the end of 2001, Arroyo was one of the first heads of state to support 
the U.S. policy of ‘war against terror.’  She would later claim to be the first national 
leader to establish the connection between ‘war against terror’ and ‘war against 
poverty.’  The policy of war against international terrorism would be reinforced by 
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U.S.-Philippine military joint exercises in Southern Philippines, near the stronghold of 
the Abu Sayyaf group, which is said to have links to Al Qaeda. Her adherence to the 
global war against terror would be underscored in her second SONA in 2002.  She 
incorporated such commitment in her vision to build a ‘strong republic’ during her 
term.  Despite exerting her best efforts to steer the country towards economic 
development, Arroyo sincerity remained in question.  Pundits observed and criticized 
her ‘weather vane’ character and her apparent ‘over-eagerness to be elected in 2004.’  
 On December 30, 2002, Arroyo announced in a speech at the Rizal Shrine in 
Baguio City that she would no longer run for the 2004 presidential elections:  ‘I have 
decided not to run for President during the election of 2004.   If I were to run, it will 
require a major political effort on my part. But since I’m among the principal figures 
in the divisive national events for the last two or three years, my political efforts can 
only result in never-ending divisiveness.’ Her plummeting popularity in the surveys 
went up after her famed declaration. 
On July 27, 2003, a day before she delivered her third SONA, Arroyo faced 
another rebellion.  This time, more than three hundred renegade junior officers and 
soldiers of the armed forces staged a mutiny and seized a hotel and a shopping mall in 
the business district of Makati City.  After twenty-two hours of negotiation, which 
included a televised warning from the President, the soldiers surrendered peacefully to 
government forces.  The President later formed a commission to investigate the 
mutiny.76 
In the same year, she changed her earlier decision not to run for the 2004 
presidential election.  She explained that her supporters had clamored that she run for 
                                                 





a second term.  The highly contested election of 2004 was viewed as an opportunity 
for Arroyo to gain a fresh mandate that would dissipate questions on the legitimacy of 
her first term.   
On June 24, 2004, Congress declared Arroyo as winner of the May 2004 
presidential elections, beating her closest rival, popular actor Fernando Poe, Jr., with a 
margin of one million votes.  Her victory was, however, marred by accusations that 
she cheated her way to the presidency.  The strong accusations would temporarily 
take back seat when the Iraq hostage crisis involving Filipino driver Angelo dela Cruz 
ensued less than a month later.  Dela Cruz’s was taken hostage by a terrorist group in 
Iraq, who demanded the Philippine government to withdraw its small Filipino 
contingent from the Arab country in exchange for the life and freedom of the Filipino 
driver.  The contingent was scheduled to withdraw in August of the same year.  This 
situation was viewed as a test of Arroyo’s adherence to the global war against terror.  
At the same time, she was torn between having to please her countrymen at home and 
the members of the international coalition fighting against international terrorism.  In 
the end, she ordered the withdrawal of the Filipino troops from Iraq amid criticism 
from the United States, Australia and other members of the coalition.  In her 2004 
SONA, she found the opportunity to justify her decision. 
 
8.3 Democracy 
In a span of four SONAs, Arroyo made mention of the term ‘democracy’ only 
a few times—six times to be exact.  In her inaugural SONA in 2001, Arroyo alluded 
to ‘democracy’ as part of the historical recounting in the introduction of her speech.  
The recounting rehearsed the conceptualization that DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL 
ACHIEVEMENT (q.v. Chapter 5.3.2) by expressing that ‘Filipinos peacefully reclaimed 
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their civil liberties in the people power revolution’ and that they ‘reaffirmed [their] 
commitment to freedom and democracy…with hardly a drop of blood shed or a shot 
fired in anger’ (1).  The expressions may be seen as re-articulations of Corazon 
Aquino’s discourse on democracy and freedom. 
 
1. In 1986 Filipinos peacefully reclaimed their civil liberties in the people 
power revolution.  Under the leadership of Corazon Aquino, we reaffirmed 
our commitment to freedom and democracy on a mere stretch of 
highway—with hardly a drop of blood shed or a shot fired in anger. (2001)  
 
 
A similar re-articulation of Aquino’s discourse is evidenced in Arroyo’s speech in 
2004—her inaugural SONA after she was elected for a full presidential term. In 
Filipino, she re-expressed the conceptualization that PEOPLE POWER IS A MEANS TO 
REINFORCE DEMOCRACY (q.v. Chapter 5.3.3).  Arroyo used the metaphor ‘puso’ 
(heart) to conceptualize people power, suggesting that it is the latter that sustains or 
reinforces democracy (2).  The corporeal metaphorization of people power and 
democracy also implies a related conceptualization, that is, DEMOCRACY IS A LIFE-
SUSTAINING SYSTEM, which was very much developed in the Aquino rhetoric (q.v. 
Chapter 5.3.4).  This is also articulated in (3), which suggests that democracy serves 
as a benefactor of the nation in that it is supposed to provide blessings (‘ang biyaya ng 
demokrasya’) to the people.  It should be noted that, in extracts 2 and 3 below, the 
Filipino language is employed to express the metaphorizations of democracy.  Such 
may have been been the case in order to highlight democracy’s significance to the 
ordinary Filipino people—the ‘taong bayan’ or ‘mamamayan.’  In Arroyo’s words, 
they make democracy work by being the ‘puso ng demokrasya’ and they ought to 
benefit from the ‘biyaya ng demokrasya.’  The Filipino metaphorizations somehow 
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make the abstraction of democracy more relevant and perhaps, comprehensible to the 
masses. 
 
2. Ang kapangyarihan ng taong bayan ay puso ng demokrasya.  Dapat 
kasama sila sa paghugis ng kanilang kapalaran. (Trans. The power of the 
people is the heart of democracy. They should be part in shaping their 
destiny.) (2004) 
 
3. Ipinapangako ko ang isang bagong direksyon: mamamayan muna.  Ang 
taong bayan ang pinakamalaki nating yaman. Ngunit madalas, kaunti lang 
ang atensyon na binibigay sa kanilang pag-unlad.  Di tuloy matawid ang 
agwat ng mayaman at mahirap.  Di tuloy mapa-abot sa lahat ang biyaya ng 
demokrasya. (Trans. I promise a new direction: the people first.  The 
people are our biggest resource.  But most of the time, little attention is 
given to their development.  This is the reason the gap between the rich 
and the poor is not bridged. This  is the reason the blessings of democracy 
is not given to everyone.) (2004)  
 
 
What emerges as relevant to the central argument of this chapter, though, are 
the other expressions on democracy found in Arroyo’s SONAs from 2002 to 2004.  
They may not appear very salient in the presidential speeches, but they fortify 
Arroyo’s recontextualization of the ‘war on terror’ discourse.  In these extracts 
Arroyo employed interrelated conceptualizations vital to her recontextualization of 
‘the global war on terror’:  DEMOCRACY IS A WEAPON, DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT 
OF THREAT, and DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL FAITH THAT THE FILIPINO HAS 
FOUGHT FOR.  The first two conceptualizations are expressed in Arroyo’s SONA 
delivered in 2002.  She said:     
 
4. Criminal syndicates will be treated as what they are, direct threats to 
national security.  Criminals are criminals, whether of the common kind or 
the kind that kills in the name of political advocacies.  They will feel the 
brunt of the arsenal of democracy.  Freedom, too, is entitled to self-





In extract 4, which would be further discussed in the peace and security section, 
Arroyo used the phrase ‘arsenal of democracy’ to suggest how criminals—‘whether 
of the common kind or the kind that kills in the name of political advocacies’—would 
be dealt with in her administration.  The phrase ‘arsenal of democracy’ implies that 
democracy can be used as a weapon—and Arroyo might have been referring to 
existing programs and policies as well as future laws that she was insistent on passing 
(e.g. Human Securities Act of 2007) that sanctioned the use of hard power or the 
militarist solution to deal not only with ordinary crime (‘of the common kind’) but 
also of ideologically driven rebellion (‘the kind that kills in the name of political 
advocacies’). The last line, ‘Freedom, too, is entitled to self-defense’ implies that 
DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF THREAT, which justifies the use of weaponry 
(‘arsenal’) and protective mechanism (‘self-defense’) to combat the perceived threat 
(‘criminals’) against ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy.’ 
  That democracy is AN OBJECT OF THREAT is also underscored in the 
following extract where it serves as a conjunct of the term ‘security.’  In the extract, 
both ‘democracy’ and ‘security’ are expressed as regional concerns.  It should be 
noted that in the U.S.-led discourse on war on terror, both ‘democracy’ and ‘security’ 
had been used to justify the United States’ preemptive strikes and its exertion of 
military power in the Middle East after the September 11 attacks.  Securitization of 
national as well as regional territories from terrorist activities as well as the spread of 
democracy had been used by the United States government to rationalize the 
employment of arms to combat groups identified by the U.S. State Department as 
terrorist organizations and the building of U.S. arsenals in strategic locations around 
the globe.  This appears to be recontextualized by Arroyo in the following extract, 




5. We have reached out to good friends and neighbors—such as Prime 
Minister Mahathir of Malaysia, and President Megawati of Indonesia—
with the message that we must work together especially where democracy 
and security are concerned. (2003) 
 
 
The defense of freedom is also expressed in the following extract where Arroyo 
declared the Philippines’ commitment to ‘democracy’ after the Philippine troops were 
pulled out from Iraq in order to save the life of kidnapped Filipino driver Angelo dela 
Cruz. The extract underlies the conceptualization that DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL 
FAITH THAT THE FILIPINO HAS FOUGHT FOR.  That democracy is a national faith is 
expressed in the clause ‘we are strong and principled believers of democracy’ and that 
this faith has been fought for by the Filipino can be seen in the statement that follows. 
In the same extract, terms such as ‘totalitarians’ and ‘terrorists’ are used to name the 
object against which the ‘fight’ or the ‘struggle’ is pursued. These terms refer to the 
‘threats’ in the discourse of global war on terror and their use in Arroyo’s speech 
establishes that in spite of the highly contested pull-out of the Philippine contingent 
from Iraq, the Philippines would continue to pursue the anti-terrorism track, 
especially because it had the historical record to back up this claim.   
 
6. As the leader of the nation, I say in behalf of the Filipino people to the 
world: we are strong and principled believers in democracy.  Four 
generations of fighting Filipinos have ceaselessly struggled against 
totalitarians and terrorists, for our freedom, for the freedom of our people 
and the people of the world. (2004) 
 
 
By metaphorizing democracy as an object of threat and ‘a national faith’ that defends 
itself against threat through the state-sanctioned use of hard power, Arroyo appeared 
to be pursuing a track similar to that of then U.S. President George W. Bush who in 
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his first speech after the 9/11 attacks declared with forthrightness that the ‘war against 
terrorism’ was a ‘crusade’ to be waged.  
 
8.4 National economy 
The way Arroyo framed the national economy was similar to how Aquino 
framed it more than fifteen years earlier.  Like Aquino, Arroyo employed the 
conceptual frame THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A MANIFESTATION OF NATIONAL 
LIFE (q.v. Chapter 5.4).  While similarities may be found in the way Arroyo and 
Aquino developed this frame in their respective national addresses, there are also 
noticeable differences.  This may be due to the differences in global as well as 
national contexts of the two presidencies.  The following conceptualizations constitute 
Arroyo’s use of the frame:  
 
  (8.4.1) THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A LIVING ENTITY CONFRONTED BY 
POVERTY AND AFFLICTED BY CHRONIC DEFICIT 
(8.4.2) THE WAR AGAINST POVERTY IDEOLOGY IS THE FORMULA TO 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
(8.4.3)    (GLOBAL) WAR ON TERROR IS (THE PHILIPPINE) WAR ON POVERTY 
(8.4.4)   TOUGH LOVE IS A CURATIVE TO CHRONIC DEFICITS 
 
 
8.4.1 THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A LIVING ENTITY CONFRONTED BY POVERTY 
AND AFFLICTED BY CHRONIC DEFICIT 
Arroyo conceptualized the Philippine society in general and the national 
economy in particular as a living entity confronted with a very serious problem on the 
one hand, and afflicted with a ‘chronic illness’ on the other.  In Arroyo’s frame, both 
problematic situations necessitate interventions from the government—one that is 
communicated in militarist terms and another that communicated as a corrective or 
curative measure.  
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Arroyo’s conceptualization of the national economy as a living entity 
confronted by a serious problem that requires initiative and strategies is evidenced by 
her use of the catchphrase ‘war against poverty,’ similar to that which her 
predecessors used to communicate their anti-poverty agenda (q.v. Chapter 6.2.3 and 
Chapter 7.2.1).  The seriousness and gravity of poverty as a national problem is 
expressed in the extracts below.  In extract (7), poverty is metaphorized as a state of 
confinement (‘imprisoned by poverty’) and a plague (‘salot ng kahirapan’), terms 
which suggest how constricting and widespread it is as a national concern.  Extract (8) 
instantiates the use of the phrase ‘war on poverty’ which suggests that initiatives and 
strategies have been developed in order to address the serious problem of poverty. 
These initiatives and strategies signaled by the term ‘war’ are discussed in Section 
8.4.2. 
 
7. Last May One, the poor raised their voices in anger and their fists in fury.  
Imprisoned in poverty, shackled to shame, denied justice in society, they 
personally delivered the message that, 100 years after they revolted to 
establish this nation, they had yet to partake in the national dream.  
  Dinig na dinig ko ang pahayag nila at napakumbaba ako.  Hindi ba’t 
nasa balikat ko ang tungkuling mamuno sa pakikibaka laban sa salot ng 
kahirapan? Ako na siyang anak ng tinawag na ‘poor boy from Lubao’? 
(Trans.  I could clearly hear what they are saying, and I was humbled.  
Isn’t it that I carry on my shoulders the responsibility to lead the struggle 
against the plague of poverty? I, the daughter of the man called ‘the poor 
boy from Lubao’?) (2001)  
 
8. We cannot afford to lose. Even a stalemate will be defeat. For what is at 
stake is our country as a viable proposition in the world economy. And we 




On the other hand, Arroyo’s conceptualization of the nation as a living entity 




9. For a country to be as good as it can get, many of the right decisions are 
tough decisions.  I have made some of the toughest.  And I will make even 
more tough decisions in the year to come.  Because the easy way out may 
be to postpone the pain but only prolong the problem (2002). 
 
10. Iyon ang aking sinabi nang naluklok ako bilang pangulo noong 2001. 
Sinabi ko noon na panahon na ng paghilom sa ating lipunan (Trans. That 
was what I said, when I became president in 2001. I said then that it is time 
to heal our society.) (2003). 
 




In the extracts, Arroyo talked of ‘pain’ (7, 9) and healing (‘paghilom’)77 (8) of the 
society, words that point to the metaphorical view of the national society as a living 
entity suffering from a poor health condition.  These lexical choices establish that THE 
NATION IS AN ILL PERSON, a conceptual metaphor that makes use of a source domain 
(A PERSON’S STATE OF HEALTH) also employed by Arroyo when discussing the 
national economy.  For instance, she would describe the nation’s economic problems 
like the budget deficit as ‘chronic,’ and refer to economic progress as ‘growth’ which 
can ‘slow down.’78 Hence, the conceptual metaphor THE NATION IS AN ILL PERSON 
can also be translated as THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS AN ILL PERSON, which is 
notably similar to Aquino’s conceptualizations of the same target domains.  
 The ill-stricken national economy is illustrated in the following extract from 
Arroyo’s 2004 SONA.  In the extract, Arroyo described the budget deficit as the 
‘most urgent problem’ of the country. She established its urgency by metaphorizing 
the budget deficit as a debilitating and fatal disease—‘chronic,’ ‘can slow down 
                                                 
77 The word ‘paghilom’ is especially noteworthy as it often collocates with the word ‘sugat’ (wound) 
when used in discourses in Filipino. Its use therefore suggests a recuperation of the national body in 
order for it to function normally and properly. 
 
78 This is most evident in the President’s SONA in 2004, which marked the beginning of her term as 




growth [if vigorously stamped out],’‘can kill the economy’ if ignored, and ‘drastically 
reduce[s] government’s ability to make [investments needed for growth and job 
creation].’ It can also prove detrimental to the nation at large (‘a surefire formula for 
national failure’).   
 
12. Our most urgent problem is the budget deficit. Sometimes it’s 
unavoidable; but chronic deficits are always bad.  
Sometimes stamping deficits too vigorously can slow down growth, 
but ignoring them can kill the economy. It sends the wrong signal that we 
don’t understand our fiscal predicament and will not help ourselves. This 
will drive away investments, exacerbate the deficit and hurt job growth.  
Chronic deficits drastically reduce government’s ability to make 
those infrastructure investments that business needs to grow and create 
jobs.   
Chronic deficits mean undertaking less social services that private 
charity will never provide but without which social war is inevitable.  This 
is a sure fire formula for national failure. (2004) 
 
To Arroyo, the corrective and curative intervention for the budget deficit experienced 
by the national economy is the ‘tough love’ formula which is discussed in section 
8.4.3. 
8.4.2 THE WAR AGAINST POVERTY IDEOLOGY IS THE FORMULA TO ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT  
 In her first SONA, Arroyo spelled out the ‘tasks’ in ‘winning the war against 
poverty within the decade.’ In the following extracts, she outlined the four elements in 
the struggle against poverty (‘apat na element ng pakikibaka sa kahirapan’) which she 
also described as ‘mga sandata natin sa digmaang-bayan laban sa kahirapan’ (Trans. 
‘our weapons in our national war against poverty’).  Clearly, these militarist 
metaphorical expressions (‘pakikibaka’ or struggle, ‘sandata’ or weapons, ‘digmaang-
bayan’ or national war) were meant to communicate the seriousness of the 




13. When I became President last January, I told the people about my vision of 
winning the war against poverty within a decade. 
To succeed, the template of our national agenda must revolve 
around four components—apat na elemento ng pakikilaban sa kahirapan 
(trans. four elements in the struggle against poverty). 
The first is an economic philosophy of free enterprise appropriate 
to the 21st century. Pagnenegosyo upang dumami ang trabaho (trans. Free 
enterprise in order to increase jobs).  Not a pitiless free-for-all but free 
enterprise with social conscience. 
The second component is a modernized agricultural sector founded 
on social equity. Palalaguin ang kita at ani ng maralitang tagabukid (trans. 
Increasing the income and harvest of the poor farmers.) 
The third component is a social bias toward the disadvantaged to 
balance our economic development plan. Pagkalinga sa mga bahagi ng 
lipunan na naiiwanan ng kaunlaran (trans. Caring for those sectors of 
society who have been left out by development.). 
And the fourth component is to raise the moral standards of 
government and society. Moralidad sa gobyerno at lipunan bilang saligan 
ng tunay na kaunlaran (trans. Morality in government and society as the 
pillar of genuine development.). 
Pagnenegosyo, pagpapaunlad ng agrikultura, kalinga sa nagigipit 
na sector, at moralidad sa gobyerno at lipunan—ito ang mga sandata natin 
sa digmaang-bayan laban sa kahirapan. (Trans. Free enterprise, modern 
agriculture, social bias towards the disadvantaged sector, and morality in 




Arroyo went on to say that she had organized her ‘interpretation of the state of the 
nation along these four components of our national anti-poverty ideology.’ In her 
discussion, she provided details on how her government intended to pursue each 
component, what her targets were for the year, and her legislative agenda.79  
                                                 
79 For instance, in describing the first component which is the economic philosophy for the 21st century, 
Arroyo sets the following formula: ‘Under this philosophy, the way to fight poverty is to create jobs, 
not destroy them.  To create jobs, we will attract investments. To attract investments, we will attend to 
macro-measures and concerns.’ In addressing the macro-measures and concerns, Arroyo focused on 
long-term structural issues: reforming the power sector, infrastructure, productivity, and savings rate. 
For each structural issue, Arroyo provided more details. In focusing on infrastructure, for example, 
Arroyo stated that her government will ‘harness the private sector via the built-operate transfer law.’ 
On the issue of productivity, Arroyo declared that her government would minimize bottlenecks such as 
high cost of power, deterrents to investments in agriculture, overly confrontational labor-management 
relations, and corruption and red tape at the national and local government levels. On these bottlenecks, 
she declared the implementation of the Power Sector Reform Law to reduce the cost of power, enact a 
law making farm land acceptable as loan collateral, work with labor and business to retrain workers for 
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Interestingly, in explicating the details of her ‘economic philosophy for the 
21st century,’ Arroyo explicitly acknowledged the United State’s ‘economic and 
military power’ as an important factor in the economic affairs of the Philippines. 
Stated less than two months before the September 11 attacks in the United States and 
before the launching of the ‘global war on terror,’ the declaration below reaffirmed 
that Arroyo’s economic policies were tied to the global economic affairs implying the 
conceptualization THE WORLD ECONOMY AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AT 
LARGE IS THE LIFE SOURCE OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY (q.v. Chapter 5.3.4).   
 
14. The strength of the financial and fiscal sectors partly lies in how we use 
the realities in the global and regional environment to our benefit.  Thus, 
we will enhance our relations with the United States, whose economic and 
military power continues to make it important as a factor in the affairs of 
the region and in the nation.  We will also strengthen bilateral economic 
and political relations with Japan, our biggest source of development 
assistance and a major trading partner. And more and more, we will design 
foreign policy and foreign trade policy in the context of ASEAN.  
 
 
Expressions such as ‘how we use the realities in the global and regional environment 
to our benefit’ and ‘our relations with the United States, whose economic and military 
power makes it important as a factor in the affairs of the region and in the nation’ 
suggest that the international environment and relations are resources for national 
strength, thereby realizing said conceptualization.   
8.4.3 (GLOBAL) WAR ON TERROR IS (THE PHILIPPINE) WAR ON POVERTY 
In July 2002, months after the September 11 attacks and after the George W. 
Bush administration launched the ‘global war on terror,’ Arroyo declared in her 
                                                                                                                                            
the fast-changing technologies of the new economy, strengthening the Presidential Anti-Graft 
Commission, full-computerization of the elections, cut in half the number of signatures required for 
service in government agencies, streamline operations and slash red tape in local governments, etc. The 




second SONA that she was ‘the first head of government to emphasize the 
interconnection between war against terrorism and the war against poverty.’  The full 
declaration on the ‘interconnection’ runs, thus: 
 
15. As a result of our decisive action after September 11, the Philippines is 
now a recognized player in world affairs. The President of the Philippines 
was the first head of government to emphasize the interconnection 
between the war against terrorism and the war against poverty.  Now, 
nations large and small embrace this interconnection. 
We have gained powerful allies in our domestic war against terrorism.  
I am certain that our increased international visibility will continue 
generating capital inflows for the Philippines. (2002) 
 
 
The declaration ran parallel to Arroyo’s pre-9/11 statement (extract 14) on the link 
(‘interconnection’) between the national economy and the global economic affairs 
including the assertion of United States economic and military interests.  Two related 
conceptualizations can be generated, thus, from this Arroyo formulation—one 
specific and the other broad: THE (GLOBAL) WAR AGAINST TERRORISM IS THE 
(PHILIPPINE) WAR AGAINST POVERTY and GLOBAL IS LOCAL. The first appears to 
have been used to pitch the need to engage in the Bush administration-led global war 
on terror while the second rehearses the conceptualization having to do with the link 
between world and national economies. In the extract above, Arroyo expressed the 
first conceptualization by saying that the Philippine engagement in war against 
terrorism (‘our domestic war against terrorism’) had led to ‘increased international 
visibility.’ It appears that in Arroyo’s national economic frame, ‘international 
visibility’ is supposedly good for national economy as it generates ‘capital inflows for 
the Philippines.’ If we refer back to Arroyo’s 2001 SONA, she considered generating 
‘capital inflows’ necessary for job creation, which falls under her ‘economic 
philosophy of free enterprise appropriate for the 21st century,’ the first component of 
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her anti-poverty ideology or ‘war against poverty.’  Curiously, however, the 
conceptualization also makes a more explicit pitch in adopting the militarist approach 
in the pursuit of national economic development. By suggesting that the war on 
terrorism translates to war on poverty, Arroyo not only justified the country’s 
engagement in the global war on terror, she also suggested that the use of hard power 
or the military element was necessary in making her national economic agenda work. 
That THE WAR ON TERROR IS THE WAR ON POVERTY may also be seen as anchored on 
the broader conceptualization THE GLOBAL IS LOCAL, a restatement of the 
conceptualization THE WORLD ECONOMY IS A LIFE SOURCE OF THE NATIONAL 
ECONOMY mentioned earlier.  This broad conceptualization—GLOBAL IS LOCAL—
suggests that international engagements can be seen in local terms (e.g., the global 
war terror in terms of the ‘domestic war on terrorism’) so that they remain relevant 
and relatable to the national audience.  
The related conceptualizations are also evident in the following extract that 
shows how vital winning the ‘war against terrorism’ is to the Philippines as ‘viable 
proposition’ in the world economy and its ‘war against poverty.’  
 
16. We cannot afford to lose.  Even a stalemate will be defeat.  For what is at 
stake is our country as a viable proposition in the world economy.  And we 




The statement was made in the context of the Arroyo government’s accomplishments 
in its domestic war against terrorism (i.e., the capture of the mastermind in the 
bombings in Southern Philippines, also considered ‘the number one expert terrorist 
bomber’).  In the extract, Arroyo established that national accomplishments in the war 
on terrorism contribute to the Philippines’ position as an important participant in the 
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global affairs (‘a viable proposition in the world economy’).  The expression ‘viable 
proposition’ brings to mind the earlier expressions such as ‘international visibility’ 
and ‘a recognized player in world affairs’ which, to Arroyo, were necessary in order 
for the Philippines to compete for investments in the free market global economy and 
consequently work towards reducing, or ‘fighting,’ the incidence of poverty in the 
country. 
8.4.4 TOUGH LOVE IS A CORRECTIVE/ CURATIVE ACTION TO ADDRESS THE 
PROBLEM OF CHRONIC DEFICITS  
In her 2004 SONA, Arroyo employed the phrase ‘tough love’—a phrase that 
suggests parental concern or maternal love—to refer to measures that her government 
deemed necessary to address the chronic budget deficit.  The ‘tough love’ formula 
involved a combination of alternatives such as an increase in revenue collection, 
expansion of government services and cost-cutting measures to cure the ‘chronic’ 
economic illness posed by the budget deficit. Also proposed were measures expressed 
in lexical terms that connote physical change: 
 
17. We have to tear away layers of inefficiency piled by decades of political 
accommodation: redundancy in the national service, waste in local 
governments, and pointless procedures for getting done what isn’t needed 
anyway to secure the public welfare (2004). 
 
18. We will downsize the government, motivate excess employees to become 
entrepreneurs, and increase the pay of a lean and mean bureaucracy 
(2004). 
 
These proposed measures are summed up in the following statement that 
expresses the formula’s asymmetrical relationship between the ‘tough’ government 
and other constituents of the national body, who are expected to exhibit ‘patience,’ to 
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‘cooperate,’ and to actively ‘support’ the government decisions and proposed courses 
of action: 
 
19. All the solutions require: toughness on the part of the government, 
cooperation on the part of business, patience on the part of our people, and 
active support on the part of Congress (2004). 
 
 
8.5 Peace and security 
Expectedly, the ‘war on terror’ discourse was heavily employed when Arroyo 
discussed peace and security.  In her 2002 SONA, Arroyo declared that the ‘global 
anti-terrorist coalition is a historical watershed,’ which had helped the government 
‘immensely in finally breaking the cycle of terrorism and criminality.’  To the Arroyo 
administration, the global anti-terrorist coalition had helped enhance crime fighting 
and advance capabilities for national defense.80 Enhanced crime fighting and 
advanced capabilities for national defense were seen as prerequisites to making the 
country ‘a viable proposition’ in the world economy, which would consequently lead 
to winning the ‘war against poverty.’ 
8.5.1 CRIMINALITY AND TERRORISM ARE PARASITES/ DISEASES 
In Arroyo’s SONAs, criminality and terrorism were portrayed as undesirable 
or parasitical elements that needed to be removed or expunged from the (national) 
body by means of ‘elimination,’ ‘cleansing,’ ‘breaking the cycle,’ and ‘a 
comprehensive reform that cure[s].’ To Arroyo, their destruction is supposed to lead 
to a kind of stability conducive to economic growth.  
                                                 
 
80 The global anti-terror movement has also given the Arroyo government a reason to ‘enhance our 
strategic relationship with the United States through continuing training exercises to sharpen our 





20. We will start with the two biggest syndicates, the Bucala and Fajardo 
gangs.  I have challenged the Philippine National Police to eliminate them 
within a year. (2002) 
 
21. I have told you the PNP that they must start with the cleansing of their 
own ranks. (2002) 
 
22. This new global consensus helps us immensely in finally breaking the 
cycle of terrorism and criminality. (2002) 
 
23. I thank the national police for their solid support in yesterday’s crisis, and I 
am sure they themselves welcome a comprehensive reform that will cure 
the organization not only of the failures of the scale of the Al-Ghozi 
escape, but also the daily devils that are the kotong cops. (2003) 
 
 
Arroyo applied a similar treatment when describing the pervasiveness of the drug 
problem in the Philippine society.  In her 2003 speech, Arroyo used such Filipino 
terms as ‘malalim ang lagos’ and ‘bumabagtas’ – roughly translated as ‘run deeply’ 
and ‘traverse’ – which suggest a fluidal and creeping movement usually associated 
with a growing disease in the human body. 
 
24. Ang katiwaliang nilikha ng kalakal sa droga ay malalim ang lagos at 
bumabagtas sa lahat ng sector.  Dapat nating kapootan ang walang 
pakundangang pagsira sa buhay ng ating mga mamamayan na maaaring 
humantong sa pagkawasak ng ating mga institusyong demokratiko (Trans. 
The irregularities brought about by the drug trade run deeply and traverse 
all sectors. We should be infuriated by this senseless devastation of the 
lives of our citizens which may lead to the destruction of our democratic 
institutions.) (2003). 
 
The drug trade, like other forms of criminality, is clearly treated then as an illness that 
runs through the national body. 
8.5.2 CRIMINALS ARE TERRORISTS 
 Arroyo declared in her 2002 address that criminal syndicates will be treated as 
‘direct threats to national security.’  The declaration implied that criminal syndicates 
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would be treated as terrorists, thus, the conceptualization CRIMINALS ARE 
TERRORISTS.  This conceptualization warranted a more militarist approach to crime, 
especially what Arroyo identified as ‘criminal syndicates.’ The following extracts 
show a more militarist approach to criminality and terrorism.  ‘Breaking the back’ 
(25) and ‘breaking up’ (28) conjure systematic destruction while expressions such as 
‘hunting down’ (26), ‘watched, tracked and infiltrated’ (27), ‘mopping up’ (28) 
suggest a capture and kill approach associated with military operations.  
 
25. I am determined to build a strong republic by breaking the back 
of terrorism and criminality (2002). 
 
26. I have given very clear orders to spare nothing in hunting down kidnapers 
(2002). 
 
27. We are getting a clearer picture of the leadership, membership and area of 
operations of these syndicates. I now want their linkages and modus 
operandi.  I am overseeing how they are being watched, tracked and 
infiltrated (2002). 
 
28. We beat down crime, we are breaking up the drug and kidnapping 
syndicates, we are mopping up the stragglers.  The people are safer in the 
streets, in their homes, and in their places of work (2004). 
 
8.5.3 REBELS ARE CRIMINALS 
In the same speech, Arroyo also did not make a distinction between what she 
called criminals ‘of the common kind’ and rebel groups that have been fighting 
against the government for decades.  She said, ‘Criminals are criminals, whether of 
the common kind or the kind that kills in the name of political advocacies.  They will 
feel the full brunt of the arsenal of democracy.’ The statement underlies the 
conceptualization REBELS ARE CRIMINALS.  It is also clearly a justification of the 
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counter-insurgency program that the Arroyo government launched in January 2002.81  
What human rights groups have found questionable about this program is that it 
indiscriminately targets legal organizations suspected by the military as ‘front 
organizations’ for armed groups. 
The indiscriminate targeting of legal organizations by Arroyo’s counter-
insurgency program is also reflected in the indiscriminate use of the term ‘enemies of 
the republic.’ In 2002, Arroyo declared, ‘As commander in chief, I am taking a direct 
hand in the war against the enemies of the republic.’ The use of the term ‘enemies of 
the republic’ appears too broad and encompassing that it is possible to include 
anybody who was strongly against Arroyo’s policies. The term would necessarily then 
include those in the left of the political spectrum whose critical stance against the 
administration’s policies and programs was widely known.  
8.5.4 WAR ON TERROR IS A CURATIVE 
As suggested in Section 8.5.1, Arroyo did not only adopt the militarist 
metaphors when she employed the war on terror discourse to fight criminality and 
rebellion. She also recontextualized ‘war on terror’ as a curative to the national ills.  
In 2002, for instance, Arroyo declared, 
  
29. At stake in this war is the very life of society, the very possibility of basic 
rights and liberties, which have been under attack for a long time (2002). 
                                                 
81 The counter-insurgency plan is called ‘Oplan Bantay Laya’ (Operation Freedom Watch). Its strategic 
goal is to ‘decisively defeat insurgents (and) armed groups in order to attain and maintain peace and 
security for national development’ (Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace, 2006, p. 6).   
The primer by EMJP states that the program was ‘framed after the US ‘war on terror.’ The 
Arroyo administration received $4.6 billion in US military assistance for AFP. Added to this is the $30 
million allotted for ‘counter-terrorism’ trainings’ (p. 7).  It also added that the program was ‘patterned 
after US military strategy.  This included the utilization of propaganda to demonize as ‘terrorists’ those 
it considers as enemies; the conduct of intensive military operations using heavy weaponry to ‘shock 
and awe’ its enemies as well as suspected supporters from the civilian populace; the conduct of 
preemptive strikes and rendition or the abduction, torture, and/or killings of suspected ‘terrorists.’ 






That the national life depended on the ‘war on terror’ (referred to in the extract as 
‘this war’) suggest that the war has some health-giving value.  More so if we consider 
that the ‘attack’ alluded to emanated from those that keep the nation ill.  Earlier in the 
speech, the president characterized ‘criminal gangs and homegrown terrorists’ as 
spreading ‘poisons’ in the nation. She said: ‘Indeed, criminal gangs and homegrown 
terrorists have exploited the poisoned political atmosphere to spread poisons of their 
own: kidnapping, gambling, drug-dealing and rampant smuggling.’ Hence, pursuing 
the war on terror was like purging the ‘poisons’ from the national body; hence, the 
conceptualization WAR ON TERROR IS A CURATIVE.  
In 2003, Arroyo was particularly explicit about the curative or rehabilitative 
effects of invoking the help of the United States government – the major proponent of 
the ‘global war on terror’ – especially in resolving insurgency and rebellion in 
Southern Philippines.  She said: 
 
30. We will avail of the good offices of Malaysia in the search of a political 
solution to the conflict with the MILF, while looking to the help of the 
United States in the rehabilitation of conflict areas and the eradication of 
the roots of war. (2003) 
 
 
That the United States should help in the ‘rehabilitation’ of conflict areas and in the 
‘eradication of the roots of war’ signaled the Arroyo administration’s support for the 
joint military exercises between the Philippine and US governments in Southern 
Philippines, which after the September 11 attacks on US soil, came to be regarded as 
part of the framework of the global war on terror. 
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8.5.5 STATE POLICIES ARE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR ON TERROR IN THE 
PHILIPPINES 
It may be inferred that the strategic recontextualization of the discourse on 
‘war on terror’ (both as a means to combat criminality and as a cure to the national 
ills) worked to fortify the Arroyo administration’s policies with regard to peace and 
national security.  These state policies may be seen as the concrete means by which 
the global war on terror might be adopted in the national scale. They are the 
INSTRUMENTS OF WAR ON TERROR IN THE PHILIPPINES.   
In her 2002 SONA, for instance, Arroyo cited the ‘the reallocation of 
resources in [the] year’s budget to enhance the republic’s crime fighting capabilities.’ 
She justified this by providing statements that bolster the significant role of the police 
and the military and the government’s ‘tough’ resolve in ‘waging war against the 
enemies of the republic.’ Below are some of the statements praising the military and 
the police: 
 
31. This year, what used to be Camp Abubakar became an authentic 
community of new hopes and dreams where our flag flies and our soldiers 
protect those who have returned to their homes. (2002) 
 
32. We achieved all of these backed by the valor, professionalism, and 
restraint of our soldiers and police.  I salute our men and women in 
uniform, at the forefront of our republic’s efforts to fight terror and enforce 
peace. (2002) 
 
33. I salute the men and women of the police who scorned to be bribed and 
confiscated 500 kilograms of shabu in Quezon province last year, and 
caught the biggest fish so far in the drug trade. (2002) 
 
34. I salute the men and women who raided the shabu factories in Batangas, 
Zambales, San Juan, Varsity Hills, and other places, seizing a total of 5 
billion peso worth of illegal drugs and lab equipment in the largest drug 





By highlighting the effectiveness and competence of the military and the police 
personnel in fighting crime and terrorism, Arroyo showed how the reallocation of 
budget for the military and the police could potentially make crime fighting and the 
fighting against acts of terrorism more effective—a case of an a fortiori argument.  In 
this regard, the government policy of enhancing military and police resources was 
rendered as a significant instrument in making ‘war on terror’ work in the domestic 
front. 
Arroyo also endorsed the anti-terrorism bill (which was eventually ratified as 
the Human Securities Act of 2007). The bill was described as that which would 
‘strengthen our legal armory’ and ‘plug the loopholes by which crimes spread and 
democracy is undermined.’82 
Both the reallocation of budget for enhanced crime fighting capabilities and 
the eventual passage of the anti-terrorism bill may be seen as instrumental in the 
Philippine version of ‘war on terror.’  They also serve as evidence of how discourses 
are transformed into ‘more authoritative contexts’ or ‘non-negotiable materialities’ 
(Blackledge 2005).  They are the concrete manifestations, if not outcomes, of 
abstractions like the catchphrase ‘war on terror’ and serve as proof or evidence that 
discourses circulated and perpetrated by those in positions of power have impact on 
our socio-political reality.   
 
                                                 
82 The Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) comments that the law’s definition of terrorism is ‘vague, 
ambiguous and highly susceptible to abuse.’ Words and phrases as ‘widespread and extraordinary fear 
and panic’, ‘populace’, and ‘unlawful demand’ remain unclear. The FLAG asserts that, ‘With no 
objective standards to guide our law enforcers, the Human Security Act in effect bestows on our law 
enforcers the unfettered discretion to decide if a person is engaged in terrorism or conspiracy to commit 
terrorism. And that is very dangerous indeed’ (Diokno, 2007). 
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8.6 The presidency 
In 2002, Arroyo introduced the concept of the ‘strong republic’ which became 
a recurring theme in her succeeding addresses.  
The ‘strong republic’ is a spin off from a trope used by national hero Jose 
Rizal in one of his writings and echoed by President Diosdado Macapagal, Arroyo’s 
father, in his inaugural speech in 1961.83  It represents what Arroyo’s deems as the 
‘great ideal’ for the country, her vision for the future of the Philippines. 
8.6.1 THE STRONG REPUBLIC IS AN EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT IN NATION BUILDING  
In the 2002 SONA, the ‘strong republic’ easily clusters with such terms as 
‘edifice,’ ‘enduring structure,’ ‘fine stone,’ and ‘bedrock.’ Arroyo considers it her 
fitting contribution to nation-building, ‘the fine stone (she) should like to add to the 
edifice of our nation.’ In her own words, it is ‘the finest stone within (her) ability to 
shape’ and the ‘bedrock of victory from poverty.’   
The image of a sturdy, structure is accentuated and complicated by 
descriptions associating the strong republic with a living entity.  When Arroyo 
described it as having ‘independence from class and sectoral interests’ and having ‘a 
capacity, represented through strong institutions and a strong bureaucracy, to execute 
good policy and deliver essential services,’ it is given an agentive character.  More so, 
when the President said, ‘[a] strong republic does what it says. It takes care of the 
people and takes care of their future.’  On the one hand, the strong republic – enduring 
and resilient – may be Arroyo’s concept of a healthy nation-state. On the other hand, 
                                                 
 
83 In his 1961 inaugural address, President Diosdado Macapagal said, ‘Nation-building is an exacting 
and endless endeavor.  No president can build the whole edifice of a nation.  All that he is called upon 
to do, is to add a fine stone to that edifice, so that those who shall come after him may add other fine 
stones that will go for a strong and enduring structure’ (Malaya and Malaya 2004, 210). The last two 




it may be regarded as something instrumental in addressing the ills of the nation and 
in restoring its health.  These may be inferred from the following extracts: 
 
35. And a prosperous republic does not exist by mere fact of declaring itself to 
be so.  A republic must be so in fact, in reality, and especially in the 
difference it makes for the better in the lives of its citizens. (2002) 
 
36. Ang malakas na republika ay para sa mahihina, para sa nagugutom, para 
sa nanganganib, para sa agrabyado, para sa mga api! Yan ang malakas 
na republika para sa kanila (Trans. A strong republic is for the weak, for 
the poor, for the jobless, for the hungry, for those in danger, for the 
disadvantaged, for the oppressed. That is the strong republic. For all of 
them.). (2002) 
 
37. Ang ating pangarap ay walang kabawas-bawas – isang matatag na 
republikang hindi matitinag ng makasariling interes, yumayabong sa mga 
gumaganang institusyon ng pamamahala, naglilingkod sa isang masipag 
na lipi saanman ito kailangan upang maibigay sa kanila ang karapat-
dapat nilang tanggapin (Trans. Our dream has remained the same – a 
strong republic that is not shaken by personal interests, that grows through 
government institutions that work, and that serves hardworking people 
wherever it is needed in order to give them what they deserve.). (2003) 
 
That the strong republic is explicitly characterized as making a ‘difference’ in the 
lives of its citizens’ by serving the weak, the poor, the jobless, the hungry, the 
disadvantaged, the oppressed—all victims of the nation’s ills—accords well with the 
conceptualization ‘WAR ON TERROR’ IS A CURATIVE. 
8.6.2 THE GOVERNMENT IS THE ARM OF A STRONG REPUBLIC 
To Arroyo, a strong republic is ‘a shield that needs a strong arm to hold it up’ 
(2002).  In her 2003 SONA, she explicitly expressed who should stand for this strong 
arm:  
 
38. For the practical purposes of most people, government exists to provide 
jobs, homes, education, peace, food on every table.  And to do that 
adequately and dependably, government must possess the capacity to 
execute good policy and deliver basic services through strong and 
responsive institutions staffed by a competent and dedicated bureaucracy. 
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The government as the arm of a strong republic is perhaps best represented in the 
2004 government publication titled Vision and Performance Record of President 
Gloria.  The document establishes the centrality of ‘a strong, effective state’ in 
propelling ‘economic growth.’  It says: 
 
There has been nearly a consensus among economists—of even contrasting 
political ideologies—that a strong, effective state has been the crucial factor in 
the economic growth of the advanced countries and more recently, of the East 
Asian tigers. One of the major conclusions of the 1997 World Bank 
Development Report was: “Development –economic, social and sustainable—
without an effective state is impossible. It is increasingly recognized that an 
effective state—not a minimal one—is central to economic and social 
development…” (18) (Emphasis added) 
 
 
The vision’s emphasis on ‘a strong, effective state’ as a determiner of ‘economic 
growth’ brings to mind notions of ‘political stability’ and ‘national security.’ These 
notions help justify the Arroyo government’s actions and policies couched in such 
terms as ‘a new bill that will strengthen our legal armory,’ ‘the full force of law,’ and 
‘the full brunt of the arsenal of democracy.’ They were regarded as elements needed 
‘to strengthen (the) investment climate’ and to present the country ‘as a viable 
proposition to the world economy.’ 
8.6.3 THE ARROYO PRESIDENCY IS A CONSCIENTIOUS WORKER 
It should be noted that questions of legitimacy had been raised against Arroyo 
from the time she assumed power in 2001 to her election as president in 2004.84  The 
                                                 
84 The year 2005 may be considered the height of the political crisis involving questions on the 
legitimacy of Arroyo’s presidency. This is due to the controversial wiretapped conversations allegedly 




recontextualization of ‘war on terror’ as war against serious national problems (i.e., 
drugs, criminality, corruption, poverty) heightens Arroyo’s presidential persona as a 
tough, serious, and engaged leader—a working president and a micro-manager ready 
to visit villages, check progress in government offices, exercise political will to 
punish erring men in uniform, and recommend what would strengthen the nation’s 
‘legal armory.’85 By recontextualizing the war on terror discourse and associating it 
with spurring economic growth and protecting the people’s ‘right to live in peace’ and 
‘right to liberty,’ Arroyo is able to project herself more prominently in different roles 
that play up the myth of ‘the working president.’ 
Her SONAs from 2002 to 2004 showed various favorable self-representations 
of the president.86 These representations include, among others: the president as a 
micro-manager, an achiever and deliverer of good news, an advocate of the U.S.-led 
war on terror, and a committed and serious national leader.  Below, I show textual 
evidence of these self-representations. 
Casting herself as a micro-manager, Arroyo made references to specific 
actions she pursued while in office:  telling and reminding her cabinet what to do (39), 
                                                 
 
85 The representation of Arroyo as a micro-manager came even before she invoked the need to support 
the global war on terror. I would like to argue, however, that the recontextualization of the war on 
terror as war against national ills has been used to intensify this image. 
 
86 The various representations of the president I argue contribute to the conceptual key of THE 
PRESIDENCY IS THE PRESIDENT which has several permutations (e.g., GOVERNMENT IS PRESIDENT, 
ADMINISTRATION IS PRESIDENT).  In such conceptualization, the presidency (institution) is embodied by 
the personality of the president or head of state. 
 It should be clarified that the president is not necessarily the presidency, which pertains to the 
institution or a large collective of people who constitute the administration or executive branch of 
government; however, the person who occupies the position of the president has the power to define 
what the institution stands for.  The conceptual key may also come to mean that the presidency is 
image-making.  This is quite related to what a former Philippine press secretary once asserted - 
‘politics is theater’ (‘The presidency,’1990). Of course, he refers to theater in the mimetic sense (that is, 
acting as role-playing) in that whoever assumes political leadership has to know how to project roles 





making surprise visits in government offices (40), and giving executive orders such as 
abolishing offices that purportedly contribute to bureaucratic red tape (41).  The 
expressions (‘sinabi ko,’ ‘pinapaalala ko,’ ‘nagsagawa ako,’ ‘I have abolished’) are 
significant in that they render Arroyo as directly involved in the affairs of the state.  
 
39. Kaya noong isang taon, sinabi ko na ang kabinete ko ay kailangan gumawa 
ng konkretong resulta sa paglaban sa katiwalian.  Pinapaalala ko sa kanila 
ngayon na sa sumunod na araw, magbigay ng kanilang ulat sa naturang 
mga resulta (Trans. So last year, I told my cabinet that they should come 
up with concrete results with regard to the fight against corruption. I am 
reminding them now that in the coming days, they should submit their 
report on the said results.) (2002). 
 
40. Kaya nagsagawa ako ng sorpresang pagbisita sa tanggapan ng gobyerno, 
upang pasiglahin ang talagang nagsisikap at gisingin kung sino ang 
natutulog sa trabaho (So I made surprise visits in government offices in 
order to encourage those who are perseverant and to rouse those who sleep 
at work.) (2003). 
 
41. I have abolished eighty offices under the office of the president.  I will 
abolish thirty more (2004).87 
 
 
In the following extracts, Arroyo cast herself as an achiever and deliverer of good 
news.  In achieving this, she made comparison between what had been the case in the 
past—before she assumed the presidency (42) or during the early part of her 
presidency (43, 44)—and what was the case at the moment of speaking.  As evident in 
the extract 42, the past situation was rendered undesirable (‘we had the second most 
expensive power rates in Asia’) while the present was represented as an improvement 
from the past (‘Now, we have gone down to number 6’).  In 43, Arroyo implied that 
targets set early on in her presidency (‘a million new jobs in agriculture and fisheries’) 
were being reached (‘We have provided more than half of that number two thirds into 
                                                 
87 Given emphasis in the extracts are the processes (material, verbal, behavioral), the doer of the 
processes, and lexical choices like ‘konkretong resulta’ (concrete results) and ‘sorpresang pagbisita’ 
(surprise visits) that indicate the kind of role the doer projects in her utterance. 
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my term’) while in 44, she emphasized positive consequences of her legislative 
agenda passed by Congress. 
 
42. Before I became president, we had the second most expensive power rates 
in Asia. Now, we have gone down to number 6 (2002). 
 
43. I said that there could a million new jobs in agriculture and fisheries.  We 
have provided more than half of that number two-thirds into my term 
(2003). 
 
44. In fact, we will now be able to bring clean water to the entire country 
because during my previous term, you, Congress finally passed the clean 
water act; because in my first days as president in 2001 I signed the solid 
waste act (2004).88 
 
 
In 45 to 47, she represented herself as an advocate of the U.S.-led war on terror by 
proclaiming that she ‘was the first head of government to emphasize the 
interconnection between war against terrorism and war against poverty’ (45), she was 
‘taking a direct hand in the war against the enemies of the republic’ (46), and 
reaffirming relations with the United States (47).  Extract 46 is particularly interesting 
in that her ‘war against the enemies of the republic’ was anchored on the U.S.-led 
‘war on terrorism’ (see 8.5.4).  References to herself as ‘the first head of government’ 
(45) and ‘their only state visitor for the year’ underscored Arroyo’s self-perceived 
importance in the global anti-terrorism movement that had spawned after the events of 
9/11 in the U.S. 
 
45. The President of the Philippines was the first head of government to 
emphasize the interconnection between the war against terrorism and the 
                                                 
 
88 Notice the emphasis on the achievements of the incumbency. This is achieved through various ways: 
by contrasting the state of the nation in the past and present, showing how targets set by the incumbent 
in the previous year are gradually and successfully achieved, and showing positive outcomes of 




war against poverty.  Now, nations large and small embrace this 
interconnection (2002). 
 
46. As commander-in-chief, I am taking a direct hand in the war against the 
enemies of the republic (2002). 
 
47. It was also fitting that I put in a new perspective on our relations with the 
United States, where three million Filipinos live and where I made a visit 
as their only state visitor for the year (2003). 
 
 
In 48 and 49, Arroyo constructed herself as a committed and serious national leader 
by promising to ‘work even harder’ and ‘do even better’ (48) and by demonstrating 
that she fit a defining characteristic of a modern leader (49).  Needless to say, the 
expressions lent themselves to Arroyo’s propagandized persona as a ‘working 
president.’ 
 
48. In any event, I promise to work even harder if that is possible, and do even 
better because I believe that there is always room for improvement (2002). 
 
49. (A modern leader) must stick to priorities that were carefully chosen, 
rather than dump them at every first issue that is recklessly raised. I have 
stuck to my priorities: jobs, food on every table, homes, education, peace 
(2002). 
 
 In several ways, Arroyo tried to identify herself with the great majority of the 
Filipino people by projecting herself as the champion of the farmers and the working 
class (50), the poor (51), and the overseas Filipino workers (52). 
 
50. To the countless incentives that Congress has granted to business, I’ve 
matched similar programs to give a similar break to the worker in the 
factory and in the farm (2003). 
 
51. Bilang pakikipag-ugnayan sa mga pinakamahirap ng ating bansa hinggil sa 
pinakamalubhang mga problema natin, dinalaw ko ang mga di-kilalang 
barangay (Trans. As a way of consulting the poorest of our country with 





52. And I cannot apologize for being a protector of my people (2004). 
 
 
 More obvious ways of legitimizing her leadership can be seen from her self- 
representation as a product of people power, 
 
53. At dahil ako ay naluklok sa pagkapangulo dala ng malawakang galit sa 
anomaliya, alam kong kailangan wakasan ang katiwalian (Trans. Because 
I was thrust into the presidency due to a wide protest against anomalies, I 
am aware that we need to end corruption.). (2002) 
 
54. I know that it is to me that those many Filipinos are looking for the 
vindication of their decision to go to EDSA.  I shall not disappoint them. 
(2002) 
 
and as a duly-elected and well-supported leader of the 2004 presidential elections, 
 
55. Thanks to many of you, I emerged from the last election with more votes 
than any previous president. (2004) 
 
56. As a further sign of the people’s overwhelming support, they gave me a 
huge majority in Congress, and among the local governments. (2004) 
 
These various roles and representations heighten the political spectacle that is the 
Philippine presidency.  They specifically established the political ethos of Arroyo as a 
leader worthy of support because what was projected rhetorically was a president who 
seriously worked and fought against long standing national problems.  Her persona as 
a working president was especially significant in that it provided a contrast to her 
predecessor, Joseph Estrada, whose populist, pro-poor image has been eroded and 
subverted by accounts that portray him as a ‘chronic violator of the law,’ ‘a 
sanctioning agent of criminal activities,’ and a self-aggrandizing public official 
(Navera 2003, 147-151).  The persona worked to de-mystify Estrada and established 
Arroyo as the (new) heroine ready to find a cure to the ailing nation or solutions to 
serious and intractable national problems by sheer observance of work ethics 
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apparently wanting in the previous administration. That recontextualized ‘war on 
terror’ as a means to combat domestic terrorism as well as a national curative 
heightens her role as a serious, no-nonsense leader geared up to fight obstacles that 
get in the way of ‘economic growth.’ 
 
8.7 Summary 
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s ascendance to the Philippine presidency marked 
the beginning of the longest presidency since Ferdinand Marcos.  Arroyo’s presidency 
spanned more than three years of successor term and a full six-year presidential term.  
This chapter focuses on the first four of Arroyo SONAs, three of which were 
delivered during her successor term and the other less than a month after she began 
her full presidential term in 2004.  The schema that emerged from the said SONAs is 
one that equates the global war on terror with the war on poverty in the national level.  
In her schema, a strong republic is complemented by such formulation. 
Thrust to the Philippine presidency at the crest of a peaceful mass 
demonstration against massive corruption involving her predecessor Joseph Ejercito 
Estrada, Arroyo sought to pursue an anti-poverty ideology—strategically termed ‘war 
on poverty’—during her presidential term. In her first SONA, she outlined the four 
components of her ‘war on poverty’ agenda and provided a detailed accounting of 
how she sought to realize them.  The four components are: an economic philosophy of 
free enterprise appropriate for the 21st century, modern agriculture, social bias for the 
disadvantaged sector, and morality in government and society. 
After the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, however, Arroyo 
adopted the framework of the US government-led ‘global war on terror.’ This marked 
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a realignment of her ‘war on poverty’ discourse with the discourse of the ‘global war 
on terror.’   
This chapter specifically focused on how the Arroyo SONAs from her 
successor term to 2004 recontextualized the war on terror discourse to make it 
relevant and relatable in the socio-political context of the Philippines and also to 
legitimize her presidency which she assumed through extra-constitutional (i.e., people 
power) means.  The discussion was developed by examining the various conceptual 
frames and metaphors employed in the speech to substantiate the themes of 
democracy, national economy, peace and security, and the presidency. 
After Arroyo’s declaration of her government’s engagement with the global 
war on terror, Arroyo framed democracy using three interrelated conceptualizations: 
DEMOCRACY IS A WEAPON, DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF THREAT, and 
DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL FAITH THAT THE FILIPINO HAS FOUGHT FOR.  The 
first conceptualization treated democracy as an instrument that sanctioned the use of 
hard power or militarist solution to deal with criminality and rebellion.  The second 
sought to justify the first by positioning democracy as an object of threat ‘entitled to 
self-defense.’ The third conceptualization extends the second conceptualization by 
showing that democracy as an object of threat is historically rooted as the Filipino 
people had fought for it over time.  It also lends value to democracy by regarding it as 
a national faith. The combination of these three conceptualizations—that democracy 
is a national faith that has been an object of threat but is capable of defending itself 
against threat through a state-sanctioned use of hard power—ran parallel to the 
George W. Bush declaration that the ‘war on terror,’ intended to ensure security and 
to spread democracy, was a ‘crusade.’ 
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In terms of the national economy, Arroyo recontextualized war on terror by 
linking it to her administration’s war on poverty agenda.  Like Aquino, Arroyo 
employed the conceptual frame THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A MANIFESTATION OF 
NATIONAL LIFE, but Arroyo substantiated this frame using conceptual metaphors that 
reflected the socio-political and historical context of the period.  In her speeches, 
Arroyo established that the NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A LIVING ENTITY CONFRONTED 
BY POVERTY AND AFFLICTED BY CHRONIC DEFICIT.  As Arroyo adopted the 
framework of the global war on terror, she made it a point that her conceptualization 
that the WAR AGAINST POVERTY IDEOLOGY IS A FORMULA TO ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT (a conceptualization spelled out in her first SONA in 2001) would 
find interconnection with the war on terror discourse.  Arroyo accomplished this by 
adopting the conceptualization that THE (GLOBAL) WAR ON TERROR IS (THE 
PHILIPPPINE) WAR AGAINST POVERTY, which is related to a broader 
conceptualization, GLOBAL IS LOCAL.  In Arroyo’s formulation, the global war on 
terror could be understood in terms of the ‘war on poverty’ agenda.  In her speeches, 
Arroyo explicated that the engagement in global war on terror would lead to the 
country’s international visibility, which would bring foreign investment and ‘capital 
flows’ necessary to pursue a major element of the war on poverty agenda. This also 
meant that global engagement translates to national development. 
While a militarist or combative frame was used to deal with poverty, Arroyo 
adopted curative and corrective metaphors to deal with the budget deficit, which, in 
her first SONA after her election for a full presidential term, she conceptualized as an 
economic illness. 
In the area of peace and order and national security, Arroyo employed both 
militarist and curative domains in dealing with criminality and rebellion.  Criminality 
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and rebellion were conceptualized as diseases and parasites that needed to be 
expunged from the national body.  In this regard, Arroyo recontextualized the war on 
terror as a curative to the national ills (i.e., criminality and rebellion).  Arroyo’s 
conceptualization of criminality and rebellion reveal a conflated formulation.  On the 
one hand, criminality was conceptualized in terms of terrorism in that criminal 
syndicates were regarded as ‘direct threats to national security’ making it necessary to 
use military power in dealing with criminals.  On the other, Arroyo did not make 
distinctions between rebels and criminals.  She adopted the conceptualization REBELS 
ARE CRIMINALS making it possible to target rebels in the same fashion that criminals 
were treated in the Philippine domestic war on terrorism. The conflated formulations 
appeared to justify the indiscriminate targeting of those critically opposed to the 
Arroyo administration. This could have possibly accounted for the high number of 
cases of political executions and extrajudicial killings during the Arroyo 
administration. 
To pursue the war on terror in the national scale, Arroyo endorsed the 
ratification of anti-terrorism bill and declared a reallocation of resources in order to 
‘enhance the republic’s crime fighting capabilities.’  Both policies served as 
apparatuses of the war on terror in the Philippines. Moreover, they prove that 
transformation of discourse in more authoritative contexts and the impact they have 
on the socio-political reality. 
The recontextualization of the war on terror as  war against poverty, as a 
means to combat threats to national security, and as a curative to the national ills 
complemented Arroyo’s vision of a ‘strong republic’ that put premium on ‘national 
security’ and ‘political stability’ which her administration deemed vital in spurring 
‘economic growth.’  The recontextualization contributed to the legitimization of her 
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presidency that had been challenged with questions of legitimacy.  By 
recontextualizing ‘war on terror’ as war against a serious and intractable national 
problem like poverty, against threats to national security, and against the national ills 
at large, Arroyo heightened her presidential persona as a tough, serious, and engaged 
leader—a working president and a micro-manager geared up to rid the nation of its 
social, economic and political ills.  
Through the SONAs, the Arroyo administration was able to work towards 
sustaining its hold of power on the one hand, and showing its commitment to the Bush 
administration-led global war on terror, on the other.  In other words, the public 
speeches were instrumental in juggling the President’s acts of justifying the 
Philippines’s involvement in the global war on terror and of ascertaining its tenuous 































Before Gloria Macapagal Arroyo could deliver her 2005 State of the Nation 
Address, her government faced arguably its worst political crisis since she assumed 
public office in 2001.  In June 2005, a tape recording of a telephone conversation that 
transpired a few weeks after the 2004 national polls allegedly between the president 
and an election official circulated in public. In the conversation, the president was 
allegedly making sure that she got a margin of one million votes against her closest 
rival, popular actor Fernando Poe, Jr. The phone conversation became a media 
spectacle and was so highly publicized that the president had to apologize for her 
‘lapse in judgment’ on national television. Following her televised apologia, ten 
members of her cabinet resigned from their posts and called on Arroyo to step down 
from office. Her staunch political backers including former President Corazon Aquino 
and supporters in Congress expressed the same call.  Resigned members of her 
cabinet warned that the crisis would mark a shift in Arroyo’s presidential policy: 
‘political survival at all cost.’89 
                                                 
89 The resigned Arroyo cabinet members explained that the reason for their resignation on 8 July 2005 
was that the Arroyo government ‘had lost its credibility and capability to govern with the confidence 
and trust of the people.’ They warned that ‘the President instead of governance would be preoccupied 
with ensuring her political survival at all cost.’  This was reiterated in a statement condemning 
‘Arroyo’s betrayal of people power’ on 24 February 2006 (see Avigail Olarte, 
http://www.pcij.org/blog/?p=634, Available: 2 September 2010).  In the same statement, the ten 
resigned cabinet m embers, also called the ‘Hyatt 10,’ contended that Arroyo’s policy of ensuring her 
political survival at all cost was demonstrated by the quashing of the impeachment case against Arroyo 
‘by technicality and generous dole-outs of patronage and political favor’ and suppression of ‘legitimate 
efforts to ferret out the truth…at every turn, with the cover-up on the Garci tapes, the imposition of the 




 This chapter covers five of Arroyo’s SONAs from 2005 to 2009—during 
which time President Arroyo had to constantly address the issue of the legitimacy of 
her full presidential term.  I argue that Arroyo’s SONAs offer three propositions that 
worked towards legitimizing her hold of power.  They are as follows: 
 
1. The national economy is a strong player in the global arena under the Arroyo 
administration. 
2. The existing political system is a roadblock to the country’s full development. 
3. The Arroyo presidency is a working presidency and has succeeded.  
 
 
Let me give an overview of these propositions.  The first proposition had been used 
by the Arroyo government to undermine challenges against its political leadership.  In 
2005, Arroyo argued that the national economy was on the verge of take-off primarily 
due to fiscal reforms that she pushed as a legislative agenda and which saw passage 
through the help of her supporters in Congress. She would consistently mention in her 
succeeding SONAs that the fiscal reforms accounted for the strong macro-economic 
fundamentals that had shielded the Philippines from the damaging impact of the 
global economic crisis that confronted her term. She contended that it was these fiscal 
reforms that had made her an unpopular leader, but that she pursued them nonetheless 
because they were the ‘right’ economic policies. Her valedictory SONA in 2009 
communicated that the state of the nation was ‘a strong economy.’ 
The second proposition put forth the idea that the existing political system, 
that is, the Philippine presidential system of government, serves as an impediment to 
the country’s full development.  Arroyo explained in her 2005 SONA that ‘Over the 
years, our political system has degenerated to the extent that it is difficult for anyone 
to make any headway yet keep his hands clean.’ Specifically, Arroyo had blamed the 
political system for the ‘political noise’ that has made it impossible for the executive 
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and legislative branches of the government to work together towards a common 
legislative agenda.  She had since then pushed for a constitutional change that aimed 
at ‘empowering’ the countryside whose development, Arroyo contended, had been 
constrained by the center or ‘Imperial Manila.’ 
The third proposition established that in spite of the ‘roadblock’ to 
development, the Arroyo government had remained committed to its duties and 
responsibilities. The proposition put forth the notion that throughout its term, the 
Arroyo government had been ‘working and working well’ (2006). This was 
supposedly evidenced by Arroyo’s purportedly impeccable ‘work ethic,’ by her 
propensity towards ‘micro-management,’ and through the creation of ‘super regions’ 
in her administration’s blueprint of the medium-term public investment plan. 
Consistent with the preceding analytical chapters, Chapter 9 also looks into 
how the four themes of democracy, national economy, peace and security, and the 
presidency/ executive leadership are conceptualized across the five congressional 
speeches and how these conceptualizations are realized in metaphorical and/or lexico-
grammatical expressions. These conceptualizations together with other rhetorical 
strategies in the texts are examined based on how they substantiate Arroyo’s assertion 
of presidential legitimacy.  The following table outlines the conceptual frames 




Table 9.1 Conceptual Frames in Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s SONAs (2005-2009) 
 
Section Theme Conceptual Frames 
9.3 Democracy  DEMOCRACY IS A VALUE THAT 
FINDS EXPRESSION IN THE 
NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND 
PRACTICES 
 DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF 
THREAT  
9.4 National economy  NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A 
PROTAGONIST/ CHARACTER IN AN 
UNFOLDING STORY OF NATIONAL 
PROGRESS 
 THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A 
SURVIVOR IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMIC CRISIS 
9.5 Peace and security  REBELLION IS TERRORISM 
 INFRASTRUCTURE IS AN 
INSTRUMENT FOR PEACE AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
 PEACE IS KEY TO RESOURCE 
GENERATION NEEDED FOR A 
MODERN MINDANAO 
 PEACE TALKS ARE THE MEANS TO 
RESOLVE AGE-OLD INTERNAL 
CONFLICTS 
9.6 The presidency  THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IS A 
BARRIER TO THE COUNTRY’S 
FULL DEVELOPMENT 
 CHARTER CHANGE IS A 
MECHANISM FOR POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC REFORM 
 THE ARROYO PRESIDENCY IS A 
CONSCIENTIOUS WORKER AND A 
CAREGIVER 
 ARROYO IS THE ECONOMIC 
REDEEMER OF THE PHILIPPINES 
 
 
An account of the historical milieu from 2005 to 2009 is provided in the following 
section to contextualize the conceptual frames and conceptual metaphors discussed in 




9.2  Historical milieu of the Arroyo presidency (2005-2009) 
Touted as the ‘Hello Garci’ scandal,90 the political crisis of 2005 also marked 
the beginning of more scandals and challenges to the Arroyo presidency.   
The ‘Hello Garci’ scandal spawned after a former deputy director of the 
National Bureau of Investigation claimed to have audio tapes of wiretapped telephone 
conversations between the president and Election Commissioner Virgilio ‘Garci’ 
Garcillano from May to June 2004.  The conversations purportedly proved the 
allegation of election cheating leveled against Arroyo since she assumed her full term 
in 2004.  In the taped conversations, she was purportedly asking Garcillano to ensure 
her victory against her closest rival by one million votes.  The scandal would so 
captivate the public mind that on June 27, Arroyo appeared on television to apologize 
for a ‘lapse in judgment’ in deciding to make phone calls with an election 
commissioner.  Without naming the commissioner, she also denied that she 
influenced the results of the elections.  Few days later, ten members of her cabinet 
resigned from their posts and called for her resignation as well. They claimed that 
President Arroyo had lost the credibility to govern because the legitimacy of her 
election had remained under the cloud of doubt.  They contended that because of this 
problem of credibility, the president, instead of working on governance, would be 
preoccupied with her political survival at all cost.  Political allies of the president like 
then Senate President Franklin Drilon and former President Corazon Aquino had also 
asked her to do the ‘supreme self sacrifice.’  As the calls for her resignation 
intensified, Arroyo immediately responded through a speech that blamed the political 
system of the country for the instability experienced by her government.  A few 
                                                 
90 ‘Garci’ pertains to the nickname of the purported election commissioner called by the president to 




weeks later, she delivered her fifth State of the Nation Address carrying the same 
premise and declaring that, ‘it is time to start the great debate on Charter change.’ 
Public condemnation of the scandal resulted in congressional hearings and 
mass protests and the state responded with a series of controversial executive orders 
and proclamations.  After two members of the military appeared on a Senate hearing 
having to do with the ‘Hello Garci’ scandal, Arroyo released Executive Order 464 
which prohibited government officials under the executive branch to attend 
congressional hearings unless permitted by the Office of the President. This was also 
seen as a response to congressional inquiry on a curious agreement supposedly 
executed by her National Security Adviser with the US-based Venable law firm ‘to 
secure grants or congressional earmarks for support of the Charter Change initiative 
of the President of the Philippines which would reshape the form of government in the 
Philippines’ (Magallona 2007).  Professor Merlin Magallona, former dean of the 
University of the Philippines College of Law, explained that this provision in the 
contract simply meant that the Philippine Government would solicit or procure US 
government funding to finance amendments or revisions of the Philippine 
Constitution.   
Arroyo also issued the Calibrated Preemptive Response, which disallowed 
street protests without permit. 
On 24 February 2006, a day before the anniversary of the EDSA People Power 
I, a purported military plot to take over the government was uncovered by authorities. 
This propelled Arroyo to issue Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP 1017) which 
sanctioned the declaration of state of emergency throughout the country. Meant as a 
response to the ‘series of actions…hurting the Philippine State—by obstructing 
governance including hindering growth of the economy and sabotaging people’s 
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confidence in the government and their faith in the future of [the] country’91, PP 1017 
gave the Arroyo government the authority to implement warrantless arrests and to 
take over private enterprises. The presidential proclamation was lifted after about a 
week, but concerned citizens together with members of the opposition and private 
lawyers challenged its constitutionality before the Supreme Court. The court decided 
that it was constitutional but ruled that the government’s enforcement of warrantless 
arrests and taking over of private institutions and companies violated the law.92 
The ‘Hello Garci’ scandal sparked a series of impeachment complaints leveled 
against Arroyo since 2005. The first impeachment complaint, which was based on the 
telephone controversy, failed. A supposedly stronger impeachment complaint based 
on the same controversy and other scandals was filed a year later, but was dismissed 
at the House of Representatives. In 2007, another impeachment complaint was filed in 
connection with the issues on bribery. Based on the revelation of priest-turned-
governor Eduardo Panlilio that a number of governors received half a million pesos 
from Malacanang (the Presidential Palace), the complaint, however, did not prosper. 
Arroyo’s annual addresses continued to declare support for the war on terror 
policy and pushed for the ratification of the Human Securities Act of 2007. Highly 
contested, the law was meant to address the issue of terrorism that had become an 
important concern in the Arroyo watch.  Set off against this backdrop was the rise in 
the cases of extrajudicial killings with unarmed activists, human rights workers, and 
journalists as victims. The 2007 report on the extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions in the Philippines by United Nations Special Rapporteur Philip Alston 
                                                 
91 For the full text of PP 1107, please see http://pcij.org/blog/2006/02/24/text-of-proclamation-no-1017 






cited the indiscriminate use of language to vilify most groups in the Philippine 
political left. In Alston’s preliminary note on his visit to the Philippines, which was 
submitted to the United Nations Human Rights Council, he identified ‘two of the most 
important underlying causes of a great many of the killings’: 
 
The first cause has been variously described as ‘vilification,’ ‘labeling,’ or 
guilt by association. It involves the characterization of most groups on the left 
of the political spectrum as ‘front organizations’ for armed groups, whose aim 
is to destroy democracy.  The result is a wide range of groups – including 
human rights advocates, labor union organizers, journalists, teachers’ unions, 
women’s groups, indigenous organizations, religious groups, student groups, 
agrarian reform advocates, and others – are classified as ‘fronts’ and as 
‘enemies of the State’ that are accordingly considered to be legitimate targets.  
The second cause is the extent to which aspects of the Government’s counter-
insurgency strategy encourage or facilitate the extrajudicial killings of activists 
and other ‘enemies’ in certain circumstances (3-4). (Emphasis added) 
 
Notably, the unabated killings and their non-resolution under the Arroyo presidency 
led others to consider that a ‘culture of impunity’ had seeped throughout the country. 
While President Arroyo struggled to eclipse what may be regarded as a sordid 
socio-political landscape with marvelous tales of economic growth as shown through 
her SONAs, controversies involving the president and her spouse surfaced. One of the 
most controversial that had gripped the Arroyo presidency since the political crisis in 
2005 was the national broadband network (NBN) deal with China’s ZTE Corporation.  
The deal was allegedly overpriced by 130 million US dollars to cover kickbacks.93 It 
allegedly involved the president’s husband and some government officials including 
the chair of the elections commission. Based on the testimony of the director of the 
National Economic Development Authority at a Senate hearing on the NBN-ZTE 
deal, the elections chair who was a close ally of the president offered him 200 million 
                                                 





pesos as bribe in exchange of approval. The director said he informed the president of 
the bribe and that she told him not to accept it. Pressed to give out details of his 
conversation with the president, the government official invoked ‘executive privilege’ 
making it difficult for the opposition to implicate Arroyo in the scandal. 
Arroyo’s espousal of Charter Change especially the shift to a federal 
parliamentary form of government worked to consolidate her support from local 
government units and members of the Congress who supported the idea of a 
decentralized government. Arroyo used this to create the perception that Manila was 
the isolated seat of protests against her presidency while the rest of the nation 
supported her to stay in power. 
Despite Arroyo’s constant declaration of a strong economy in her presidential 
speeches, leading polls such as the Social Weather Station and Pulse Asia showed 
marked decline in her public trust ratings. These ratings caused some news reports, 
political pundits, and media commentators94 to declare that Arroyo is the most 
unpopular president since Marcos. 
In the succeeding sections I present the analysis of the texts. I discuss how 
specific conceptualizations underlying metaphorical expressions work with certain 
rhetorical strategies to legitimize Arroyo’s hold of power until the end of her term. 
 
                                                 
94 See for instance, this news from the Associated Free Press, http://www.asia-pacific-
action.org/node/101, available at the Action in Solidarity with Asia and the Pacific website on 2 
September 2010.  This is also communicated in this 18 July 2008 report available at the gmanews.tv 
website: http://www.gmanews.tv/story/107780/Survey-shows-Arroyo-most-unpopular-RP-president-




9.3  Democracy 
 ‘Democracy’ figured in the post-2005 crisis SONAs to indicate two things: 
one, the government’s reaffirmation of democratic institutions and practices; and two, 
the government’s position in the midst of speculations that democracy had eroded 
under the Arroyo watch.  In conceptual terms, these are: DEMOCRACY IS A VALUE 
THAT FINDS EXPRESSION IN THE NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES and 
DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF THREAT. 
9.3.1 DEMOCRACY IS A VALUE THAT FINDS EXPRESSION IN THE NATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES 
 The first point was variously expressed in the SONAs delivered in 2005, 2007, 
and 2009. These expressions underlie the conceptualization that DEMOCRACY IS A 
VALUE THAT FINDS EXPRESSION IN THE NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND 
PRACTICES. In 2005, Arroyo declared in her introduction that the purpose of the 
opening session of congress where the president gives her national address is ‘to 
celebrate democracy.’ The phrase implicitly reaffirms the unique partnership between 
the executive and legislative branches of government as expressed in the 1987 
Constitution.  
In 2007, she expressed that spending more on human capital formation under 
her administration was to ensure that democracy was a ‘government for the people.’ 
She said:  
 
1. We have spent more on human capital formation than ever in the past. 
Why? Because if the government of the people and by the people is not for 
them as well, it is a mockery of democracy. (2007) 
 
In the passage, Arroyo justified her government’s investment in ‘human capital 
formation’ as a realization of the Lincolnian concept of the democracy—a 
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‘government of the people, by the people, and for the people.’ The use of the term 
‘human capital formation’ is itself curious in that it regards people as capital that can 
be ‘formed’ or accumulated for the purpose of investment.  It is a dehumanizing 
concept that is part of the global capitalist discourse which privileges quantifiable 
economic growth instead of holistic human development (Bourdieu 1998).  
That the Lincolnian articulation of democracy should be used to justify a 
global capitalist notion such as ‘human capital formation’ is interesting when seen in 
the larger context of the Arroyo discourse.  The passage is preceded by an articulation 
of the government’s initiatives and investments in education. Mentioned are 
investments such as ‘3 billion pesos in science and engineering research and 
development technology’ as well as Filipino students’ sterling achievements in 
international math and science competitions. These details are anchored on the 
premise that ‘in today’s global economy, knowledge is the greatest creator of 
wealth’—a statement that Arroyo foregrounds to jumpstart her discussion on ‘safety 
net and education’ in her SONA.  This specific formulation of democracy—‘human 
capital formation’ as an exercise in democracy—is linked to Arroyo’s grand vision of 
the Philippines as a First World Country and actually adds another layer to the 
conceptualization of democracy as a value expressed in national institutions and 
practices, that is, DEMOCRACY IS A PRECURSOR FOR FIRST WORLD STATUS (cf. 
Chapter 6.3.2).  
 In 2009, Arroyo declared, ‘let us address the highest exercise of democracy, 
voting!’ She followed this up by saying that a fully automated elections was approved 
by Congress, implying that the 2010 elections would push through (‘In 2001, I said 
we would finance fully automated elections. We got it, thanks to Congress.’).  The 
declaration served the purpose of allaying fears that she would perpetuate herself in 
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power after her term ends in 2010; it also re-articulated an important post-Marcos 
conceptualization that PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT IS A MEANS TO REINFORCE 
DEMOCRACY (q.v. Chapter 5.3.3). It should be noted that in Aquino’s final report to 
the nation, she articulated that democratic practices like elections—which may also be 
very well considered expressions of ‘people empowerment’ or ‘people power’— 
‘strengthen’ democracy.  This was channeled in Arroyo’s declaration. 
9.3.2 DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF THREAT 
 In articulating the government’s position in the midst of speculations that 
democracy had eroded under the Arroyo watch, her SONAs proved to be useful.  
Arroyo specifically addressed the growing public perception that her government’s 
response to her critics—members of the opposition, activists, the press and other 
media personalities, and some members of the military—had been heavy handed and 
anti-democratic.  In doing so, she employed the conceptualization DEMOCRACY IS AN 
OBJECT OF THREAT to justify her actions. 
In her valedictory SONA in 2009, she concurred that democracy was 
potentially under threat during her watch, but at the same time justified that her 
government’s actions (e.g., PP 1017, calibrated preemptive response, military solution 
to rebellion and insurgency) should not be perceived as threat but an act of defending 
and protecting democracy from threat. She said: 
 
2. In the face of attempted coups, I issued emergency proclamations just in 
case. But I was able to resolve these military crises with the ordinary 
powers of my office. My critics call it dictatorship. I call it determination. 
We know it as a strong government. 
But I never declared martial law, though they are running scared as 
if I did. In truth, what they are really afraid of is their weakness in the face 
of this self-imagined threat. 
I say to them: do not tell us what we all know, that democracy can 
be threatened. Tell us what you will do when it is attacked. 
I know what to do: 
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As I have shown, I will defend democracy when it is threatened by 
violence; with firmness when it is weakened by division; with law and 
order when it is subverted by anarchy; and always, I will sustain it by 
economic progress, so that a democracy means not just an empty liberty 
but a full life for all. (2009) 
 
The extract shows how discourse worked to legitimize the Arroyo government’s 
actions towards attempted military coups.  Arroyo used the strategies of 
differentiation and transcendence to justify her emergency proclamations (‘My critics 
call it dictatorship. I call it determination. We know it as a strong government.’). Her 
assertion that hers was a ‘strong government’ recontextualized her use of emergency 
powers, which was perceived by her critics as Arroyo’s prelude to declaring martial 
law in order to perpetuate her stay in power. She also employed denial (‘I never 
declared martial law…’) and combined it with counter-accusation or an attack on her 
accusers (‘…though they are running scared as if I did. In truth what they are really 
afraid of is their weakness in the face of this self-imagined threat.’). Finally, she 
asserted the position of the government as the actual ‘defender’ against threat to 
democracy, dismissing notions that the government was the source of threat. This she 
achieved by naming the threat—‘violence’, ‘division’, ‘anarchy’—names that had 
been used in previous presidential rhetoric to ascribe to armed resistance, mass 
protests, subversion, and (attempted) military coups (q.v. section 4.5 of Chapter 4).  In 
doing so, Arroyo worked to establish her government’s legitimacy in enacting state 
response to what it perceived as actions perpetrated by ‘enemies of the state’—a term 
that in the Arroyo’s highly contested counter-insurgency program had been used to 
include even unarmed activists and civil society workers (see discussion on the 
employment of ‘war on terror’ rhetoric in Chapter 8). 
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By doing all this, however, Arroyo was also channeling Marcos’ rhetoric on 
constitutional authoritarianism in that she had used protection and defense of 
democracy in order to warrant contested state policies that were perceived anti-
democratic.  
 
9.4 National economy 
Having faced its worst political crisis in 2005, Arroyo used the argument of a 
strong Philippine economy to establish that she and her government was what the 
country needed to stir it towards progress.  She also asserted that her economic 
policies were what shielded the Philippines from the damaging effects of the global 
economic crisis.  Her SONAs from 2005 to 2009 communicated that as far as setting 
the direction of the national economy was concerned, she was at the helm. This 
contributed to the legitimization of her hold of power. 
From 2005 to 2009, Arroyo framed the national economy in two ways, a move 
which may be attributed to the changing socio-economic and political context of the 
period. On the one hand, Arroyo employed the conceptualization THE NATIONAL 
ECONOMY IS A PROTAGONIST IN THE UNFOLDING STORY OF NATIONAL 
PROGRESS to assert that the Philippine economy was doing well under her watch.  On 
the other, she employed the conceptualization THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A 
SURVIVOR IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS to respond to the developments in the 
global context.  Each of these frames is constituted by conceptualizations derived 
from the expressions found in the speeches: 
 
(9.4.1)  THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A PROTAGONIST IN THE UNFOLDING STORY 
OF NATIONAL PROGRESS 
(9.4.1.1) FISCAL REFORMS ARE LIBERATING FORCES, RESOURCE 
GENERATORS AND ECONOMIC BOOSTERS 
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(9.4.1.2) THE PHILIPPINES IS A UNIQUE DESTINATION FOR FOREIGN 
TOURISTS AND INVESTORS 
              
(9.4.2) THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A SURVIVOR IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
CRISIS 
(9.4.2.1) THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS IS A CALAMITY 
(9.4.2.2) FISCAL REFORMS ARE A MECHANISM FOR SURVIVAL 
 
9.4.1  THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A PROTAGONIST IN THE PHILIPPINES’ 
UNFOLDING STORY OF PROGRESS 
In her 2005 SONA delivered a few weeks after the ‘Hello Garci’ controversy, 
Arroyo characterized the country as divided—‘the story of the nation is a tale of two 
Philippines.’ She went on, 
 
3. One is the Philippines whose economy, after long years of cumulative 
national endeavor, is now poised to take off. The other is the Philippines 
whose political system, after equally long years of degeneration, has 
become a hindrance to progress. (2005) 
 
 
Here, Arroyo characterized the national economy as a VOYAGER/ TRAVELER ‘poised 
to take off’ and the political system as a BARRIER TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, ‘a 
hindrance to progress.’  This section will focus on the national economy while 
discussion on Arroyo’s characterization of the political system would be done in the 
section on the presidency or executive leadership.   
Arroyo’s metaphorization of the national economy as a VOYAGER/ TRAVELER 
ready to take flight or to engage in a journey is an articulation of the broader 
conceptualization THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY IS A PROTAGONIST IN THE UNFOLDING 
STORY OF NATIONAL PROGRESS.  This is demonstrated by descriptions of the 
economy as robust (‘an economy that grew more than 6% last year’), productive 
(‘continued to work…while generating 4 million jobs in the last four years’) (4), 
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‘resilient and full of potential’ (5) within the context of a developing ‘story’ or 
‘storyline.’ 
 
4. As a country on the verge of take off, our storyline would surprise many at 
home and abroad. The story includes an economy that grew more than 6% 
last year and that has continued to work in the teeth of the biggest oil price 
hikes in history, while generating 4 million jobs in the last four years. 
(2005) 
 
5. This story should work itself as one about an economy as resilient and full 
of potential as its people are patient and hardworking, guided by a 
government—with the executive and the legislative hand-in-hand—that is 
able to pass a no-nonsense budget and make the tough decisions to put our 
fiscal house in order. (2005) 
 
 
Interestingly, in Arroyo’s triumphalist narrative, it is not only the economy that is 
bolstered through descriptions of its strength and resilience; the ‘people’ are 
characterized as uncomplaining (‘patient and hardworking’) and more importantly, 
the government is strategically positioned as a paternalistic guide (‘able to…make 
tough decisions to put our fiscal house in order’) that makes possible the highly 
favored development of the story. 
9.4.1.1 FISCAL REFORMS ARE LIBERATING FORCES, RESOURCE GENERATORS, 
AND ECONOMIC BOOSTERS 
The unfolding story of national economic progress, Arroyo argued, was 
largely due to the fiscal reforms—‘the tough decisions’—that her administration 
pursued and its allies in congress supported through legislation. In what may be 
deemed as a strategy to dramatize and bolster the image of her administration, she 
employed heightened descriptions of the reform package:   
 
6. I specially refer to our recent titanic struggle to enact the three laws that 
comprised the biggest fiscal package in our history, the biggest revenue 
increase in a generation that will break the vicious cycle of financing 
development by borrowing and having to borrow again just to service 
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those loans. This is the one reform that will snap the chain that has bound 
our future to a profligate past and debt-burdened present. (2005) 
 
The use the expressions ‘our recent titanic struggle’, ‘the three laws that comprised 
the biggest fiscal package in our history’, ‘the biggest revenue increase in a 
generation’ underscore the importance of the fiscal reform measures Arroyo was 
referring to in her speech. This gets extended when the reform is conceptualized as A 
LIBERATING FORCE as seen in the expressions ‘break the vicious cycle’ and ‘snap the 
chain.’ Arroyo was, in a way, presenting herself as an indispensable leader—the 
messiah as it were (Nadal 2010)—since her fiscal reforms were expected to perform 
acts of deliverance from a ‘vicious cycle’ or a ‘chain’ to a desirable future. 
In 2006, Arroyo sustained her explication of the fiscal reforms by 
conceptualizing them as a RESOURCE GENERATOR that strengthens the economy and 
enables the government to pursue its reform agenda. Specifically, Arroyo talked of 
her economic and fiscal reforms—including reforms in revenue collection—as the 
reason her government had funds for the ‘war on poverty,’ ‘stamping terrorism,’ 
‘fighting corruption,’ and ‘pursuing constitutional and electoral changes.’  Moreover, 
Arroyo declared that there were now ‘funds’ to realize the Medium Term Public 
Investment Plan (MTPIP), which consisted of a grand project aimed at enhancing the 
country’s comparative advantage.   
In the following extract, Arroyo conceptualized fiscal reform expressed 
through such terms as ‘more vigorous tax collection’ and ‘fiscal discipline’ as 
effective mechanisms for generating profit (‘we have achieved record revenue 
collections’; ‘billions of pesos in annual interest savings’) needed for ‘public 
investments.’  Moreover, fiscal reform was rendered as a means towards ‘turning a 
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weakening economy to a strong republic’—an expression that underlies the 
conceptualization FISCAL REFORM IS AN ECONOMIC BOOSTER. 
 
7. To the civil servants who rose to the challenge of turning a weakening 
economy to a strong republic, through more vigorous tax collection and 
more vigilant action against corruption, maraming salamat. We have 
achieved record revenue collections. We are lining up corrupt officials to 
face the consequences of their misdeeds. And finally earned the respect of 
the international community as a serious and viable state for our fiscal 
discipline and billions of pesos in annual interest savings that are now 
going into necessary public investments. (2006) 
 
 
9.4.1.2 THE PHILIPPINES IS A UNIQUE DESTINATION FOR FOREIGN TOURISTS AND 
INVESTORS 
In explaining MTPIP, Arroyo highlighted the creation of ‘Super Regions’ and 
the infrastructure development aimed at making the Philippines a ‘First World 
Country’ in twenty years. In her SONAs delivered in 2006 and 2007, Arroyo 
articulated that the Super Regions are ‘the blueprint for building the future’ and are 
envisioned to constitute the modern Philippines. Their creation is meant to enable the 
government to ‘enhance the comparative advantage’ of the different geographical 
sections of the Philippines and at the same time brand the country as a comparatively 
unique destination for foreign tourists and investors.  
Worth noting is the way the Super Regions are packaged or branded in the 
Arroyo SONAs: North Luzon as ‘an agribusiness quadrangle’ (2006 and 2007); Metro 
Luzon Urban Beltway as the ‘globally competitive urban, industrial, and service 
center’ (2006) or ‘the top magnet for industry and investment’ (2007); Central 
Philippines as ‘a tourism hub’ (2006) or ‘tourism super region’ (2007); and Mindanao 
as the ‘priority for agribusiness investment in the south’ (2006) or as ‘the country’s 
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food basket’ (2007).  Also included among the ‘Super Regions’ is the ‘Cyber 
Corridor,’ conceived as the ‘center of technology and learning’ that ‘runs the length of 
all the super regions, from Baguio to Cebu to Davao.’ It is an electronic environment 
created ‘to boost telecommunications, technology and education’ (2006).  Arroyo 
explained in her 2006 SONA that the Cyber Corridor is where ‘the English and 
information and communication technology skills of the youth give them a 
competitive edge in call centers and other business process outsourcing.’ It is 
supposedly that which would position the Philippines as ‘a top off-shoring hub in the 
world’ (2007).  
The branding of these Super Regions and their corresponding descriptions 
manifest Arroyo’s proclivity for marketing the Philippines as an attractive spot for 
foreign investment and foreign tourists and paint an ultra-optimistic picture of the 
country’s potential to become among the ‘First World Countries.’  Their expression in 
the texts made it appear that governing the Philippine archipelago with an already 
complex past and an increasingly complex present is manageable—in fact, in 
Arroyo’s term, micro-manageable.  This is particularly evident in how Arroyo 
substantiated what her government had done and intended to do further with the Super 
Regions.  
In the following extract, for instance, Arroyo presents a point-by-point account 
of what the strategic goal is for the region (in this case, Central Philippines), what 
accomplishments have been made, the specific projects that are under way, the local 
executives and international partners involved in the projects, the budget allocation, 




8. Let’s now go to Central Philippines, our tourism super region: 
*We protect its natural wonders and provide the means to travel to 
those wonders 
*For Boracay, the leading overall destination, the Kalibo Airport is 
now international with an instrument landing system as we said last year. 
Next is an P80 million terminal on request of Joben Miraflores. 
*The Aklan-Libertad-Pandan Road, waiting for Japan to approve 
the contractors, will connect Boracay to the nature park we declared in 
Northwest Panay Peninsula. We are improving other Panay roads and 
building the road from the Iloilo Airport which we inaugurated in Santa 
Barbara to Iloilo and the Metro Radial Road that Mayor Jerry Trenas asked 
for when we inaugurated the airport, Art Defensor conceived the airport 
when he was governor, Governor Neil Tupaz midwifed its delivery when 
we inaugurated the airport, I said… 
*Iloilo connects Guimaras via Jordan Wharf. We thank Congress 
for the P900 million oil spill calamity fund to save the environment of 
Guimaras. I thank once again the previous Congress. It is back on its feet. 
The other side of the island will connect to Bacolod soon because we 
started building the Sibunag RORO Port last May on recommendation of 
Governor, now Congressman, Rahman Nava. 
 
The extract comprises just a section of a rather lengthy point-by-point account of the 
Super Regions in the 2007 SONA. The detailed accounting cast Arroyo as a hands-on 
president—someone engaged in development activities of the regions and privy to 
what was going on beyond the confines of the presidential residence in Manila.  In 
other words, the Super Regions also served to help Arroyo substantiate her claims at 
micro-management—something she would regularly boast about her administration.  
Their articulation in the speech represented a leader that was willing to work for the 
often neglected countryside by decentralizing and redistributing power and resources 
from the center (‘Imperial Manila’) to the regions. It positioned the Arroyo 
presidency’s vision as far-reaching, its development program wide-ranging, and its 
potential impact broad and inclusive, that is, not confined to Metro-Manila—the 
traditional seat of protests against the Arroyo leadership. In other words, the 
articulation of the ‘Super Regions’ in the SONAs functioned to legitimize the Arroyo 
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presidency. Moreover, it worked strategically in consolidating support for the 
president from different sections of the archipelago. 
9.4.2 THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A SURVIVOR IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
CRISIS 
Faced by the global economic crisis in 2008, Arroyo saw an opportunity to 
further the characterization of the Philippine economy within the global context—and 
that is by conceptualizing it as A SURVIVOR. To establish this, Arroyo employed two 
conceptual metaphors—one that describes the context of strife and survival and 
another that tackles the means for survival.  These conceptualizations are: THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS IS A CALAMITY and FISCAL REFORMS ARE A MECHANISM 
FOR SURVIVAL. 
9.4.2.1 THE GLOBAL CRISIS IS A CALAMITY 
It should be interesting to note that Arroyo conceptualized the global 
economic crisis as an unexpected but inevitable turn of events—a natural calamity 
that economies like the Philippines had to survive.  In the following extract, Arroyo 
did not exactly pinpoint what she thought was the root cause of the crisis; instead, she 
considered it as a condition—in fact, a meteorological phenomenon—to which the 
Philippines just had to adjust:   
 
9. Bigla-bigla, nabaligtad ang ekonomiya ng mundo. Ang pagtalon ng presyo 
ng langis at pagkain ay nagbunsod ng pandaigdigang krisis, the worst since 
the Great Depression and the end of World War II (Trans. All of a sudden, 
the world economy has turned around. The hike in oil and food prices 
triggered the world crisis, the worst since the Great Depression and the end 
of World War II.). Some blame speculators moving billions of dollars 
from subprime mortgages to commodities like fuel and food. Others point 
of the very real surge in demand as millions of Chinese and Indians move 
up to the middle level. 
Whatever the reasons, we are on a roller coaster ride of oil price 
hikes, high food prices and looming economic recession in the US and 
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other markets. Uncertainty has moved like a terrible tsunami around the 
globe, wiping away gains, erasing progress. (2008) 
 
 
In the extract, Arroyo mentioned reasons cited by analysts and pundits for the onset of 
the world economic crisis—oil and food price hikes, speculators, and the surge in the 
demands in China and India—but as to the root cause or causes of the crisis, Arroyo 
did not seem interested in explaining in her speech.  Instead, she considered the 
uncertainty brought about by the crisis as a given. This was established through the 
use of paratactic clauses where the crisis is conceptualized as an ensuing phenomenon 
(‘roller coaster ride’, ‘a terrible tsunami’) that her government had no control. 
Another example of this is shown below: 
 
10. While we can take some comfort that our situation is better than many 
other nations, there is no substitute for solving the problem of rice and fuel 
here at home.  In doing so, let us be honest and clear eyed—there has been 
a fundamental shift in global economics. The price of food and fuel will 
likely remain high.  Nothing will be easy; the government cannot solve 
these problems over night.  But we can work to ease the near-term pain 
while investing in long term solutions. (2008) 
 
 
The extract shows a paratactic clause expressing the ‘fundamental shift in global 
economics.’ The shift is represented as something existent—‘there’—without 
identifying who is responsible for the shift. The paratactic expression suggests that the 
so-called ‘shift’ is a truism whose social agency is effaced (see Fairclough 2003). 
 The conceptualization GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS IS A CALAMITY then 
establishes the gravity of the situation. It enables the audience to identify with a 
problem through a familiar domain—the domain of natural calamity which based on 
Philippine experience is as common occurrence that has had devastating effects on the 
life and property of the people.  Moreover, the metaphorization puts the burden of 
finding relief or spearheading relief operations on the government which is often the 
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case when the country is hit by the worst typhoons, earthquakes or other natural 
calamities.  It positions the government as the chief rescue operator. 
9.4.2.2 FISCAL REFORMS ARE MECHANISMS FOR SURVIVAL 
Arroyo attributed the country’s survival to the ‘tough choices’ her 
administration had made—the fiscal reforms she introduced—and cast her 
government as the indispensable element in the country’s survival from the ‘worst 
effects of the global crisis.’ In the following extract, Arroyo communicated that her 
administration’s fiscal reforms created the ‘shield’ around the country and served to 
protect it from the impact of the crisis; they were the country’s MECHANISM FOR 
SURVIVAL amid the devastating ‘storm’ of the global financial crunch: 
 
11. Because tough choices were made, the global crisis did not catch us 
helpless and unprepared. Through foresight, grit and political will, we built 
a shield around our country that has slowed down and somewhat softened 
the worst effects of the global crisis. We have the money to care for our 
people and pay for food when there are shortages; for fuel despite price 
spikes. 
Neither we nor anyone else in the world expected this day to come 
so soon but we prepared for it.  For the guts not to flinch in the face of 
tough choices, I thank God. For the wisdom to recognize how needed you 
are, I thank, you Congress. For footing the bill, I thank the taxpayers. 
The result has been, on the one hand, ito ang nakasalba sa bayan 
(this is what saved the nation); and on the other, more unpopularity for 
myself in the opinion polls. Yet, even unfriendly polls show self-rated 
poverty down to its 20-year low in 2007. (2008) 
 
 
In the extract, Arroyo implied that her fiscal reform measures (‘tough 
choices’) not only prepared the nation for the global crisis; it also saved the nation 
(‘nakasalba ang bayan’) from the unfavorable effects of the crisis.  The extract also 
shows a government that is competent in planning (‘foresight’), decisive (‘grit and 
political will’, ‘guts not to flinch in the face of tough choices’), and a caring one, 
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rendering the Arroyo government central to the country’s purported survival. This 
shall be further explicated in the section on the presidency. 
A similar rendering of the national economy is evident in Arroyo’s final 
SONA delivered in July 2009.  In her introduction, she described the devastation 
caused by the ‘financial meltdown’ over the past twelve months, but was quick to 
mention that the country ‘weathered a succession of global crises in fuel, in food, then 
in finance and finally, economy in a global recession, never losing focus and with 
economic fundamentals intact.’    
Arroyo attributed the country’s capacity to ‘weather’ the global crises to her 
‘key reforms,’ her ‘economic policies,’ and ‘revenue measures.’  In the following 
extract, Arroyo conceptualized these ‘reforms’ as MECHANISMS FOR SURVIVAL as 
they served as the country’s protection from the ‘worst of shocks’ of the crises. She 
said: 
 
12. Our reforms gave us the resources to protect our people, our financial 
system and our economy from the worst shocks that the best in the west 
failed to anticipate. 
They gave us the resources to extend welfare support and enhance 
spending power. (2009) 
 
13. The strong, bitter and unpopular revenue measures of the past few years 
have spared our country the worst of the global financial shocks. They 
gave us the resources to stimulate the economy. (2009) 
 
 
 Arroyo’s rather optimistic portrayal of the national economy’s success in 
surviving the challenges brought about by the global crises and her administration’s 
significant role in that regard may very well be seen in the following summative 
account of the state of the national economy in her valedictory SONA—an account 




14. In sum: 
(1) We have a strong economy and strong fiscal position to withstand 
global shocks. 
(2) We built new modern infrastructure and completed unfinished ones. 
(3) The economy is more fair to the poor than ever before. 
(4) We are building a sound base for the next generation. 
(5) International authorities have taken notice that we are safer from 
environmental degradation and man-made disasters. 
 
 
Apart from expressing the conceptualization of the national economy against the 
backdrop of the global economic crises, this summative account of the state of the 
national economy render the country ready for Arroyo’s envisioned future—the 
Philippines as a First World Country complete with ‘modern infrastructure,’ 
characterized by an economy supposedly ‘more fair to the poor than ever before,’ and 
whose safe environment has taken the notice of ‘international authorities.’  The 
account is also reflective of Arroyo’s argumentative strategies to legitimize her 
position of leadership:  that the economy was in a position of strength under her 
watch, that concrete manifestations of her government’s resolve to push the country’s 
development towards full swing are the completed infrastructure projects in the 
‘Super Regions,’ that her government pursued the right economic policies despite a 
hostile popular opinion, that the policies were proven effective during the crises, and 
that the international authorities acknowledge the accomplishments of her leadership. 
To sum up this section on the national economy, Arroyo argued from 2005 
until her final SONA that under her watch the national economy was poised to 
become a strong voyager, a character of strength in the unfolding story of national 
progress, a survivor during the global financial crisis, and a strong and resilient entity 
towards the end of her term. Arroyo considered her economic policies including the 
value added tax (VAT) as instrumental in sustaining the economy and in ensuring its 




9.5 Peace and security 
 In the aspect of national security and peace and order, Arroyo’s speeches from 
2005 to 2009 focused on the passage of antiterrorism law and on engaging in peace 
talks with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).   
 On the anti-terrorism law, Arroyo said: 
 
In the area of national security, I urge the swift passage of an anti-terrorism 
law that will protect rather than subvert, enhance rather than weaken, the 
rights and liberties that terrorism precisely threatens with extinction. (2005) 
 
 
By persisting on the passage of the Human Rights Act, Arroyo sustained her 
recontextualized discourse on ‘war on terror.’   
9.5.1 REBELLION IS TERRORISM 
What the Arroyo government considered as terrorism especially in the 
congressional speeches delivered from 2005 to 2006 remained contentious as it 
subscribed to the United States government’s list of terrorist groups that included the 
Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA). Thus, in 
Arroyo’s framing of national security around this time, the following 
conceptualizations were evident: COMMUNIST REBELLION IS TERRORISM and the 
MILITARY SOLUTION TO INSURGENCY IS A MEANS TOWARD JUSTICE AND FREEDOM.  
These are particularly evident in her 2006 SONA: 
  
15. And we will end the long oppression of barangays by rebel terrorists who 
kill without qualms, even their own. Sa mga lalawigang sakop ng 7th 
Division, nakikibaka sa kalaban si Jovito Palparan. Hindi siya aatras 
hanggang makawala sa gabi ng kilabot ang mga pamayanan at maka-ahon 
sa bukas ng liwayway ng hustisiya at kalayaan. (For those provinces 
covered by the 7th Division, Jovito Palparan is fighting against the enemy. 
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He will not stop until you are freed from the dark night of fear and reach 
the dawn of justice and freedom.) (2006)95 
 
 
In the extract, Arroyo’s use of the expression ‘the long oppression of barangays by 
rebel terrorists who kill without qualms, even their own’ alluded to the communist 
rebels who in the early 1990s were engaged in massive self-purging activities within 
the communist movement due to ideological conflicts as well as suspected military 
infiltrators within their ranks. The collocation of the terms ‘rebel’ and ‘terrorists’ in 
the noun phrase ‘rebel terrorists’ emphasized not only the fact that rebels are engaged 
in what the Arroyo government deemed as terrorist activities, but actually suggested 
that REBELS ARE TERRORISTS.  This conceptualization, which vilifies the communist 
rebellion, was further heightened by such phrases as ‘long oppression’ and ‘who kill 
without qualms, even their own.’  These cast the rebels as the chief perpetrators of 
political and extrajudicial executions instead of the military which operated based on 
the state policies of the Arroyo administration.  This strategy to vilify the rebels was 
further reinforced by statements that compliment General Jovito Palparan, a high-
ranking military officer regarded by the militant left as the ‘mastermind’ behind 
extrajudicial killings of activists under the Arroyo watch. In fact, Arroyo 
characterized Palparan as one who fights the enemy (‘nakikibaka sa kalaban’) and as 
the complete opposite of what his critics have said about him (‘Hindi siya aatras 
hanggang makawala sa gabi ng kilabot ang mga pamayanan at maka-ahon sa bukas ng 
liwayway ng hustisiya at kalayaan’).   In the preceding expression, Arroyo cast him as 
                                                 
95 Jovito Palparan was a high-ranking military official under the Arroyo administration regarded by the 
militant leftist groups as responsible for the extra-judicial killings during the Arroyo administration. It 
should be interesting to note that this was mentioned prior to Arroyo’s condemnation of political 
killings and vow to stop extrajudicial execution. This was considered by some as Arroyo’s way of 
vindicating Palparan and the military involved in counter-insurgency. Her statements differentiated the 




a protector of the community—a man who would fight relentlessly for the 
community’s justice and freedom—and employed the images of darkness (‘gabi ng 
kilabot’) and light (‘liwayway ng hustisiya at kalayaan’) to show what Palparan had 
been fighting against and what he was fighting for.96 By and large, Arroyo’s 
conceptualization of communist rebellion until 2006 tended to reduce the complex 
problem of insurgency in the Philippines to an act of terrorism within communities, 
thereby justifying the use of military force in the countryside. Her seemingly 
ambivalent take on terrorism sent off the impression that her administration 
sanctioned the extrajudicial executions when perpetrated by government troops 
against ‘enemies of the state’ and rejected them only when communist rebels 
perpetrated the political killings. 
 In 2007, however, Arroyo declared a less ambivalent position on political 
killings. Criticized the year earlier for praising Palparan and for justifying the use of 
state violence against what the government considered as terrorists or state enemies, 
Arroyo stated: 
 
We fight terrorism.  It threatens our sovereign, democratic, compassionate and 
decent way of life. 
Therefore, in the fight against lawless violence, we must uphold these 
values.  It is never right and always wrong to fight terror with terror. 
I ask Congress…I urge you to enact laws to transform state response to 
political violence: First, laws to protect witnesses from lawbreakers and law 
enforcers.  Second, laws to guarantee swift justice from more empowered 
special courts. Third, laws to impose harsher penalties for political killings.  
Fourth, laws reserving the harshest penalties for the rogue elements in the 
uniformed services who betray public trust and bring shame to the greater 
number of their colleagues who are patriotic. 
  We must wipe this stain from our democratic record. (2007) 
  
 
                                                 
96 Interestingly, ‘kilabot’—a Filipino term for ‘source of fear’—had also been used by the militant left 




International pressure to address political killings due the damaging report by the 
United Nations’ Rapporteur Phillip Alston on extrajudicial executions in the 
Philippines as well as demands from Philippine human rights groups to stop the 
killings made the Arroyo government reconsider its policies against rebellion. 
9.5.2 INFRASTRUCTURE IS AN INSTRUMENT FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT 
Interestingly, while Arroyo employed tough rhetoric when dealing with the 
communists, she talked about peace in Mindanao and forging an agreement with the 
Moro rebels as shown in the following: 
 
We’ve worked with the Organization of the Islamic Conference to forge peace 
with our Muslim brothers.  Eight percent of our peace talks with them have 
been completed. Permanent peace in Mindanao is within reach. (2005) 
 
 
How peace in Mindanao would be achieved in Arroyo’s frame is what is interesting. 
Eager to achieve a First World Philippines through the creation of ‘Super Regions’ 
which would be the target of investors both local and foreign, Arroyo emphasized that 
it is the investments in agribusiness in Mindanao that would hasten the peace process 
and build a modern Southern Philippines. In this regard, Arroyo employed the 
conceptualization INFRASTRUCTURE IS AN INSTRUMENT OF PEACE AND 
DEVELOPMENT. This is evident in the following extracts taken from the 2006 and 
2007 SONAs: 
 
16. Susi sa anumang pag-ibayo ang malakas na suporta at ma-abilidad na 
liderato ng pamahalaang local. Halimbawa, iyong ‘from arms to farms’ ni 
Governor Ben Loong ng Sulu, with his caravan of tractors literally 
invading former rebel camps in his province. Congratulations. (Trans. Key 
to any endeavor is the strong support and skillful leadership of the local 
government. For example, the ‘from arms to farms’ program of Governor 
Ben Loong of Sulu, with his caravan of tractors literally invading former 
rebel camps in his province. Congratulations.) 
Mahigit isang linggong nakaraan, dumating sa ‘Eleven Islands’ ang 
daan-daang rebelde at kanilang pamilya, sa pamumuno ng dating MNLF 
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Commander na si Aribari Samson.  Dito sa mga pulo na kilalang ‘no 
man’s island,’ dati nagtatago ang mga rebelde at criminal.  Ngayon sa 
tulong ng isang programa ng United Nations, nagtayo tayo ng dalawang 
daang tahanan at panibagong buhay para sa pangkat ni Samson.  Thank 
you for giving peace a chance. Congratulations, Commander Samson. 
(Trans.  More than a week ago, hundreds of rebels and their families 
headed by former Moro National Liberation Front Aribari Samson arrived 
at ‘Eleven Islands.’ These islands known as ‘no man’s island’ used to be 
the hiding place of rebels and criminals. With the help of a United Nations 
program, we were able to build two thousand houses and a new life for the 
group of Samson. Thank you for giving peace a chance. Congratulations, 
Commander Samson.) 
I take this occasion to express our gratitude to the donor community 
from the US, the Organization of Islamic Conference and the European 
Union, Australia, Japan, our ASEAN neighbors, the multilaterals and the 
rest of the world. Thank you for helping our peace process. 
If we can harness the forces of good in our nation, the positive force at 
work here at home and those from abroad such as the US, Malaysia, the 
OIC and others, we shall prevail in Mindanao with a peace agreement that 
brings freedom and hope to all Filipinos.  With this peace, we would reap 
dividends in resources invested in agribusiness, not aggression, to build 
up, not tear down, the Philippine South. (2006) 
 
17. We have created a Philippine model for reconciliation built on inter-faith 
dialogue, expanded public works and more responsive social services.  
These investments show both sides in the Mindanao conflict that they have 
more at stake in common; and a greater reason to be together than hang 
apart, including being together isolating the terrorists. 
Imprastraktura ang haliging nagtitindig hindi lamang ng kapayapaan 
kundi ng ating buong makabagong ekonomiya: mga kalsada, tulay, 
paliparan, public parks and power plants (Trans. Infrastructure is the pillar 
that establishes not only peace but an entirely modern economy: roads, 
bridges, airports, public parks and power plants.) (2007) 
 
In extract 17, the ‘caravan of tractors’ and foreign donations and investment from 
world organizations like the United Nations and the Organization of Islamic 
Conference, countries like the United States, Japan, and Australia, regional groupings 
like the ASEAN and the European Union are conceptualized as having transformative 
capacity in that they can change rebel camps into farms and productive residential 
areas for former rebels.  They constitute the ‘forces of good’ that can hasten the peace 
process necessary to realize the transcendental values of ‘freedom’ and ‘hope.’  Peace, 
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on the other hand, is conceptualized as that which would enable the country ‘to reap 
dividends in resources invested in agribusiness’ necessary to build a modern 
Mindanao.  This last point develops the conceptualization INFRASTRUCTURE IS AN 
INSTRUMENT OF PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT by suggesting that PEACE IS KEY TO 
RESOURCE GENERATION NEEDED FOR A MODERN MINDANAO.   
In extract 18, investment in infrastructure is conceptualized as ‘the pillar’ that 
establishes peace and a modern society in general (‘ang haligi na nagtitindig hindi 
lamang ng kapayapaan kundi ng ating buong makabagong ekonomiya’). Along with 
the ‘inter-faith dialogue’ and ‘more responsive social services,’ ‘expanded public 
works’ are thought of as constitutive of ‘the Philippine model for reconciliation.’  
Emphasis on infrastructure or public works reveals a proclivity for details and for 
something concrete which is actually in consonance with Arroyo’s image as a micro-
manager. 
The urgency for dialogue was emphasized in the 2008 SONA. In the following 
extract, Arroyo privileged ‘talk’ over ‘fight’ and advocated sorting out political 
dynamics in Mindanao through ‘utmost sobriety, patience, and restraint.’  
 
18. A comprehensive peace has eluded us for half a century.  But last night, 
differences on the tough issue of ancestral domain were resolved.  Yes, 
there are political dynamics among the people of Mindanao.  Let us sort 
them out with utmost sobriety, patience and restraint.  I ask Congress to 
act on the legislative and political reforms that will lead to a just and 
lasting peace during our term of office. 
The demands of decency and compassion urge dialogue.  Better 
talk than fight, if nothing sovereign value is anyway lost. Dialogue has 
achieved more than confrontation in many parts of the world.  This was the 
message of the recent World Conference in Madrid organized by the King 
of Saudi Arabia, and the universal message of Pope in Sydney. 
Pope Benedict’s encyclical Deus Caritas Est reminds us: ‘There 
will always be situations of material need where help in the form of 





The word choices such as ‘utmost sobriety, patience, and restraint,’ ‘demands of 
decency and compassion,’ and ‘dialogue’ as well as allusions to the World 
Conference in Madrid, which appealed to the transcendental value of peace, were 
important in selling a controversial Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on ancestral 
domains signed by the Arroyo government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
which was later rendered unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. On the other hand, 
they were important in establishing Arroyo’s adherence to peaceful modes of 
resolving conflict in order to downplay accusations of state terror, state repression, 
and political killings.  Privileging talk over war positioned the Arroyo government on 
a high moral ground.  It communicated that peace took precedence in the Arroyo 
schema. 
9.5.3 PEACE TALKS ARE THE MEANS TO RESOLVE AGE-OLD INTERNAL 
CONFLICTS 
 The adherence to peaceful and democratic means to resolve conflict was 
sustained in Arroyo’s valedictory SONA in 2009.  In fact, she not only talked about 
the prospect of peace talks with MILF but also with the Communist Party of the 
Philippines.  The statements below underlie the conceptualization PEACE TALKS ARE 
THE MEANS TO RESOLVE AGE-OLD INTERNAL CONFLICTS.  This was important in 
establishing the value of what Arroyo had done to resolve ‘inherited’ and ‘age-old’ 
conflicts with the Moro and communist rebels. On the other hand, it worked to 
differentiate Arroyo’s peace-oriented policy from that of her predecessor’s (‘a 
politically popular but near-sighted policy of massive retaliation’), thereby asserting 
the importance of her rise as president and her hold of power. 
 
19. Namana natin ang pinakamatagal na rebelyon ng Komunista sa buong 
mundo. (We inherited the longest communist rebellion in the world.) 
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Si Leah de la Cruz, isa sa labindalawang libong rebel returnee. 
Sixteen pa lang siya nang sumali sa NPA. Naging kasapi sa regional White 
Area Committee, na-promote sa Leyte Party Committee Secretary. Nahuli 
noong 2006. (Trans. Leah de la Cruz is one of the 12 thousand rebel 
returnees. She was only sixteen when she joined the NPA.  She became a 
member of the White Area Committee and was then promoted at as Leyte 
Party Committee Secretary.) She is now involved in an LGU-supported 
handicraft livelihood training of former rebels. We love you, Leah! 
There is now a good prospect for peace talks with both the 
Communist Party of the Philippines and the MILF, with whom we are now 
on ceasefire. 
We inherited an age-old conflict in Mindanao, exacerbated by a 
politically popular but near-sighted policy of massive retaliation.  This 
only provoked the other side to continue the war. 
In these two internal conflicts, ang tanong ay hindi, ‘Sino ang 
mananalo?’ kundi, bakit pa ba kailangang mag-laban ang kapwa Pilipino 
tungkol sa isyu na alam naman nating lahat na di malulutas sa dahas, at 
mareresolba lang sa paraang demokratiko? (Trans. In these two internal 
conflicts, the question is not ‘Who is going to win?’ but, why should there 
be a need to fight fellow Filipinos on an issue that we all know cannot be 
resolved through force, but only through democratic means?) 
There is nothing more that I wish for than peace in Mindanao. It 
would be a blessing for all its people, Muslim, Christian and lumads.  It 
will show other religiously divided communities that there can be common 
ground on which to live together in peace, harmony and cooperation that 
respects each other’s religious beliefs. (2008) 
 
 
Arroyo’s use of ‘peace talks’ and ‘democratic means’ to resolve conflict with the 
communist and Moro rebels should not, however, be taken as a mere rejection of 
earlier policies on using force to ‘defend democracy.’ Their use can be seen as 
strategic in sending the message that it was Arroyo’s policy to adhere to peaceful 
methods of resolving the age-old conflicts, but that it invoked the use of force when 
threat became imminent. In fact, in the same speech, Arroyo justified what may be 
considered militaristic solution to conflict: 
 
As I have shown, I will defend democracy with arms when it is threatened by 
violence; with firmness when it is weakened by division; with law and order 
when it is subverted by anarchy; and always, I will try to sustain it by wise 
policies of economic progress, so that a democracy means not just empty 






9.6 The presidency 
 In Arroyo’s SONAs from 2005 to 2009, interrelated conceptual frames with 
regard to the presidency emerge as crucial to her assertion of presidential legitimacy.  
Each of these conceptualizations will be substantiated in separate sub-sections: 
 
(9.5.1)    THE CURRENT POLITICAL SYSTEM IS A BARRIER TO FULL 
NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
(9.5.2)    THE CHARTER CHANGE IS A MECHANISM FOR POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC CHANGE  
(9.5.3)    THE ARROYO PRESIDENCY IS A CONSCIENTIOUS WORKER AND A 
CAREGIVER 
(9.5.4)    ARROYO IS THE ECONOMIC REDEEMER OF THE PHILIPINES 
 
 
9.6.1 THE CURRENT POLITICAL SYSTEM IS A BARRIER TO FULL NATIONAL 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The damaging political crisis in 2005 also propelled Gloria Macapagal Arroyo 
to set a new agenda for public debate and discussion. In her 2005 SONA, Arroyo 
declared: ‘It is time to start the great debate on Charter change.’ She was of course 
referring to changes in the 1987 Constitution and recommended a shift from the 
presidential form of government to a federal parliamentary form similar to some of 
the Philippines’ neighbors in the ASEAN region.  The pursuit of charter change put 
forth two related conceptualizations that had to do with Arroyo’s framing of 
presidential leadership after the 2005 crisis: THE CURRENT POLITICAL SYSTEM IS A 
BARRIER TO FULL NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT and THE CHARTER 
CHANGE IS A MECHANISM FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE. 
Arroyo blamed the current political system for the difficulties that her 
administration had been facing—especially the difficulty to push her legislative 
agenda because of the often tenuous relationship between the executive and the 
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legislative branches of government.  Such sentiment underlay the conceptualization 
THE CURRENT POLITICAL SYSTEM IS A BARRIER TO FULL NATIONAL ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT.   
Arroyo characterized the political system as a ‘burden’ on the anticipated 
economic ‘take off,’ a ‘hindrance’ to national progress, an impediment to 
development, and a system that ‘has degenerated’ and ‘betrayed its promise to the 
new generation of Filipinos.’ These are expressed in the following extract: 
 
20. The other message to send is that we will address the burden that the other 
Philippine story imposes on our anticipated take off.  I refer to the story of 
how our political system has now become a hindrance to our national 
progress.  
Over the years, our political system has degenerated to the extent 
that it is difficult for anyone to make any headway yet keep his hands 
clean.  To be sure, the system is still capable of achieving great reforms.  
But, by and large, our political system has betrayed its promise to each 
new generation of Filipinos, not a few of whom are voting with their feet, 




9.6.2 CHARTER CHANGE IS A MECHANISM FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
CHANGE 
In proposing charter change, Arroyo pitched the following reasons: (1) that the 
Charter change would bring people closer to the government through federalism; (2) 
that the new form of government would work at every level and would ‘not end 
before the closed door of a bureaucrat in Metro Manila’; and (3) that the sooner the 
fundamental change is done the better for the country.  These reasons underlie the 
conceptualization that CHARTER CHANGE IS A MECHANISM FOR POLITICAL 
CHANGE.  On the other hand, Arroyo also conceptualized the proposed constitutional 





21. I shall work with Congress, civil society groups and local government 
executives who are convinced that charter changes are needed to enable 




When she talked about new challenges or ‘the challenges of the 21st century,’ Arroyo 
necessarily referred to the demands of the global economic order. The charter change 
then as a mechanism for surmounting ‘unprecedented challenges’ can also be 
articulated as A MECHANISM FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE, that is, a mechanism for 
realigning the fundamental law of the Philippines to the rules of the a world economic 
order that espoused the liberalization of national economies.  This is indicated in the 
following where Arroyo talked of a major concern that the charter change should 
address: 
 
We must address such questions as how much more government is needed for 
the greater safety and economic security of our people, and how much less 




By proposing a change in the fundamental law of the country, Arroyo was therefore 
not only asserting her leadership in setting a new agenda or in changing the course of 
public debate and discussion, but also in launching the Philippines’ position in the 
global arena. 
Arroyo did not conceal her preference for the Constituent Assembly mode in 
amending the charter.  The Constituent Assembly would allow the two congressional 
bodies—the House of Representatives and the Senate—to sit down as one body in 
pursuing constitutional amendments. Arroyo knew that she had a control of the 
majority in the House of Representatives which clearly outnumbered the Senators 
whose majority were critical of her administration.  This and her preference for 
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federalism in her proposed charter change can be seen as Arroyo’s strategic move to 
consolidate support from the regions.  In her SONA, she acknowledged the local 
government executives that were present in the hall and bolstered the position of the 
regions and provinces by citing their accomplishments vis-à-vis national 
development.  It is interesting to note that from here on, she would constantly use the 
issue of decentralization to rally her supporters from the regions behind her while 
situating Manila as the IMPERIAL CAPITAL (‘Imperial Manila’ in 24) that benefits at 
the expense of the regions (‘from the center to the countryside that feeds it,’ ‘an 
inequitable concentration from Manila’ in 23 and 25). 
 
22. The economic progress and social stability of the provinces, along with the 
increasing self-reliance and efficiency of political developments and public 
services there, make a compelling case for federalism.  
Perhaps, it’s time to take the power from the center to the 
countryside that feeds it. (2005) 
 
23. We now have the funds for constitutional and electoral changes.  Sa 
kasalukuyang sistema, napakabagal ng proseso, at bukas sa labis na 
pagtutunggali, at sikil ang lalawigan at mamamayan sa paghahari ng 
Imperial Manila.  Panahon nang ibalik ang kapangyarin sa taumbayan at 
lalawigan (In the current system, the process is slow and open to too much 
fighting, and the provinces and the people are constrained by the 
dominance of Imperial Manila.). (2006) 
 
24. Last year I unveiled the Super Regions—Mindanao, Central Philippines, 
North Luzon Agribusiness Quadrangle, Luzon Urban Beltway and the 
Cyber Corridor—to spread development away from an inequitable 
concentration in Metro Manila. Hindi lamang Maynila ang Pilipinas 
(Trans. The Philippines is only Manila).(2007) 
 
 
9.6.3 THE ARROYO PRESIDENCY IS A CONSCIENTIOUS WORKER AND A 
CAREGIVER 
The barrier posed by the political system notwithstanding, Arroyo was also out 
to prove that THE ARROYO PRESIDENCY IS A CONSCIENTIOUS WORKER.  From 
2005 to 2009, she intensified this persona in her congressional speeches by spelling 
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out what had been done, what was being done, and what would be pursued further 
during the rest of her term.   
Arroyo put great emphasis on the said persona through expressions that 
indicate her government’s focus on work as well as calls for unity while suggesting 
that criticisms leveled against her office by the opposition posed unnecessary 
restraint.  The following extracts show this: 
 
25. Now is not the time for divisiveness, and while there’s no avoiding 
partisan politics, there can be a determined effort by all sides to limit the 
collateral damage on a country poised for take off. (2005) 
 
26. Bickering in politics may delay, but not derail the initiatives that need to 
be taken on our pro-poor, pro-growth, and pro-peace agenda. (2006) 
 
27. For those who want to pick old fights, we’re game but what a waste of 
time.  Why not join hands instead? Join hands in biggest challenge of all, 
where we all win or we all lose: battle for the survival and progress of our 
one and only country. (2006) 
 
28. I stand in the way of no one’s ambition.  I only ask that one stand in the 
way of the people’s well being and the nation’s progress.  
The time for facing off is over.  The time is here for facing forward 
to a better future our people so desperately want and richly deserve. (2007) 
 
29. There isn’t a day I do not work at my job or a waking moment when I do 
not think through a work-related problem.  Even my critics cannot 
begrudge the long hours I put in.  Our people deserve a government that 
works just as hard as they do. 
A President must be on the job 24/7, ready for any contingency, 
any crisis, anywhere, anytime. 
Everything right can be undone by a single wrong. Every step 
forward must be taken in the teeth of political pressures and economic 
constraints that could push you two steps back if you flinch and falter. I 
have not flinched, I have not faltered. Hindi ako umaatras sa hamon 
(Trans. I do not retreat from a challenge.). (2009) 
 
 
Extracts 24 to 28 show how Arroyo regarded criticisms against her office as an 
unnecessary and useless suggesting that CRITICISM FROM THE OPPOSITION IS A 
DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITY.  By using expressions such as ‘divisiveness’, ‘bickering in 
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politics’, ‘those who want to pick up old fights’, and ‘facing off’, Arroyo trivialized 
the position of her political enemies. In extract 28, she cast herself as one with  an 
impeccable work ethic—a ‘President on the job 24/7’—and one who does not 
surrender to challenges posed by political pressure and economic constraints. The 
strategy worked to legitimize her position as a national leader while delegitimizing 
that of her critics. 
To counter claims that she was unpopular among her constituents, Arroyo 
asserted that she would rather be ‘right than popular’ (30) and that her role as 
president and as a national leader was to do ‘what is necessary’ (31), ‘to work, to lead, 
to preserve and protect our country, our people’ (32).  These assertions worked to 
dismiss what she termed as ‘unfriendly’ popularity polls which showed her to be the 
most unpopular president since Ferdinand Marcos and to prove wrong her critics from 
the business sector—‘those cocooned in corporate privilege [who] refuse to recognize 
[that the administration is doing something right]’ (33).  The following extracts 
express how Arroyo dealt with the issue on her unpopularity: 
 
30. We were able to strengthen our economy because of the fiscal reforms that 
we adopted at such great cost to me in public disapproval.  But I would 
rather be right than popular. (2007) 
 
31. We have come too far and made too many sacrifices to turn back now on 
fiscal reforms.  Leadership is not about doing the first easy thing that 
comes to mind; it is about doing what is necessary, however hard. 
The government has persevered, without flip flops, in its much 
criticized but irreplaceable policies, including oil and power VAT and oil 
deregulation. (2008) 
 
32. I did not become President to be popular. To work, to lead, to protect and 
preserve our country, our people, that is why I became President.  When 
my father left the Presidency, we were second to Japan.  I want our 
Republic to be ready for the first world in 20 years. (2009) 
 
33. Our administration, with the highest average of rate of growth, recording 
multiple increases in investments, with the largest job creation in history, 
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and which gets a credit upgrade at the height of a world recession, must be 
doing something right, even if some of those cocooned in corporate 
privilege refuse to recognize it. (2009) 
 
Note that in extract 30, Arroyo indicated her awareness of the unpopularity of her 
fiscal reforms, especially the VAT (value-added tax).  She, however, saw this as an 
important opportunity for her to assert the strength of her leadership.  By asserting her 
leadership against the backdrop of an unpopular policy, Arroyo was giving off the 
message that her low popularity ratings were due to ‘tough policy choices’ and not 
because of corruption scandals and misuse of presidential powers as her critics would 
claim.  On the other hand, her affirmation of VAT was also a reaffirmation of the neo-
liberal policy that she inherited and continued from the previous administrations.  
VAT and other fiscal reforms then also served as her tools for legitimizing her 
tenuous hold of presidential leadership while they allowed Arroyo to remain anchored 
on the neoliberal agenda of the world economic order. 
Accentuating her working president rhetoric was her rhetoric of care. In the 
following extracts, Arroyo projected herself as a protector of the people in the face of 
the global crisis (33), a leader whose concern is a ‘responsive and accountable’ 
government (34), as a champion of the people’s wellbeing (35), and as a selfless 
caretaker of the people (36).  These characterizations manifest the conceptualization 
that THE ARROYO PRESIDENCY IS A CAREGIVER. 
 
34. Many more have nothing to protect them from the immediate blunt force 
trauma of the global crisis.  Tulad ninyo, nag-aalala ako para sa kanila.  Ito 
ang mga taong bayan na dapat samahan natin (Trans. Like you, I worry for 
them. They are the people that we need to attend to.). Not only because of 
their sacrifices for our country but because they are our countrymen. 
(2008) 
 
35. I call on all our government workers at the national and local levels to be 
more responsive and accountable to the people.  Panahon ito ng pagsubok.  
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Kung saan kayang tumulong at dapat tumulong ang pamahalaan, we must 
be there with a helping hand.  Where government can contribute nothing 
useful, stay away.  Let’s be more helpful, more courageous, more quick.  
Kaakibat ng ating adhikain ang tuloy na pagkalinga sa kapakanan 
ng bawat Pilipino.  Iisa ang ating pangarap—maunlad at mapayapang 
lipunan, kung saan ang magandang kinabukasan ay hindi pangarap 
lamang, bagkus natutupad. (Trans. Part of our aspiration is the continuous 
care for the welfare of each Filipino. We have one dream—a progressive 
and peaceful society where a bright future is not just a dream but a reality.) 
(2008) 
 
36. As your President, I care too much about this nation to let anyone stand in 
the way of our people’s well-being.  Hindi ko papayagang humadlang ang 
sinuman sa pag-unlad at pagsagana ng taong bayan. I will let no one—and 
no one’s political plans—threaten our nation’s survival. (2009) 
 
37. Governance, however, is not about looking back and getting even.  It is 
about looking forward and giving more—to the people who gave us the 
greatest, hardest gift of all: the care of the country. (2009) 
 
 
Thus, in Arroyo’s presidential schema, working president is also a caring one 
especially towards ‘the people.’ 
9.6.4    ARROYO IS THE ECONOMIC REDEEMER OF THE PHILIPPINES 
Complementing the conceptualization THE ARROYO PRESIDENCY IS A 
WORKING AND CARING PRESIDENCY is the conceptualization that ARROYO IS THE 
ECONOMIC REDEEMER OF THE PHILIPPINES. 
In her valedictory SONA, Arroyo gave out the specific results of her economic 
policies and especially underscored how her administration had addressed problems 
inherited from her predecessors.  This was again an opportunity to legitimize her hold 
of power. In the following extract, for instance, she asserted that her government did 
the heroic act of ‘exorcising’ the ‘demon of foreign debt’ while the past 
administrations merely ‘conjured’ it: 
 
38. The next generation will also benefit from our lower public debt to GDP 
ratio. It declined from 78% in 2000 to 55% in 2008. We cut in half the 
debt of government corporations from 15% to 7%. Likewise foreign debt 
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from 73% to 32%. Kung meron man tayong malaking kaaway na tinalo, 
walang iba kundi ang utang (If there is one big enemy that we defeated, it 
is our foreign debt.) Those in the past administrations conjured the demon 
of foreign debt. We exorcised it. 
 
 
The metaphorization of debt as an enemy and its reduction as a dramatic form of 
defeating or ‘exorcising’ the enemy portrayed Arroyo as some sort of an economic 
redeemer—a ‘messiah’ to borrow the term from Nadal (2010)—that the Philippines 
needed all this time. 
 The conceptualization of Arroyo as THE ECONOMIC REDEEMER OF THE 
PHILIPPINES further personalizes the Philippine presidency. It downplays the 
historical context of the problem of foreign debt by obviating the circumstances faced 
and efforts exerted by the previous administrations in addressing the problem of 
foreign debt.  Moreover, it casts the Arroyo presidency as the necessary heroine who 
accomplished what her predecessors failed to do.  
 
9.7 Summary 
This chapter sought to spell out the frames and conceptualizations that make 
up the schema of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s presidency after it faced a major 
political crisis in 2005—a crisis the put the legitimacy of her election as a full term 
President into question.  As in the previous chapters, it examined the 
conceptualizations relating to democracy, national economy, national security/peace 
and order, and the presidency as expressed and realized in the SONAs delivered from 
2005 to 2009. 
In Arroyo’s speeches, democracy is conceptualized as A VALUE THAT FINDS 
EXPRESSION IN THE NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES.  This 
conceptualization was important in affirming democratic institutions and practices 
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which Arroyo invoked as her hold of power became tenuous due to questions on her 
presidential legitimacy.  Due to attempted military coups and challenges posed by 
communist and Moro rebels, Arroyo had to express through her speeches the 
conceptualization that DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF THREAT and that her 
government had always been ready and prepared to protect it.  Both 
conceptualizations of democracy were important building blocks of Arroyo’s strategy 
to legitimize her hold of power.  The first was used to undermine attempts at using 
extra-constitutional and extra-legal acts to remove her from power while the second 
cast herself as the country’s much-needed leader in the face of threat from the military 
and communist and Moro rebels. 
In 2005, Arroyo conceptualized the national economy as a STRONG AND 
COMPETITIVE VOYAGER and broadly as A PROTAGONIST IN THE UNFOLDING STORY 
OF NATIONAL PROGRESS.  She attributed the protagonist’s strength to her fiscal 
reforms and economic policies which she conceptualized as RESOURCE GENERATORS 
and LIBERATING FORCES.  To Arroyo, these fiscal reforms were needed to fund a 
grand public investment project that sought to create ‘Super Regions’ meant to brand 
the Philippines as A UNIQUE DESTINATION OF FOREIGN TOURISTS AND INVESTORS 
and accelerate its transformation into a First World Country. Later, these fiscal 
reforms were also considered as the economy’s MECHANISMS FOR SURVIVAL amid 
the global economic crisis which Arroyo conceptualized as A NATURAL CALAMITY. 
To underscore the importance of her administration’s role and its fiscal reform 
policies in the midst of the crisis, Arroyo expressed through her speeches that THE 
NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A SURVIVOR.  
In the aspect of national security and peace and order, Arroyo carried on with 
her tough stance against the communist rebels.  She employed the conceptualization 
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REBELLION IS TERRORISM in consonance with the United States watch list of 
‘terrorist groups’ that included the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s 
Army. This was a continuation of her recontextualization of the US-led ‘war on 
terror’ (2002-2004).  However, she later abandoned this after her administration was 
heavily criticized for the rise of extra-judicial killings. A United Nations report which 
implicated the military in the political killings made Arroyo reconsider her stance 
towards the rebels. Arroyo explicitly expressed her administration’s adherence to the 
peaceful resolution of the ‘age-old’ conflicts with the communist rebels and the 
Moros. The conceptualization of the communist and Moro rebellions as long-standing 
conflicts inherited from the previous administrations was a strategic move to contrast 
the Arroyo government’s policy with that of the previous presidency which declared 
an all-out war against the Moro rebels in Southern Philippines.  Arroyo had taken a 
conciliatory stance towards the Moro rebels and insisted that INFRASTRUCTURE IS 
AN INSTRUMENT OF PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT and that PEACE IS KEY TO 
RESOURCE GENERATION NEEDED FOR A MODERN MINDANAO. These 
conceptualizations were important in Arroyo’s vision to transform Mindanao into a 
‘Super Region’—one of five needed to accelerate the Philippines’ voyage into a First 
World status. 
In the political front, Arroyo conceptualized the current political system as a 
BARRIER TO THE COUNTRY’S FULL DEVELOPMENT. She used this to account for the 
challenges faced by her executive leadership after the 2005 political crisis. To set a 
new agenda for public debate and discussion, Arroyo proposed charter change which 
she conceptualized not only as a MECHANISM FOR POLITICAL CHANGE but also as a 
MECHANISM FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE especially in the context of the global 
economic order.  This did not only show Arroyo’s capacity to set the national agenda, 
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but also her capacity to initiate moves to realign the fundamental law of the land with 
the world economic order’s demands for economic liberalization. 
Arroyo’s strategies to assert the legitimacy of her presidency included 
showing that she was serious about her work as president and that hers was a caring 
government. These put forth the conceptualizations that THE ARROYO PRESIDENCY 
IS A CONSCIENTIOUS WORKER and A CAREGIVER which were expressed in various 
ways across her speeches from 2005 to 2009.  Complementing these frames is the 
conceptualization ARROYO IS THE ECONOMIC REDEEMER OF THE PHILIPPINES 
which further personalizes the role of the presidency in effecting change. 
The conceptualizations employed by Arroyo may be seen as continuations of 
her rhetoric before the 2005 crisis and are reminiscent of the conceptualizations used 
by her predecessors. For instance, her characterization of the economy as a strong 
character in the unfolding story of national progress and as a survivor in the global 
economic crisis was reminiscent of Ramos’ conceptualization of the Philippine 
economy as a participant in the survival-of-the-fittest economic order—and this 
shows continuity in terms of economic policy. What might have differentiated 
Arroyo’s schema from her previous schema prior to the 2005 crisis and from that of 
her predecessors was the fact that her employment of frames and conceptualizations 
were anchored on the need to assert her presidential legitimacy. The context within 
which Arroyo communicated her leadership and the state of the nation constrained as 
well as defined how these conceptualizations worked rhetorically.    In a way, it was 
convenient for Arroyo to invoke earlier conceptualizations of democracy in order to 
fortify her position as president.  It was also necessary for her to highlight the strength 
and resilience of the Philippine economy to show that her fiscal reforms worked and 
that she knew what she was doing.  She had to assert her tough position with regard to 
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the communist and Moro rebellion and military adventurists to show who was in 
control.  Later, she had to soften her stance in the dealing with these groups to show 
that her government was pro-peace, was not guilty of state terrorism, and was 
responsive to the calls to end the rising extra-judicial killings during her watch.  
Meanwhile, she had to cast her presidency as a working presidency to differentiate 
herself from her predecessor and to show that in spite of criticisms and challenges 
leveled against her office—including several attempts at impeachment—she remained 
focused, strong, and determined to lead the country towards a ‘modernized economy’ 
and to finish her full term.  Her presidency from 2005 to 2009 then can be defined as 










Schemas of the State of the Nation: Continuities and Discontinuities in  





This chapter compares and contrasts schemas of the four post-Marcos 
presidencies by examining similarities and differences in the framing and 
conceptualizations of the four themes of democracy, national economy, peace and 
security, and the presidency.  Specifically, the chapter looks at what 
conceptualizations were sustained across the four presidencies, what were replaced, 
subverted or recontextualized, and what accounts for the conceptualizations’ 
constancy or variation.  I address this concern in two discussion sections.  In both 
sections, I not only make comparisons among the four presidencies under question, 
but also show how they compare with the rhetoric of Marcos established in Chapter 4. 
The first section discusses the key emphases in the four post-Marcos 
presidencies while the second is a theme-based analysis of the conceptual frames and 
metaphors across the four presidencies.  The first section is meant to establish 
differences and similarities in terms of what themes were given prominence in the 
post-Marcos presidencies.  In the section, I shall also discuss why certain themes were 
given emphasis over others, how these emphasized themes configure with other 
themes to form schemas of the state of the nation and presidential leadership, and how 
they figure in relation to the rhetoric of Marcos during his authoritarian rule.  
The purpose of the second discussion section is to show the commonalities 
and variations in the way the focal themes are talked about and conceptualized across 
the four presidencies.  In this section I establish that these commonalities and 
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differences reflect continuities and discontinuities in terms of political beliefs and 
policies among the four presidencies, as well as in relation to Marcos’ rhetoric during 
his authoritarian regime.  I also show how these continuities and discontinuities work 
towards or against social discourses that dominate the national and global contexts. 
A summary is found at the end of the chapter. 
10.2 Key emphases in the post-Marcos presidencies 
In this section, I discuss, based on the analytical chapters, the theme or themes 
that were prioritized or given significant emphasis in each of the four presidencies. To 
show this, I present a table of conceptual frames and metaphors that constitute each 
presidential schema. I also explain why such theme or themes were given emphasis by 
each presidency. 
10.2.1 Corazon Aquino’s SONAs (1987-1991) 
 Democracy was the key emphasis in the presidential rhetoric of Corazon 
Aquino.  This is demonstrated in the following table which shows the conceptual 




Table 10.1 Conceptual frames and metaphors in Corazon C. Aquino’s SONAs (1987-1991) 
Theme Conceptualizations (frames and conceptual metaphors) 
DEMOCRACY  DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 
THAT SUSTAINS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL LIFE 
 DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING SYSTEM THAT HAD BEEN 
RENDERED WEAK UNDER MARCOS DICTATORSHIP 
 THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL 
ACHIEVEMENT 
 DEMOCRACY IS PEOPLE POWER 
 DEMOCRACY IS LIFE-SUSTAINING SYSTEM 
 DEMOCRACY IS A BENEFACTOR OF THE NATION 
 DEMOCRACY IS A NURTURER 
 DEMOCRACY IS A RESOURCE FOR PEOPLE POWER 
 DEMOCRACY IS A CURE TO THE NATIONAL ILLS 
 DEMOCRACY IS A KEY TO A PEOPLE-POWERED 
ECONOMY/ CAPITALISM CONDUCIVE TO GROWTH
NATIONAL 
ECONOMY 
 NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A MANIFESTATION OF NATIONAL 
LIFE 
 THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS AN AILING PERSON 
 POVERTY IS A DESTRUCTIVE FORCE THAT HAS KEPT THE 
NATIONAL ECONOMY IN A MISERABLE STATE 
 THE MARCOS DICTATORSHIP WAS AN AGGRAVATOR OF 
THE ALREADY MISERABLE STATE OF THE NATIONAL 
ECONOMY. 
 THE WORLD ECONOMY AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY ARE LIFE-SOURCES AND BENEFACTORS OF 
THE NATIONAL ECONOMY 
 THE AQUINO GOVERNMENT IS AN INVIGORATOR OF THE 





 REBELLION AND CRIMINALITY ARE THREATS TO 
DEMOCRACY AND THE NATIONAL LIFE 
 THE COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IS A DISEASE 
 THE COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IS TERRORISM 
 THE MILITARY REBELS ARE TERRORISTS 
 THE MILITARY REBELS ARE DESTROYERS 
 THE MILITARY COUP PLOTTERS ARE EVIL 
 THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT UNDER THE NEW 
GOVERNMENT IS A DEFENDER OF THE PEOPLE AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 
 THE ARMED FORCES ARE A PARTNER OF THE CIVILIAN 
BUREAUCRACY 
 THE ARMED FORCES ARE DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS 
 THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST THE REBELS IS 
PEACEMAKING 
 THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IS SECURITY OPERATIONS IN 
THE GOVERNMENT’S COUNTER-INSURGENCY STRATEGY 
 THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IS A DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION 
TO INSURGENCY 
 THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE TO DEFEND DEMOCRACY 
AND THE NATION IS A MORAL ACT 
THE 
PRESIDENCY  
 THE GOVERNMENT IS A MORAL COMBATANT, A PROTECTOR 
OF THE PEOPLE AND THE PRIMARY AGENT OF DEMOCRACY 
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The table shows a multilevel conceptualization of democracy across Aquino’s 
presidential addresses.  It is arguably the most well developed theme in the Aquino 
addresses.  Also, the conceptualizations of democracy were significant to Aquino’s 
conceptualization of other themes.  This is evident in the way Aquino linked certain 
metaphorizations of democracy with the national economy, peace and security, and 
the presidency.  As mentioned in Chapter 5, the multi-layered framing of democracy 
was well entrenched in the Cory Aquino rhetoric that it figured quite prominently in 
the conceptualizations of other themes.   For instance, democracy or democratization 
was seen as key to the recovery and growth of the national economy which was 
conceptualized in Aquino’s speeches as a manifestation of the national life. 
Democracy was also used as a reason for justifying militaristic policies against 
rebellion and criminality.  It was rendered as the object of defense while both the 
rebels from the ranks of the communists and the military were metaphorized as 
terrorist threats to the newly restored democracy.  Through the SONAs, the Aquino 
government also cast itself as the primary agent of democracy which was significant 
in her overall framing of Philippine democracy and in her schema of the state of the 
nation. Such conceptualization acts as an important measure for evaluating the actions 
and public policies of post-authoritarian presidencies including that of Aquino.  The 
Aquino presidency being the leadership that replaced the Marcos authoritarian regime 
and the one that launched the restoration of democracy, its conceptualization of 
Philippine presidential leadership has consequently become the basis for how its 
successors have worked towards balancing their use of state powers on the one hand 
and their commitment to democratic ideals on the other.   
It can be inferred that the emphasis on democracy and democratization in 
Aquino’s SONAs was due to the socio-political context of the Aquino presidency, 
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Aquino’s persona as a heroine of democracy and the anti-thesis of Marcos, and the 
conscious and persistent effort of the Aquino administration to ‘de-Marcosify’ the 
Philippine government and society.  The Aquino presidency was a period of transition 
from dictatorship to democracy and it was during this time that the democratic 
institutions, basic freedoms, and civil liberties which were sacrificed during Marcos’ 
authoritarian rule were restored.  During this transition, Aquino consciously 
performed her role as the anti-thesis of Marcos, thus repudiating the dictatorial style 
of his leadership.  A distinct rhetorical strategy that Aquino employed to perform this 
role was to render a contrast between the ‘dark’ period of martial rule and the 
‘democratized’ state of the nation after the 1986 ‘people power’ revolution.  This 
reinforced the persona or image that Aquino had had cast for herself throughout, and 
even beyond, her presidency. 
10.2.2 Fidel V. Ramos’ SONAs (1992-1997) 
 While Aquino emphasized the theme of democracy and democratization in her 
SONAs, Fidel Ramos put premium on the idea of global competitiveness.  Clearly, 
the key emphasis in Ramos’ presidential rhetoric was the national economy and how 
it can be a competitive player in the arena of the world economic order.  This is 
apparent in the following table which shows the conceptual frames and metaphors that 




Table 10.2 Conceptual frames and metaphors in Fidel V. Ramos’ SONAs (1992-1997) 
Theme Conceptualizations (frames and conceptual metaphors) 
DEMOCRACY  DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 
THAT CAN SUSTAIN NATIONAL LIFE 
 DEMOCRACY IS A SOURCE OF NATIONAL STRENGTH 
 DEMOCRACY IS A RESOURCE FOR DEVELOPMENT 
 DEMOCRACY IS A FOUNDATION FOR A GOOD SOCIETY 
 DEMOCRACY IS A FUNCTIONAL SYSTEM THAT IS CAPABLE 
OF INITIATING CHANGE 
 DEMOCRACY IS A PRECURSOR FOR COMPETITIVENESS 
 DEMOCRACY IS A COMPETITIVE EDGE 
 DEMOCRACY IS A COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
NATIONAL 
ECONOMY 
 THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A COMPETITOR IN THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMIC ARENA 
 GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER IS A COMPETITIVE ARENA 
 THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER IS BASED ON THE 
SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST 
 THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER IS A SPORTS 
ARENA 
 THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER IS AN ADVENTURE 
 ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION IS AN ACCELERATOR OF 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND IS AN INCENTIVE FOR 
COMPETITIVENESS 
 PROTECTIONIST POLICIES ARE AN IMPEDIMENT TOWARDS 
ACHIEVING GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS 
 POVERTY ALLEVIATION IS WAR 
 POVERTY IS A SELF-PERPETUATING, OPPRESSIVE ENEMY 
 GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES ARE INTERVENTIONS OR WAR 
STRATEGIES AGAINST POVERTY 
 THE POOR ARE VICTIMS AND BENEFICIARIES OF 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS 






 NATIONAL STABILITY IS A PRECONDITION FOR ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS 
 REBELS ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO NATIONAL PROGRESS 
 REBELS ARE MISFITS/ WAYWARD MEMBERS OF SOCIETY 
 REBELS ARE A CONFLAGRATION 
 REBELS ARE DISEASES 
 PEACE TALKS AND AMNESTY ARE STEPS TOWARDS LASTING 
PEACE 
 GOVERNMENT POLICY AGAINST CRIMINALS IS A MORAL 
AND CIVILIZED WAR 
 DEATH PENALTY IS A DETERRENT TO CRIME 
 PROPOSAL TO RESTORE DEATH PENALTY IS A CIVILIZING 
INSTRUMENT 
 ANTI-CRIME EFFORT IS WAR 
THE 
PRESIDENCY 
 THE GOVERNMENT IS AN ENABLER OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
AND DEVELOPMENT 
 THE GOVERNMENT IS A PARENT 
 THE GOVERNMENT IS AN AGENT OF ECONOMIC 
LIBERALIZATION 




In his SONAs, Ramos emphasized the notion of global competitiveness 
especially with regard to the Philippine economy. This was in line with his 
government’s adoption of structural adjustment plans, which were part of its policy of 
economic liberalization.   
That the notion of ‘global competitiveness’ pervaded the Ramos presidential 
rhetoric is evidenced by the way through which the four themes of democracy, 
national economy, peace and security, and the presidency were framed and 
metaphorized in Ramos’ presidential addresses.  This was clearly a response to the 
global economic order that espoused the reduction of tariffs and trade liberalization.   
While Ramos reaffirmed Aquino’s framing of democracy in his earlier 
SONAs, he adopted a different frame in his latter speeches when he conceptualized 
democracy as a ‘comparative advantage’ or a ‘competitive edge’ in the global 
economic order.  This comparative advantage or competitive edge was seen as 
significant to the Philippines, particularly to the national economy, which Ramos 
conceptualized as a competitive participant in the ‘survival-of-the-fittest’ world 
economic order. 
In Ramos’ discourse of global competitiveness, economic liberalization was 
framed as a booster or accelerator of economic growth as well as an incentive for 
competitiveness.  This justified the Ramos administration’s economic policies that 
included tariff reduction, deregulation, and privatization, among others.  It also 
enabled the administration to render protectionist or nationalist economic policies as 
barriers or impediments to economic growth. 
With regard to the serious and almost intractable national problem of poverty, 
Ramos employed the war frame which conceptualized government initiatives and 
programs as ‘interventions’ to alleviate poverty.  Ramos’ war frame complemented 
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the competitive frame by highlighting the government’s primary role in empowering 
the poor.  Although Ramos recognized the capacity of the poor to become agents of 
development, he nevertheless underscored that it is the government that ultimately 
decides which courses of action are enabling and disabling, which are empowering 
and disempowering.  This may have ensured that ‘interventions’ for poverty 
alleviation were not inconsistent with or inimical to the liberalization policies of the 
Ramos administration. 
In the peace and security front, Ramos framed national stability as the 
precondition for economic development and global competitiveness.  This 
necessitated that conflicts with military, communist, and Moro rebels, who were 
conceptualized as impediments to national progress, found resolution.  Ramos offered 
peace talks and granting of amnesty as solutions to the long-standing conflict with the 
rebels.  Meanwhile, he conceptualized the government policy on criminality as a 
moral and civilized war.  This worked to justify the government’s resolve to restore 
the law on death penalty which was repealed under the Aquino watch. 
In a presidential schema undergirded by the notion of competitiveness, Ramos 
conceptualized his presidency as an exercise in effective management—a 
conceptualization that emphasized managerial characteristics and values consistent 
with his government’s neoliberal orientation and his vision of the Philippines as a 
newly industrialized country—an economy with a ‘tiger’ status. 
10.2.3 Joseph E. Estrada’s SONAs (1998-2000) 
 The following table shows the conceptual frames and metaphors that 
constitute the Estrada schema as expressed in his SONAs delivered during his 




Table 10.3 Conceptual frames and metaphors in Joseph E. Estrada’s SONAs (1998-2000) 
Theme Conceptualizations (frames and conceptual metaphors) 
DEMOCRACY  DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF DEFENSE AND PROTECTION 
 DEMOCRACY IS A PRIZED IDEAL 
 DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING ENTITY 
 DEMOCRACY IS A STRUCTURE 
 DEMOCRACY IS AN ORGANIC ENTITY 
NATIONAL 
ECONOMY 
 THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A PATIENT IN NEED OF 
MEDICAL PRESCRIPTION 
 NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ARE HEALTH 
CONDITIONS 
 FINANCIAL CRISIS IS A HEALTH PROBLEM/ ILLNESS 
 THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AGENDA IS A MEDICAL 
PRESCRIPTION 
 THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A POTENTIAL DISASTER 
VICTIM 
 GLOBAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ARE WEATHER 
CONDITIONS 
 RADICAL RESTRUCTURING IS A MEANS TOWARDS 
COMPETITIVENESS 
 WAR ON POVERTY IS A PRESCRIPTION/ FORMULA FOR 
RECOVERY AND GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS 
 PROTECTIONIST POLICIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS TOWARDS 





 ARMED REBELLION AND CRIMINALITY ARE OBSTACLES TO 
SOCIAL PROGRESS, THREATS TO CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY, AND DISEASES/PESTS THAT NEED TO BE 
CRUSHED 
 ARMED REBELLION IS A CRIME 
 WAR IS PEACE
THE 
PRESIDENCY 
 THE PRESIDENT IS A TOUGH GUIDE, A VISIONARY, AND A 
LEARNER 
 
In his speeches, Estrada emphasized his tough persona, his macho image 
which ran consistent with his cinematic characters that made him a movie star in 
earlier years.  His tough rhetoric was manifested in the way he conceptualized the 
four focal themes in his three SONAs.  He conceptualized democracy as an object of 
protection and defense, which justified his rather antagonistic policies towards critics 
of the administration.  While using a combination of health, weather and journey 
metaphors to communicate the state of the national economy, he also positioned his 
administration as the necessary agent in finding cure for the economy afflicted with 
the disease brought about by the Asian financial crisis and as the ship captain that the 
nation needed to endure the stormy seas.  Like his predecessor, Estrada employed the 
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militarist metaphor of ‘war on poverty’ and recontextualized it as a prescription or 
formula for recovery and global competitiveness. This coupled with his use of words 
that suggest aggressiveness (e.g., ‘radical restructuring’ in favor of what he regarded 
as a ‘wimpish’ term, ‘reform’) contributed to his tough or macho rhetoric.    
The tough image of Estrada proved useful when he dealt with peace and 
security concerns.  It afforded him the opportunity to discredit the insurgents and 
criminals by metaphorizing them as diseases or pests that needed to be ‘crushed.’  
This common negative representation of rebellion and criminality—a representation 
that denies the humanness of both rebels and criminals—underlies the formulation 
ARMED REBELLION IS A CRIME, one that conflates the two forces.  Such formulation 
was not only consistent with Estrada’s crime buster persona; it also privileged a 
retributive kind of justice over the restorative kind (cf. Lazar and Lazar 2007).  
Furthermore, the ‘all out war’ declared by Estrada against Moro rebels may also be 
seen as part of his projection as a tough leader. 
In spite of the tough and aggressive rhetoric of Estrada, his policies remained 
consistent with the neoliberal policies adopted by the previous administrations.  This 
implies that the shift in rhetoric in the case of Estrada’s SONAs were more in 
consonance with the presidential image he wanted to project in public than with the 
supposed change in the way Philippine government was run.  Estrada merely 
sustained the neoliberal policy agenda pursued by the Aquino and Ramos 
governments. 
10.2.4 Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s SONAs (2001-2009) 
 Below, I present two tables that show the conceptual frames and metaphors 
constituting the schemas of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo before and after the political 





Table 10.4 Conceptual frames and metaphors in Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s SONAs (2001-04) 
Theme Conceptualizations (frames and conceptual metaphors) 
DEMOCRACY  DEMOCRACY IS A WEAPON  
 DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF THREAT 




 THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A MANIFESTATION OF 
NATIONAL LIFE 
 THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A LIVING ENTITY 
CONFRONTED BY POVERTY AND AFFLICTED BY CHRONIC 
DEFICIT 
 THE WAR AGAINST POVERTY IDEOLOGY IS THE FORMULA 
TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 (GLOBAL) WAR ON TERROR IS (THE PHILIPPINE) WAR ON 
POVERTY 





 CRIMINALITY AND TERRORISM ARE PARASITES/ DISEASES 
 CRIMINALS ARE TERRORISTS 
 REBELS ARE CRIMINALS 
 ‘WAR ON TERROR’ IS A CURATIVE TO REBELLION AND 
CRIMINALITY 




 A STRONG REPUBLIC IS AN EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT IN 
NATION BUILDING 
 THE GOVERNMENT IS THE ARM OF A STRONG REPUBLIC 




Table 10.5 Conceptual frames and metaphors in Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s SONAs (2005-09) 
Theme Conceptualizations (frames and conceptual metaphors) 
DEMOCRACY  DEMOCRACY IS A VALUE THAT FINDS EXPRESSION IN THE 
NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES 
 DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF THREAT
NATIONAL 
ECONOMY 
 NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A PROTAGONIST/ CHARACTER IN 
AN UNFOLDING STORY OF NATIONAL PROGRESS 
 FISCAL REFORMS ARE LIBERATING FORCES AND 
RESOURCE GENERATORS 
 THE PHILIPPINES IS A UNIQUE DESTINATION FOR TOURISM 
AND INVESTMENTS 
 THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A SURVIVOR IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMIC CRISIS 
 THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS IS A CALAMITY 





 REBELLION IS TERRORISM 
 INFRASTRUCTURE IS AN INSTRUMENT FOR PEACE AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
 PEACE IS KEY TO RESOURCE GENERATION NEEDED FOR A 
MODERN MINDANAO 




 THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IS A BARRIER TO THE COUNTRY’S 
FULL DEVELOPMENT 
 CHARTER CHANGE IS A MECHANISM FOR POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC REFORM 
 THE ARROYO PRESIDENCY IS A CONSCIENTIOUS WORKER 
AND A CAREGIVER 
 ARROYO IS THE ECONOMIC REDEEMER OF THE PHILIPPINES
 
 Commonalities and variations in the conceptualizations of the focal themes are 
evident in Tables 10.4 and 10.5 and they indicate the continuities and discontinuities 
in terms of beliefs and policies throughout Arroyo’s nine-year presidency.   Let me 
start with the commonalities. 
 In both schemas, Arroyo had notably conceptualized democracy as an object 
of threat.  This conceptualization, I argue, justified Arroyo’s use of hard power when 
dealing with perceived national threats.  In Arroyo’s earlier schema, the framing 
worked to justify the use of weaponry (‘arsenal’) and protective mechanism (‘self-
defense’) to combat the perceived national threat (‘criminality’ which was conflated 
with ‘rebellion’) to ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy.’ This complemented with two other 
conceptualizations—DEMOCRACY IS A WEAPON and DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL 
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FAITH THAT FILIPINOS HAVE FOUGHT FOR—bringing forth a formulation which ran 
parallel to the George W. Bush declaration that the ‘war on terror’ was a ‘crusade.’  In 
Arroyo’s second schema, the conceptualization of democracy as an object of threat 
justified her contested policies which included her Presidential Proclamation 1017, 
the calibrated preemptive response, and her counter-insurgency program Oplan 
Bantay Laya.  At the same time, it cast her as the country’s much needed leader in the 
face of threat from the rebels—military, communist, and Moro. 
 Conflation of rebellion and terrorism also ran consistent in the Arroyo SONAs 
from the early years of her presidency to her final year in office.  In recontextualizing 
the ‘war on terror’ discourse, Arroyo made the terms ‘rebellion’ and ‘criminality’ 
synonymous while establishing early on that criminality is a form of ‘terrorism.’  The 
conflation of these terms was strategic in that it allowed the government to target 
rebels in the same way that criminals were treated in the Philippine domestic war on 
terrorism.  It justified indiscriminate targeting of those critically opposed to the 
Arroyo administration, which could have possibly accounted for the rise in the cases 
of political executions during Arroyo’s presidency.  The tough stance against the 
rebels and the conflation of the terms ‘rebellion’ and ‘terrorism’ was sustained even in 
the SONAs delivered after the 2005 political crisis, although this was apparently 
abandoned when the Arroyo government was heavily criticized for the rise of extra-
judicial killings.  This criticism was backed up with a report prepared by Philip 
Alston, a United Nations rapporteur, whose findings indicated that the counter-
insurgency run by the military under the Arroyo watch was partly to blame for the rise 
in political executions of activists and those considered critical of the administration. 
Also, throughout her more than nine years as president, Arroyo emphasized 
her persona as a working president.  While this was originally meant to distinguish 
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herself from her predecessor whose work ethic was much criticized, the 
conceptualization THE ARROYO PRESIDENCY IS A CONSCIENTIOUS WORKER 
functioned towards legitimizing her hold of power.  It conveyed that despite the 
criticisms leveled against her office—including several attempts at impeachment—
she remained true to her constitutional duties as a national leader and was focused and 
serious in leading the country towards a ‘modern economy.’ 
Several variations or differences are also evident in the two schemas.  First, 
there is the difference in the way the national economy had been rendered in the pre- 
and post-2005 SONAs.  In Arroyo’s earlier schema, the national economy was 
conceptualized as a living entity confronted by poverty and afflicted by chronic 
deficit.  Such conceptualization rendered the economy as an object of challenges (that 
is, poverty and chronic deficit) which can only be overcome by government 
interventions that included the ‘war on poverty’ ideology.  ‘War on poverty’ was 
linked to the ‘global war on terror.’  Arroyo established through her SONAs that the 
country’s engagement in the global war on terror would translate to national 
development in that it would contribute to the country’s international visibility, which 
would bring in foreign investment and ‘capital flows.’  Arroyo argued that these were 
necessary to pursue her war on poverty agenda.  After the 2005 crisis, Arroyo 
emphasized the role of the economy as a strong and competitive subject—a voyager, a 
protagonist in the unfolding narrative of national progress, and a survivor in the global 
economic crisis rendered both as a critical health condition and a weather problem.   
Arroyo attributed the strength and resilience of the economy to her fiscal reforms and 
economic policies, casting her leadership role as a redeemer in the face of the global 
crisis.  The re-conceptualization of the national economy from being an object of 
challenges to being a subject emerging as strong and resilient from a global crisis 
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shows that the shifts in conceptual frames are not just motivated by changes in socio-
political contexts, but also by changes in political agenda—in Arroyo’s case, the need 
to assert her legitimacy after the 2005 political crisis. 
Another variation or difference in conceptualization is evident in terms of 
peace and security.  In her earlier schema, Arroyo emphasized the ‘war on terror’ 
discourse by applying the framework of the US-led global war on terror in dealing 
with the insurgents.  This, however, changed after the Alston Report was released.  
From an emphasis on ‘war on terror’ that was even linked to the ‘war on poverty,’ 
Arroyo shifted her emphasis to ‘peace.’  She conceptualized peace talks as the means 
to resolve age-old conflicts and even went on to conceptualize infrastructure as an 
instrument of peace and development.  This emphasis on ‘peace talks’ or ‘peaceful 
resolution’ to long-standing conflicts communicated that peace took precedence in the 
Arroyo schema, thereby downplaying accusations of state terror, state repression, and 
political killings.  While the shift in policy may have been due to the flak the US-led 
global war on terror was getting both in the international and local contexts, the need 
to save face after the release of a critical report on extra-judicial killings may have 
also accounted for the shift. 
Finally, there was a noticeable shift in the way the executive leadership was 
rendered in the Arroyo speeches.  In Arroyo’s earlier SONAs, she presented what was 
thought of as a sustained discourse on the ‘strong republic.’  After the crisis in 2005, 
Arroyo blamed the existing political system as a barrier to the country’s full 
development.  De-emphasizing on the ‘strong republic’ while putting the blame on the 
political system served—to borrow the words of Abinales and Amoroso (2005, 
280)—‘to highlight the real limitations of state capacity.’  Arroyo could not assert her 
‘strong republic’ so she had to resort to blaming the political system in order to 
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explain the 2005 political crisis that almost cut her full term short.  She then offered 
charter change or constitutional amendments as an agenda and conceptualized this 
proposed policy as a mechanism for political and economic change within the context 
of the global economic order.  This demonstrated not only Arroyo’s capacity to set the 
national agenda, but also her capacity to initiate moves to realign the fundamental law 
of the land with the global financial institutions prescription for economic 
liberalization. 
The two Arroyo’s schemas are quite similar to those of the earlier presidencies 
in a number of ways.  Her conceptualization of democracy as an object of threat 
resembles those of Marcos, Estrada, and even Aquino, all of whom had to justify the 
use of military action to quell the insurgency.  During her full presidential term, 
Arroyo’s use of the same conceptualization to justify policies that were perceived 
anti-democratic as they curtailed civil liberties was reminiscent of Marcos’ 
conceptualization of martial law, making Arroyo appear as the most Marcosian of the 
four presidencies under study.  This is also evident in her conceptualization of the 
political system as a barrier to progress and of constitutional change as a means to 
advance the system.  However, unlike Marcos who succeeded in launching the 1973 
Constitution, Arroyo failed to push through with the charter amendments she openly 
advocated after the 2005 crisis.   
Like her predecessors, Arroyo conceptualized the national economy as a living 
entity confronted by challenges such as poverty and chronic deficits.  Her post-2005 
conceptualization of the economy as a strong, resilient subject was also very much 
like those of her predecessors, especially Estrada, who rendered the economy as a 
survivor of the global crisis.  Interestingly, Arroyo shared with her predecessors 
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including Marcos the idea that economic liberalization as prescribed by global 
financial institutions is what the national economy needs in order to fully develop. 
The shifts in emphasis and differences in conceptual frames in the two 
schemas of the Arroyo presidency show that national leaders give due consideration 
to changes in socio-political contexts when they address the nation.  Leaders like the 
president (and her presidential advisers) are likely to manage these changing or 
shifting domestic and global concerns in their discourses in order to make relevant 
their beliefs and policies as well as to legitimize their positions of power when 
challenged.  This point is further substantiated in the next section. 
 
10.3 Conceptualization of themes: Commonalities and variations 
In this section, I show the multiple conceptual frames and metaphors 
employed to communicate the themes of democracy, national economy, peace and 
security, and the presidency across the post-Marcos SONAs.  
 In my discussion on each theme, I identify which conceptualizations had been 
consistently employed across the four presidencies and account for their consistent 
use. I also account for the differences in the way each theme had been framed and 
metaphorized among the four administrations.  I then examine how the conceptual 
frames and metaphors employed to develop the theme depart from and 
recontextualize Marcos’ conceptualizations of the said theme.  I also show how they 
reinforce or deviate from discourses that dominate the national and global contexts. 
Two points that were partly discussed in the earlier section are reinforced in 
the analysis.  One: the recurrence of conceptualizations of the focal themes across the 
four presidencies indicates continuities in terms of political beliefs and policies over 
time and such continuities become even more pronounced when the four presidencies 
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are examined vis-à-vis Marcos’ regime.  Two: variations or differences in the 
conceptualizations of the focal themes show the fluidity in the framing of national 
concerns and this fluidity may be due to the unique contingencies faced by the one in 
power, the changing socio-political context, and the agency and persona of the 
political actor (or actors) involved. 
10.3.1 Democracy 
Table 10.6 Framing of Philippine democracy in the post-Marcos presidential SONAs (1987-2009) 
President Conceptual frames 
Aquino (1987-
1991) 
 DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 
THAT SUSTAINS NATIONAL LIFE 
 DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING SYSTEM THAT HAD BEEN 
RENDERED WEAK UNDER MARCOS DICTATORSHIP 
 THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL 
ACHIEVEMENT 
 DEMOCRACY IS PEOPLE POWER 
 DEMOCRACY IS LIFE-SUSTAINING SYSTEM 
 DEMOCRACY IS A BENEFACTOR OF THE NATION 
 DEMOCRACY IS A NURTURER 
 DEMOCRACY IS A RESOURCE FOR PEOPLE POWER 
 DEMOCRACY IS A CURE TO THE NATIONAL ILLS 
 DEMOCRACY IS A KEY TO A PEOPLE-POWERED 
ECONOMY/ CAPITALISM CONDUCIVE TO GROWTH
Ramos (1992-1997)  DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING SYSTEM  OF GOVERNMENT 
THAT SUSTAINS NATIONAL LIFE 
 DEMOCRACY IS A SOURCE OF NATIONAL STRENGTH 
 DEMOCRACY IS A RESOURCE FOR DEVELOPMENT 
 DEMOCRACY IS A FOUNDATION FOR A GOOD SOCIETY 
 DEMOCRACY IS A FUNCTIONAL SYSTEM THAT IS CAPABLE 
OF INITIATING CHANGE 
 DEMOCRACY IS A PRECURSOR FOR COMPETITIVENESS 
 DEMOCRACY IS A COMPETITIVE EDGE 
 DEMOCRACY IS A COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
Estrada (1998-
2000) 
 DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF DEFENSE AND PROTECTION 
 DEMOCRACY IS A PRIZED IDEAL 
 DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING ENTITY 
 DEMOCRACY IS A STRUCTURE 
 DEMOCRACY IS AN ORGANIC ENTITY 
Arroyo (2001-2004)  DEMOCRACY IS A WEAPON  
 DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF THREAT 
 DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL FAITH THAT THE FILIPINOS 
HAVE FOUGHT FOR
Arroyo (2005-2009)  DEMOCRACY IS A VALUE THAT FINDS EXPRESSION IN THE 
NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES 




The data shows a multilayered conceptualization of the concept of democracy 
especially apparent in the Aquino presidency.  Aquino, being the first president since 
the end of Marcos’ authoritarian rule and under the 1987 Constitution, necessarily set 
off the scope and boundaries of post-dictatorship Philippine democracy.  Her 
multilayered conceptualization was bound to be adopted and recontextualized by her 
successors. 
A conceptualization that had been sustained in the post-Marcos presidencies is 
the conceptualization of democracy as an evolving entity (see sections on Aquino, 
Ramos, and Estrada in Table 10.6).  This frame had been substantiated through the 
use of metaphors that suggest democracy either as a structure that goes through 
alterations or as an organic entity.  The frame takes into consideration that several 
factors affect or influence the way democracy moves from one phase to another.  The 
influence of these factors—people power being a prominent one—suggests the 
specific and unique process of democratization in the Philippines whose 
understanding may possibly lead to the articulation of the Philippines’ contribution to 
the theory and practice of democracy at large. 
Common to all of the four presidencies covered in this study is the framing of 
democracy as a national value.  This is suggested in the following conceptualizations 
of democracy from each of the four presidents:  RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IS A 
NATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT (Aquino); DEMOCRACY IS A FOUNDATION FOR A GOOD 
SOCIETY (Ramos); DEMOCRACY IS A PRIZED IDEAL (Estrada); and DEMOCRACY IS A 
VALUE THAT FINDS EXPRESSION IN NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES 
(Arroyo).  The high importance given to democracy across the four presidencies 
suggests the presidents’ commitment to the national ideals embedded in the 1987 
Constitution.  It also implies that public addresses of national importance like the 
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SONA serve as opportunity for national leaders to engage in what Campbell and 
Jamieson (2008) term as ‘a public meditation of values.’ 
In the latter presidencies—specifically that of Estrada and Arroyo—emphasis 
given to the conceptualization DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF THREAT is evident.  It 
should be noted that both presidencies had been criticized for being anti-democratic or 
harboring dictatorial tendencies (See Chapters 7.3 and 9.3.2) and both responded by 
asserting that democracy was threatened under their watch. This common response 
channels that of Marcos. Marcos conceptualized democracy as an object of 
communist threat in order to justify his imposition of martial law. This rendering of 
democracy can be seen as a common feature of Philippine presidential rhetoric that 
had been fully utilized during the Marcos presidency and re-deployed even in post-
dictatorship presidencies.  That democracy is used to justify the use of state power to 
respond to the opposition and critical sectors of Philippine society makes democracy a 
problematic notion.  It somehow rekindles the discourse of constitutional 
authoritarianism which Marcos used to justify his imposition of martial law and 
consequently his abuse of presidential power. 
While commonalities are evident among the conceptualizations across the four 
post-Marcos presidencies, the fluidity by which democracy had been conceptualized 
in the 23 SONAs cannot be denied.  The fluidity may be explained by various factors. 
These include differences in key emphasis (as shown in 10.2), shifts in domestic and 
global concerns, shifts or changes in presidential agenda, and the agency of the 
political actor.  For instance, because Ramos emphasized the need to be ‘globally 
competitive’ in order to reach the state of national industrialized country-hood (NIC-
hood), there was a shift in the way he conceptualized democracy in his addresses. 
From channeling and paying homage as it were to the conceptualizations rendered by 
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his predecessor, Ramos adopted and made more salient the conceptualizations of 
democracy as a competitive edge or a unique comparative advantage. These 
conceptualizations were more attuned to his presidential agenda and the domestic and 
global concerns of his presidency which included the ratification of the GATT-WTO. 
The Philippine government’s active involvement in the GATT-WTO marked the 
country’s participation in the new global economic order which was primarily 
anchored on the discourse of neo-liberalization.  In other words, each President 
conceptualized democracy in terms of how her/his administration could respond to 
existing domestic and global issues. 
There also appears to be less articulation on democracy as a concept in the 
latter presidencies compared to those of Aquino and Ramos.  If at all, the invocation 
of democracy in the SONAs of Arroyo and Estrada was merely a reaffirmation of a 
national ideal—a ‘public meditation of values’ as expressed earlier.  This shows that 
other issues of national significance had through time taken the place of what was 
considered a primary concern in the early post-Marcos years.  It, however, takes a 
salient position in presidential discourse when the incumbent president is accused of 
resorting to authoritarian measures as in the case of Estrada in 1999 and Arroyo after 
the 2005 political crisis.  That democracy is reaffirmed in the SONAs or any 
important presidential speech to dispel public perception of a return to martial law 
indicates the Filipino people’s tendency to be skeptical towards a strong state and its 
propensity for abuse (see Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 242). 
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10.3.2 National economy 
Table 10.7 Framing of the national economy in the post-Marcos presidential SONAs (1987-2009) 
President Conceptual frames 
Aquino (1987-
1991) 
 NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A MANIFESTATION OF NATIONAL 
LIFE 
 THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS AN AILING PERSON 
 POVERTY IS A DESTRUCTIVE FORCE THAT HAS KEPT THE 
NATIONAL ECONOMY IN A MISERABLE STATE 
 THE MARCOS DICTATORSHIP WAS AN AGGRAVATOR OF 
THE ALREADY MISERABLE STATE OF THE NATIONAL 
ECONOMY. 
 THE WORLD ECONOMY AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY ARE LIFE-SOURCES AND BENEFACTORS OF 
THE NATIONAL ECONOMY 
 THE AQUINO GOVERNMENT IS AN INVIGORATOR OF THE 
(ILL-   STRICKEN) NATIONAL ECONOMY. 
Ramos (1992-1997)  THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A COMPETITOR IN THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMIC ARENA 
 GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER IS A COMPETITIVE ARENA 
 THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER IS BASED ON THE 
SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST 
 THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER IS A SPORTS 
ARENA 
 THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER IS AN ADVENTURE 
 ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION IS AN ACCELERATOR OF 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND IS AN INCENTIVE FOR 
COMPETITIVENESS 
 PROTECTIONIST POLICIES ARE AN IMPEDIMENT TOWARDS 
ACHIEVING GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS 
 POVERTY ALLEVIATION IS WAR 
 POVERTY IS A SELF-PERPETUATING, OPPRESSIVE ENEMY 
 GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES ARE INTERVENTIONS OR WAR 
STRATEGIES AGAINST POVERTY 
 THE POOR ARE VICTIMS AND BENEFICIARIES OF 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS 




 THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A PATIENT IN NEED OF 
MEDICAL PRESCRIPTION 
 NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ARE HEALTH 
CONDITIONS 
 FINANCIAL CRISIS IS A HEALTH PROBLEM/ ILLNESS 
 THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AGENDA IS A MEDICAL 
PRESCRIPTION 
 THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A POTENTIAL DISASTER 
VICTIM 
 GLOBAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ARE WEATHER 
CONDITIONS 
 WAR ON POVERTY IS A PRESCRIPTION/ FORMULA FOR 
RECOVERY AND GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS 
 PROTECTIONIST POLICIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS TOWARDS 




Arroyo (2001-2004)  THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A MANIFESTATION OF 
NATIONAL LIFE 
 THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A LIVING ENTITY 
CONFRONTED BY POVERTY AND AFFLICTED BY CHRONIC 
DEFICIT 
 THE WAR AGAINST POVERTY IDEOLOGY IS THE FORMULA 
TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 (GLOBAL) WAR ON TERROR IS (THE PHILIPPINE) WAR ON 
POVERTY 
 TOUGH LOVE IS A CURATIVE TO CHRONIC DEFICITS 
Arroyo (2005-2009)  NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A PROTAGONIST/ CHARACTER IN AN 
UNFOLDING STORY OF NATIONAL PROGRESS 
 FISCAL REFORMS ARE LIBERATING FORCES AND 
RESOURCE GENERATORS 
 THE PHILIPPINES IS A UNIQUE DESTINATION FOR TOURISM 
AND INVESTMENTS 
 THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A SURVIVOR IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMIC CRISIS 
 THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS IS A CALAMITY 
 FISCAL REFORMS ARE A MECHANISM FOR SURVIVAL 
 
The national economy had often been conceptualized as a person and served 
as the synecdoche for the nation; thus, the conceptualization NATIONAL ECONOMY IS 
A MANIFESTATION OF THE NATIONAL LIFE was fairly common in the post-Marcos 
presidencies.  The conceptualization of the national economy as a person across the 
post-Marcos presidencies varied based on the contingencies faced by those in power.  
This also manifests the fluidity with which the theme of the national economy had 
been conceptualized over time. 
As was often the case in the post-Marcos presidencies covered in this study, 
the national economy was rendered as an ill person when it was set against long-
standing, serious, and almost intractable problems such as poverty or the global 
economic crisis.  This was very much evident in the Aquino, Estrada, and Arroyo 
presidential rhetoric.   
The economy was rendered potentially strong and resilient when the 
government talked about accomplishments in the economic front.  In Ramos’ 
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addresses specifically, the national economy’s potential to compete had to be 
highlighted in order to justify the adoption of liberalization policies.  In the latter 
SONAs of Gloria Arroyo, where the need to assert the incumbent’s legitimacy 
became a political objective, a rendering of the economy similar to that of Ramos was 
also evident.  That the economy was conceptualized as a resilient character—a 
protagonist—in the unfolding Philippine story as well as a survivor in the global 
economic crisis showed that the Arroyo leadership was on the right track when it 
introduced ‘fiscal reforms’ and pushed for what it purported as ‘sound macro-
economic policies.’  Arroyo even went on farther by characterizing the Philippines as 
a unique tourism and investment hub, thereby justifying its grand infrastructural plan 
also dubbed as the ‘Super Regions.’ 
Poverty had been conceptualized in the post-Marcos presidencies as an enemy 
or oppressor as suggested by the phrase ‘war on poverty.’  That war metaphor was 
often employed in dealing with poverty meant that poverty had always been 
considered a serious and intractable problem (cf. Semino 2008).   
Across the presidential schemas, government initiatives and economic policies 
were considered either as interventions in the war against poverty or as necessary 
medical prescriptions or formula to cure the country of poverty when it was rendered 
as an illness.   This conceptualization positioned the incumbent government as a vital 
agent in the resolution of the national problem.   
The link between the global and the national spheres had been a common 
feature of all presidential schemas especially with regard to the theme of the national 
economy.  Differences lay in the way the relationship had been conceptualized.  The 
world economy and the international community were conceptualized as life sources 
in the Aquino addresses.  In the Ramos speeches, the global economy became the 
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inevitable arena within which competition among national economies including the 
Philippines was bound to happen.  In the case of Estrada, developments in the global 
context, especially the Asian financial crisis, were rendered as influential to the 
condition or state of the national economy.  The crisis was rendered either as a disease 
or a natural disaster from which the national economy had to suffer, endure and 
recover.  A similar rendering of the global economic crisis can be seen in the 
addresses of Arroyo during her full term.  The link between the global and the 
national or between the global and the local had been expressed quite explicitly when 
Arroyo argued for the interconnection between the global ‘war on terror’ and the 
national ‘war on poverty.’  The presidential expression underlay the conceptualization 
that GLOBAL IS LOCAL in that international engagements were considered directly 
relevant to the national context especially in the realization of the national economic 
agenda. 
In playing up the link between the global and the national, it was inevitable for 
post-Marcos presidencies to underscore the importance of economic liberalization.  In 
the neoliberal agenda, economic liberalization—which entailed following the IMF-
WB prescribed structural adjustment plans such as privatization, deregulation, and 
tariff reductions in trade—is considered necessary to achieve national development.  
In this regard policies that were considered ‘protectionist’ or nationalist were 
considered impediments to global competitiveness and national economic 
development.  The conceptualization of the link between the global and the national 
then highlights the seemingly perpetual and inexorable dependence of the nation on 
the global economic order.  It is a case of the global economic order imposing its will 
on a national economy.  Chen (2010) points out that this proclivity towards treating 
the global economic order as inexorable tends to dissolve ‘structural differences 
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between oppressor and oppressed, first and third world, capital and labor, and state 
and social subject’ (21-22).  In this case, any assertion of nationalist orientation with 
regard to the economy is seen as a repudiation of what should be. 
10.3.3 Peace and security 
 
Table 10.8 Framing of peace and security in the post-Marcos presidential SONAs (1987-2009) 
President Conceptual frames 
Aquino (1987-
1991) 
 REBELLION AND CRIMINALITY ARE THREATS TO 
DEMOCRACY AND THE NATIONAL LIFE 
 THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT UNDER THE NEW 
GOVERNMENT IS A DEFENDER OF THE PEOPLE AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 
 THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST THE REBELS IS 
PEACEMAKING
Ramos (1992-1997)  NATIONAL STABILITY IS A PRECONDITION FOR ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS 
Estrada (1998-
2000) 
 ARMED REBELLION AND CRIMINALITY ARE OBSTACLES TO 
SOCIAL PROGRESS, THREATS TO CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY, AND DISEASES/PESTS THAT NEED TO BE 
CRUSHED 
 ARMED REBELLION IS A CRIME 
 WAR IS PEACE
Arroyo (2001-2004)  CRIMINALITY AND TERRORISM ARE PARASITES/ DISEASES 
 CRIMINALS ARE TERRORISTS 
 REBELS ARE CRIMINALS 
 ‘WAR ON TERROR’ IS A CURATIVE TO REBELLION AND 
CRIMINALITY 
 STATE POLICIES ARE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR ON TERROR IN 
THE PHILIPPINES
Arroyo (2005-2009)  REBELLION IS TERRORISM 
 INFRASTRUCTURE IS AN INSTRUMENT FOR PEACE AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
 PEACE IS KEY TO RESOURCE GENERATION NEEDED FOR A 
MODERN MINDANAO 
 PEACE TALKS ARE THE MEANS TO RESOLVE AGE-OLD 
INTERNAL CONFLICTS
 
Rebellion and criminality were common problems identified in the post-
Marcos administration’s rendering of the state of peace and security in the country. 
How they were conceptualized varied from one president to the next.   
Aquino considered them threats to democracy and the national life.  To her 
both rebels from the communist front and the military were anti-democratic forces 
whose goal was to impede the process of re-democratization.   
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Ramos, whose administration tried to be conciliatory with the rebels by 
repealing the anti-subversion law, was more implicit compared to the other three in 
conceptualizing rebellion. It would seem though that to Ramos any cause of national 
instability would pose as an impediment to the nation’s global competitiveness. Peace 
and security then were important elements in the Ramos schema. The peace process 
and amnesty for the rebels were vital in ensuring national stability.    
Estrada was more explicit in his conceptualizations of rebellion and 
criminality.  He considered them obstacles to national progress, a threat to 
constitutional democracy, and pests that need to be crushed.  The last one was 
particularly in consonance with his tough rhetoric.  He was also outright in expressing 
that the armed rebellion is a crime, something that would appear to be implicit in 
Ramos’ national addresses but adopted and extended further by his successor, Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo.   
Arroyo not only conflated rebellion with criminality; she also conflated 
criminality with terrorism making possible the formulation that REBELLION IS 
TERRORISM.  The formulation was in consonance with the US-led global war on 
terror. 
Common to post-Marcos presidencies is the conceptualization of the militarist 
solution to rebellion as a justifiable course of action. The use of hard power or the 
military force to address the problem of insurgency appeared as a common recourse 
for post-Marcos presidencies especially when peace talks would fail.  Only when 
there were strong accusations of privileging the military at the expense of human 
rights would the government shift its rhetoric to one that advocated dialogue and the 
peace process.  This was also the same strategy that Marcos employed so well 
especially during the period of ‘normalization’ in the early 1980s. 
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The vilification of the insurgents—their metaphorization as ‘terrorists’ 
(especially pronounced during the presidency of Arroyo) or ‘pests’ that need to be 
crushed—tends to hide or obscure the root cause of insurgency which is socio-
economic poverty and lack of social justice—problems which have existed even prior 
to Marcos’s authoritarian rule.  By vilifying the rebels, the government not only 
justifies its pursuit of the militarist solution; it also evades its responsibility of 
examining the conditions that breed insurgency and rebellion—its policies that may 
actually turn out to be anti-poor or those that actually perpetuate the culture of poverty 
and social injustice.   
10.3.4 The presidency 
Table 10.9 Framing of the presidency in the post-Marcos presidential SONAs (1987-2009) 
President Conceptual frames 
Aquino (1987-
1991) 
 THE GOVERNMENT IS A MORAL COMBATANT, A PROTECTOR 
OF THE PEOPLE AND THE PRIMARY AGENT OF DEMOCRACY 
Ramos (1992-1997)  THE GOVERNMENT IS AN ENABLER OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
AND DEVELOPMENT 
 THE PRESIDENT IS AN EFFECTIVE MANAGER 
Estrada (1998-
2000) 
 THE PRESIDENT IS A TOUGH GUIDE, A VISIONARY, AND A 
LEARNER 
Arroyo (2001-2004)  A STRONG REPUBLIC IS AN EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT IN 
NATION BUILDING 
 THE GOVERNMENT IS THE ARM OF A STRONG REPUBLIC 
 THE ARROYO PRESIDENCY IS A CONSCIENTIOUS WORKER
Arroyo (2005-2009)  THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IS A ROADBLOCK TO THE 
COUNTRY’S FULL DEVELOPMENT 
 CHARTER CHANGE IS A MECHANISM FOR POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC REFORM 
 THE ARROYO PRESIDENCY IS A CONSCIENTIOUS WORKER 
AND A CAREGIVER 
 ARROYO IS THE ECONOMIC REDEEMER OF THE PHILIPPINES
 
Various conceptualizations of the presidency or executive leadership or the 
government are evident across the post-Marcos SONAs.  I argue that the way the 
government or executive leadership was cast in the SONAs depended on the persona 




Aquino projected that her government was the primary agent of democracy not 
only to distinguish herself from the dictatorial leadership of her predecessor but to 
assert her position as a transition leader whose legacy is the restoration of democratic 
institutions.  Ramos had to cast himself as an effective manager and the government 
as an enabler of economic growth in order to communicate that his administration was 
in the center of transforming the Philippines into a newly industrialized country by the 
end of the 20th century.  Estrada’s projection of himself as a tough guide, a visionary 
and a learner in his SONAs was partly motivated by the macho image he projected in 
the movies in earlier years.  Estrada’s recourse to his prior image which had become a 
significant part of his political brand as a tough guy with a heart of gold can be seen 
as a strategy of intertextuality which lent itself well to the tough rhetoric of his 
SONAs.  Arroyo’s persona as a working president was necessary to distinguish 
herself from her predecessor and to legitimize her perennially challenged presidency.  
By communicating that her work ethic was impeccable and that she was a 
hardworking micromanager, she reduced criticisms leveled against her office to being 
trivial and unnecessary.  She considered the criticisms as emanating from partisan 
politics which did not help in getting things done.  
The overarching conceptualization appears to be that THE GOVERNMENT/ THE 
PRESIDENCY IS THE PRESIDENT.  This validates the long-standing notion that the 
Philippine presidency as a national institution is largely defined by the one who 
occupies the presidential position.   On the one hand, it belabors an obvious point—
that there can never be a stable schema as far as the Philippine presidency is 
concerned; on the other, it proves the personalistic nature of the presidential system of 
government in the Philippines.  The Philippine presidency, as noted by such political 
analysts as Rocamora (1998) and Quimpo (2010), is a powerful position—‘much too 
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powerful, in fact, that it has become vulnerable to being manipulated and abused by 
holders who have authoritarian or predatory inclinations, or who want to remain in 
power beyond their terms’ (Quimpo, 59).  Such observation suggests that the 
Philippine presidency is significantly defined by the president’s agency—or by how 
the person occupying the public office makes use of his or her powers, duties, and 
responsibilities enshrined in the Constitution. 
The various conceptualizations—‘moral combatant’, ‘protector of the people’, 
‘agent of democracy’, ‘enabler of economic growth’, ‘effective manager’, ‘tough 
guide’, ‘arm of a strong republic’, ‘working presidency’, ‘economic redeemer’, 
among others—all present positive representations of executive leadership which 
makes the SONA an instrument of propaganda, particularly of fostering a favorable 
evaluation of the incumbent leadership.  The SONA, as far as the post-Marcos 
presidencies are concerned, has proven to be a powerful tool for the president to assert 




In this chapter, I compared and contrasted schemas of the four post-Marcos 
presidencies.  The presidential schemas including that of Marcos can be summarized 
in the table below: 
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 Table 11 Summary of the presidential schemas from Marcos to Arroyo (1972-2009) 
Presidency Schema97 
Marcos Constitutional authoritarianism is the way to protect society from the 
threats of communism. Exercised by the president, it becomes a means 
to protect and reform society. 
Aquino Democratic restoration is vital to national life in that it enables the full 
development of the national economy and ensures the country’s peace 
and security. 
Ramos Global competitiveness is what will ensure the country’s survival and 
its development in the global economic order. 
Estrada Tough leadership is the way to fight poverty and long standing 
insurgencies that get in the way of national development. 
Arroyo (2001-
2004) 
War on terror can be equated with the war on poverty.  A strong 
republic is complemented by such formulation. 
Arroyo (2005-
2009) 
Economic resiliency due to sound economic policies is proof of 
presidential legitimacy. This is a reality that unfolds while a parallel 
one reveals that the existing political system is a roadblock to national 
development. Constitutional change should address the roadblock. 
 
In my comparative analysis of the presidential schemas, I examined the 
continuities and discontinuities in the framing and conceptualizations of the four 
themes of democracy, national economy, peace and security, and the presidency.  I 
addressed this concern in two discussion sections. 
In the first section, I established differences and similarities in terms of what 
themes were given prominence in the post-Marcos presidencies. I argue that certain 
themes were given emphasis over others due to the socio-political context that 
circumscribed and constrained a presidency, the unique persona assumed by the 
president, and his or her political agenda, among others.  These emphasized themes 
configure with other themes to form schemas of the state of the nation and 
presidential leadership that were more or less unique to each presidency.   
                                                 
97 In this table, the schema is verbalized as a statement or statements that put together or encapsulate 
the conceptual frames and metaphors expressed in the SONAs. 
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In the second section, I showed the commonalities and variations in the way 
the themes are talked about and conceptualized across the four presidencies.  I 
suggested that these commonalities and variations reflect continuities and 
discontinuities in terms of political beliefs and policies.  I also showed how the 
conceptualizations of the focal themes reinforce or adhere to social discourses that 



































Conclusion:  Insights, Reflections, and Possibilities  




11.1 Review of the present study 
This research is a socio-political discourse analysis of Philippine presidential 
rhetoric after the country’s re-democratization in 1987.  Covering the four post-
dictatorship presidencies of Corazon Aquino, Fidel Ramos, Joseph Estrada, and 
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, this thesis examines how specific conceptualizations of 
key themes and their configurations in presidential speeches constitute the schema of 
each of the four presidencies.  The thesis also accounts for the similarities and 
differences of the presidential schemas.  The State of the Nation Addresses (SONAs) 
delivered annually by these presidents are used as primary data. 
Theoretically, the thesis assumes that mediating mental structures such as 
schema account for the relationship between text and context.  In my analytical 
framework, a schema, which is a collection of experiences that mediate our sense-
making processes, is constituted by frames that at the same time organize these 
experiences.  These frames may be represented through conceptual statements—
macro-level conceptualizations—that are likewise constituted by a cluster of 
conceptual metaphors that underlie metaphorical and lexico-grammatical expressions 
found in political texts and talk.  Through repeated use and deployment, these 
metaphors that function as and work in conjunction with rhetorical resources such as 
logical, emotional, and ethical proofs, strategies of self-representation and othering, 
and political myths, among others, can set off, prompt, trigger or disrupt schemas 
responsible for our sense making processes.  
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I suggest that the schemas that emerge from the analysis of the national 
addresses may be used to compare similarities and differences among the four post-
dictatorship presidencies and to account for continuities and discontinuities in 
Philippine presidential leadership within the last two decades. 
I argue that as schemas of the state of the nation and presidential leadership 
are constituted and reconstituted through the speeches. Variations in schemas cast the 
Philippine presidency as an evolving national institution. These variations reflect the 
changing socio-political and cultural contexts, shifts in presidential agenda, and the 
different choices that the political actors make during their respective terms of office. 
Moreover, presidential personae contribute to the fluidity in the framing and 
conceptualization of the themes that ran across national addresses delivered within a 
period of time. 
 
11.2 Insights on the analyses of the post-Marcos SONAs 
From the analyses of the post-Marcos SONAs, I have deduced a couple of 
insights.  First, themes are framed and metaphorized in relation to the key themes 
emphasized by a president and this is accounted for by the evolving socio-political 
contexts and the agency of the president.  Second, metaphorizations and 
conceptualizations serve to justify and work towards hastening the public acceptance 
of government policies.  Third, schemas of state of the nation and the presidential 
leadership in the post-Marcos SONAs take on a path structure; what distinguishes a 
presidential schema from the rest is the way specific elements (or themes) in the path 
structure are conceptualized.  Finally, certain conceptualizations of the focal themes 
in the post-Marcos presidencies reinforce or adhere to social discourses that tend to 
perpetuate or reproduce relations of dominance and control; this provides impetus for 
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multiple audiences of presidential speeches to engage in the critical examination of 
how themes commonly invoked in these addresses are metaphorized and strategically 
expressed before they get transformed into public policies. 
Firstly, while the SONAs delivered over a presidential term or a period of time 
are multi-thematic, certain theme or themes tend to be given emphasis and emerge as 
the most salient.  The salience of these key themes is manifested in their centrality to 
the arguments in the political speeches.  Various themes are framed and metaphorized 
in relation to these key themes.  This may be accounted for by the evolving socio-
political context within which these speeches were uttered and by the rhetorical 
choices made by the speaker—choices which necessarily contribute to the 
reinforcement of his or her public persona.  The key themes or emphases (e.g., 
democracy for Aquino, global competitiveness for Ramos) are indicative of the 
varying emphases of the post-Marcos administrations which were implicated in 
varying contexts, that is, socio-political, national and global.  It is also important to 
note that recontextualization of themes across the national addresses delivered over a 
period of time is fairly common because of the said changes in the sociopolitical 
context as well as the assertion of presidential agency. 
In the analyses, these varying emphases and conceptualizations are revealed 
through conceptual frames and conceptual metaphors which are expressed 
linguistically through metaphorical expressions working in conjunction with other 
rhetorical strategies.  The conceptual frames and the conceptual metaphors that 
constitute them reveal how common and recurring themes across the speeches are 
publicly circulated or communicated.  By deriving the conceptual frames and 
conceptual metaphors—conceptualizations—that underlie national addresses within a 
specified term or period of time, it is possible to reconstruct schemas of presidential 
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leadership.  These schemas of political or presidential leadership reveal how those 
who were and have been in power project themselves and their administration when 
they communicate to their audience or the public. 
Secondly, the use of metaphorizations and conceptual frames in the SONAs 
are motivated by the need to communicate in concrete and tangible terms the evolving 
and often complex socio-political situation that the nation faces and how the 
incumbent government intends to address it.  Specific metaphorizations and 
conceptualizations serve to justify and work towards hastening, as it were, the public 
acceptance of (contested) government policies as shown by the institutionalization of 
‘people power’ or the integration of nongovernmental organizations and people’s 
organizations in governance and decision-making processes during the Aquino 
administration, the adoption of neoliberal policies under the Ramos watch, the all-out 
war against the Moro rebellion during the unexpired term of Estrada, or the passage of 
the anti-terrorism law or the Human Securities Act during the Arroyo presidency.  
These conceptualizations help define as well as substantiate the policies of the 
incumbent administration. 
Thirdly, the analyses show that the post-Marcos presidential schemas 
generally take on a path structure.  This is evident in the way the focal themes are 
conceptualized in the speeches.  The path structure is realized in the speeches through 
a movement from one point to another—from a less favorable state to a more 
favorable one.  The movement may also be in a form of evolution, that is, from a 
fledgling stage to a stage of maturity (as in the case of democracy), from a sorry state 
to one of recovery and competitiveness (as in the case of the national economy).  The 
path structure is also laden with obstacles and impediments (like insurgency and 
criminality) and overcoming them would require meeting the prerequisites (i.e., peace 
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and security; national stability).  The defeat of long standing enemies (like poverty) 
also allow for the transition from the current state of affairs to a more favored national 
situation (e.g., newly industrialized economy, tiger status, economic progress).  In this 
path structure, the president is seen as a vital agent—one that causes movement or 
change.  Presidential leadership serves as the impetus in the national trajectory—from 
dictatorship to democracy, from economic stagnation to global competitiveness, from 
a conflict-infested national state to national stability.  The president, who embodies 
the executive leadership, is positioned as a hero or heroine—one that is in the 
forefront of preserving national values but at the same time propels national change.   
Charteris-Black (2005) offers an explanation of this tendency to employ the 
path structure, often linguistically realized through journey metaphors, in political 
discourse.  He says that journeys are 
 
…a highly expressive source domain for political metaphor because they 
integrate basic cognitive schematic knowledge of daily experience of 
movement with other rich and varied knowledge of experiences that only 
sometimes occur when we go on journeys.  I would suggest that their 
expressive potency for leaders is because they integrate underlying positive 
experiences of successful arrival at destinations with the knowledge of what 
can go wrong.  However, unlike, say, health and sickness metaphors, or life 
and death metaphors where the evaluation is fairly overt because we know 
health and life are good and that sickness and death are bad, journey 
metaphors are rhetorically successful because they rely on rich underlying 
cognitive patterns and on subliminal associations.  (Charteris-Black, 207) 
 
 
He takes on the idea farther by looking at the experience of journeys ‘from the point 
of view of myth and what we might call cultural, historical experience.’ He says: 
 
In many myths going on long journeys toward some predetermined goal is an 
established means of taking on the stature of a hero.  A very common theme 
from folktales around the world is quest; this is a journey in which the hero 
encounters various tasks that entail danger and require courage to overcome.  
The journey is either self-chosen or imposed on a particular individual.  Tasks 
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may be finding treasure of some kind (usually guarded by a dragon or other 
dangerous beast); finding the solution to a riddle (e.g., Rumpelstiltskin); or 




Charteris-Black then speculates on the reason politicians employ journey metaphors:   
 
Is it too improbable to believe that the major reason why politicians draw on 
journey metaphors is because they wish to inherit the heroic qualities 
associated with epic heroes?  If this were the case then it would explain why 
journey metaphors occur very frequently in their speeches and they normally 
convey highly positive evaluations of the traveler/ politician.  What is 
important, then, about journey metaphors is that they provide support for the 
claim that metaphors provide a link between semi-conscious knowledge or 
myths and conscious political ideologies.  By drawing on deeply rooted 
cultural schemata politicians are able to represent their policies as heroic tasks 
and themselves epic heroes. (Charteris-Black, 208) 
 
 
The explanation on the use of journey metaphors in political discourse may also 
possibly explain why Philippine presidential schema seems to conveniently take the 
path structure.  A path structure particularly lends itself well to administrations with a 
fixed term, which helps articulate accountability and achievement in the given time 
period.  That Philippine presidencies take on the path structure when they 
communicate presidential leadership establishes a commonality with the way some of 
their foreign counterparts do political discourse.  
I wish to point out, however, that what would distinguish one presidency from 
another, or Philippine presidency from its counterparts abroad for that matter, would 
be the way specific elements (or themes) in the path structure are conceptualized 
along the national trajectory or in the movement from one point to another.  I would 
also like to suggest that regardless of one’s political ideology or party affiliation, 
politicians will tend to employ the path structure in order to show continuities or 
discontinuities in leadership.  The path structure is a convenient way to demonstrate 
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what previous programs the incumbent regards as worthy of follow through and 
extension, and what detours in terms of policies and beliefs the current leadership 
would take. 
Finally, the analyses of the SONAs reveal that certain conceptualizations of 
the focal themes in the post-Marcos presidencies reinforce or adhere to social 
discourses that tend to perpetuate or reproduce relations of dominance and control.  
These include, among others, the conceptualization of democracy as an object of 
threat in order to justify the assertion of state power, rendering the link between the 
global and the national as perpetual and inexorable so that the global agenda 
supersedes that of the nation’s, vilifying the insurgency to the extent of obscuring its 
root cause, and the constant positive conceptualizations of the incumbent leadership 
or government that transforms a national leader’s constitutional duty to report on the 
state of the nation into a powerful instrument that privileges representations not 
inimical to the president’s agenda. 
The rendering of democracy as an object of threat in order to justify the 
assertion of state power is specifically reminiscent of Marcos’ rhetoric on 
constitutional authoritarianism.  It shows that even after a regime change or a 
transition from dictatorship to democracy, the Philippine presidential leadership has 
remained prone towards such tendency to use democracy in order to meet 
authoritarian ends.  Furthermore, democracy, being a concept that is almost always 
positively evaluated in the Philippines and easy to seek agreement on, yet easily 
malleable, gets invoked in order to regain, sustain or build on the president’s political 
capital.  The notion of democracy in Philippine political rhetoric therefore becomes 




The established link between the global and the national in the SONAs is 
another feature of post-Marcos presidential rhetoric that is worth critically examining.  
In the economic front, the link is one that puts ‘globalist’ concerns above ‘nationalist’ 
ones in that certain national economic policies that are rendered ‘protectionist’ are 
considered obstacles to global competitiveness and the realization of economic 
liberalization advanced by global financial institutions such as the IMF and World 
Bank.  This tendency to thwart the so-called ‘protectionist’ national economic policies 
in order to give way to structural adjustments such as privatization, deregulation, and 
tariff reductions in trade is also reminiscent of the Marcos’ policy of opening up the 
Philippine economy, which, as mentioned in Chapter 4, was actually facilitated by the 
imposition of martial law.  It may be said then that the shift from dictatorship to 
democracy did not really totally change the national economic agenda.  Embracing 
the neo-liberal economic policies was, in fact, apparent in the Aquino, Ramos, 
Estrada, and Arroyo’s SONAs in much the same way as it was in Marcos’.  What 
seems to have changed over the years is the way these neo-liberal policies have been 
conceptualized or communicated.  They were framed and metaphorized in ways that 
the presidents have envisioned or imagined not just the national economy but their 
role in the movement towards their desired national goals. 
The vilification of the insurgents is of course a strategy of othering and 
downplays perpetration of state terrorism in the post-Marcos presidencies.  Such 
strategy also justifies the use of military action or hard power which could translate to 
human rights abuses by the government’s armed forces.  Vilification frames military 
abuses within the bounds of a government-sponsored counter-insurgency—variously 
conceptualized in the SONAs as a defense of democracy, anti-criminality, anti-
terrorism, and curative to national illness—thereby breeding a culture of impunity, 
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one that regularizes the practice of abuse by armed authorities.  Again, this tendency 
in the post-Marcos presidencies rehearses the Marcos authoritarian rule during which 
time the military became the very symbol of oppression. 
By privileging representations of the presidency not inimical to the president’s 
agenda, the SONA becomes an instrument of propaganda.  For instance, by portraying 
the presidency as the primary agent of democracy, it obfuscates the national 
leadership’s role in sanctioning the use of state power to curtail basic freedoms and 
civil liberties.  The SONA becomes a tool for the incumbent president to assert her 
power in representing the state of the nation and the quality of her presidential 
leadership.     
The above-mentioned instances of conceptualizations that tend to perpetuate 
relations of dominance and control make it imperative for the multiple audiences of 
political speeches like the SONA to engage in the critical examination of how 
commonly used themes are metaphorized and expressed strategically in these 
addresses, to render them as problematic concepts, and to discuss about them in 
various public communication settings before they get transformed into public 
policies or non-negotiable materialities.  What the president says and how she says 
them especially in important events like the annual SONA translate to the 
administration’s legislative agenda, which a supportive Congress eager to make 
concessions with the executive for various political reasons can easily pass into law.   
Laws can mean a better life for the people; but it could also mean the death of 
freedom as what the Marcos example showed us.  In this light, Lakoff’s (1992, 2004) 
point that metaphors can or do kill is well taken.  
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11.3 Reflections on the limitations and challenges of the study 
 In doing the present study, I encountered challenges and limitations which I 
would like to discuss in terms of how I tried to address them while I was doing my 
research and how they can inform future analysts of presidential discourse.  I would 
like to focus on three sets of challenges or limitations that may be regarded as 
significant concerns in this type of research:  (1) the challenges that arise from using 
the schema-theoretic framework; (2) problems that have to do with taking the critical 
perspective in research; and (3) the limitations of academic writing vis-à-vis critical 
scholarship in the humanities and social sciences. 
 What I would consider a major challenge that arose from using the schema-
theoretic framework for the analysis of the SONAs was the apparent subjectivity by 
which conceptual frames and conceptual metaphors are generated from linguistic 
metaphorical expressions—a challenge also recognized by other metaphor scholars 
(e.g., Kovecses 2005, 2010;  Semino 2008).  The challenge of resolving the ‘semantic 
tension’ (Charteris-Black 2004) from related metaphorical expressions through 
general declarative statements was most certainly not an easy task.  It required reading 
and re-reading the texts to identify lexico-grammatical cues as well as a working 
knowledge of the personal histories of the speakers, the changing socio-political 
contexts of the speeches under investigation including prevailing concerns and public 
sentiments at the time the speeches were delivered, and the apparent as well as 
potential cultural resources upon which Filipino presidents or political speakers draw 
their conceptualizations.  Analysts of political discourse in specific socio-cultural 
contexts may do well to heed what Julia Kristeva (noted by Strauss 2005) had to say 
about social discourse analysis: ‘Social discourse analysis is by necessity 
intertextual…requires familiarity with prior verbal and written expressions of the 
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ideologies in question, so you can recognize when a given text incorporates 
established ways of expressing certain ideas’ (22). 
The challenge of reconstructing the conceptual metaphors from the text is 
perhaps best demonstrated by the need to reword some of them in the process of 
revising earlier drafts of this work (e.g., PEOPLE POWER IS A MEANS TO REINFORCE 
DEMOCRACY is restated as DEMOCRACY IS EMPOWERMENT; MILITARY FORCE IS A 
JUSTIFIABLE COURSE OF ACTION is restated as MILITARY FORCE IS PEACEMAKING).  
Conceptual metaphors, as mentioned earlier, are not necessarily spelled out or 
expressed explicitly in texts; the analyst has to rely on linguistic cues.  Needless to 
say, phrasing the conceptual metaphor after positing the target and source domains 
from linguistic cues is not an easy task especially if the ultimate goal of the analysis is 
not just to identify these conceptualizations but to show how these conceptualizations 
configure to form the broader categories including presidential schemas.  The 
conceptual metaphors as well as the conceptual frames may very well be regarded as 
the underlying assumptions of the rhetoric of presidencies under study.  These 
conceptualizations, after all, represent the presuppositions and taken-for-granted 
notions that motivate how the presidents cognitively structure the national situation 
and leadership.  I have to admit that this excitement or yearning to see the bigger 
picture (i.e., the presidential schemas) apart from my closeness or familiarity with the 
material had sometimes led me to be less cognizant of the accuracy of the phrasing of 
the conceptual metaphors which should not have been the case.  At times, when I 
would posit the conceptual metaphors from the text, my primary goal would be to 
point out the underlying assumptions that work toward the broader categories.  It took 
the necessary distance from the material and from my draft for me to be able to realize 
this.  It was largely because of the ‘fresh eyes’ of the readers of my work that the 
Navera 402 
 
problems having to do with expressing conceptual metaphors in my draft became 
apparent.98   
 In re-wording my conceptual metaphors, I had to re-read and reexamine the 
data especially the extracts that I used to substantiate my analytical points.  Moreover, 
I had to recall the socio-political and historical context that constrained the speaker in 
crafting and presenting her presidential speech before the public. I was guided by a 
couple of criteria in my rewording of the conceptual metaphors: the semantic tension 
between the target and source domains and the need for economy of expression.  For 
instance, the statement THE GOVERNMENT IS A PROPONENT OF ECONOMIC 
LIBERALIZATION which one of my examiners correctly pointed out as a literal 
statement has been reworded as THE GOVERNMENT IS AN AGENT OF ECONOMIC 
LIBERALIZATION.  The term ‘agent’ personifies the government and casts it as an 
instigator of an activity (i.e., economic liberalization) which is what is suggested by 
the linguistic cues of the extracts from Ramos’ speech and not just an advocate which 
it literally does anyway with its programs and policies.  An example of economy in 
expression is demonstrated in the rewording of the conceptualization THE USE OF 
MILITARY FORCE AGAINST THE REBELS IS A JUSTIFIABLE COURSE OF ACTION 
(another literal statement) to WAR IS PEACE.  The latter is not only succinct in 
expression; it also better captures the assumption that underlies Estrada’s rhetoric 
against the insurgency or armed rebellion.  
One of the things that this research has therefore taught me is to develop that 
balance between working towards (re)creating that big picture or the story of my 
                                                 
98 It also helped that while waiting for the examiners’ reports, I did not read my draft.  The waiting 
period which was spent doing non-thesis related activities like applying for work in a way helped me 
establish distance from my thesis. It afforded me the chance to incubate ideas that had not fully 
developed when writing the early drafts of this thesis and most importantly, to develop fresh eyes that I 
needed to revisit my data and to review how represented them in this work. 
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research—so that one ‘does not mistake the wood for the trees’—and making sure 
that the details of the analysis are accurately presented to substantiate my story—so 
that there is clear evidentiary basis for my claims. 
 Another limitation of the analytical framework used in this study is its 
dependence on classical rhetorical categories like the pisteis in demonstrating how 
concepts in discourse and rhetorical studies can be meshed.  While I had considered 
how other rhetorical concepts such as ideographs (McGee 1980) configure with 
conceptual frames and metaphors in my analysis, I would suggest that analysts also 
consider more non-traditional rhetorical strategies such as the ‘strategies for change’ 
identified and explained by Allen and Faigley (1995, 144-168).  Allen and Faigley 
discussed a host of persuasive uses of language that do not necessarily match the 
analytical categories of classical rhetoric.  Although the authors refer to them as 
‘discursive strategies for change,’ they can also be used to achieve the opposite.  
Some of these strategies that are also quite apparent in the analyzed presidential 
speeches are the ‘juxtaposition of languages’ which can be used for stylization and 
image-bolstering (157) and narratives which can ‘supply the basis of stereotypes and 
become a strong conservative force by justifying inequality’ (167).  
Taking a critical perspective also posed a challenge in doing this research.  
Since critical discourse analysis is a conscious social and political engagement on the 
part of analysts, they then tend to be seen as above the ordinary reader as they 
examine texts with systematicity and through a disciplined lens.  This should not be 
the case, as pointed out by Chilton, Tian and Wodak (2010) and Billig (2003).  While 
analysts employ an informed analytical framework in studying texts, their readings 
should not be considered above or superior to those who do not employ the same lens.  
Chilton, Tian, and Wodak argue that the analysts’ knowledge about potential 
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meanings that readers will arrive at in processing the texts under investigation does 
not guarantee that the analysts will be able to spot all potential meanings.  The 
analysts must be conscious of their limitations and recognize that there may be other 
ways of reading the texts under question.  It is incumbent, however, on the analysts to 
make explicit and accessible their readings of the political texts under question 
because ‘there is in fact no other route than to produce analyses and allow open 
critical discussion about alternative analyses and readings’ (Chilton el al, 494).  To 
accommodate open critical discussion about alternative ways of reading the texts is to 
realize that the analysts’ readings are not definitive, but are part of the larger and 
ongoing conversations about language and politics and are therefore subject to 
challenge and further investigations.  
  The final point that I wish to discuss is the limitation of academic writing 
especially when one takes the position of critical scholarship.  One of the criticisms 
leveled against critical language studies in recent years is the tendency to employ a 
language that is inaccessible to the larger audience (see Billig 2003; Chilton, Tian, 
and Wodak 2010).  Academic research like this present study is made in such a way 
that technical language and the use of jargon almost always becomes a rule.  Given 
the current academic culture that encourages scholars to be knowledgeable of the 
recent scholarship in their fields of study, this becomes inevitable.  It is a fact that 
studies such as this one are written for a specialized audience.  But then, one should 
also recognize that this becomes accessible to students of other fields who may be 
interested in similar problems but are working on them using different lenses or 
analytical frameworks.   I myself have tried to be conscious of this.  In the process of 
writing and re-writing my study, I have learned that much is expected of critical 
analysts, especially those who study language in use, in making sure that they are 
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explicit in what they mean by their assertions and that they avoid obfuscation of ideas 
in their prose so as not to alienate their larger audience. 
 
11.4 Possibilities for future research 
The SONAs of the four Philippine presidencies covered in this study prove to 
be a rich source of data for analysis of political discourse in the Philippines.  As one 
scholar suggests, ‘The highly rhetorical world of Philippine politics, where a small 
Philippine elite continues to rule the country, is most certainly a minefield of data 
which can help firm up the (largely West-based) work in discourse and rhetorical 
studies.’99  I believe much can still be done though to generate insights on the 
presidential addresses. 
Other research topics that emerge from the doctoral thesis that are worthy of 
further investigation are: (1) the language choice of Philippine presidents in delivering 
their SONAs; (2) the gender factor in the development of presidential rhetoric; and (3) 
metaphorizations of the presidency as style.100  It is interesting to examine, for 
instance, why Philippine presidents like Estrada, Arroyo and even the incumbent 
president Benigno Aquino III chose to deliver their national addresses largely in 
Filipino or using intra-sentential mixtures of English and the national language(s). I 
have noted that there are at least two reasons for this: (1) to provide a translation of 
passages delivered in English especially, if the passages warrant emphasis (this is 
apparent in the speeches of the four post-Marcos presidents); and (2) to identify with 
the audience (this is demonstrated quite clearly by Estrada, Arroyo, and most recently, 
the current Philippine president as of this writing).  The translation of English 
                                                 
99 Comment from a referee of the journal Critical Inquiry in Language Studies. 
 
100 This is an idea based on a suggestion by one of the examiners. 
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passages into Filipino in the speech is a strategy of repetition and appears to be an 
attempt to make an important point more comprehensible to the larger Filipino 
audience.  Two things may be said in relation to this point of making an important 
passage comprehensible.  One, the SONA may be regarded as a highly elitist piece of 
discourse; this is so because only specific portions of the text largely delivered in 
English are made relatable to the larger Filipino audience.101  Two, it would appear 
that not everything that the president says is of importance to the larger public 
because not everything warrants repetition or translation into a more comprehensible 
language.  This then begs the question: Who is to say what is important or more 
important to the Filipino audience when it comes to the SONA—an exercise in public 
accountability?  That the president or her speech consultants should decide which 
ideas are important to the Filipino public negates the very idea of accountability and 
suggests a condescending attitude of the presidential leadership towards the public 
which it is mandated to serve. 
Identification is, of course, a strategy of the politician to gain or sustain public 
support for his agenda, thus, ensuring his political capital.  The way Estrada and 
Arroyo went about employing this strategy is instructive and worth further 
investigation.  Estrada, because of his prior image as a tough guy with a compassion 
for the masses, had to use tough street-smart Filipino language to identify himself 
with his audience and to remain faithful to his image.  Arroyo, on the other hand, 
made use of the intrasentential mixtures of English and the national language (also 
called ‘Taglish’ in the Philippine vernacular) in her latter SONAs to make herself 
relatable to her audience in an attempt to reverse her dwindling popularity. 
                                                 
101 The incumbent Philippine president, Benigno Simeon Aquino III who who has chosen to deliver his 




With regard to the relationship of gender and presidential rhetoric, it would be 
interesting to find out how the rhetorics of the two women presidents (Aquino and 
Arroyo) differ from those of the men (Ramos and Estrada).  Are the differences 
gendered?  If so, how do both women presidents enact or perform femininity through 
their addresses? How do the male presidents reinforce their masculinities through 
their speeches?  One of the things that I find quite noticeable with regard to gender 
and the SONAs is the interesting use of metaphors by the female and male presidents.  
While both female and male presidents employ ‘tough’ rhetoric when dealing with 
concerns like the national economy and peace and security typically through military 
metaphors, the marked difference appears to be in the specific metaphors used.  For 
instance, absent in Estrada and Ramos, but present in Arroyo is the use of the 
expression ‘tough love’ which suggests parental discipline.   Arroyo’s use of parental 
metaphors coincides with Aquino’s expressions that suggest nurturing and caring a 
(fledgling) democracy, something not quite apparent in the expressions of Ramos and 
Estrada.  So, does gender influence the use of parental and nurturing metaphors in 
presidential rhetoric?  That may well be an interesting question for future research. 
On a more theoretical level, it might be interesting to relate metaphorizations 
of the presidency with the sociolinguistic notion of style.  The treatment of Estrada’s 
rhetoric of toughness may lend itself to the notion of stylization (Coupland, 2001).  
Estrada in making use of his macho rhetoric in his speeches (by employing the 
language of his cinematic characters and his persona as a crime-buster) enacts the 
presidency as macho (sometimes hyper-masculine). This is extended to his choice of 
policies with regard for instance to democracy and national security (e.g., democracy 
as an object of defense, ‘all-out-war’ against the MILF).  Estrada’s example somehow 
rehearses Coupland’s notion of stylization as a ‘creative selection from a pre-existing 
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repertoire’ to project a social personas or stances (347).  In this case, the presidency 
may possibly be viewed as a ‘style’—an evolving style that has been shaped and 
reshaped by those who have assumed its role.  In the course of shaping the 
presidency, some of the resources from the pre-existing repertoire are used, others are 
dismissed, and new ones are added up to form innovative ways of enacting what it is 
to be a president or a national leader. 
In terms of future research, it would also be worth conducting an ethnographic 
study of the production and reception of the SONAs.  A limitation of the present study 
is that it has been solely text-oriented.   It would be interesting to find out what goes 
on in the production phase or the preparations for the SONA and reception of its 
multiple audiences.  How is the speech recontextualized by media, distilled by the 
members of the Congress, appropriated by ordinary Filipino folks, rejected and 
resisted by the opposition or the militant groups?  How are the SONA sound bites 
redeployed towards non-negotiable contexts—that is, legislation and public policies?  
Moreover, what activities are mounted by the public in relation to the SONA beyond 
the congressional hall where the president delivers his speech?  What counter-
discourses are being made?  How do these counter-discourses work in relation to the 
official discourses of the president? 
The possibilities for future research in Philippine political discourse are many.  
And reading the word in order to read previous readings of the world will prove to be 
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